• KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
23 September 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 23

Kazakhstan’s Oil Logistics Trap: Higher Prices, Limited Gains

Escalation in the Middle East has pushed oil back above $100 a barrel. For Kazakhstan, whose budget remains heavily dependent on commodity exports, that should have been good news. But a high price matters only if the oil can reach buyers. For the world’s largest landlocked country, that is where the problem begins. European refiners are looking for alternatives to disrupted Saudi supplies, while problems along established routes through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are increasing demand for crude from other regions. More than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, however, move through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium system across Russian territory to a terminal near Novorossiysk. The Middle East crisis is pushing prices and global freight costs higher, while attacks around Russian infrastructure are increasing the risks to Kazakhstan’s main export route. Over the past decade, Kazakhstan has significantly increased its oil exports. According to the Bureau of National Statistics, volumes rose from 63.6 million metric tons in 2015 to a record 76.3 million tons in 2025, an increase of about 20%. Exports grew from 65.2 million tons in 2022 to 71 million in 2024 and 76.3 million tons in 2025. Expansion at the Tengiz field contributed to that growth. Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production reached 99.6 million tons in 2025. The government had planned for about 98 million tons in 2026, but export disruptions have already forced temporary output cuts. Revenue has not risen as steadily as volumes. “In monetary terms, growth over the past decade was considerably stronger, although the trend, as noted above, was also much more volatile. The value of exports increased from $26.8 billion in 2015 to $40 billion in 2025, or by 49.3%. The highest figure during this period was recorded in 2022, at $46.9 billion,” Ranking.kz said in its analysis. Physical volumes and export revenue have often moved in different directions. “This was particularly evident in 2025: Kazakhstan exported 7.4% more oil than a year earlier, but its value fell by 6.8%. The average estimated value of one exported metric ton declined from $604 in 2024 to $524 in 2025,” the analysts calculated. In the first half of 2026, Kazakhstan exported $40.3 billion worth of goods. Crude oil and petroleum products accounted for 46.5% of the total. Export statistics and transportation data measure different things. The Bureau of National Statistics records goods cleared for export, while the Energy Ministry and pipeline companies report volumes pumped, transshipped, and transported. The same cargo can pass through several sections of the system, so those figures cannot simply be added together. In March, Talgat Makuov, acting director of the Energy Ministry’s oil refining and transportation department, said 64.8 million tons of Kazakh oil had moved through CPC in 2025. Another 9.2 million tons went through the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, while 1.1 million tons were shipped through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline toward China. Against those volumes, the Trans-Caspian route remains small. In 2025, 1.26 million tons were shipped across the Caspian toward the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The plan...

Karachaganak Maintenance to Cut Kazakhstan’s Oil Output by Up to 450,000 Tons

Karachaganak, one of Kazakhstan’s three largest oil and gas fields, entered planned maintenance on September 7, a shutdown expected to reduce the country’s oil and gas condensate output by 400,000–450,000 metric tons before work ends on October 1. The interruption comes in a year when the government has already lowered its national production forecast following repeated disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the main export route for Kazakhstan’s oil. In August, Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said Kazakhstan had lowered its 2026 oil production target from 98 million to 96 million metric tons. He put production losses from attacks on CPC infrastructure in January, June, and July at about 3.5 million metric tons. CPC loadings rebounded by 22% in August after July’s disruptions, reaching around 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd). CPC exports are expected to fall to about 1.5 million bpd in September, partly because of the Karachaganak maintenance. More than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports move through CPC. The July shutdown at the Black Sea terminal showed how quickly an export disruption can force production cuts at fields far inland. On July 22, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate output fell by about 21%, while output at Tengiz dropped 56%, from roughly 925,000 to 406,000 bpd. Karachaganak also depends on Russian processing infrastructure. Raw gas from the field is sent to Russia’s Orenburg gas processing plant. In June, Karachaganak reduced production after an incident at the plant sharply curtailed its intake of gas from the field. Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. (KPO), the field’s operator, is expanding its gas reinjection capacity. The process returns some of the produced gas to the reservoir, helping to maintain pressure and sustain oil and gas condensate output. A fifth gas reinjection compressor began operating in 2024. In June 2026, KPO announced that the KEP-1B project, which includes a sixth compressor, had begun reinjecting gas ahead of schedule. The Energy Ministry has said the two compressors would help maintain Karachaganak’s liquid hydrocarbon production at around 11–12 million metric tons a year. Following the expansion of Tengiz, Kazakhstan had expected national oil production to approach 100 million metric tons a year. Its production capacity has increased, but the events of 2026 have exposed the limits of the infrastructure used to move that oil to market. In May, Akkenzhenov said there was no full-scale alternative to CPC. Some oil can be rerouted across the Caspian into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline or east to China, but these routes cannot absorb CPC-scale volumes. CPC can carry up to 72.5 million metric tons a year from Kazakhstan. Whether or not the maintenance reduction was already incorporated into the revised forecast, Kazakhstan has little room for further disruption to the export and processing infrastructure on which its production depends.

