Afghanistan - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 1064

Islamic State – Khorasan

Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia

In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments. When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable. The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed. Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability. However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game. History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained. There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you. This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly. This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia. First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection. Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central...

Afghanistan

Three Main Principles of Kazakhstan’s Afghan Policy

August 15, 2026 will mark five years since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan. This substantial period can be assessed in different ways, particularly given the widespread skepticism at the outset regarding the Taliban’s ability to govern effectively and build relations with other countries. The situation in Afghanistan remains complex and multifaceted, with diverging trends. On the one hand, the current Afghan leadership faces a wide range of internal challenges, primarily socio-economic. After the Taliban’s return to power, humanitarian assistance declined sharply. For many years, two-thirds of Afghanistan’s budget had been financed through foreign aid, and its reduction has significantly affected the social conditions of ordinary Afghans. According to the United Nations, only one-third of the $2.4 billion humanitarian response plan required for 2025 has been funded. Over 21 million Afghans require humanitarian assistance. The economic situation has been further complicated by the deteriorating humanitarian environment, largely due to the deportation of millions of Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan this year. In total, around 4.5 million Afghans have returned since 2023, primarily through deportations from Iran and Pakistan, resulting in a 10% population increase. Other pressing social issues remain. Several countries continue to focus on security and terrorist threats, as well as government inclusiveness and the rights of women and girls, particularly their access to employment and education. At the same time, nearly five years into Taliban rule, the anticipated “economic and political collapse” has not materialized. The national budget is gradually increasing, and small and medium-sized enterprises are emerging. Industrial parks aimed at developing domestic production have appeared in major cities such as Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Herat. Since 2023, relative macroeconomic stabilization has been observed, although growth rates remain insufficient to offset demographic pressures and reduce poverty. The World Bank forecasts Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth at 4.3% in 2025, with inflation projected to remain low at approximately 2%. According to the United Nations, the area under opium poppy cultivation has declined by 95% during the years of Taliban rule. At the same time, synthetic drug production has reportedly increased, reflecting trends observed in many other countries. Politically, the Taliban maintains consolidated control over most of the country. In other words, a more stable, albeit fragile, reality has emerged, one that Central Asian countries must engage with on a daily basis. Kazakhstan has adopted a pragmatic approach. Its policy toward Afghanistan is based on a model of “pragmatic engagement without recognition,” while developing an independent system of transport, energy, and humanitarian ties with the country. Kazakhstan’s decision to remove the Taliban from its list of banned organizations does not signify a departure from international law nor does it constitute automatic recognition of the current Afghan authorities. On the issue of formal recognition, Kazakhstan relies on decisions of the UN Security Council. From a foreign policy perspective, this step forms part of a broader strategy: Kazakhstan is adapting its instruments to a changed reality while remaining within international norms and avoiding symbolic gestures that could be interpreted as...

