Oil Exports - The Times Of Central Asia

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Growth Forecasts

Central Asia Economic Growth Expected to Slow in 2027

After several years of rapid expansion, Central Asian economies are expected to lose some momentum. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) forecasts that regional economic growth will slow from 5.8% in 2026 to 5.3% in 2027. However, growth in manufacturing and construction will not necessarily translate into comparable increases in household incomes. The forecast appears in the EBRD’s September report. The bank’s Central Asia figures also include Mongolia, so the regional growth rate should not be interpreted as an average for the five Central Asian countries alone. The Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD) has published its own projections for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. They differ somewhat from the EBRD’s forecasts but also anticipate continued economic growth. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Maintain Strong Growth The EBRD expects the economies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to grow by 7% in 2027, the highest rates projected for the five countries in the region. Kyrgyzstan has experienced a construction boom in recent years, driven by investment in roads, housing, and energy infrastructure. The service sector is also expanding. The country’s economy grew by 11.9% in the first half of 2026. However, rapid growth has been accompanied by rising food and fuel prices. The country's performance is closely tied to economic conditions in Russia, where a significant number of Kyrgyz migrant workers are employed and from which Kyrgyzstan imports the vast majority of its fuel. Changes in the Russian labor market can affect remittances and household spending in Kyrgyzstan. In Tajikistan, growth is supported by investment and exports, particularly precious metals and mineral resources. The economy expanded by 8.2% in the first half of 2026. Tajikistan also relies heavily on imported goods and equipment, with spending on imports exceeding export earnings. Remittances from migrant workers in Russia are an even more important source of household income for Tajiks than for their Kyrgyz neighbors, while rising fuel costs are putting additional pressure on family budgets. Kazakhstan Remains Dependent on Oil Exports For Central Asia’s largest economy, the EBRD forecasts growth of 4.5% in 2027, while the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development expects 5%. In 2026, Kazakhstan’s economy has been constrained by disruptions to oil production and exports. Problems arose at the Tengiz oil field and along the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) export route, through which a significant share of Kazakhstan’s oil reaches global markets via Russia. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s factories increased production. But even growth in industries outside the oil sector has yet to eliminate the country’s dependence on commodity exports. For international buyers, the reliability of supply routes is also important. Disruptions to the CPC can restrict Kazakhstan’s oil exports regardless of demand or global prices. The Times of Central Asia recently examined the challenges facing Kazakhstan’s oil logistics. Inflation is another concern. According to the EFSD, prices in Kazakhstan are expected to rise by approximately 9.5% by the end of 2026. This means economic expansion will not necessarily be accompanied by a noticeable improvement in household purchasing power. Uzbekistan’s Growth Driven by...