Push for Kazakhstan Oil Exports Diversification as CPC Disruptions Expose Capacity Gap

Kazakhstan has spent years looking for more ways to export its oil without relying so heavily on Russia. This summer has shown how difficult that remains. Shipments to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline have been suspended since May, disruptions on the Black Sea in July forced Tengiz to more than halve production, and now Russia is rerouting Kazakh crude from Ust-Luga to Novorossiysk to free Baltic capacity for its own oil. The shift comes as exports from Russia’s western ports ran 15% below plan in the first half of August, with Novorossiysk shipments of Russian Urals and Kazakh KEBCO falling to around 400,000 barrels per day. At least two cargoes of Kazakhstan’s KEBCO crude scheduled for loading at Ust-Luga in late August will instead be shipped through the Black Sea. No KEBCO loadings are currently planned at the Baltic port in September. The move will free up about 100,000 barrels per day of export capacity at Ust-Luga for Russian crude. Kazakh producers support the arrangement because shipments through Novorossiysk are currently more profitable. From a commercial standpoint, the decision is understandable. But Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk give Kazakhstan access to two different seas while remaining Russian ports. And Novorossiysk, where the KEBCO cargoes are now being redirected, had itself suspended crude loadings only a few days earlier. On August 14, loadings at the Sheskharis terminal, Novorossiysk port’s main oil-export facility, were halted following a drone attack. The facility handles around 700,000 barrels per day and loads Russian Urals and Siberian Light as well as Kazakhstan’s KEBCO. Operations resumed on August 16, and one of the first tankers to load was carrying Kazakh crude. Another 80,000-ton KEBCO cargo was due to begin loading on August 18. Kazakhstan’s far larger vulnerability, however, is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Its marine terminal near Novorossiysk is separate from Sheskharis. In 2025, the country exported 78.7 million metric tons of oil, of which 64.8 million tons were shipped through CPC. Volumes through the pipeline rose by 18% compared with 2024, largely as production increased following the Tengiz expansion. The July disruptions showed how quickly problems on that route can affect production inside Kazakhstan. After drone attacks near the CPC terminal forced restrictions on loadings, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production fell by about 21% by July 22 to roughly 1.63 million barrels per day, from a July average of 2.07 million barrels per day. Tengiz output dropped from a July average of around 925,000 barrels per day to about 406,000. A few days later, the situation deteriorated further. On July 26, Kazakhstan produced around 1 million barrels per day of oil and gas condensate, down from an average of 2.16 million barrels per day in June. Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak all had to reduce production. On July 27, CPC resumed loadings after a week-long suspension. CPC accounts for more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, so replacing it quickly with other routes is impossible. The pipeline typically carries around 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day....

