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Bruce Pannier

Bruce Pannier is a Central Asia Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the advisory board at the Caspian Policy Center, and a longtime journalist and correspondent covering Central Asia. For a decade, he appeared regularly on the Majlis podcast for RFE/RL, and now broadcasts his Spotlight on Central Asia podcast in partnership with The Times of Central Asia.

Articles

Rule of law

American Professor and Longtime Central Asia Researcher Denied Entry to Kyrgyzstan

Professor Steve Swerdlow of the University of Southern California (USC) arrived at the Bishkek airport at 4:30 am on May 19, leading a group of 16 students for a trip of a lifetime: two weeks in Kyrgyzstan and two weeks in Kazakhstan. Swerdlow, a veteran Central Asian researcher who had previously worked for Human Rights Watch in Uzbekistan (2010), Kazakhstan (2011), and Kyrgyzstan (2012-2019), had led similar trips to Kyrgyzstan with USC students in 2022 and 2024. This time, however, there were problems immediately upon his arrival at Bishkek. “I was taken out of line at passport control and whisked away to the departure area, and then taken to a little room,” Swerdlow told TCA. “There were three guys there and they said, almost with a smirk, that we only work here and were told not to allow you into the country.” Swerdlow attempted to get clarification as to why he was being denied entry to Kyrgyzstan, but the border officials merely said their instructions were that Swerdlow was not to be admitted. They told him that an official letter stating the reason for the denial of entry would come, but Swerdlow said he was never given such a document. The border officials said he was to be deported on a plane to Istanbul that was due to leave at 10:00 am. The officials gave Swerdlow his passport with a letter in it addressed to the people at Turkish Airlines, who later showed Swerdlow the contents. It said only that Swerdlow was being denied entry to Kyrgyzstan because entry to Kyrgyzstan was “closed” to him. Swerdlow’s passport was returned to him when he reached Istanbul, but there was another complication. Kyrgyz border control officers had told Turkish Airlines that Swerdlow was being sent all the way back to Los Angeles, so his luggage was transferred at Istanbul to a flight preparing to leave for California. He managed to retrieve his luggage from that flight but remains in Istanbul, where he is trying to coordinate with his students, USC, and officials in Kyrgyzstan. The students are Swerdlow’s main concern. The trip was organized with help from the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek, so the students have accommodation, and there are people who speak English helping them. During previous trips, students met with people from Kyrgyzstan’s presidential administration, the human rights ombudsman, and visited parliament. It is unclear if this group will now be able to do the same. Some parts of the trip will almost surely be canceled. Swerdlow mentioned that the group had yurts reserved at Tamga on the shore of Issyk-Kul, the immense alpine lake that is Kyrgyzstan’s premier tourist attraction. “It was going to be a cultural event,” Swerdlow said. “We were going to watch a kok-boru match, attend some cooking classes for local dishes, and a reading of Manas.” Kok-boru is a national sport in Kyrgyzstan, something like polo with players on horseback trying to drag a replicated sheep carcass to goals at either end...

4 days ago

State Visit

Rahmon Looks to China as Tajikistan’s Options Narrow

Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon just finished a state visit to China. Rahmon has made trips to China many times during the nearly 34 years he has been in power in Tajikistan, but this visit came during a critical period. Simply put, Tajikistan is losing the international importance it once had, and China might now be the most dependable friend remaining for Rahmon and his country. A ‘Sweet’ Start China established diplomatic ties with all five Central Asian countries at the start of 1992. Just months later, a civil war broke out in Tajikistan that would last until June 1997, but that did not deter China from seeking investment opportunities in Tajikistan. China funded the construction of a sugar plant in Kurgan-Tepe in 1992, and later helped build confectioneries in large cities and towns in Tajikistan, as well as providing 10,000 tons of feed for livestock and, in 1994, extending a $50-million loan to Tajikistan. In April 1996, Rahmon and the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan met in Shanghai and formed the Shanghai Five, which, after the inclusion of Uzbekistan five years later, would become the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China used the SCO to improve economic ties with all the Central Asian members, but while Chinese investment in Tajikistan was far less than in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, it was extremely important for Tajikistan, which was, and remains, the poorest country in Central Asia. After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the start of the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan, China gave equipment and winter uniforms to Tajikistan’s border guards. Later, China also helped fund the construction of Tajik border posts along the frontier with Afghanistan, and Beijing is set to help finance nine more border posts. Security along Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan is also in China’s interest. China shares an approximately 475-kilometer border with Tajikistan. Eastern Tajikistan is mountainous, remotely inhabited, and shares a long border with Afghanistan. China is concerned about the ability of potential enemies to move from Afghanistan through eastern Tajikistan and enter China. That is why, less than ten years ago, China built a small, forward observation military post in eastern Tajikistan, not far from the Chinese border. Militant groups such as the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement, comprised mainly of Uyghurs from China’s Xinjiang Region, and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province, which has explicitly threatened China, are present in northern Afghanistan. Chinese companies have been building Tajikistan’s infrastructure for some 20 years: roads, power transmission lines, the Dushanbe thermal power plant, hydropower plants, factories, and other objects. In 2025, China finally surpassed Russia to become Tajikistan’s leading trade partner, and Chinese-Tajik trade turnover in the first three months of 2026 increased by more than 52% compared to Q1 in 2025. Changing Times China is likely to remain Tajikistan’s leading trade partner and more for the foreseeable future. The geopolitical situation in Central Asia has changed, and not in Tajikistan’s favor. The biggest change for Rahmon and his country...

