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EAEU

Putin’s Astana Visit Shows What Russia Still Wants From Kazakhstan

The Eurasian Economic Union summit in Astana gave Vladimir Putin's state visit a wider stage. The summit produced technical documents and familiar language about integration. The bilateral Russia-Kazakhstan package around it was more concrete. It showed what Moscow still wants from Kazakhstan, and what Astana expects in return. The detail lies in infrastructure, where contracts can last for decades. The setting echoed history. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed the treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana on May 29, 2014, with Armenia joining in January 2015, and Kyrgyzstan in August of the same year. In 2026, the bloc returned to Astana for the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and the V Eurasian Economic Forum. The theme of the forum was artificial intelligence, digital regulation, and the EAEU's place in the global technology race. Its website said 14 integration documents were signed on the sidelines, including memoranda, agreements, protocols, and joint action plans. Those documents gave the visit a regional frame. The larger result came on May 28, when Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Putin oversaw a broad set of bilateral agreements. Akorda listed nuclear power, Russian export credit, expanded oil-sector cooperation, a tenge-ruble currency swap, education projects, financial monitoring, transport digitalization, and nuclear safety regulation. That package points to the real agenda: energy, transit, payments, industrial production, and public-facing alliance language. For Moscow, Kazakhstan’s primary value is geographic: it sits between Russia and China, and across routes that connect Central Asia to Europe, the Caspian, and South Asia. Russian crude already crosses Kazakhstan on the Priirtyshsk-Atasu-Alashankou route to China. A KazTransOil contract keeps transit at 10 million tons a year until the end of 2033. The tariff is $15 per ton, excluding VAT. The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline has a design capacity of 20 million tons a year and belongs to Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP, a 50-50 venture between KazTransOil and China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company. Reuters has reported that Russia and Kazakhstan agreed last year to raise that flow by 2.5 million tons, although the extra volume had not started flowing before Putin’s visit. The new agreement on oil-sector cooperation gives the issue a political push. For Moscow, the route strengthens access to China as Western sanctions keep pressure on Russian exports and payments. For Kazakhstan, it brings fees and gives Astana a useful position in Russia-China energy flows. The nuclear agreement, meanwhile, gives Russia a long-term role in Kazakhstan’s shift to nuclear power. Kazakhstan and Russia signed a $16.5 billion agreement for the Balkhash nuclear power plant at Ulken, near Lake Balkhash. The project covers two VVER-1200 III+ reactors. Kazakhstan held a groundbreaking ceremony for the plant in August 2025, with the active construction phase expected to begin in 2027, and the first reactor expected in early 2034. Russia will provide export credit for the first plant, with Rosatom leading the Balkhash project after competition with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), France’s EDF, and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power. But Kazakhstan has not handed the wider program to Moscow....

Energy Security

Putin Visit Puts Nuclear Power and Oil Transit at Center of Russia-Kazakhstan Ties

