Afghanistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Afghanistan

Tensions Simmer Between Pakistan and Afghanistan, in Setback for Central Asian Trade Hopes

A round of peace talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan in Istanbul came under strain after another clash between the two countries along their border. A resolution to the conflict is important to Central Asian countries that want to trade south through Afghanistan and onward to Pakistani seaports that open the way to the Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s government and the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan accused each other of instigating the latest confrontation on Thursday, though they still expressed commitment to a delicate ceasefire that was agreed to last month. Dozens of people were killed and cross-border trade was suspended during the fighting in October. According to the Taliban’s account, Pakistani forces fired on the Afghan border town of Spin Boldak as the talks in Turkey began on Thursday. Afghan forces, “out of respect for the negotiation team and to prevent civilian casualties, have so far shown no reaction. It is worth noting that in the previous round of negotiations, both sides had agreed to extend the ceasefire and prevent any acts of aggression,” Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said on X. Pakistan’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, however, said firing started from the Afghan side and that Pakistan forces responded. “The situation was brought under control due to responsible action by Pakistani forces and the ceasefire remains intact. Pakistan remains committed to ongoing dialogue and expects reciprocity from Afghan authorities,” the ministry said. Turkey, which along with Qatar is mediating, said ahead of the talks this week that the two sides had agreed to continue the ceasefire and establish “a monitoring and verification mechanism” to ensure peace and impose penalties for any violations. But Pakistani Information Minister Attaullah Tarar, while thanking the mediators, said late Friday that Afghanistan had failed to control terrorism, indicating that the talks in Istanbul had not overcome major sticking points. A key dispute is over Pakistani allegations that militants have used Afghan territory as a sanctuary while carrying out attacks against targets in Pakistan. The Taliban in Afghanistan denies those allegations. Additionally, Afghanistan doesn’t recognize its porous, 2,600-kilometer border with Pakistan, saying it’s a British colonial-era construct that divided the ethnic Pashtun populations that have traditionally dominated Afghanistan. These complexities pose a challenge for landlocked countries in Central Asia that are looking to diversity their trade routes. Several Central Asia-South Asia projects in the works – the Trans-Afghan Railway, the TAPI natural gas pipeline and the CASA-1000 electricity project - have a long way to go before completion. Meanwhile, the post-Soviet states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are working on other trade and investment opportunities. Their leaders held a summit with U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington on Thursday, building ties with the West even as they nurture more established contacts with Russia and China.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan Restores Power Imports from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan After Earthquake

A powerful earthquake that struck northern Afghanistan on November 2 caused significant destruction and disrupted electricity imports from neighboring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, according to Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), the country’s national power company. The earthquake damaged two major transmission lines, Nayibabad to Samangan and Kholm to Pul-e-Khumri, severing power supplies from Uzbekistan to several provinces, including Kabul, Baghlan, Parwan, Panjshir, Kapisa, Logar, Paktia, Ghazni, and Maidan Wardak. Electricity imported from Tajikistan to Kunduz was also interrupted, leaving large swathes of northern Afghanistan without power. Technical teams were immediately deployed to assess the damage and begin restoration work. The U.S. Geological Survey reported that the 6.3-magnitude quake struck at a depth of 28 kilometers near Mazar-i-Sharif. Tremors were felt across multiple provinces, including Samangan, Balkh, and the capital, Kabul. The cities of Aybak, Mazar-i-Sharif, Maymana, Takhar, Kunduz, and Sar-e-Pul experienced the strongest shocks. According to CNN, at least 27 people were killed and more than 950 injured, citing Dr. Sharafat Zaman Amar, spokesperson for Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Health. The quake also damaged one of the country’s historic mosques in the north. DABS confirmed that electricity imports have now been fully restored, including the damaged 220-kilovolt transmission line from Tajikistan. On November 3, the company’s spokesperson told TOLONews that imports from both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan had been interrupted due to the earthquake. DABS representative Mohammad Sadiq Haqparast said, “Our technical teams are working diligently to restore both transmission lines as quickly as possible.” Following the disruption, Kabul residents urged the government to accelerate repairs, emphasizing that stable and reliable access to electricity remains a critical concern, particularly in the capital. Afghanistan is heavily reliant on imported electricity, receiving over 720 megawatts from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. These imports cost the country between $250 million and $280 million annually. Separately, on the sidelines of the International Conference and Exhibition on Energy, Construction Affairs, Industry and Development of Chemicals of Turkmenistan-2025, DABS General Director Dr. Abdul Bari Omar met with Turkmen Deputy Cabinet Minister Batur Amanov. Their discussions focused on key regional energy projects, including the 500 kV transmission line, the TAPI gas pipeline, and the electrification of Bala Murghab district. The meeting underscored the importance of regional cooperation in bolstering Afghanistan’s energy infrastructure.