1 week ago

Power Struggle

Japarov, Tashiyev, and the Kompromat War

Kyrgyzstan has seen three revolutions since 2005. It has been a politically active country since becoming independent in late 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed. But since the current President Sadyr Japarov came to power after the 2020 revolution, he and his long-time friend and security chief, Kamchybek Tashiyev, have stifled expressions of public discontent. For the last five years, Kyrgyzstan’s political scene has been uncharacteristically quiet. But events since Japarov sacked Tashiyev on February 10 have raised speculation that a fierce political battle between the two powerful men now looms ahead for the country. Japarov has already fired the first shots. Accusations of corruption against Tashiyev and his family have led to arrests. But two can play at that game, and the former security likely has compromising information about Japarov and his family. “You Can't Cook Two Sheep's Heads in One Cauldron” The February 10 announcement of Tashiyev’s firing was arguably Kyrgyzstan’s biggest political shock since the October 2020 revolution that saw Japarov go from a prison cell to simultaneously occupying the posts of prime minister and president within ten days. The two had been friends for decades, they started their political careers about the same time, and both quickly rose through the ranks of government during the presidency of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who was ousted in the 2010 revolution. The day after he was confirmed as president, Japarov appointed Tashiyev to be head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB). The day before Tashiyev was sacked, a group of 75 prominent figures, who included former government officials, released an open letter to President Japarov and the speaker of parliament calling for an early presidential election. The group pointed to the discrepancy over whether Japarov was serving the six-year presidential term mandated in the 2010 constitution or the five-year term stipulated in the constitution adopted in April 2021, three months after the snap presidential election that Japarov won. It quickly became apparent that Tashiyev’s dismissal and the letter were connected. The same day Tashiyev was fired, so were several top GKNB officials, with the sacking of officials said to be close to Tashiyev continuing for days. Japarov’s spokesman said it was necessary to “prevent a split in society.” However, Japarov has avoided any detailed explanation of the reasons for the many changes and repeatedly described Tashiyev as a friend. Member of Parliament Elvira Surabaldiyeva, in an April 24 interview with a Kazakh journalist, said Tashiyev was dismissed because he was planning a coup and had been preparing it for a long time. “The president is going through a very difficult time right now, because his longtime friend tried to remove him from office,” Surabaldiyeva said, and added, “There's a saying: ‘You can't cook two sheep's heads in one cauldron.’ This seems to be exactly the case.” Kompromat Tashiyev was out of Kyrgyzstan when the news broke that he had been fired. He briefly returned on February 13, leaving again on February 17. He returned on March 19 and the...