Gold Mining

Gold Mining in Afghanistan Raises Security Concerns for Central Asia

Large-scale gold mining in northern Afghanistan is increasingly raising tensions and potential security risks for Central Asia, particularly along the Afghan-Tajik border, according to a report by ExpressAsia. The outlet reports that intensive extraction activities are continuing in border areas adjacent to Tajikistan, where clashes and exchanges of fire have periodically occurred between Tajik border guards and individuals described as illegal miners or smugglers attempting to cross the frontier. Over the past two years, mining operations have expanded significantly, with thousands of units of heavy equipment, including excavators and trucks, reportedly transported to Afghanistan’s Takhar and Badakhshan provinces. Local residents have referred to the rapid industrial expansion as a “gold apocalypse.” Mining is concentrated in the Chah Ab district, as well as the Shahri Buzurg and Raghistan areas, which border Tajikistan’s Khatlon region. The report states that around five Chinese companies and two Turkish firms are operating in the area, along with approximately 30 enterprises linked to Haji Bashir Noorzai, whom analysts widely describe as a major figure in Afghanistan’s narcotics trade, in addition to numerous smaller operators. Badakhshan province is considered one of Afghanistan’s most resource-rich regions. In addition to gold, deposits of rubies, lapis lazuli, platinum, and other valuable minerals are being actively extracted. Official figures cited in the report indicate that gold mining generated approximately $900 million in government revenue in 2025. At the same time, experts estimate that gold worth roughly $60 million is extracted daily in border areas alone. Despite the scale of the operations, analysts cited by ExpressAsia say regulatory oversight remains weak and revenue distribution lacks transparency. A significant share of profits is believed to flow to intermediaries and armed groups, while local communities reportedly receive limited economic benefit. Environmental concerns are also mounting. Ecologists warn that intensive mining has already degraded agricultural land, with some fertile areas reportedly turning into sandy terrain, potentially creating long-term ecological challenges for the region. Additional tensions stem from unresolved border management issues along the Panj River, which forms the natural boundary between Afghanistan and Tajikistan under agreements reached in the 1970s. As the river’s course gradually shifts, disputed islands have emerged, increasing the risk of unintentional crossings by miners and triggering repeated protests from the Tajik side. According to ExpressAsia, Tajik authorities have begun reinforcing riverbanks, a move that could further alter water flow and complicate territorial arrangements as mining activity continues to expand.

TCA Interviews

Uzbekistan’s Ambassador to Kazakhstan on Regional Integration and a Shifting Global Order

Amid shifting regional dynamics and an evolving global order, Uzbekistan has emerged as one of Central Asia’s most proactive diplomatic and economic actors. Since 2016, Tashkent has pursued an ambitious reform agenda at home while expanding cooperation with its neighbors and major global powers. In a wide-ranging interview with TCA, His Excellency Bakhtiyor Ibragimov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan, discusses regional integration, strategic partnerships, Afghanistan, China, and the future of economic diplomacy in Central Asia. TCA: Mr. Ambassador, Uzbekistan has demonstrated significant economic progress in recent years. What do you see as the key drivers behind this success? Ambassador Ibragimov: First of all, welcome to the Embassy of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Astana. We are familiar with your publication. We read it often, follow it, and analyze it. I would start with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev taking office at the end of 2016. It is no secret that until 2016, the Republic of Uzbekistan, despite its potential, was a fairly closed country. Our president always asks us, his representatives abroad, to speak openly about this. You cannot rewrite history or hide it. Relations with our neighbors were, frankly, at a very low level, and with some, there were no relations at all. The end of 2016 was a turning point, when reforms were not only declared but implemented and are now yielding results. One of President Mirziyoyev’s first foreign-policy priorities was normalization, and I want to emphasize this: normalization and then improving relations with neighbors. There is a saying in Uzbekistan: "If your neighbor is doing well, then you will also do well." Today, nearly a decade later, we can see that this policy is yielding results. Please note: this is not my personal assessment, but the assessment of international experts who recognize that the President has managed to achieve what once seemed impossible. I am speaking about regional integration with our neighbors. For example, a key issue for Central Asia is water. Many analysts warn that competition for water resources could, in the future, become a potential source of conflict. Two main rivers feed the region. Unfortunately, due to climate change, water volumes are not increasing year by year, while consumption is rising. We have managed to resolve almost all issues to date. In particular, based on the level of accumulation in the autumn-winter period in the upper reaches of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, and taking into account irrigation needs during the growing season, our water specialists jointly agree on and ensure the necessary water discharge within an agreed time frame. Uzbekistan, as you know, is located in the very center of Central Asia, bordering all Central Asian states, as well as Afghanistan. Today, border issues have largely been resolved. The final chord was struck on March 31, 2025, when the leaders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement on the border junction point, confirming the point of convergence of the three countries’ state borders. It should also be...