Oil Exports

Kazakhstan Weighs a Second Major Oil Export Route

Following repeated disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) system, Kazakhstan’s leading oil producers are examining a much larger Trans-Caspian export route. A working group representing eight shareholders responsible for production in the Tengiz and Kashagan fields has commissioned a feasibility study for moving crude from the Atyrau area to Aktau, across the Caspian to Baku, and onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. The study is expected to go to shareholders in November. The current proposal follows a policy line set out in July 2022, when President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev identified the Trans-Caspian route as a priority and instructed KazMunayGas to examine options, including possible participation by Tengiz investors. The present study puts a much larger export channel under commercial examination. CPC remains indispensable, carrying more than four-fifths of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. Of the 78.7 million tons of oil that Kazakhstan exported in 2025, 64.8 million went through CPC. Existing alternatives are small by comparison. Even the eastbound flow to China and the Schwedt route through Russia together absorb only a fraction of CPC volumes, while current Trans-Caspian shipments are smaller still. What has changed is the cost of concentrating so much of Kazakhstan’s oil exports on CPC, not its underlying commercial importance. The producers are in fact studying two alternatives, a subsea pipeline or a much larger tanker fleet. The Trans-Caspian pipeline idea itself is not new. Variants surfaced in 2009 and appeared again in 2016. What is new is the present combination of shareholder sponsorship, operational urgency, and contemplated scale. Each option is intended to support volumes of up to 35 million metric tons a year. KazMunayGas (KMG) moved 1.3 million tons from Aktau toward BTC in 2025, while its agreement with SOCAR provides for a phased increase to 2.2 million tons annually. The shareholder proposal would expand the existing Trans-Caspian route into a second major export channel. Why Redundancy Now Repeated interruptions in CPC flows have converted the risks of route concentration into lost oil production and a lower national production target. In July, for example, attacks struck tankers loading or approaching the CPC marine terminal, repeatedly suspending operations. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov later put production lost to January, June, and July disruptions at about 3.5 million tons and reduced the 2026 production target from 98 million to 96 million tons. Even temporary interruptions reduce revenues and force urgent production decisions upstream. A Trans-Caspian route capable of carrying 35 million tons a year would not replace CPC, but it would materially reduce Kazakhstan’s exposure to a prolonged interruption. The reported figure equals more than half the 64.8 million tons exported through CPC in 2025 and is almost sixteen times the 2.2-million-ton level contemplated under the existing KMG–SOCAR expansion agreement. It would allow Kazakhstan to divert a substantially larger share of production during disruptions. Kazakhstan can now reroute one or two million tons relatively quickly, but not the tens of millions carried through CPC. The first constraint is inside Kazakhstan. Tengiz and Kashagan lack a high-volume pipeline connection to...

Oil logistics

Kazakhstan’s Oil Logistics Trap: Higher Prices, Limited Gains

Escalation in the Middle East has pushed oil back above $100 a barrel. For Kazakhstan, whose budget remains heavily dependent on commodity exports, that should have been good news. But a high price matters only if the oil can reach buyers. For the world’s largest landlocked country, that is where the problem begins. European refiners are looking for alternatives to disrupted Saudi supplies, while problems along established routes through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are increasing demand for crude from other regions. More than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, however, move through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium system across Russian territory to a terminal near Novorossiysk. The Middle East crisis is pushing prices and global freight costs higher, while attacks around Russian infrastructure are increasing the risks to Kazakhstan’s main export route. Over the past decade, Kazakhstan has significantly increased its oil exports. According to the Bureau of National Statistics, volumes rose from 63.6 million metric tons in 2015 to a record 76.3 million tons in 2025, an increase of about 20%. Exports grew from 65.2 million tons in 2022 to 71 million in 2024 and 76.3 million tons in 2025. Expansion at the Tengiz field contributed to that growth. Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production reached 99.6 million tons in 2025. The government had planned for about 98 million tons in 2026, but export disruptions have already forced temporary output cuts. Revenue has not risen as steadily as volumes. “In monetary terms, growth over the past decade was considerably stronger, although the trend, as noted above, was also much more volatile. The value of exports increased from $26.8 billion in 2015 to $40 billion in 2025, or by 49.3%. The highest figure during this period was recorded in 2022, at $46.9 billion,” Ranking.kz said in its analysis. Physical volumes and export revenue have often moved in different directions. “This was particularly evident in 2025: Kazakhstan exported 7.4% more oil than a year earlier, but its value fell by 6.8%. The average estimated value of one exported metric ton declined from $604 in 2024 to $524 in 2025,” the analysts calculated. In the first half of 2026, Kazakhstan exported $40.3 billion worth of goods. Crude oil and petroleum products accounted for 46.5% of the total. Export statistics and transportation data measure different things. The Bureau of National Statistics records goods cleared for export, while the Energy Ministry and pipeline companies report volumes pumped, transshipped, and transported. The same cargo can pass through several sections of the system, so those figures cannot simply be added together. In March, Talgat Makuov, acting director of the Energy Ministry’s oil refining and transportation department, said 64.8 million tons of Kazakh oil had moved through CPC in 2025. Another 9.2 million tons went through the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, while 1.1 million tons were shipped through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline toward China. Against those volumes, the Trans-Caspian route remains small. In 2025, 1.26 million tons were shipped across the Caspian toward the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The plan...

