Afghanistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Central Asian politics

The “Central Asia 2030” Roundtable in Astana: From External Interest to Regional Choice

Discussions about Central Asia’s long-term strategic future are increasingly shifting from a focus on external attention to one of growing regional agency. On Monday, Astana International University hosted the first roundtable in the series Central Asia 2030: Strategic Horizons and Regional Choices. Speakers included Andrew D’Anieri, Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center; Yerkin Tukumov, Special Representative of the President of Kazakhstan; Ambassador-at-Large Zulfiya Suleimenova; and Dauren Aben, Deputy Director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan. Pragmatism, Regional Choice, and the Logic of the “Grand Bargain” In his remarks, Andrew D’Anieri emphasized that Central Asia is increasingly viewed in the U.S. not as a peripheral zone but as an independent strategic partner. He noted that “environmental, water, and climate issues considered within a regional framework are fully supported by the U.S.” However, he added that “long-term commercial and investment projects are impossible without long-term stability, which in turn requires coordination between neighbors, engagement on sensitive issues, and pragmatic regional cooperation.” D’Anieri also pointed to Afghanistan as “an integral part of regional logic,” and described formats such as C5+1 as evidence of Central Asia’s growing subjectivity. He highlighted the first-ever C5+1 summit at the presidential level in Washington as a landmark event, especially under the administration of Donald Trump, known for its preference for bilateral over multilateral formats. Trump and the Possibility of a Visit: Only with a “Big Deal” When asked whether a visit by President Trump to Central Asia is realistic, D’Anieri offered a candid assessment: “Such a visit is only possible if there is a large, symbolically and economically significant deal.” Whether in aviation, technology, or infrastructure, these high-visibility projects are typically what draw Trump’s engagement. He added that “the region has work to do in developing a package of initiatives that could interest the U.S. president and justify a high-level visit.” Potential areas include mining, transport, and logistics. Reframing Afghanistan’s Role in the Region Special Representative Yerkin Tukumov focused on the importance of reframing the region’s relationship with Afghanistan. For too long, he said, Afghanistan has been viewed primarily “through the prism of security threats,” resulting in a narrow and often misleading approach. Tukumov argued for a broader, more pragmatic view that considers economic, humanitarian, and cross-border dimensions. He described the C5+1 format not as a replacement for bilateral diplomacy, but as “an additional level of coordination where Central Asia can speak with a more consolidated voice without losing national autonomy in foreign policy.” He stressed the need to move beyond “ideological and declarative approaches,” toward practical, interest-based mechanisms of cooperation. Ecology, Water, and the Case for a Global Water Agency Ambassador-at-Large Zulfiya Suleimenova addressed the strategic urgency of regional coordination on water and climate. She emphasized that “water issues are transboundary in nature,” and that efforts to resolve them solely within national frameworks are bound to fall short. “Regional coordination in Central Asia is not a political slogan, but a functional necessity,” she said. Suleimenova argued that jointly promoting...

Qosh Tepa canal

Opinion – Qosh Tepa Canal: Transboundary Impacts Without a Transboundary Mechanism

In recent months, media attention has increasingly focused on infrastructure projects underway in Afghanistan. Chief among them is the Qosh Tepa Canal, widely seen not only as an irrigation initiative but as a development with significant transboundary implications for the Amu Darya River basin. The canal draws water from one of Central Asia’s most critical transboundary rivers. For downstream countries, primarily Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the Amu Darya is a vital water source, directly linked to agricultural output and the sustainability of rural communities. As such, the conversation surrounding Qosh Tepa extends well beyond Afghanistan’s domestic agenda. Concerns voiced by experts and analysts stem from both the scale of the project and the absence of an inclusive, basin-wide mechanism that includes Afghanistan, which is not a party to the main post-Soviet Amu Darya allocation frameworks. As a result, discussions regarding the canal’s potential impacts are taking place largely outside formal multilateral frameworks. One positive development is the increasing presentation of Qosh Tepa within a broader context, where water flow management is recognized as a factor shaping regional political and economic relations. However, these assessments often highlight not the canal’s stated purpose, but rather the absence of a sustainable mechanism for coordinating discussion of its cross-border effects. [caption id="attachment_43173" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: TCATCA[/caption] A recurring concern among experts is the lack of a structured multilateral platform that enables early-stage evaluation of such projects before they are perceived as risks. Infrastructure development in the region frequently outpaces the establishment of mechanisms for joint impact assessment and management. In this light, Kazakhstan’s initiative to establish a specialized structure within the UN system, the International Water Organization, acquires particular relevance. This proposal is not about building a theoretical global agenda but about addressing a specific institutional gap: the lack of a neutral forum for technical and expert discussion of transboundary water projects at an early stage. The Qosh Tepa Canal, currently a unilateral infrastructure undertaking rather than the result of an international agreement, could serve as a test case for such a preventive mandate. While the project is already underway and its transboundary implications are actively being discussed among experts, it has not yet escalated into a regional dispute. This creates an opportunity for professional dialogue, without entanglement in political or status-related debates. The present situation can be summarized as one of “transboundary implications without a transboundary mechanism.” The project, while entirely within Afghan territory, objectively affects the interests of downstream states, yet it remains disconnected from any multilateral framework for consultation or agreement. Is it in Afghanistan’s interest to engage in multilateral formats? Though the question is often left unanswered, the answer is a clear “yes.” Such engagement would help dispel suspicion not only among Central Asian states, but also in Iran and Pakistan, both of which have voiced concerns over shared water resources. First, it would reduce negative external rhetoric. Currently, Qosh Tepa is largely discussed via external media with alarmist scenarios and with little to no Afghan participation. This reinforces the image...

