Central Asian migrants - The Times Of Central Asia

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Migrant School Fees

Russian Lawmakers Propose School Fees for Central Asian Migrants’ Children

Russia relies on millions of workers from Central Asia, but lawmakers want to charge some of their children, typically aged 15–17, for the final two years of public schooling. The move comes after tougher enrollment rules that have left thousands of migrant children struggling to attend Russian schools. The proposal, submitted to the government by deputies from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) on October 14, would require foreign citizens and stateless people to pay for education in grades 10 and 11. LDPR leader Leonid Slutsky argued that migrant families should bear the costs of educating their children in Russian upper-secondary schools, allowing public funds to be redirected toward Russian students. The party claimed that more than 130,000 foreign children attend grades 10–11, costing the state over 37 billion rubles (about $440 million) annually. However, these figures contradict data from Russia's Ministry of Education analyzed by the data project Tochno, which found approximately 130,000 foreign pupils and another 3,000 stateless pupils enrolled across all school grades in 2025–26, with only 4% of foreign pupils attending grades 10–11. That would put the number of foreign pupils in the final two grades at roughly 5,200, casting doubt on the LDPR's estimated savings. Growing Pressure on Migrant Families The proposed fees follow a series of Russian restrictions that have already made it more difficult for Central Asian families to educate their children in Russia. Since April 2025, foreign children seeking admission to Russian schools have been required to demonstrate sufficient Russian-language proficiency and provide documentation establishing their legal residence. Enrollment among children from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan fell by 27% in the 2025–26 school year, from approximately 122,000 to 89,000. In January 2026, Tajikistan's Minister of Education and Science Rahim Saidzoda reported that approximately 9,000 Tajik children had returned from Russia during 2025 following difficulties continuing their education there. Kyrgyzstan's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) raises a separate legal question. The EAEU treaty recognizes the right of migrant workers' children to receive education in the country where their parents work, subject to that country's legislation. However, it does not explicitly guarantee free tuition, leaving unclear whether children of workers from EAEU member states would qualify for exemptions. For migrant families, the immediate consequences would depend on the eventual tuition charges and exemptions. Some parents might choose vocational education for their children after grade nine, while others could leave them with relatives in their home countries rather than incur additional schooling expenses in Russia. Additional education costs could discourage migrant workers from bringing their families to Russia, even as the country continues to rely on Central Asian labor. Central Asia's Dependence on Remittances The proposed fees would affect families whose earnings are often vital to their home countries' economies. Tajikistan is the most dependent on remittances relative to the size of its economy, Kyrgyzstan relies particularly heavily on earnings from Russia, and Uzbekistan receives the largest remittance inflows in absolute terms. According to The Times of Central Asia's Central Asia Balance...

Central Asian migrants

Russia Still Dominates Uzbek Remittances Despite Falling Share

Remittances to Uzbekistan continued to rise in the first quarter of 2026, even as Russia’s share of migrant transfers declined, according to a new labor market review by the Central Bank of Uzbekistan. Uzbek migrant workers sent home $3.8 billion in the first three months of the year, up 13% from the same period in 2025. Russia remained by far the largest source of those transfers, accounting for 72.4% of the total, but its share fell from 77.6% a year earlier. More than 1.63 million Uzbek citizens traveled abroad in the first quarter of 2026, an increase of 11.6% compared with the same period last year, according to the Central Bank. The figure covers outbound travel by Uzbek citizens, rather than labor migration alone, but it points to continued growth in population mobility. Air travel also expanded sharply during the first three months of the year, with 2.25 million passengers transported by air, up 32% year-on-year. Russia remained the main destination for Uzbek labor migrants, although the number of citizens working there under the country’s patent system declined. A work patent is the permit used by many visa-free foreign nationals, including Uzbeks, to work legally in Russia, with workers making regular tax-style payments to maintain the document. According to the Central Bank, 1.34 million Uzbek citizens were working in Russia under work patents in the first quarter, down 8.8% from the previous quarter and 1.8% compared with the same period in 2025. The bank said the decline reflected seasonal factors as well as changing conditions in external labor markets. Those "changing conditions" include a weaker ruble and tighter migration enforcement in Russia, where the price of a work patent has also risen. In Moscow, for example, the monthly payment required to maintain a migrant work patent increased from 8,900 rubles (about $120) to 10,000 rubles (about $135) from January 2026. There has also been a gradual opening of alternative destinations for Uzbek workers. Citing Turkey’s migration authority, the Central Bank said the number of Uzbek citizens in Turkey holding official residence or migration permits reached nearly 70,000 in the first quarter, up 14% year-on-year. The number of Uzbek nationals residing in South Korea also continued to grow, reaching 99,600. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s share of remittances rose from 3.1% to 4.1%, Europe’s increased from 2.3% to 3.3%, and South Korea’s rose from 3.5% to 4.1%. The combined share of other countries climbed from 13.6% to 16.2%. The figures suggest that Uzbek labor migration is becoming more geographically varied, but Russia remains dominant. Its 72.4% share of remittances is still more than 17 times the share of Kazakhstan or South Korea, and almost 22 times Europe’s share. The latest figures build on a broader trend identified by the Central Bank last year. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, Uzbek migrant workers sent home $4.8 billion in the second quarter of 2025, up 21.4% year-on-year. At the time, the Central Bank linked the increase to stable exchange rates in host countries, rising wages, and continued economic activity, while noting particularly strong growth...

