• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%

Our People > Andrei Matveev

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Journalist

Andrei Matveev is a journalist from Kazakhstan.

Articles

Britain Expands Central Asia Ties as Kazakhstan Ratifies Strategic Partnership Deal

Last week, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed a law ratifying a strategic partnership and cooperation agreement with the United Kingdom. With that move, Central Asia’s largest economy added Britain to its growing list of strategic partners, reinforcing Astana’s long-standing multi-vector foreign policy. For London, meanwhile, the agreement marked another milestone in what some analysts have framed as a renewed contest for influence in Central Asia, an area where Britain has sought to strengthen its position over the past five years. Kazakhstan already counts Russia, China, the United States, several European Union states including Italy, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, as well as Turkey, Azerbaijan and its Central Asian neighbors among its strategic partners. Britain has now joined that group as it seeks to revive its historical influence in the region. That broader contest is often described through the language of a “New Great Game,” a phrase that draws on an older imperial rivalry. The term “Great Game” emerged in the 19th century to describe the geopolitical rivalry between the British and Russian Empires across Central and South Asia. The phrase was popularized by British officer, spy, and diplomat Arthur Conolly, who compared the complex web of political intrigues to a vast strategic board game stretching across half a continent. Since 2022, observers say London has intensified its engagement in this geopolitical competition, aimed partly at limiting Russian and Chinese dominance in Central Asia. At stake are key sectors such as critical minerals, including rare earths, as well as logistics corridors, particularly the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor. In December 2023, the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee published a report titled Countries at the Crossroads: UK Engagement in Central Asia. The report criticized what it described as ineffective engagement by British ministers with the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. One of the report’s central recommendations was that London should more actively counter Russian influence in the region. In recent years, British embassies across Central Asia have established offices linked to the UK’s international development structures, expanding engagement with local civil society groups. Through the British Council, London has also expanded its soft power initiatives, financing programs such as Creative Central Asia and Creative Spark. More than 60 universities have joined these programs, with participation exceeding 65,000 people. Britain also continues to operate the Chevening scholarship program, under which young political and public sector figures from Central Asia study in the UK before often returning to influential positions in their home countries. For Kazakhstan’s ambitious younger generation, Britain’s appeal may also be reinforced by symbolic success stories. On May 8, the same day Tokayev signed the strategic partnership into law, Kazakhstan-born Sanjar Abishev was elected to Westminster City Council, representing London’s prestigious St James’s district. Abishev’s election drew attention in Kazakhstan as a symbolic example of the country’s growing diaspora presence in Britain. Little is publicly known about Abishev, though one detail stands out: he entered politics only in 2022 after previously running a...