Iran protests

Iran Protests and Regional Stability: An Afghan Perspective

The protests that spread across Iran in late 2025 and early 2026 reflected more than short-term public discontent, instead exposing the cumulative effects of a prolonged socio-economic crisis. Persistently high inflation, declining real incomes, and falling living standards have placed sustained pressure on households and weakened the social contract between the state and society. Against this backdrop, the unrest increasingly acquired a foreign policy dimension. Strong statements from U.S. officials warning of consequences in response to Iran’s handling of the protests, combined with Tehran’s rejection of what it described as external interference, heightened the risk of the crisis becoming internationalized. Thus, the protests in Iran ceased to be an exclusively domestic issue and became a factor of regional instability. A key feature of the current situation is that the Iranian crisis is developing simultaneously on three fronts: socio-economic, where protests are fueled by deteriorating living conditions; political, linked to a crisis of confidence and governability; and geopolitical, where internal processes are used by external actors as a tool of pressure. Consequences for Afghanistan For Afghanistan, developments in Iran carry direct and practical significance. Since late 2024, Iran has become a source of large-scale returns of Afghan migrants, both voluntary and forced. By 2025, this process had become systematic, placing a heavy burden on Afghanistan’s western provinces, particularly Herat. In the event of prolonged instability and a deepening economic crisis in Iran, the likelihood of additional waves of migrant returns would increase. This would place further strain on Afghanistan’s labor market, healthcare system, social infrastructure, and already limited economic resources. In a fragile economy, the return of large numbers of migrants intensifies competition for jobs and raises the risk of local social tensions. The trade and logistics dimension is equally significant. Iran remains Afghanistan’s key economic partner and a vital transit corridor, including through the Islam Qala border crossing. Any deterioration in Iran’s socio-economic conditions has a direct impact on trade flows, supply chains, and broader regional economic stability. Significance for Central Asia The ongoing protest movements and the deterioration of the situation in Iran, driven by a systemic economic crisis and growing political and social discontent, could have a significant impact on political and economic dynamics, as well as security, across Central Asia. On the one hand, governments in the region are responding with cautious concern, mindful of the potential spillover effects of instability and rising internal discontent. A prolonged crisis in Iran increases the risks of migration pressure, border instability, and cross-border threats, all of which directly affect regional security. On the other hand, a further deterioration of Iran’s internal situation could disrupt trade, transit, and energy ties with Central Asia, weakening Tehran’s regional influence and reshaping the balance of power. Under such conditions, the role of other regional and external actors, including Russia, China, Turkey, and Western countries, is likely to grow as they gain opportunities to strengthen their positions in the region. As a result, the crisis in Iran is evolving beyond a domestic challenge and is...