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan is becoming more than a diplomatic event. It is increasingly being seen as a demonstration of how Russia and Kazakhstan are shaping one of Eurasia’s key energy and logistics axes amid the restructuring of global markets, sanctions pressure, and the continued shift of economic flows toward Asia. Symbolically, ahead of the visit, Putin published a programmatic article in Kazakh media titled “Russia-Kazakhstan: An Alliance at the Heart of Eurasia,” in which he outlined a new framework for bilateral relations. The Russian president focused on nuclear energy, oil and gas cooperation, transport corridors, and Eurasian integration, describing the partnership between the two countries as a factor of stability and development for the wider continent. For Moscow, the current visit carries particular significance. It is Putin’s second state visit to Kazakhstan during a single presidential term. A rare occurrence in international diplomatic practice. Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said the move was intended to emphasize the “unprecedentedly high level of relations between our two countries.” The main outcome of the talks is expected to be the signing of agreements related to the construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant with the participation of Russia’s state nuclear corporation, Rosatom. According to Ushakov, the two sides are expected to finalize “the main parameters for the creation of the nuclear power plant and financing of the project through a Russian state export credit.” For Kazakhstan, the nuclear project is about far more than electricity generation. The country faces growing domestic power demand, aging infrastructure, and the need to ensure long-term energy security. At the same time, the project reflects a broader geopolitical calculation. Nuclear energy has traditionally been one of the most sensitive forms of strategic cooperation. A country building a nuclear power plant enters into a long-term technological partnership involving fuel supplies, engineering maintenance, personnel training, and technical support lasting for decades. Russia’s role in constructing Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant would therefore allow Moscow to preserve a deep technological presence in Central Asia despite its growing international isolation. For Astana, however, cooperation with Russia in the nuclear sector remains a pragmatic choice rather than a purely political one. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer of uranium, yet it still lacks its own nuclear power generation sector. Amid intensifying competition between global power centers, Kazakhstan appears less interested in choosing sides than in strengthening its resilience and turning its geography into a strategic advantage. The same logic is evident in the oil and gas agenda surrounding Putin’s visit. Moscow and Astana are discussing increasing the transit of Russian oil to China through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline from 10 million to 12.5 million tons annually. Ushakov said prospects for the negotiations were “optimistic” and noted that the legal framework for the agreements was already in its final stages. According to KazTransOil, approximately 832,000 tons of Russian oil were transported to China through the route in April alone, while first-quarter transit volumes reached 2.5 million tons. Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russian...

Oil Supply

Kazakhstan on Europe’s Oil Podium, but for How Long?

Kazakhstan has strengthened its position as one of the key suppliers of oil to the European Union, capitalizing on the redistribution of energy flows following the reduction of Russian crude imports. However, declining production and vulnerabilities in export infrastructure cast doubt on the country’s ability to maintain this position in the medium term. According to official EU data, the EU remains one of the world’s largest oil importers, meeting about 97% of its demand through external supplies. In 2025, EU countries imported approximately 435 million tonnes of crude oil worth more than €212 billion. The reduction in Russia’s share from 25.8% in 2021 to 2.2% in 2025 led to a significant redistribution of flows in favour of alternative suppliers, including the United States (14.6%), Norway (12.8%), and Kazakhstan (12.8%) by crude-oil import volume. Kazakhstan has been among the main beneficiaries of these changes. According to an Econovis Economic Research Laboratory report, the share of Kazakh supplies in European imports has increased for several consecutive years. This growth has been driven by strong demand from European refineries for light, low-sulfur CPC Blend crude. Alongside Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan has also strengthened its position, benefiting from Europe’s diversification efforts. A notable example is the Czech Republic, where, following the cessation of deliveries via the Druzhba pipeline, Azerbaijan accounted for more than 42% of oil imports in 2025, according to Czech import data. Kazakhstan ranked third in the Czech market with a share of around 18%, indicating the emergence of a new energy balance in the Caspian region. Despite this favorable external environment, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector has faced a significant downturn. According to government data, in the first quarter of 2026, oil and gas condensate production amounted to 19.7 million tonnes, 20% less than in the same period of 2025. Oil exports declined by approximately 22% to 15.3 million tonnes, while the annual export forecast stands at about 76 million tonnes. By mid-April, however, CPC exports had risen from February levels as Tengiz resumed production, suggesting that some of the early-year disruption had eased. The decline is linked to disruptions in the operations of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and temporary shutdowns at major fields, including Tengiz. The CPC remains the key export route for Kazakh oil to Europe, transporting most of the crude through the terminal in Novorossiysk. Economic analyst Olzhas Baidildinov said the consequences of attacks on the consortium’s infrastructure could have long-term implications. “Oil and gas condensate production in Kazakhstan fell by 20% in the first quarter compared to January-March 2025, 19.7 million tonnes versus 24.6 million tonnes. Oil exports decreased by approximately 22% to 15.3 million tonnes. The export forecast for this year is 76 million tonnes,” he wrote on his Telegram channel. According to his estimates, the country will once again fail to surpass the psychologically significant threshold of 100 million tonnes of annual production. “As a result of the attacks on the CPC, at least 6 million tonnes of oil worth no less than $3.4 billion were...