1 month ago

Tokayev Sets Two-Year Deadline for Military Reform in Kazakhstan

Speaking at a traditional ceremony ahead of Defender of the Fatherland Day, celebrated in Kazakhstan on May 7, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said the country must reform its armed forces within the next two years. “Our country must be prepared to prevent various challenges and respond to any threats. Therefore, we need to strengthen our defense potential and continue, above all, the technological modernization of the Armed Forces. This is a requirement of today’s unstable and turbulent times. In this regard, it is first necessary to carry out deep reforms in our Armed Forces and militarized structures. This is a strategically important task that must be resolved in a short period within two years,” Tokayev said during a ceremony awarding state honors and military ranks ahead of Defender of the Fatherland Day and Victory Day, celebrated on May 9. Russian analysts responded to the statement before many Kazakh commentators, largely arguing that Kazakhstan faces no major external threats and therefore has little need for sweeping military reform. One of them, Stanislav Pritchin, head of the Central Asia sector at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow, said Kazakhstan had no serious territorial disputes or significant tensions with neighboring countries. “There are some political disagreements, but overall, the country exists in a fairly calm environment. There are simply no conflict points that would require Kazakhstan to fundamentally revise its military doctrine or significantly strengthen its army,” he told the publication, Expert. Pritchin also suggested that Russian concern stemmed from uncertainty over how Tokayev’s accelerated military reform agenda fits with Kazakhstan’s commitments to Moscow-led organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In Kazakhstan, however, the reform agenda fits a familiar pattern: by the time Tokayev publicly announces a deadline, work in that direction is often already well underway. In December 2025, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov outlined major military reforms while responding to parliamentary questions about discipline in the armed forces. Following presidential instructions, the government submitted three draft laws to parliament intended to form the foundation of the reform process. The legislation addresses crime prevention and revises administrative regulations within the military system. One of the main goals is to clearly divide responsibilities among commanders, military police, and other authorized bodies while introducing technology-based disciplinary oversight mechanisms. At the same time, the Health Ministry has developed a 2026-2028 roadmap for suicide prevention in Kazakhstan, with separate provisions focused on military personnel. As part of the broader reform effort, the authorities have also approved the interagency “Digital Prevention” program for 2025-2028. The initiative includes integrating video surveillance systems, artificial intelligence, and a unified database to monitor discipline and public order within the military. In parallel, the “Law and Order in the Army” program aims to strengthen military discipline and prevent offenses among service members. Tokayev also addressed military reform in an interview with the newspaper Turkistan earlier this year. The interviewer noted that repeated deaths among soldiers during military service were damaging...

2 months ago

European Summit in Yerevan Sends a Signal to Central Asia

The 8th European Political Community summit in Yerevan highlighted deepening geopolitical fault lines while signaling that some post-Soviet countries, notably Azerbaijan and Armenia, are gradually shifting their geopolitical orientation away from Moscow. It is a realignment that Central Asian states are watching with increasing interest. On May 4, attention across post-Soviet space, from Russia and Belarus to Central Asia and the South Caucasus, turned toward Yerevan. Armenia, still a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Eurasian Economic Union and formally tied to the Collective Security Treaty Organization despite freezing its participation, hosted Europe’s political leadership. Among those attending were French President Emmanuel Macron, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President António Costa, and prime ministers including Donald Tusk, Keir Starmer, and Petteri Orpo. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev participated via video link. No Central Asian leaders attended the summit. Even so, the gathering carried a message for the region. Armenia hosted Europe’s political leadership while remaining tied to Moscow-led structures, including the CIS and the Eurasian Economic Union. For Central Asian governments pursuing their own multi-vector policies, the summit showed how a post-Soviet state can widen its diplomatic options without a clean break from Russia. The parallel is not exact, but it is visible. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan remain in the Eurasian Economic Union, while Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan remain in the CSTO. All five Central Asian states maintain working ties with Moscow, while expanding contacts with the EU, Turkey, China, and the Gulf, part of a wider effort to diversify foreign policy options through closer engagement with Europe and other outside powers. Turkey was represented by Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, the highest-level Turkish official to visit Armenia since then-President Abdullah Gül in 2008. Turkey and Azerbaijan largely positioned themselves as counterweights to the dominant European framing, marking one of the summit’s key geopolitical divides. Aliyev adopted a confrontational tone, announcing a suspension of relations with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. “Instead of addressing fundamental problems of some member states, such as xenophobia, Islamophobia, antisemitism, migration, competitiveness, and homelessness, the European Parliament targets Azerbaijan, spreading slander and lies,” Aliyev said. “And the reason is that Azerbaijan restored its territorial integrity and sovereignty, put an end to separatism, and brought war criminals to justice.” In response, António Costa sought to soften tensions, emphasizing the summit’s historical significance as the first of its kind held in the South Caucasus and highlighting Aliyev’s participation as a symbol of peace efforts in the region. Cevdet Yilmaz focused on bilateral diplomacy, meeting Romanian President Nicușor Dan to discuss trade, regional issues, and global challenges. He also held talks with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, the summit’s host. The two sides signed a memorandum of understanding on the joint restoration of the historic Ani Bridge, located on the border between the two countries and dating back to the 11th century. Yilmaz suggested that Armenia would benefit from closer alignment with Turkey...