Bilateral Trade

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan Aim to Boost Trade to $5 Billion

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan plan to accelerate the introduction of a preferential trade regime and significantly expand bilateral trade, Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khodjaev said. In a post on his LinkedIn page, Khodjaev wrote that on February 24 he held a video conference with Afghanistan’s Minister of Industry and Trade, Nuriddin Azizi. “We discussed practical steps to expand trade and economic cooperation and preparations for an upcoming visit of the Afghan delegation to Uzbekistan,” he said. Khodjaev noted that Uzbekistan values its “friendly and constructive relations” with Afghanistan. According to him, over the past five years bilateral trade has grown 2.5 times, from $653 million in 2021 to $1.7 billion in 2025. “Our shared goal is to increase this figure to $5 billion,” he wrote. The discussions also addressed the development of interregional ties and the infrastructure needed to promote goods, including showrooms and warehouse facilities. The two sides considered industrial cooperation in agricultural processing, construction materials, and textiles, as well as joint initiatives in food security. “We agreed to accelerate the entry into force of the Preferential Trade Agreement and to advance projects in investment and industrial cooperation,” Khodjaev stated. He added that, after Ramadan, work would continue in a practical format, including a business forum in Kabul and the preparation of a roadmap outlining priority areas. Earlier data indicate that in 2024 bilateral trade reached approximately $1.1 billion, with more than $1 billion accounting for Uzbek exports to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

From Security Threat to Economic Partner: Central Asia’s New ‘View’ of Afghanistan

Afghanistan is quickly becoming more important to Central Asia, and the third week of February was filled with meetings that underscored the changing relationship. There was an “extraordinary” meeting of the Regional Contact Group of Special Representatives of Central Asian countries on Afghanistan in the Kazakh capital Astana. Also, a delegation from Uzbekistan’s Syrdarya Province visited Kabul, and separately, Uzbekistan’s Chamber of Commerce organized a business forum in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif. A Peaceful and Stable Future for Afghanistan The meeting in Astana brought together the special representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for Afghanistan. The group was formed in August 2025. There was no explanation for why the fifth Central Asian country, Turkmenistan, chose not to participate. The purpose of the Astana meeting was to coordinate a regional approach to Afghanistan. Comments made by the representatives showed Central Asia’s changing assessment of its southern neighbor. Kazakhstan’s special representative, Yerkin Tokumov, said, “In the past [Kazakhstan] viewed Afghanistan solely through the lens of security threats… Today,” Tokumov added, “we also see economic opportunities.” Business is the basis of Central Asia’s relationship with the Taliban authorities. Representatives noted several times that none of the Central Asian states officially recognizes the Taliban government (only Russia officially recognizes that government). But that has not stopped Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in particular, from finding a new market for their exports in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan’s special representative, Ismatulla Ergashev, pointed out that his country’s trade with Afghanistan in 2025 amounted to nearly $1.7 billion. Figures for Kazakh-Afghan trade for all of 2025 have not been released, but during the first eight months of that year, trade totaled some $335.9 million, and in 2024, amounted to $545.2 million. In 2022, Kazakh-Afghan trade reached nearly $1 billion ($987.9 million). About 90% of trade with Afghanistan is exports from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. For example, Kazakhstan is the major supplier of wheat and other grains to Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan is the biggest exporter of electricity to Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan’s trade with Afghanistan is significantly less, but from March 2024 to March 2025, it came to some $66 million. To put that into perspective, as a bloc, the Central Asian states are now Afghanistan’s leading trade partner, with more volume than Pakistan, India, or China. Kazakhstan’s representative, Tokumov, highlighted Afghanistan’s strategic value as a transit corridor that could open trade routes between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. Kyrgyzstan’s representative, Turdakun Sydykov, said the trade, economic, and transport projects the Central Asian countries are implementing or planning are a “key condition for a peaceful and stable future for Afghanistan and the region as a whole.” The group also discussed humanitarian aid for Afghanistan. All four of these Central Asian states have provided humanitarian aid to their neighbor since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021. Regional security was also included on the agenda in Astana, but reports offered little information about these discussions. A few days before the opening of the meeting in Astana, Russian Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Sergei...