Oil Exports

Drone Strikes on Russian Baltic Ports Raise Risks for Kazakhstan’s Oil Exports

Drone attacks on Russian Baltic ports have heightened concerns about potential risks to Kazakhstan’s oil export routes. Ukrainian drone strikes targeted the ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga in Russia’s Leningrad Oblast earlier this week, disrupting operations at both major oil export hubs. Primorsk has an estimated capacity of around one million barrels of crude oil and approximately 300,000 barrels of diesel fuel per day. Large fuel storage facilities are also located at both ports. Further strikes were reported on March 25, when drones again targeted both ports. Media reports indicated that shipments of oil and petroleum products were suspended, and that fires broke out at Ust-Luga. As of March 26, loadings at both ports were reportedly still suspended following the latest strikes, with no confirmed return to normal operations. Kazakhstan has increasingly used Baltic routes for part of its oil exports following periodic disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) system. Commenting on the situation, Kazakh oil and gas journalist Oleg Chervinsky said that the port of Ust-Luga has been used to export Kazakh crude marketed under the KEBCO brand, with volumes rising after earlier challenges affecting CPC shipments. Kazakhstan’s national pipeline operator, KazTransOil, transports crude through Russian pipeline infrastructure under agreements with Russia’s Transneft. From there, oil can be delivered to Germany, shipped via Baltic ports such as Ust-Luga, or exported through Black Sea terminals, including Novorossiysk, which has also been targeted by drone attacks in the past year. According to open-source intelligence analysts cited in international media, energy infrastructure in the Ust-Luga industrial zone, including facilities linked to NOVATEK’s gas processing complex, was affected by the latest strike. The Ust-Luga site is located roughly 850 kilometres from the Ukrainian border. A similar attack on infrastructure in the Ust-Luga area was reported in August 2025. At that time, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy stated that Kazakh oil exports had not been affected. As of March 26, the ministry had not publicly commented on the latest incidents. Officials have previously emphasized the importance of diversifying export routes amid geopolitical risks and infrastructure disruptions.

Oil Exports

Kazakhstan Seeks to Expand Oil Exports Amid Geopolitical Uncertainty

Kazakhstan is seeking to reinforce its status as a stable oil supplier while accelerating the diversification of export routes and revising the terms of cooperation with foreign investors amid growing geopolitical uncertainty. These priorities were outlined by Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov during a speech at the CERAWeek conference in Houston and in a series of meetings with major international oil and gas companies. Discussions focused on structural changes in the global oil industry, ranging from geopolitical instability to the reconfiguration of logistics chains. According to the minister, Kazakhstan remains resilient while adapting to evolving conditions. Energy security continues to be a central concern for the sector, particularly the reliable operation of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), through which the majority of Kazakhstan’s oil exports are transported. This route remains the most cost-effective and strategically important option. Authorities have openly acknowledged its critical role in the national economy, stressing the need to ensure uninterrupted transit. At the same time, efforts to develop alternative routes, including the Trans-Caspian corridor and increased shipments to China, are part of a strategy to reduce logistical and political risks. On the sidelines of the forum, government officials held talks with leading energy companies including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Shell, all key investors in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas industry. Discussions with Chevron focused on expanding production at the Tengiz and Karachaganak fields, as well as developing export infrastructure. ExxonMobil reaffirmed its interest in increasing output at Tengiz and Kashagan, where localization levels are high, with Kazakhstani specialists accounting for more than 90% of the workforce. Talks with Shell focused on boosting production and expanding refining capacity, including refinery modernization and the production of winter-grade diesel fuel. In addition to operational issues, the discussions addressed the question of redistributing roles within joint projects. Kazakhstan is considering independently implementing certain gas-processing initiatives after partners failed to reach a final investment decision on the Karachaganak project. The development of the petrochemical industry and the expansion of refining capacity have been identified as separate priorities. Kazakhstan plans to double its oil-refining capacity to meet domestic demand and increase exports of petroleum products. To attract investment, the government has introduced a revised model contract offering tax incentives and encouraging geological exploration. Experts say Central Asia’s role in the global energy sector is increasing, with Kazakhstan playing a key part in regional stability. The minister said the country’s strategic objective is to maintain the sector’s investment appeal while ensuring maximum economic returns for the national economy. “Kazakhstan remains a predictable and reliable supplier of energy resources and is ready to translate the trust of its partners into the development of technological projects within the country,” Akkenzhenov said. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Italian energy company Eni is accelerating the expansion of its projects in Kazakhstan. The company plans to complete construction of a hybrid power plant in Zhanaozen, one of the country’s main oil and gas hubs, by the end of the year.