2 months ago

Belousov’s Bishkek Warning: Russia Uses SCO Meeting to Target Outside Influence in Central Asia

The April 28 meeting of defense ministers from the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), held in Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek, received relatively modest coverage in Central Asia and China. Russia’s Ministry of Defense, however, used the routine gathering to send a sharper message: Moscow remains opposed to any non-regional military presence in Central Asia. According to the SCO Secretariat, the meeting was attended by defense ministers from member states, the organization’s Secretary-General, and the director of the Executive Committee of the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. “During the meeting, the parties held a substantive exchange of views on pressing regional and international security issues, noting persistent challenges and threats, including international terrorism, extremism, transnational crime, as well as emerging risks in information and cybersecurity,” the SCO said in a general statement. The statement also emphasized the need to strengthen trust between the armed forces of member states, expand practical cooperation, conduct joint exercises, exchange experience, and develop mechanisms for military cooperation within the SCO. China’s Defense Minister Dong Jun used similar institutional language. According to Xinhua, Dong said the SCO should uphold the international order, improve security governance, and “eliminate the sources of turmoil and conflict through shared development.” He also called for deeper defense and security cooperation among member states. Kazakhstan’s Defense Minister Dauren Kosanov presented a report on the country’s approach to strengthening regional security, developing cooperation within the SCO, and improving joint responses to contemporary challenges, according to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense. The ministry said participants also discussed the expansion of practical cooperation between defense agencies and approved a cooperation plan for SCO defense ministries for 2027. Defense ministers from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan also held bilateral talks on the sidelines of the meeting, discussing military-technical cooperation, joint training, experience-sharing among officers, and initiatives aimed at strengthening regional security. Uzbek media described the talks as being held in a constructive and friendly atmosphere. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov adopted a markedly different tone. His remarks were not limited to general SCO language about counterterrorism or cyber threats. They directly targeted the possible presence of outside powers in Central Asia. “We are closely monitoring attempts by non-regional states to establish a military presence and address logistical tasks in Central Asia. We consider this unacceptable,” Belousov said, according to RIA Novosti. Belousov also expressed concern about Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, warning that militants from crisis zones could infiltrate neighboring countries, including the SCO space. Belousov further argued that U.S. activity in the Asia-Pacific region was having a destabilizing effect. “Their efforts to reshape the regional security system into a U.S.-centric model by strengthening military-political structures under Washington’s control provoke tensions, undermine regional stability, and increase the risks of armed conflict,” he said. The contrast was striking. The SCO Secretariat spoke in broad terms about common threats and institutional cooperation. China emphasized development, governance, and multilateral stability. Russia used the same setting to issue a direct warning over Central Asia. Iran added another layer to...

2 months ago

Technology and Investment: What Kazakhstan Stands to Gain from Its Middle East Outreach

