Our People > Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Senior Editor and Contributor

Robert M. Cutler has written and consulted on Central Asian affairs for over 30 years at all levels. He was a founding member of the Central Eurasian Studies Society’s executive board and founding editor of its Perspectives publication. He has written for Asia Times, Foreign Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Euractiv, Radio Free Europe, National Post (Toronto), FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, and many other outlets.

He directs the NATO Association of Canada’s Energy Security Program, where he is also senior fellow, and is a practitioner member at the University of Waterloo’s Institute for Complexity and Innovation. Educated at MIT, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), and the University of Michigan, he was for many years a senior researcher at Carleton University’s Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, and is past chairman of the Montreal Press Club’s Board of Directors.

Articles

Official Visit

Kazakhstan and Israel Deepen Cooperation in Astana

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s official visit to Astana on January 27, 2026, was the first by an Israeli foreign minister to Kazakhstan in 16 years, and it yielded a package of institutional and economic steps. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev received Sa’ar and Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev, holding talks that both sides framed as elevating cooperation to a new level. The two foreign ministries signed documents on diplomatic training and public diplomacy, and agreed to pursue visa-free travel for holders of ordinary passports. A Kazakhstan–Israel business forum convened in parallel, with January–November 2025 trade of about US$162.4 million cited as the baseline for expansion. The visit’s value lay in its forward-looking measures to deepen cooperation. The sides agreed to convene the Kazakhstan–Israel Joint Economic Commission at a ministerial level. This move creates a regular venue where sector priorities can be translated into specific workstreams. The Kazakhstan–Israel business forum was framed as the practical feeder for that process, as both sides publicly identified a project map running from high-tech agriculture and water-resource management through digital technologies (including artificial intelligence) to infrastructure and logistics, energy efficiency and renewables, and healthcare and pharmaceuticals. In parallel, the two foreign ministries’ political consultations, in their twelfth round, covered wider international and regional agendas, including Middle East confidence-building and peaceful-settlement initiatives. Regularizing Cooperation Channels The documents signed in Astana were narrow-gauge instruments designed to regularize contacts. The memorandum on diplomatic training provides for structured interaction in the preparation of diplomatic personnel. What this means in practice is that exchanges between the two foreign-policy services will be routinized through their training institutions rather than on an ad hoc basis. The memorandum on public diplomacy set a framework for coordinated outreach, providing an agreed approach to presenting their cooperation. Taken together, these instruments are the administrative layer that will operationalize joint political intent. The visa initiative was narrowly framed as a statement of intent to conclude a visa-exemption agreement for holders of ordinary passports, not as an agreement already in force. In practice, such a regime would lead to higher tourism flows and denser business travel. The latter development would widen the base of commercial contacts, which could in turn be carried into ministerial-level economic follow-up. The visa track is thus an enabling measure for the economic agenda. At the leadership level, Sa’ar publicly invited President Tokayev to visit Israel. This move signals an intent to sustain momentum beyond merely ministerial channels. The visit coincided with International Holocaust Remembrance Day in Kazakhstan, and Sa’ar participated in a state ceremony in Astana connected to the commemoration. The ceremony included senior officials and diplomatic representatives, with official messaging from Tokayev to Israel’s president on the occasion. The civic and humanitarian nature of this event complemented a visit that otherwise concentrated on governance mechanisms, economic priorities, and institutionalizing diplomatic follow-through. First Steps Toward Joint Projects Beyond merely listing priority sectors, the business forum also surfaced first-step commercial and quasi-commercial documents providing a basis for follow-through. Kazakhstan’s investment agency reported three signed items:...