Citizenship Revocation

Russia Cancels Citizenship of Eight People Originally From Central Asia

Russia’s Federal Security Service and Ministry of Internal Affairs have revoked the citizenship of eight naturalized people originally from Central Asia, citing alleged threats to national security, Interfax reported. The Federal Security Service (FSB) said the citizenship cancellations were carried out under Russia’s 2023 citizenship law, which allows authorities to strip naturalized citizens of Russian nationality in certain cases related to national security and public safety. Among those affected is a resident of Russia’s Tver region who had previously been convicted several times of arranging fictitious registrations and residency permits for foreign nationals and Russian citizens. According to the FSB, one of the people whose status he helped legalize in Russia is suspected of assisting the perpetrators of the March 2024 terrorist attack at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall concert venue, which killed more than 140 people and became one of the deadliest attacks in modern Russian history. Authorities also revoked the citizenship of a resident of the Tula region who, according to the FSB, presented himself as a figure in the local criminal underworld. He had been convicted of illegal weapons possession and sentenced to one year and six months in a penal settlement. The remaining cases involved people living in several Russian regions. The FSB said a resident of Buryatia promoted nationalist views directed against Russia’s indigenous population, while a resident of the Altai region had repeatedly faced criminal charges for assault-related offenses. Three residents of the Tyumen region were stripped of citizenship for allegedly spreading what authorities described as anti-Russian sentiments and encouraging people to organize along ethnic lines to participate in interethnic conflicts. Another resident of the Arkhangelsk region was accused of contributing to tensions in interethnic and interfaith relations. The FSB did not disclose the countries of origin of the eight people, describing them only as natives of Central Asia. The move comes amid increased scrutiny of migration and naturalization policies in Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack. Russian authorities have tightened migration controls and expanded security checks involving foreign nationals and naturalized citizens from Central Asia, a region that remains a major source of labor migration to Russia. Under the citizenship law adopted in 2023, Russian citizenship obtained through naturalization can be revoked for a range of offenses that authorities classify as threats to national security.

CIS

Putin in Tajikistan for CIS Summit Amid Migration Tensions

When President Vladimir Putin arrives in Dushanbe on 8 October for his first state visit, Tajikistan will briefly become the focal point of regional diplomacy. Currently holding the rotating chair of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Dushanbe is preparing to host both the CIS Heads of State Council and the second Russia–Central Asia summit. For Moscow, Central Asia has remained a priority since the invasion of Ukraine, and the visit highlights what is at stake for both Russia and its host. Tajikistan depends heavily on Russia for security, trade, and employment opportunities for its citizens, but relations have been tested by the aftermath of the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack, which exposed the fragility of migration-driven economics and the risk of renewed extremism. An Old Relationship Tested by New Tensions Russia and Tajikistan have been closely entwined since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin has already made twelve trips to Tajikistan since taking office, and this will be his first with state‑visit status. Security cooperation remains the backbone of the relationship. Russia’s 201st military base in Tajikistan - formerly the 201st motor rifle division and now Moscow’s largest overseas facility - has long been billed as a shield along the Afghan frontier; the two sides continue to coordinate through the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), and within the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) framework. Trade between the two nations has expanded despite sanctions headwinds. On the eve of the visit, presidential aide Yuri Ushakov said bilateral turnover rose by more than 17 % in the first seven months of 2025, and reached about US$1.5 billion in 2024. Russia accounts for over 22 % of Tajikistan’s foreign trade. Meanwhile, more than 1.2 million Tajik citizens work in Russia, making up about 16 % of all foreign workers there. They remitted US$1.8 billion back home last year, roughly 17 % of Tajikistan’s GDP. This symbiosis means that the two leaders routinely discuss labor migration and social issues alongside security and trade. Yet the relationship has been strained by a wave of xenophobia following the Crocus City Hall attack, which killed 145 people, which the Russian authorities accused militants from Tajikistan of perpetrating. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, following the arrest of four Tajik suspects, Central Asian migrants in Russia have faced arson attacks, beatings, and boycotts of their businesses. Russian law enforcement has launched aggressive street inspections and created special units to check hostels and businesses frequented by Central Asians. Even long‑time Tajik residents with Russian citizenship have reported menacing phone calls and threats. In the wake of the attack, diaspora leaders urged compatriots not to leave their homes, and the Tajik interior ministry publicly rebutted Russian media reports, stating that three of the four suspects named were not involved. Those pressures hit a country heavily reliant on remittances. The World Bank’s 2025 update estimates that money sent home by migrants accounted for 49 % of Tajikistan’s GDP in 2024. Since the start of the Ukraine war, Russian politicians and media have become increasingly hostile toward Central Asian migrants, leading Moscow to deactivate all foreign‑owned SIM cards and...