Afghanistan

Border Violence Between Afghanistan and Pakistan: A New Risk for Central Asia

The escalating tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan are forcing a reassessment of Afghanistan’s viability as a “partner space.” With cross-border clashes increasingly resembling a prolonged pattern rather than isolated incidents, and with both sides showing little willingness to compromise, the question grows more urgent: Can Afghanistan realistically become a partner for Central Asian countries, or is it destined to remain a persistent source of regional instability? This confrontation is deeply unsettling for the countries of Central Asia. Still in the early stages of formulating coherent policies toward Afghanistan, they have tentatively linked their development strategies to the hope of having a stable neighbor to the south – one that might serve as a bridge to South Asia. Against this backdrop, deteriorating Afghan-Pakistani relations breed more frustration and anxiety than hope. No country in the world, except Russia, has recognized the Taliban regime de jure. This broad reluctance reflects deep skepticism; few are willing to assume legal obligations or share responsibility for Kabul’s actions. Yet, Afghanistan remains far from isolated. Its geographic centrality makes it impossible to ignore. Accordingly, Central Asia has developed a distinct approach to dealing with its southern neighbor. It can be summarized as: We do not recognize, but we cooperate; we do not trust, but we verify; we do not agree, but we engage. In essence, Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly the ones in Central Asia, have adopted a pragmatic, long-term strategy: engage without illusions or formal recognition, while maintaining the flexibility to adjust based on Kabul’s behavior. For these countries, Afghanistan does not stand as an independent priority. Its role is evaluated solely within the broader regional framework. In the most favorable scenario, Afghanistan serves as a transit corridor linking South and Central Asia. Yet even this utility is not indispensable; viable alternatives through Iran, the South Caucasus, Turkey, and China already exist and are expanding. Looking ahead, three broad scenarios can be envisioned: Optimistic: The Taliban demonstrate readiness for responsible engagement. This would enable Afghanistan’s gradual integration into trade and transport initiatives, expansion of economic ties, and a firm establishment as a bridge between Central and South Asia. Pessimistic: Afghanistan remains a chronic risk factor and flashpoint for regional crises. The ongoing Afghan-Pakistani confrontation, no longer a fleeting episode but an entrenched conflict, is a clear warning sign. If this becomes the norm, it will deter serious investment, no stakeholder will commit to a country that cannot guarantee peace with its neighbors. Inertia: Central Asian states continue their cautious balancing act under the logic that “a bad peace is better than a good war.” While cooperation continues at a minimal level, countries prioritize alternative routes and avoid deep commitments. Under this status quo, ambitious projects like the Trans-Afghanistan Railway and the TAPI pipeline are unlikely to materialize. The former risks losing the “trans” prefix; the latter may, for now, become little more than a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan venture. Nonetheless, there remains a window for diplomacy. Pressured by Turkey and Qatar, Kabul and Islamabad have agreed to resume negotiations aimed...

Afghanistan

Tajik Border Guards Clash with Taliban Fighters Along Afghan Border

Armed clashes erupted between Tajik border guards and Taliban fighters on October 25 along the Tajik-Afghan frontier, according to local sources cited by the Afghan outlet 8 Subh. The confrontation reportedly occurred in the Davanga district of Shahr-e Buzurg, located in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province. The dispute reportedly stemmed from disagreements over water diversion from the Amu Darya river, which serves as part of the natural boundary between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The region is also home to Chinese-operated gold mining projects, further complicating the security landscape. Sources on the ground reported casualties and injuries, although official figures have not yet been released. The Tajik government has not issued an official statement. In response to the incident, Taliban representatives in Badakhshan held a meeting with the province’s appointed governor, Ismail Ghaznawi. This is not the first escalation in the area. On August 24, a shootout occurred near a Chinese-operated gold mining facility on the Afghan side of the border. That conflict was halted following emergency negotiations between the two sides, although accusations of harboring hostile groups persisted. The latest incident comes just days after a Taliban delegation visited Dushanbe. Led by Balkh province's Governor Yusuf Wafa, the delegation met with Tajikistan’s National Security Council Chairman Saimumin Yatimov and the Chairman of the Council of Ulemas, Saidmukarram Abdulkodirzoda. Despite this diplomatic contact, Tajikistan remains the only Central Asian country that has not recognized the Taliban government. Dushanbe continues to call for the formation of an inclusive government in Afghanistan and the protection of human rights. Nonetheless, limited trade and humanitarian engagement between the two countries persist. The Afghan embassy in Dushanbe is still headed by a diplomat appointed by the former government, while the Afghan consulate in Khorog is administered by a representative of the current Taliban-led administration. Tajikistan, in turn, maintains its embassy and consulate in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