Caspian Region

War Reaches the Caspian: Central Asia Faces Growing Regional Risk

The United States and Israel's war with Iran began on February 28, 2026. The intensity of the conflict has fluctuated, but daily reports of missile strikes and explosions are increasingly resonating across Central Asia. Meanwhile, Russia’s latest war against Ukraine has continued for 1,466 days since it began on February 24, 2022. Late last year, Ukrainian drones reportedly struck a Russian oil platform at the Filanovsky field in the Caspian Sea, more than 700 kilometers from Ukraine’s nearest border. Ukraine also said the operation targeted the patrol ship Okhotnik, although the extent of the damage was not independently verified. The war in Ukraine has also created serious challenges for Kazakhstan’s oil exports via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). Repeated attacks and disruptions have threatened export flows, increased logistical risks, and added pressure on Kazakhstan’s budget revenues. The war against Iran has now brought military action to the Caspian coast of Iran, raising concern for energy producers and transit routes across the wider region. On March 5, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that drones launched from Iranian territory struck the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. According to the ministry, one drone hit the terminal building at Nakhchivan International Airport, while another crashed near a school in the village of Shekerabad. Azerbaijan demanded a thorough investigation. Iran later stated that it had promised to investigate the incident. Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor General’s Office subsequently opened a criminal case. As of now, tensions remain high, with both sides continuing to exchange accusations, and Azerbaijan maintaining heightened alert measures. More recently, the Israeli Defense Forces confirmed carrying out airstrikes in northern Iran, targeting naval vessels in the port city of Bandar-Anzali on the Caspian coast. The straight-line distance from Bandar-Anzali to Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku, is just over 300 kilometers, and approximately 420 kilometers to Turkmenbashi, a major international seaport and the center of Turkmenistan’s oil-refining industry. The resort zone of Avaza is also located there. By comparison, the distance from Israel to Bandar-Anzali exceeds 1,300 kilometers. These developments are contributing to rising economic uncertainty across Central Asia. The consequences extend beyond transportation and logistics disruptions, with broader implications for regional economies. The U.S. and Israel have not always appeared aligned on what would constitute victory, meaning the measure of success remains difficult to gauge. While the United States and Israel have repeatedly stated that significant damage has been inflicted on Iran’s military infrastructure (including destroying a substantial part of the Iranian navy), there is no publicly available, independently verified evidence confirming the extent of the damage to Iran’s leadership structure following the death of Ali Khamenei, Ali Larijani and other senior Iranian figures, or on Iran’s ability to mount an effective defence. Analysts have described Iran’s military resilience as decentralized, sometimes using the term "mosaic defense," meaning units can continue operating under standing orders even when senior leadership is hit. It is understood that, as part of this strategy, the Iranian military has spent decades refining its ability to operate as independent nodes, each equipped to conduct strikes under...