The ongoing escalation in the Middle East, with Iran at its epicenter, appears to be accelerating economic rapprochement between countries in the region and Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s diplomacy has emerged as a key driver of this process. In recent days, Kazakhstan’s foreign minister has visited several Gulf states, while Israeli President Isaac Herzog arrived in Astana on April 27 for an official visit. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev has visited the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. In the UAE, he delivered a written message from Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan on bilateral relations, and held talks with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan. The sides discussed the consequences of Iranian missile strikes on the UAE and other countries, as well as their impact on international shipping security, energy supply, the global economy, and regional stability. Kosherbayev reaffirmed Kazakhstan’s support for the UAE in taking measures to protect its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the safety of citizens and residents. Senior UAE officials responsible for energy and sustainable development also participated in the meeting. In Qatar, the minister met with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani. Discussions focused on investment cooperation, with both sides emphasizing the importance of implementing joint projects in priority sectors such as energy, telecommunications, digital technologies, agriculture, and transport and logistics. Regional escalation was also addressed, with Kosherbayev reiterating that President Tokayev’s proposal to host peace negotiations in Turkestan remains in place. While in Qatar, the minister also met with the leadership of Power International Holding and Milaha. Talks with Power International Holding Chairman Moutaz Al-Khayyat focused on cooperation in gas processing, natural gas transportation, and electricity generation. Transport and transit issues were central to discussions with Milaha CEO Fahad Saad Al-Qahtani. The parties explored opportunities to develop multimodal transport and expand access to port infrastructure, which could significantly increase cargo transit through Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports. Kazakhstan’s engagement with Middle Eastern countries is increasingly reciprocal. Representatives from the region are also visiting Astana. Recently, Oman’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, Sayyid Theyazin bin Haitham Al Said, visited Kazakhstan. President Tokayev, who received him, expressed support for the people of Oman during the current period of regional instability. According to the presidential press service, the sides discussed expanding trade and economic cooperation, with a focus on energy, metallurgy, transport and logistics, agriculture, and digitalization. They also emphasized the importance of strengthening cultural and humanitarian ties. At the conclusion of the meeting, Tokayev awarded Theyazin bin Haitham Al Said the Order of Dostyk (Friendship), First Class, for his contribution to strengthening bilateral cooperation. Kazakhstan and Oman currently maintain a joint portfolio of five major investment projects worth $3 billion. Two projects worth $1.1 billion, covering energy and railway transport, have already been implemented, while additional projects in ore processing are under development. The following day, in the presence of Olzhas Bektenov, Samruk-Kazyna and the Oman Investment Authority signed a Heads of...

2 months ago

Russia to Halt Kazakh Oil Flow to Germany, Exposing Europe’s Transit Vulnerability

Russia will stop the transit of Kazakh oil to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline from May 1 according to Reuters, disrupting a route that Berlin had built up after ending direct Russian crude imports. The move affects supplies to the PCK refinery in Schwedt, a major fuel plant for Berlin and Brandenburg. Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said the change would begin because of “technical possibilities.” Germany’s economy ministry said Rosneft Germany, which remains under German trusteeship, had informed the Federal Network Agency that transit of Kazakh crude through Russian territory to PCK would be prohibited from that date. The ministry added that the Russian government had not directly notified Berlin. Germany’s economy ministry said the stoppage did not threaten fuel supply and that existing alternatives would be used. About 17% of PCK Schwedt’s current crude supply comes from Kazakh oil delivered through the Druzhba pipeline. Germany’s economy ministry said that “existing options will be utilized to ensure security of supply in Germany” and that the halt “did not put the security of supply of petroleum products in jeopardy.” [caption id="attachment_47676" align="aligncenter" width="1038"] Image: pck.de/[/caption] However, the halt still exposes Germany’s reliance on a route that runs through Russia. Schwedt can process up to 12 million metric tons of oil a year and is a major fuel supplier for Berlin and Brandenburg, so any disruption attracts close attention even if replacement volumes can be found elsewhere. Germany has already looked at alternative deliveries through Rostock and Gdansk. Since 2023, Kazakh crude has reached Germany through Russia and Belarus via the Druzhba pipeline, giving Berlin a non-Russian source of oil and expanding Astana’s role in the European market. But the route still relied on Russian transit approval. The halt comes after two years of growth. Regular deliveries of Kazakh crude to Germany began in 2023, and in October 2025, the supply arrangement was extended through the end of 2026. Kazakhstan had been planning to expand that trade further. During an April 7 meeting with Bavarian State Minister Eric Beißwenger, Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry said it aimed to raise oil exports to Germany to 2.5 million tons in 2026. Reuters reported that 2.146 million metric tons were delivered in 2025 and that 730,000 tons were supplied in the first quarter of 2026. KazTransOil has separately published its first-quarter operating results. Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov confirmed that Druzhba transit to Germany would be halted. “For May, transit through Atyrau-Samara in the direction of the Druzhba pipeline and further to the Schwedt refinery is zero,” Akkenzhenov stated. He added that the Russian side, according to unofficial information, said it lacked the technical capability to pump Kazakh oil and that this was “most likely” linked to recent strikes on Russian infrastructure. He said transit would resume once the technical issue was resolved. Kazakh crude sent to Germany through Druzhba first moves via the Uzen-Atyrau-Samara pipeline and then through Transneft’s system to the Adamova Zastava delivery point before reaching Schwedt. The oil is sold as...