TAPI Gas Pipeline

TAPI Gas Pipeline Advances Toward Herat, Afghanistan

Progress on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, one of the largest energy infrastructure projects in the region, was the central focus of recent talks between Turkmenistan’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, Khoja Ovezov, and Afghanistan’s Minister of Mining and Petroleum, Hedayatullah Badri. According to Turkmenistan’s state oil and gas company, Turkmennebit, the Turkmen delegation briefed its Afghan counterparts on the current phase of construction and outlined upcoming steps. Both sides expressed optimism that the pipeline will reach the western Afghan city of Herat by the end of 2026, a key milestone for the project. The TAPI pipeline is projected to span approximately 1,814 kilometers, with 214 kilometers running through Turkmenistan, 774 kilometers through Afghanistan, and 826 kilometers through Pakistan, ending at the Indian border. The Afghan segment is not only the longest outside of Pakistan but also the most challenging, both logistically and politically. The most recent development in the project, the opening of the Serhetabat-Herat section, officially named Arkadagyň ak ýoly (“Arkadag’s White Path”), was marked on October 20, 2025. Once operational, the pipeline is expected to bring substantial economic benefits to the participating countries. Afghanistan could receive over $1 billion annually in transit and related revenues, while Pakistan is projected to earn between $200 million and $250 million. These figures, according to project stakeholders, represent a significant step toward the economic goals of each nation involved. Preparatory work has already been completed on a 91-kilometer stretch of the TAPI route in Herat province. The necessary infrastructure is in place, and worker camps have been established along the pipeline corridor.

Afghanistan

Tajik Border Guards Kill 4 Gunmen From Afghanistan

Security forces in Tajikistan killed four armed men who crossed the border from Afghanistan, the Tajik government said. It was the latest clash in a rugged, sparsely populated area that has become a hotspot for violence along the frontier. Border guards in Tajikistan’s Shamsiddin Shohin district located the assailants after they entered the country early on Sunday, according to a border force statement that was reported by the state Khovar news agency. “The terrorists refused to obey the border guards' order to surrender and offered armed resistance,” the border force said. “All four terrorists were killed during the operation.” The statement said security forces seized equipment, including three Kalashnikov assault rifles, one pistol, ammunition, mobile phones, one walkie-talkie, and one boat. The vessel was likely used to cross the Pyanj River from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. Chinese gold mining operations in Tajikistan’s border area have become a target of deadly attacks, prompting China to urge Tajikistan to take robust measures to get the situation under control. On January 15, Yusuf Rahmon, secretary of Tajikistan’s Security Council, met Chinese ambassador Guo Zhijun to discuss regional stability.

Afghanistan

Taliban Remove Uzbek Language from Samangan University Sign

The Taliban have removed Uzbek and Persian inscriptions from the main signboard of Samangan University in northern Afghanistan, replacing them with a new sign written only in Pashto and English. The move, reported by Afghanistan International, has drawn criticism amid ongoing concerns about the marginalization of non-Pashtun languages and communities since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. Sources told Afghanistan International that the change followed the appointment of a new university head. The previous sign, which featured the university’s name in four languages, Pashto, Persian, Uzbek, and English, was taken down and replaced approximately four days later with a version that excluded the Persian and Uzbek languages. Samangan province is home to a significant ethnic Uzbek population. The decision has provoked backlash from academics and former officials. Former Faryab governor Naqibullah Faiq condemned the move as “ethno-nationalist,” warning that such actions risk exacerbating ethnic and linguistic tensions in the country. In response, some Uzbek and Persian speakers have publicly called for the reinstatement of their languages on the university sign. Mohibullah Mohib, a lecturer at Samangan University, wrote on Facebook that the sign change coincided with the institution’s transition from an institute of higher education to a full-fledged university. According to Mohib, the Taliban’s Ministry of Higher Education ordered the new sign and formally rejected a request to include Uzbek. He added that the ministry's written response explicitly denied the inclusion of Uzbek alongside the other languages. This is not the first incident of its kind. In October, the Taliban removed Uzbek from the signboard of Jawzjan University, sparking widespread criticism. Following public outcry, Uzbek was later reinstated on that sign. Over the past four years, the Taliban have faced repeated accusations of sidelining minority languages such as Persian, Uzbek, and Turkmen, including by removing Persian-language signage from government buildings and erasing cultural symbols associated with Persian-speaking poets and writers. The latest incident has also drawn attention in Uzbekistan. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Akhror Burkhanov told Qalampir.uz that Tashkent is closely monitoring the situation. He emphasized that any potential restrictions on the Uzbek language are a serious concern for Uzbekistan. Burkhanov stated that Uzbekistan is maintaining an ongoing dialogue with Afghan authorities. According to him, Afghan officials have assured Tashkent that no restrictions on the Uzbek language are currently in place or planned. They have also reiterated their respect for Uzbekistan, the Uzbek language, and the Uzbek people.