Oil Production

Karachaganak Maintenance to Cut Kazakhstan’s Oil Output by Up to 450,000 Tons

Karachaganak, one of Kazakhstan’s three largest oil and gas fields, entered planned maintenance on September 7, a shutdown expected to reduce the country’s oil and gas condensate output by 400,000–450,000 metric tons before work ends on October 1. The interruption comes in a year when the government has already lowered its national production forecast following repeated disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the main export route for Kazakhstan’s oil. In August, Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said Kazakhstan had lowered its 2026 oil production target from 98 million to 96 million metric tons. He put production losses from attacks on CPC infrastructure in January, June, and July at about 3.5 million metric tons. CPC loadings rebounded by 22% in August after July’s disruptions, reaching around 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd). CPC exports are expected to fall to about 1.5 million bpd in September, partly because of the Karachaganak maintenance. More than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports move through CPC. The July shutdown at the Black Sea terminal showed how quickly an export disruption can force production cuts at fields far inland. On July 22, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate output fell by about 21%, while output at Tengiz dropped 56%, from roughly 925,000 to 406,000 bpd. Karachaganak also depends on Russian processing infrastructure. Raw gas from the field is sent to Russia’s Orenburg gas processing plant. In June, Karachaganak reduced production after an incident at the plant sharply curtailed its intake of gas from the field. Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. (KPO), the field’s operator, is expanding its gas reinjection capacity. The process returns some of the produced gas to the reservoir, helping to maintain pressure and sustain oil and gas condensate output. A fifth gas reinjection compressor began operating in 2024. In June 2026, KPO announced that the KEP-1B project, which includes a sixth compressor, had begun reinjecting gas ahead of schedule. The Energy Ministry has said the two compressors would help maintain Karachaganak’s liquid hydrocarbon production at around 11–12 million metric tons a year. Following the expansion of Tengiz, Kazakhstan had expected national oil production to approach 100 million metric tons a year. Its production capacity has increased, but the events of 2026 have exposed the limits of the infrastructure used to move that oil to market. In May, Akkenzhenov said there was no full-scale alternative to CPC. Some oil can be rerouted across the Caspian into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline or east to China, but these routes cannot absorb CPC-scale volumes. CPC can carry up to 72.5 million metric tons a year from Kazakhstan. Whether or not the maintenance reduction was already incorporated into the revised forecast, Kazakhstan has little room for further disruption to the export and processing infrastructure on which its production depends.

Oil Exports

Push for Kazakhstan Oil Exports Diversification as CPC Disruptions Expose Capacity Gap

Kazakhstan has spent years looking for more ways to export its oil without relying so heavily on Russia. This summer has shown how difficult that remains. Shipments to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline have been suspended since May, disruptions on the Black Sea in July forced Tengiz to more than halve production, and now Russia is rerouting Kazakh crude from Ust-Luga to Novorossiysk to free Baltic capacity for its own oil. The shift comes as exports from Russia’s western ports ran 15% below plan in the first half of August, with Novorossiysk shipments of Russian Urals and Kazakh KEBCO falling to around 400,000 barrels per day. At least two cargoes of Kazakhstan’s KEBCO crude scheduled for loading at Ust-Luga in late August will instead be shipped through the Black Sea. No KEBCO loadings are currently planned at the Baltic port in September. The move will free up about 100,000 barrels per day of export capacity at Ust-Luga for Russian crude. Kazakh producers support the arrangement because shipments through Novorossiysk are currently more profitable. From a commercial standpoint, the decision is understandable. But Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk give Kazakhstan access to two different seas while remaining Russian ports. And Novorossiysk, where the KEBCO cargoes are now being redirected, had itself suspended crude loadings only a few days earlier. On August 14, loadings at the Sheskharis terminal, Novorossiysk port’s main oil-export facility, were halted following a drone attack. The facility handles around 700,000 barrels per day and loads Russian Urals and Siberian Light as well as Kazakhstan’s KEBCO. Operations resumed on August 16, and one of the first tankers to load was carrying Kazakh crude. Another 80,000-ton KEBCO cargo was due to begin loading on August 18. Kazakhstan’s far larger vulnerability, however, is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Its marine terminal near Novorossiysk is separate from Sheskharis. In 2025, the country exported 78.7 million metric tons of oil, of which 64.8 million tons were shipped through CPC. Volumes through the pipeline rose by 18% compared with 2024, largely as production increased following the Tengiz expansion. The July disruptions showed how quickly problems on that route can affect production inside Kazakhstan. After drone attacks near the CPC terminal forced restrictions on loadings, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production fell by about 21% by July 22 to roughly 1.63 million barrels per day, from a July average of 2.07 million barrels per day. Tengiz output dropped from a July average of around 925,000 barrels per day to about 406,000. A few days later, the situation deteriorated further. On July 26, Kazakhstan produced around 1 million barrels per day of oil and gas condensate, down from an average of 2.16 million barrels per day in June. Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak all had to reduce production. On July 27, CPC resumed loadings after a week-long suspension. CPC accounts for more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, so replacing it quickly with other routes is impossible. The pipeline typically carries around 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day....