10 hours ago

Central Asia-U.S. Relations

Astana and Tashkent Engage Washington’s Central Asia Vector

On January 22 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed President Donald Trump’s new Board of Peace charter. The document matters less than what their participation signifies: recognized access to the White House and a willingness to be publicly associated with a U.S.-led initiative. This is all the more significant as Washington’s relations with several long-standing partners have recently become more fraught and publicly contested. The Central Asian response is part of that story. Their participation indicates that the Trump White House regards them as interlocutors of consequence, and that both Central Asian capitals are embracing that status. On December 1, Washington assumed the G20 presidency for 2026 and set three priorities: limiting regulatory burdens, strengthening affordable and secure energy supply chains, and advancing technology and innovation. It has also scheduled the leaders’ summit for December 14–15, 2026, in the Miami area. On December 23, Trump said that he was inviting Tokayev and Mirziyoyev to attend as guests. That invitation places Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan inside a host-defined agenda whose working tracks overlap with their strongest external bargaining assets, including energy, critical minerals potential, and transport connectivity. Trump publicly tied the invitations to discussions of peace, trade, and cooperation, which is in line with his subsequent Board of Peace invitations. Diplomatic Logic and Multi-Vectorism It is worthwhile situating these developments in the context of Central Asian cooperation, which Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have driven as the regional core. At the August 2024 Consultative Meeting in Astana, all five leaders signed a Roadmap for the development of regional cooperation for 2025–2027, and adopted a “Central Asia 2040” conceptual framework. Tokayev and Mirziyoyev referenced their 2022 allied-relations agreement and announced plans to adopt a strategic partnership program through 2034, including large-scale joint economic and energy projects. Moscow’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has widened the room for maneuver by other external actors, and Central Asian capitals have pursued these opportunities selectively. For example, the EU’s then foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell visited Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in early August 2024, Japan has pursued its “Central Asia plus Japan” line as a counterweight to China’s influence, and Azerbaijan has been building an energy bridge between Central Asia and Europe via the South Caucasus with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Washington’s main channel into this complex is the C5+1, and the current U.S. emphasis is to create routines that survive individual summits. The U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asian Affairs Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau travelled to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in October 2025 ahead of the Washington summit that Trump hosted the following month for the five leaders. Such formats can concentrate attention on the implementation of standardized procurement procedures and regularized dispute resolution that new supply-chain corridors require for interoperable paperwork and predictable customs treatment. Kyrgyzstan is scheduled to host the second B5+1 forum (the business counterpart to C5+1) on February 4–5, 2026. This has already been prepared by a joint briefing...

4 days ago

Parliamentary Reform

Tokayev Proposes a New Constitutional Architecture

In mid-January 2026, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev moved Kazakhstan’s parliamentary reform agenda onto a deeper constitutional track. He framed the emerging package as comparable, in substance, to adopting a new constitution rather than making a bounded set of amendments. He also presented it as a further move away from the institutional logic of the 1995 framework and as the logical next step after the 2022 referendum changes, with the legislative branch identified as the main site of redesign. Tokayev laid out a two-stage pathway. First, a Constitutional Commission of more than 100 members is to consolidate proposals and draft a coherent text. The work is organized through the Constitutional Court leadership, and the participant pool is expected to include representatives of the National Kurultai, legal experts, media figures, maslikhat chairs, and regional public councils. The commission was established by decree shortly after Tokayev’s public rollout of the initiative, with early reporting identifying its chair and senior officers as part of the process’ initial institutionalization. Second, the resulting draft is to be submitted to a nationwide referendum, with timing to be set once the commission produces an implementable package. This is an architecture exercise before it is a policy program. The direction is clear enough to describe, but the operative meaning will depend on still-undetermined details, including how headline concepts are translated into constitutional language and how the referendum track shapes that drafting process. The Kurultai Plan and the Lawmaking Design Tokayev’s central institutional move is to abolish the current bicameral parliament and replace it with a single chamber, the Kurultai, combining functions now divided between the Mazhilis and the Senate. The change is publicly presented as consolidation, with unicameralism framed as a simplification of legislative structure that still keeps parliament as the focal representative institution within a presidential system. The package also sketches a streamlined internal design. Tokayev stated that the new chamber should comprise 145 deputies, with up to three deputy speakers and no more than eight committees. Public reports on the working-group discussions remark that earlier concepts ranged more widely before converging on 145; the current Mazhilis and Senate total 148 members. Tokayev indicated that deputies would be elected by proportional representation at the national level, while majoritarian rules would be retained at the regional level. He also signaled the removal of quota and appointment mechanisms associated with the existing system, including the elimination of a small number of presidentially appointed seats. A unicameral legislature raises a predictable design problem. Consolidation can increase legislative throughput unless procedures are structured to preserve deliberation. Allies of the reform have therefore emphasized a shift to a three-reading format, presented as a way to make lawmaking more deliberative. In practice, the decisive criteria here are implementation choices that are not yet public. These include final electoral rules, the internal allocation of committee jurisdiction, and procedural requirements governing readings, hearings, and amendments. Those choices will determine whether the Kurultai becomes a stronger site of relatively autonomous bargaining and scrutiny or a more efficient transmission...