2 months ago

At Antalya Forum, Tokayev Delivers a Stark Warning on Iran and the UN

Last week, the Turkish resort city of Antalya hosted the fifth annual Antalya Diplomacy Forum. Particular attention was drawn to the speech by Kazakhstan’s president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who once again raised the issue of reforming the United Nations. Held since 2021 at the initiative of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the forum brings together political leaders, diplomats, experts, business representatives, media, and civil society. It serves as a platform for bilateral and multilateral contacts, political consultations, and informal diplomacy. This year, alongside Turkey and Kazakhstan, the forum was attended by delegations from Azerbaijan, Qatar, Pakistan, Syria, Georgia, North Macedonia, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, all led by their respective heads of state. A widely circulated photograph from the opening ceremony, showing Erdoğan and Tokayev in conversation, was interpreted by some observers as reflecting the Kazakh president’s standing and the level of engagement between the two leaders. Political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev pointed to what he described as a convergence in messaging between the two presidents. “Opening the forum, President Erdoğan stated that ‘the world is experiencing a crisis of direction alongside a crisis of order.’ He noted that ‘mechanisms designed to protect human rights and international security remain ineffective and often inactive in the face of serious violations.’ Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, judging by his speech, sought, drawing on his experience and position, to respond to the concerns expressed by the Turkish and other leaders,” Ashimbayev said. Another Kazakh political analyst, Andrey Chebotarev, highlighted the broader diplomatic context, noting that Erdoğan is expected to pay a state visit to Kazakhstan on May 14. “In addition to bilateral cooperation, this visit is linked to the upcoming informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States in the city of Turkestan. It is worth recalling that following the previous informal OTS summit, held online on March 31, 2021, Turkestan was officially recognized as the spiritual capital of the Turkic world. Holding a similar summit in person is intended to underscore both the city’s significance and Kazakhstan’s role within the Turkic community,” Chebotarev said. Analyzing Tokayev’s remarks, Chebotarev also pointed to what he described as a consolidation of Kazakhstan’s position on the situation in the Middle East, particularly in the context of tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran. “Astana had previously signaled its distancing from all parties to the conflict, while expressing solidarity with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which, despite not being direct participants, were affected by strikes linked to the broader confrontation. In this context, the Kazakh president’s call for restraint and a cessation of hostilities is not merely an expression of neutrality but reflects the position of an active international actor seeking a diplomatic resolution,” he said. One of the central elements of Tokayev’s speech was his assessment of developments surrounding Iran. He called for greater awareness of global dynamics and emphasized the need to address root causes. “The core issue is the proliferation of nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons. This must be...