Kazakhstan Responds to Claims It Has Abandoned Ethnic Kazakhs in Afghanistan

Recent claims circulating on social media have accused the Kazakh government of abandoning ethnic Kazakhs in Afghanistan, with posts often alleging that thousands of Kazakhs have been left to fend for themselves, painting an emotionally charged but factually questionable picture. The Times of Central Asia set out to verify these claims and found a far more complex reality. Historical Background Kazakh migration to Afghanistan dates back over a century. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, some groups of Kazakhs arrived via Xinjiang, China. Later waves followed during the 1930s, prompted by famine and Stalinist repression in the USSR. Some speculate that early migrants may have included supporters of Kenesary Khan, but this remains the subject of academic debate. While there are no official Afghan census records, estimates suggest that by the mid-20th century, the number of Kazakhs in Afghanistan may have reached 20,000-24,000. However, the repatriation programs of the 1990s drastically reduced these numbers. Since Kazakhstan’s independence, approximately 13,000 Kazakhs have returned from Afghanistan, part of a broader national effort that has repatriated over 1.15 million ethnic Kazakhs from abroad. Even after the Taliban takeover, repatriation efforts continued. In September 2021, for example, 35 ethnic Kazakhs were airlifted to Kazakhstan on a specially arranged flight. Disputed Numbers According to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry and as confirmed by its embassy in Kabul, the number of ethnic Kazakhs remaining in Afghanistan is about 200 people, or roughly 15 families. In contrast, some self-proclaimed “cultural centers” and online activists claim there are “thousands” of families, with some estimates as high as 3,600 people. These figures are not substantiated by either official data or independent research. Verifying Ethnic Identity The Kazakh embassy in Kabul maintains contact with community representatives to track and verify the status of ethnic Kazakhs. Yet, confirming identities is a serious challenge in Afghanistan due to the absence of a comprehensive population registry. Since 2018, Afghan identity cards (e-Tazkira) have included a “nationality” field, but filling it is optional and based primarily on self-declaration or statements by local elders. This system is vulnerable to manipulation. The embassy reports cases where individuals from other ethnic backgrounds have falsely identified as Kazakh in the hope of qualifying for repatriation programs. Additional complications include limited access to remote provinces, weak administrative oversight, and security concerns. The embassy thus relies on field visits, trusted local contacts, and cautious verification to produce its population estimates. Mixed Marriages and Assimilation One of the biggest challenges in identification is interethnic marriage. Over the decades, many Kazakhs in Afghanistan have assimilated into surrounding Uzbek, Turkmen, or Tajik communities. Many no longer speak Kazakh, and identity is maintained through fragmentary knowledge of family genealogies (shezhire), often insufficient for verification. The embassy also raised concerns about “disputed applicants”, individuals attempting to exploit Kazakhstan’s earlier, more lenient kandastar (ethnic repatriation) policy. In the absence of rigorous documentation, ethnicity in Afghanistan has often been based on verbal claims, creating openings for abuse and corruption. Why Not Use DNA? Some social media users...

Central Asian Borders

The Taliban’s Border Rhetoric: Pashtun Frontiers, Not Central Asian Borders

Two incidents in mid-October reignited debate over Afghanistan’s borders, particularly its long-disputed frontier with Pakistan. On October 18, Mohammad Nabi Omari, Afghanistan’s first deputy minister for interior affairs, suggested that Afghanistan’s “historical lands” now in Pakistan could one day return to Afghan control. The next day, Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred to “ending tensions on the Afghanistan–Pakistan border” in a ceasefire statement, prompting Taliban objections and a quick retraction. These remarks revived a longstanding Afghan grievance: the Durand Line, a frontier drawn in 1893 by the British between Afghanistan and British India. No Afghan government has ever recognized it as an international border, and the Taliban refers to it as an “imaginary line.” The Taliban’s language may alarm some observers who wonder whether such rhetoric could extend beyond Pakistan to Afghanistan’s northern borders with Central Asia. Those frontiers were defined in the 19th century by treaties between the Russian and British empires, with little Afghan involvement. Yet despite the heated language and recent armed clashes with Pakistan, the Taliban’s stance appears more ideological than expansionist. The Durand Agreement of 1893 established the boundary between Afghanistan and British India as a line separating their respective spheres of influence. When Pakistan gained independence in 1947, that line became an international border, recognized by all states except Afghanistan. The 2,600-kilometer frontier divided Pashtun and Baloch communities between two countries, leaving deep resentment that continues to shape tensions in the region. Pashtuns still move relatively freely across this rugged border, which has served as a haven for militants for decades. Afghanistan’s northern borders tell a slightly different story. They were drawn not by Afghan rulers but under the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873, which set the Amu Darya River as the boundary between the Russian and British spheres of influence. This arrangement confirmed Afghanistan’s authority over the lands south of the river, including Balkh, Kunduz, and Badakhshan, reinforcing both its territorial control and its legitimacy. In essence, the demarcation of Afghanistan’s northern boundary was a political gain. While the Durand Line came to represent partition and loss, the 1873 agreement brought Afghanistan new territory and legitimacy as a buffer state between the Russian and British empires. The north is largely inhabited by Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen, with few Pashtuns. This distinction helps explain why the Taliban’s references to “historic lands” focus on the Durand Line rather than Afghanistan’s borders with Central Asian states. Afghanistan’s acting defense minister, Mawlawi Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid, the son of the Taliban’s late founder Mullah Mohammad Omar, recently reiterated that “[the Durand Line] has never been recognized as an official border, and no agreement has been made on this issue.… This is not a decision any government can make; it is a matter for the people.” Deputy Interior Minister Mohammad Nabi Omari’s call for the “return” of historic lands reflects the same ideological stance: a vision of Pashtun unity shaped by popular will rather than a call for military action or unilateral political moves. The Taliban, a Pashtun-led movement, uses...