4 weeks ago

EU-Turkmenistan Relations

Turkmenistan Opens the Door a Little Wider to Europe

Turkmenistan has historically been a difficult partner to deal with. The Turkmen government’s isolationist policies run counter to deep cooperation with any foreign party, but the Turkmen authorities seem to now perceive that these policies are costing them opportunities and revenue. In one of the latest shifts in foreign policy, Turkmenistan appears to be warming up relations with the European Union, though currently, the EU has its own reasons to boost interaction with Turkmenistan. Let’s Meet For decades, the EU and many other countries and international organizations have gone through frustrating efforts to establish a reliable relationship with Turkmenistan. Ashgabat’s form of governance is based on a cult of personality, a supposedly infallible leader capable of protecting the country from the evils of the outside world. The UN recognition in December 1995 of Turkmenistan’s neutrality was used by its government to seal off the country. It would normally be easy for the rest of the world to ignore Turkmenistan. However, Turkmenistan possesses the planet’s fourth-largest proven natural gas reserves, and it is located on what is developing into a key global trade route. On March 20, the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) regional representative for Central Asia, Olivier Kueny, complimented Turkmenistan for its “ambitions in transport and… projects that reduce greenhouse gases.“ Kueny noted that, “with direct access to the Caspian Sea, [Turkmenistan] is a key node” of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (TITR). He hinted the EIB could be interested in investing in Turkmenistan’s “rail, road, rolling stock and port infrastructure [that] could help reduce the cost and time needed to move goods between continents.“ On March 26, Charlotte Adriaen, the head of the EU division for Central Asia and Afghanistan, met in Ashgabat with Turkmenistan’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Myahri Byashimova, to discuss energy cooperation. The two also reviewed EU programs for sustainable energy, trade, and digital connectivity. On the same day, there was also a “New Horizons for Connectivity, Investment and Sustainable Growth” Turkmenistan-EU business forum in Ashgabat. Turkmenistan’s Minister of Finance and Economy, Mammetguly Astanagulov, addressed more than 200 delegates attending the forum, telling them his country is ready to expand trade, transport, and energy cooperation with the EU. Astanagulov noted EU-Turkmenistan trade increased from $1.1 billion in 2024 to $2.1 billion in 2025. EU Ambassador to Turkmenistan Beata Peksa also spoke at the forum. She noted Turkmenistan’s growing role in global transport corridors between Europe and Asia and said the EU is seeking to work more closely with Turkmenistan on improving investment conditions in the country. Peksa also mentioned helping Turkmenistan improve regulatory frameworks and investment in modern technologies to increase efficiency in moving cargo. On April 1, Adriaen met with representatives from Turkmenistan’s State Service of Maritime and River Transportation at the Turkmenbashi International Seaport on the Caspian coast to discuss the port’s role in the TITR and projects at the Balkan shipbuilding yard. And on April 7, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) co-sponsored an “Export Experience Exchange” conference in Ashgabat, the aim...

1 month ago

Nuclear Power Plant

Kyrgyzstan Weighs Nuclear Power as Rosatom Talks Advance

Kyrgyzstan is still in talks with Russia’s state-owned nuclear power company Rosatom about building a nuclear power plant (NPP) in Kyrgyzstan. But on March 3, Kyrgyz Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, Daniyar Amangeldiyev, was already speaking about conducting a national referendum on the construction of a nuclear power plant. It is clear why Rosatom is anxious to build the NPP, but it is less clear why Kyrgyzstan needs it. Kyrgyzstan’s Road to Nuclear Power Rosatom is active in Central Asia, receiving the contract to build Kazakhstan’s first NPP in June 2025. Uzbekistan had already signed a contract with Rosatom in May 2024, and in late March 2026, the first concrete was poured for the NPP that Rosatom is constructing in Uzbekistan. At first glance, Central Asia might not seem like an ideal market for nuclear power. But after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Finland canceled its contract for Rosatom to build the Hanhikivi-1 NPP, and while several European countries are building or considering building NPPs, Hungary is the only country committed to partnering with Rosatom. With limited prospects for new contracts in Europe, Rosatom is likely to focus on securing additional deals in non-European markets to expand its already extensive portfolio. Kyrgyzstan’s Energy Ministry and Rosatom signed a Memorandum of Understanding for a small NPP in January 2022. The initial plan for Kyrgyzstan’s NPP was to build a small RITM-200N with a 55-megawatt (MW) capacity. In May 2025, Director General of Rosatom, Alexey Likhachev, said his company was offering Kyrgyzstan a modular NPP project that could generate anywhere from 110 MW to 440 MW using RITM-200N reactors, equivalent to two to eight units. In late March 2026, Likhachev said current talks with Kyrgyzstan were not only focused on the construction of a small NPP but also a medium-sized NPP. Kyrgyz Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Amangeldiyev said in June 2025 that Kyrgyz officials and Rosatom representatives were already looking at potential sites for the NPP. Reports about the planned NPP in Kyrgyzstan don’t mention the cost of construction, and it remains unclear how many and what size reactors will be installed. According to Uzbek officials, the six 55-MW units that Rosatom was initially contracted to build (the project has since changed) would have cost “less than $2 billion.” An Agreement or Not In March 2024, Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Energy Minister Taalaybek Baygaziyev signed an agreement with Rosatom on the development and implementation of the NPP investment project. In September 2025, Altynbek Rysbekov was appointed Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Energy Minister, and he said, “There is a possibility of building a (nuclear power) station, but no fundamental decision has been made yet.” However, Rysbekov’s further comments indicated he supported the idea of building an NPP in Kyrgyzstan, and he reconfirmed that the search for an appropriate site for the NPP continued. On April 3, 2026, Amangeldiyev said negotiations with Rosatom are continuing. “We are collaborating with Rosatom on infrastructure development and personnel training,” Amangeldiyev stated. “Only after...

2 months ago