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Vance Personally Asked Zelensky to Halt CPC-Linked Tanker Strikes, FT Reports

U.S. Vice President JD Vance personally asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 31 to halt attacks on oil tankers serving the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk, the Financial Times reported on August 12. Citing Ukrainian officials and others familiar with the call, the newspaper said Kyiv had agreed not to target CPC infrastructure or non-Russian vessels unless they were under Ukrainian sanctions or carrying Russian oil or other Russian cargo. Ukraine has not struck tankers near the CPC terminal since the July 31 call. Vance’s intervention came after repeated July attacks had disrupted Kazakhstan’s main oil-export route, halted loading several times, and forced producers to cut output. Washington was also concerned that the attacks were destabilizing oil markets and harming U.S. commercial interests. A U.S. official confirmed to the FT that Washington had warned Kyiv against attacks on non-Russian vessels and CPC infrastructure, describing the pipeline as “a vital conduit of Kazakhstan-origin energy for European markets” and an alternative to Russian energy supplies. The latest incidents before the call came on July 30, when two more tankers were attacked. NISSOS SIFNOS was struck while loading Tengizchevroil crude at CPC’s SPM-3 mooring, while MARATHI was attacked while awaiting a berth about six nautical miles offshore, forcing CPC to stop loading again. The Vance-Zelensky call took place the following day. Washington had already warned Kyiv about attacks affecting U.S. and Kazakh economic interests. Ukraine’s ambassador to Washington at the time, Olha Stefanishyna, disclosed in February that the State Department had delivered a formal démarche after an earlier strike on Novorossiysk. On July 23, Representative Bill Huizenga, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia, told TCA that Ukraine had an obligation to avoid legitimate allied energy exports and infrastructure, and that further strikes would "not be tolerated." The Wall Street Journal later reported that Chevron CEO Mike Wirth had raised the tanker attacks with Trump administration officials, after which Washington cautioned Ukraine against targeting non-Russian vessels in the Black Sea. By early August, the disruption was showing clearly in export data. Reuters reported on August 7 that CPC loadings in July fell more than 20% behind schedule to around 1.2 million to 1.3 million barrels per day. The reduction amounted to a loss of about 400,000 barrels per day of CPC Blend from international markets in July. Kazakhstan’s oil production fell 14% in July from June. CPC is the dominant route for Kazakhstan’s oil exports and normally handles roughly 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day. The 1,511-kilometer pipeline runs from the Tengiz field through Russia to the Black Sea. Its shareholder structure also gives U.S. companies a substantial direct interest: Chevron owns 15%, while Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company, an ExxonMobil affiliate, owns 7.5%. Responsibility for the individual tanker attacks has remained politically sensitive. Russia has blamed Ukraine. Kyiv has not publicly claimed responsibility for attacks on vessels carrying predominantly Kazakh crude. According to the FT, the July 31 call resulted in a...