2 months ago

Hungary’s Political Shift Puts Central Asia Partnerships Under Scrutiny

Hungary’s political transition following the defeat of Viktor Orbán’s party and his resignation as prime minister is drawing attention not only in the EU and the United States, but also in Central Asia, where Budapest has built growing energy and investment ties. The key question is whether the policy of cooperation with Central Asia developed under Orbán will continue under the new leadership. In recent years, under Orbán, Budapest has actively developed its Central Asian foreign policy, primarily driven by the desire to find alternatives to Russian energy supplies. That push reflects Hungary’s long-standing reliance on Russian oil and gas, which has shaped its search for alternative suppliers beyond Europe. Resource-rich Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan became natural partners for diplomatic engagement. Orbán succeeded in building trust-based relationships with the presidents of the Central Asian republics, grounded in what Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó, described as “sincere friendship” in an interview with Uzbek media. “In Hungary, we have always viewed Central Asia as one of the fastest-growing regions in the world, with enormous potential. Our efforts to build these relations did not begin today, but decades ago,” he said. Hungary became the first Central European country to sign a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan in 2014. Currently, the Kazakhstan-Hungary Business Council is in operation, along with a joint agricultural direct investment fund. In 2024, bilateral trade approached $200 million, and from January to August 2025, it grew by another 22.1%, exceeding $164.6 million. Hungarian investments in Kazakhstan’s economy have surpassed $370 million, while the current investment portfolio includes 16 projects worth about $700 million in engineering, agriculture, and logistics. These links also intersect with wider efforts to expand east–west transport routes through the Caspian region, offering Hungary indirect access to Central Asian energy and trade flows. In May 2025, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held talks with Orbán in Budapest, where both sides highlighted rising trade volumes and a joint investment portfolio of about $500 million. Hungary’s OTP Bank entered into Uzbekistan’s financial market in 2023, acquiring a 73.71% stake in Ipoteka Bank, becoming its principal owner and the majority shareholder of the country’s fifth-largest bank. As early as 2019, Hungary had intensified cooperation with Turkmenistan. After talks at the Turkmen Foreign Ministry, Szijjártó told the media that Hungary views Turkmenistan as an important country from the perspective of European security. “We very much hope that Turkmenistan’s gas resources will be integrated into the overall energy flow of Central Europe,” he said. However, uncertainty remains over whether this policy direction will continue under Orbán’s successor, Péter Magyar. Oil and gas analyst Oleg Chervinsky has suggested that political changes in Hungary could affect cooperation with Kazakhstan’s national company KazMunayGas (KMG). Chervinsky notes that, having secured a constitutional majority in parliament, Magyar has a mandate to “implement reforms in both foreign and domestic policy [which could] reshape the constitutional structure of the right-wing populist authoritarian system built around Orbán.” The analyst points to Hungary’s oil and gas company MOL Group, which in recent...

2 months ago

The Astana-Tashkent Tandem: A Developing Partnership Based on Mutual Interest

On April 11, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev paid a working visit to Uzbekistan, where he was hosted in Bukhara by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The historic city provided the setting for discussions that increasingly reflect a broader regional agenda. A second informal meeting in just over a year suggests this format may be gaining weight in relations between Central Asia’s two largest economies. “The informal format is of strategic importance, since such meetings make it possible to discuss sensitive issues without protocol constraints, build personal trust between leaders, which plays a key role in Central Asia, and align positions ahead of official negotiations,” said Uzbek political analyst Ravshan Nazarov. He added that such meetings reflect a growing intra-regional focus, reduced dependence on external actors, and the strengthening of the “Tashkent-Astana” tandem. During the talks, Tokayev emphasized the importance of the visit “given the current unstable geopolitical situation.” The two sides reviewed bilateral cooperation across multiple sectors. Trade turnover reached $5 billion last year, with both countries aiming to double this figure to $10 billion in the near term. Joint projects are already underway in automotive manufacturing, infrastructure, logistics, electrical engineering, and construction materials. The discussion also extended to other sectors, including energy and industrial cooperation. Both Presidents stressed the need to modernize border infrastructure, eliminate bottlenecks, and develop efficient transport corridors to external markets. They also discussed accelerating major regional projects, including the construction of the Kambarata hydropower plant and advancing “green” energy exports. Tokayev also voiced his support for Uzbekistan’s “Clean Air” initiative, highlighting environmental challenges in Almaty. “I share your concern regarding the environmental condition of Tashkent. We have a very difficult situation in Almaty. Unfortunately, Almaty has entered the list of the most polluted major cities in the world, and urgent measures must be taken. Therefore, we could propose the joint implementation of the ‘Clean Air’ initiative under presidential patronage,” Tokayev said. The reference to Almaty also recalled the setting of the previous informal meeting on March 29, 2025. During that visit, Mirziyoyev toured the Medeu high-mountain sports complex and visited the National Museum of Arts, where an exhibition featuring works by Abilkhan Kasteev and Ural Tansykbayev was organized. That visit drew attention to the city’s preparedness for high-level events. Tokayev subsequently instructed then-Mayor of Almaty, Yerbolat Dossayev, to improve conditions in the city and report regularly on progress. In May 2025, Dossayev was dismissed as mayor and reassigned to the Presidential Administration. He was later also relieved of that post. In contrast, the Bukhara program was more extensive. Mirziyoyev presented industrial and technological projects, including a cotton-textile cluster, an artificial intelligence hackathon, and several cultural landmarks, including the mausoleum of Bahauddin Naqshbandi, founder of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. The discussions themselves also appeared more substantive, covering areas such as rare earth metals, transport, energy, and information technology. “When discussions include not only trade but also rare earths, transport, energy, and IT, it indicates a shift toward strategic thinking. The focus is no longer just on trade turnover,...