Vance Personally Asked Zelensky to Halt CPC-Linked Tanker Strikes, FT Reports

U.S. Vice President JD Vance personally asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 31 to halt attacks on oil tankers serving the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk, the Financial Times reported on August 12. Citing Ukrainian officials and others familiar with the call, the newspaper said Kyiv had agreed not to target CPC infrastructure or non-Russian vessels unless they were under Ukrainian sanctions or carrying Russian oil or other Russian cargo. Ukraine has not struck tankers near the CPC terminal since the July 31 call. Vance’s intervention came after repeated July attacks had disrupted Kazakhstan’s main oil-export route, halted loading several times, and forced producers to cut output. Washington was also concerned that the attacks were destabilizing oil markets and harming U.S. commercial interests. A U.S. official confirmed to the FT that Washington had warned Kyiv against attacks on non-Russian vessels and CPC infrastructure, describing the pipeline as “a vital conduit of Kazakhstan-origin energy for European markets” and an alternative to Russian energy supplies. The latest incidents before the call came on July 30, when two more tankers were attacked. NISSOS SIFNOS was struck while loading Tengizchevroil crude at CPC’s SPM-3 mooring, while MARATHI was attacked while awaiting a berth about six nautical miles offshore, forcing CPC to stop loading again. The Vance-Zelensky call took place the following day. Washington had already warned Kyiv about attacks affecting U.S. and Kazakh economic interests. Ukraine’s ambassador to Washington at the time, Olha Stefanishyna, disclosed in February that the State Department had delivered a formal démarche after an earlier strike on Novorossiysk. On July 23, Representative Bill Huizenga, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia, told TCA that Ukraine had an obligation to avoid legitimate allied energy exports and infrastructure, and that further strikes would "not be tolerated." The Wall Street Journal later reported that Chevron CEO Mike Wirth had raised the tanker attacks with Trump administration officials, after which Washington cautioned Ukraine against targeting non-Russian vessels in the Black Sea. By early August, the disruption was showing clearly in export data. Reuters reported on August 7 that CPC loadings in July fell more than 20% behind schedule to around 1.2 million to 1.3 million barrels per day. The reduction amounted to a loss of about 400,000 barrels per day of CPC Blend from international markets in July. Kazakhstan’s oil production fell 14% in July from June. CPC is the dominant route for Kazakhstan’s oil exports and normally handles roughly 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day. The 1,511-kilometer pipeline runs from the Tengiz field through Russia to the Black Sea. Its shareholder structure also gives U.S. companies a substantial direct interest: Chevron owns 15%, while Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company, an ExxonMobil affiliate, owns 7.5%. Responsibility for the individual tanker attacks has remained politically sensitive. Russia has blamed Ukraine. Kyiv has not publicly claimed responsibility for attacks on vessels carrying predominantly Kazakh crude. According to the FT, the July 31 call resulted in a...

Black Sea Risks Elevate Azerbaijan and Turkey in Kazakhstan’s Export Strategy

Bloomberg reported on August 8 that the Turkish authorities were withholding or delaying transit permission for some vessels bound through the Dardanelles for Novorossiysk. Some applicants were reportedly told that permits were not being issued, while others faced additional review. The practice appeared selective: vessels bound for some other Black Sea destinations continued to transit, while some Ukraine-bound vessels were also reportedly affected. On August 9, however, Turkish officials told Reuters that shipping through the Turkish Straits was proceeding smoothly and described the actions as temporary security measures rather than an ongoing restriction. The reported restrictions followed a sharp increase in attacks on commercial shipping around the Black Sea, including Turkish-linked vessels near Novorossiysk. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry expressed concern after attacks on the Turkish-owned Yaşar and Nadezhda and called on Russia and Ukraine to ensure navigational safety. Novorossiysk is especially important for Kazakhstan, because the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal there handles the overwhelming majority of its oil exports. Although the CPC pipeline itself remains operational, the episode showed how quickly traffic serving Kazakhstan’s principal oil-export outlet could face an additional constraint. The events shed light on an export strategy Kazakhstan began developing several years before the current problems. Tokayev’s July 2022 instructions addressed both oil-export diversification through the Trans-Caspian route and alternative transport chains for other cargo. In particular, he called for greater use of Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports and the development of alternative railway routes. Later that year, KazMunayGas (KMG) and SOCAR established a framework for moving Kazakhstani oil from Aktau across the Caspian Sea and onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, initially for up to 1.5 million tons annually. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey also adopted a 2022–2027 roadmap to remove bottlenecks along the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan continued to develop transport links with Russia and China as it expanded Trans-Caspian routes through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The strategy extended Kazakhstan’s longstanding geopolitical multi-vector policy, which balances relations with partners in multiple directions, into the geoeconomic sphere. Tokayev made the combination explicit in his 2023 State of the Nation address. Relations with Turkey had meanwhile been elevated to an enhanced strategic partnership in May 2022, including transport cooperation and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan deepened their strategic and allied cooperation later that year, likewise emphasizing transport and logistics. Closer ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey widened Kazakhstan’s options without displacing established routes through Russia. The CPC pipeline remains so dominant in Kazakhstan’s oil exports that no other existing route approaches its present scale. Of the 78.7 million tons of oil that Kazakhstan exported in 2025, the Energy Ministry reported the volume moving through the CPC pipeline at 64.8 million tons (the CPC itself reported about 63 million tons), meaning that more than four-fifths of Kazakhstan’s exported oil depended on the CPC system. Kazakhstan moved only about 1.4 million tons through the Aktau–Baku–Ceyhan (ABC) route in 2024, and about 1.3 million tons in 2025. Diversification cannot at present mean replacing CPC. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline gives Kazakhstani oil a westbound egress...