Labor migrants

Russia’s Crackdown Forces Central Asia to Rethink Labor Migration

The most recent World Bank study on labor migration highlighted the immense scale of the issue, describing it as "an ongoing development challenge in Europe and Central Asia, which is currently home to 100 million migrants," roughly one-third of all migrants globally. Historically, Russia has been the primary destination for Central Asia's mobile labor force. However, since March 2024, Moscow’s increasingly restrictive migration policies have forced Central Asian states to confront a dual challenge: managing displaced workers and rethinking the logistics of cross-border labor flows. As of 2023, more than 80% of labor migrants from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were working in Russia. Migration from Uzbekistan was more diversified, with 57% of migrants heading to Russia, 15% to Kazakhstan, and 10% to Ukraine. For millions across the region, labor migration remains a vital economic lifeline. According to the World Bank report, The Journey Ahead: Supporting Successful Migration in Europe and Central Asia, remittances in 2024 accounted for 45% of Tajikistan’s GDP, the highest ratio globally. In Kyrgyzstan, remittances made up 24% of GDP, while in Uzbekistan the figure was 14%. A 2025 update increased the figure for Tajikistan further still, noting that domestic consumption was "supported by large remittance inflows - peaking at 49% of GDP in 2024." Since the start of the war in Ukraine, rhetoric in the Russian media and among some politicians toward Central Asian migrants has increasingly shifted toward overt hostility. Following the March 2024 terrorist attack at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, in which Tajik nationals were named among the suspects, Russia began implementing harsher measures. This included widespread street inspections of Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik citizens, alongside new, more restrictive legal frameworks. While certain steps, such as mandatory biometric data collection, were officially justified by security concerns, other policies have further complicated daily life for foreign nationals. For example, since January 2025, all foreign-owned SIM cards in Russia have been deactivated. Foreign citizens must now register with government agencies to obtain new mobile services, a policy framed as a response to telecom fraud. Another measure, introduced on June 30, requires citizens of visa-free countries to register in the “Gosuslugi RuID” app before entering Russia. They must obtain a digital code to pass border control, effectively instituting a pre-entry surveillance mechanism. Kazakhstan was the first to publicly respond, with Foreign Ministry spokesman Aibek Smadiyarov refusing to rule out reciprocal measures against Russian citizens. “We are studying this issue very carefully. It requires consultations with our government agencies,” Smadiyarov said. Yet, despite these developments, none of the Central Asian countries currently maintains a comprehensive migration strategy equipped to handle these shifting dynamics. In Kazakhstan, the issue came to the fore in 2025 with a noticeable influx of Tajik nationals, the group most affected by Russia’s new rules. At a government meeting in late July, officials noted that Kazakhstan had recorded a positive migration balance for the second consecutive year, as well as a 1.5-fold increase in the number of foreign citizens permanently residing in the country. “The importance...

War in Ukraine

Central Asian Migrants Coerced Into Russia’s War in Ukraine

Citizens of Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, are increasingly being coerced into joining Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, according to a recent statement from Ukraine’s military intelligence agency. Many of those affected are labor migrants who originally traveled to Russia for work but were later pressured or misled into signing military contracts. Reports suggest that Russian army representatives have been enticing migrants with promises of fast money through short-term enlistment. In practice, however, many of these so-called “volunteers” are deployed to the most dangerous front-line positions. Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence claims most do not survive. Among the recently reported casualties were nationals from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan who had enlisted earlier this year. Ukraine's warning also highlights the legal risks facing survivors. Returning home after fighting in a foreign conflict can expose them to criminal charges and potentially long prison sentences under national laws that prohibit participation in overseas military operations. Russian officials have also acknowledged the recruitment of migrants. Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, stated during a legal forum in St. Petersburg that his office had identified around 80,000 individuals who received Russian citizenship but then attempted to evade military service. Of those, approximately 20,000 are currently serving on the front lines in Ukraine, according to Bastrykin. As of September 2024, Russia hosted nearly four million citizens from Central Asia. Uzbekistan accounted for the largest share with an estimated 1.79 million migrants, followed by Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. While some migrants sign military contracts out of economic desperation, others reportedly face coercion, threatened with the loss of citizenship or imprisonment for avoiding conscription. The practice of deploying foreign labor migrants to the battlefield has caused mounting concern across Central Asia. Families fear for the fate of relatives drawn into a distant and escalating conflict, often without clear legal protection or state support.