2 months ago

Moldova Moves to Leave CIS as Post-Soviet Bloc Loses Another Member

Moldova’s parliament approved, in final reading on April 2, the country’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with 60 deputies voting in favor. President Maia Sandu then promulgated the denunciation decrees, which were published in the Official Journal on April 8 and entered into force, with the Foreign Ministry set to notify the CIS. If Moldova’s withdrawal takes full legal effect after notification and the relevant notice period, eight CIS member states would remain: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The CIS was created immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a framework to manage the breakup and maintain post-Soviet cooperation among former republics. Moldova’s denunciation concerns a structure originally formed by 11 former Soviet states, not all 15 Soviet republics. Moldova’s exit further weakens the CIS politically, though the bloc will continue to exist if the remaining member states stay in place. Moldova has already approved the denunciation of the 1991 Agreement on the Establishment of the CIS, the related Protocol, and the 1993 CIS Statute. The Moldovan authorities say the CIS’s core values and principles are no longer being respected, especially the recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. They cite Russia’s war against Ukraine, acts of aggression against Georgia, and the illegal military presence of Russian troops on Moldovan territory. Chisinau says the move is consistent with Moldova’s European path, while the European Union remains its main economic partner. Economic ties with the Commonwealth have significantly declined: in 2025, CIS countries accounted for 5.9% of Moldova’s exports, while the European Union accounted for 67.5%. Moldova’s final withdrawal from the CIS may not, therefore, come as a surprise to its other members. On January 19, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi announced the start of the process to denounce the three core CIS agreements underpinning Moldova’s membership. “We are already in the process of getting approvals for the denunciation of three agreements with the CIS. They are the agreements that form the basis of our affiliation to the CIS, namely: the CIS Statute, the CIS Founding Agreement, and the Annex to this agreement,” Popșoi said. He added that this would mean Moldova was no longer a CIS member legally, while participation had already been suspended de facto. Moldova set a course toward breaking its remaining ties with its Soviet past after the 2020 presidential elections, when new president, Maia Sandu, announced a path toward EU integration and refused to participate in CIS summits. Moldova has spent the past several years unwinding CIS-linked agreements. As of January 2026, Moldovan officials said the country had signed 283 CIS agreements, of which 71 had already been rescinded, and about 60 more were in process. On December 12, 2025, Moldova’s parliament approved the denunciation of the 1992 Bishkek agreement on visa-free travel for CIS citizens. For Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and several other states, visa-free travel with Moldova remains in place under bilateral agreements. Moldovan authorities said the denunciation of the Bishkek agreement would affect...

3 months ago