4 days ago

G20 Summit

Trump’s G20 Invitations: Why Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Matter

On December 23, President Donald Trump said he would invite Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend the United States–hosted 2026 G20 summit in Miami. The meeting is planned at Trump National Doral. The announcement followed separate telephone calls with Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, which Trump described as focused on peace and expanded trade, and cooperation. The G20 is a group of major economies, with membership based mainly on large nominal GDP and global economic importance, collectively representing about 85% of global GDP. Kazakhstan is ranked roughly 50th in the world by nominal GDP, at approximately $300 billion, while Uzbekistan is ranked around 62nd, with a nominal GDP of about $137–140 billion. According to Polish radio, the president of Poland stated that his country would also be on the guest list. Poland is the world’s 21st-largest economy. The G20 is a forum, not a treaty body. Leaders’ summits include member governments and a limited number of host-selected guest countries. Invitations to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would place their leaders physically at the table with G20 heads of state, allowing them to be seen, heard, and recognized by other leaders, without conferring membership or a formal role in shaping the summit agenda. On average, the host invites six to seven guests. One official host-country explainer notes that guest invitations allow non-members to bring their own perspectives. For them, the significance of attending is access, not membership. What Washington Wants and What Can Be Transacted The host typically uses the guest invitations to signal which countries and regions they regard as priorities. U.S. interest in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan rests on an immediate material basis. The United States is rebuilding its nuclear-fuel supply chain away from Russian-origin material. Federal law now bans imports of certain Russian uranium products, with waivers terminating no later than January 1, 2028. U.S. agencies have been explicit that supply diversification is a policy objective. In 2024, Kazakhstan-origin material accounted for 24% of uranium delivered to U.S. owners and operators, while Uzbekistan-origin material accounted for about 9%. Kazakhstan’s structural advantage is scale and reliability. It remains the world’s leading uranium producer, with 2024 output around 23,270 metric tons of uranium and the largest share of global mine production. Astana has also signaled an interest in moving beyond extraction toward higher value-added fuel-cycle activity. Uzbekistan’s advantage is growth potential and its fit with Western joint-venture structures. Its uranium sector has attracted major external entrants, including Orano’s South Djengeldi joint venture Nurlikum Mining with the state partner Navoiyuran to develop a new mine alongside an Itochu (Japan) minority stake. The second instrument is the resource-focused diplomacy under the C5+1 umbrella. The State Department frames the C5+1 as organized around economy, energy, and security, within which framework it has elevated critical minerals to a dedicated track. The United States launched a C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue in early 2024, and subsequent U.S. statements have described it as a vehicle for geological exploration, mining, processing, and investment opportunities across the region. This...

1 month ago

Advanced Technologies

Kazakhstan Turns from Pipelines to Processors

Kazakhstan’s strategic plan for advanced computing represents a diversification of its traditional oil, gas, and transit profile and of the wider national economy. A $2 billion Nvidia-linked initiative now turns on three main elements. First is a national supercomputer using Nvidia H200 chips, with headline AI performance around 2 exaflops. Second is a planned 100 MW data-center campus, designed to expand capacity for commercial users over several years. Third is a “sovereign AI hub” concept that promises long-term chip access for sensitive public-sector workloads. Prior to this package, Kazakhstan had already moved unusually quickly to build high-end AI and computing infrastructure, treating digital capacity as central to its development policy. The national supercomputer is now the most powerful system in Central Asia and is housed in a Tier III state data center intended for use by universities, startups, and corporate tenants. The hardware push accompanies a wider digital policy agenda, including new training programs with Nvidia to expand the country’s AI talent base. Parallel initiatives with the United States seek to anchor Kazakhstan more firmly within Western regulatory and connectivity frameworks, as part of a broader attempt to move beyond hydrocarbons and build domestic capability in computation-heavy activities. Kazakhstan’s New AI Statecraft Astana is presenting the Nvidia package as an economic instrument, not just a hardware upgrade. Senior officials now describe advanced computing as a new pillar of national development, on a par with hydrocarbons and transit. Recent policy statements frame AI and digital infrastructure as central, not a side theme of “innovation” policy. In parallel, the long-running “Digital Kazakhstan” agenda has moved from e-government and broadband roll-out into a second phase where data centers, national platforms, and specialized training come to the foreground. Within that shift, “sovereign AI” is becoming a core organizing idea. Officials and local specialists talk about national language models that can handle Kazakh, Russian, and other regional languages, and about keeping sensitive public-sector data on infrastructure under national jurisdiction. The new supercomputer and the sovereign AI hub are presented as the place where that work will happen at scale: training and serving models for government services, regulatory tasks, and domestic firms, rather than relying entirely on foreign platforms. The Nvidia partnership is therefore framed as a way to secure long-term access to leading chips for these “sovereign” workloads, even as global export rules tighten. The same initiative also underwrites a shift in Kazakhstan’s self-presentation from a “pipeline corridor” to Kazakhstan as a corridor for data and high-end digital services. The government has begun to link the sovereign AI hub and supercomputer to a set of fiber-optic projects across the Caspian that aim to tie Central Asia more tightly into Eurasian data routes. The same geography that once made Kazakhstan a crucial link for oil, gas, and rail freight can now make it a regional conduit for digital traffic and AI-enabled services. Kazakhstan is also using the package to deepen a specific diplomatic track with the United States. Joint announcements and working groups on digital transformation,...

2 months ago