U.S. Reportedly Secures Ukrainian Pledge to Avoid Strikes on CPC Infrastructure

Turkey has begun restricting some commercial vessels from entering the Black Sea on voyages to Novorossiysk, adding a potential new obstacle to Kazakhstan’s oil exports through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium amid reports that Ukraine has agreed to spare CPC infrastructure and qualifying non-Russian tankers from attack. Turkey’s Directorate-General of Coastal Safety has told multiple ships bound for Novorossiysk that it is not currently issuing transit permits for those voyages or needs more time to review applications through the Dardanelles. The authorities have not publicly explained the measure. Some vessels were told the restriction also applied to ships heading to Ukraine, while traffic bound for Bulgarian and Turkish ports continued. There is no confirmation that any tanker scheduled to load Kazakh crude at the CPC terminal has been denied passage. The measure nevertheless comes at a difficult point for CPC, where repeated attacks and stoppages have already made some shipowners reluctant to accept voyages to the terminal near Novorossiysk. On August 7, Reuters reported that CPC loadings fell more than 20% behind schedule in July, to around 1.2 million to 1.3 million barrels per day. That removed about 400,000 barrels a day of CPC Blend from the international market. Loadings averaged roughly 1.1 million to 1.2 million barrels per day in the first week of August, while Kazakhstan’s oil production has fallen 14% from June. CPC normally handles around 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day and carries more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. Four tankers completed loading after the July 30 attacks, but operations remained intermittent as tanker availability and security concerns continued to limit the recovery. The Turkish restrictions emerged on the same day as a potentially important change in the security picture around CPC. According to an unnamed U.S. government official cited by Bloomberg, Ukraine has agreed not to target CPC infrastructure or qualifying non-Russian vessels bound for the terminal, provided they are not under Ukrainian sanctions, are not carrying Russian cargo, and are not owned by Russian individuals or entities. Ukraine has also established points of contact through which commercial shippers can provide vessel information and seek safe passage. The arrangement follows months of U.S. pressure over the exposure of Kazakhstan-origin crude and Western commercial interests at CPC. During a July 29 call, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev discussed the need for “reliable and uninterrupted” exports of Kazakhstan-origin oil through the system. The commitment could reduce one source of risk for ships serving CPC, but it does not immediately resolve the commercial disruption. Previous attempts by companies to identify vessels that should not be targeted did not prevent all attacks, while war-risk insurance and charter costs have risen sharply. Ankara has become increasingly vocal as attacks spread across the Black Sea. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry said the Turkish-owned civilian vessels Yaşar and Nadezhda were attacked by drones on August 3 after leaving Novorossiysk, injuring crew members including Turkish citizens. It warned that further escalation could have broader consequences, including...