CSTO - The Times Of Central Asia

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CSTO

CSTO Summit in Bishkek: Armenia’s Boycott, Russia’s Agenda, and a New Secretary General

On November 27, Kyrgyzstan will host the annual summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Bishkek, bringing together foreign ministers, defense ministers, and security council secretaries from member states. While often portrayed in Russian media as an Eurasian analogue to NATO, the CSTO remains an organization heavily dependent on Russian military power. Should Moscow withdraw or reduce its support, the Organization’s relevance would likely collapse. A stark illustration of this fragility is Armenia, whose Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will boycott the summit entirely. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov confirmed that Armenia will not attend the session of the Collective Security Council, the CSTO’s highest governing body, though it does not object to the adoption of bloc-wide documents. According to the CSTO press service, the Council is expected to adopt a declaration outlining member states’ joint positions on current security challenges. Also on the agenda is the formal appointment of the next Secretary General for the 2026-2029 term, and the unveiling of Russia’s priorities for its upcoming presidency in 2026. President Vladimir Putin’s speech on these priorities is expected to dominate the summit. Armenia’s withdrawal highlights the CSTO’s waning cohesion, maintained largely by members' reliance on Russian security assistance, a dynamic in place since the Treaty’s inception in Tashkent on May 15, 1992. The original signatories included Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia joining in 1993. The treaty entered into force in 1994. Its central provision, Article 4, mandates collective defense: an attack on one member is considered an attack on all, obligating military and other forms of assistance in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter. In 1999, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan signed a protocol extending the treaty, establishing an automatic renewal every five years. The formal CSTO was created in 2002; its charter was registered with the UN the following year, and it has held observer status at the UN General Assembly since 2004. For Armenia, the CSTO’s relevance has waned dramatically since the bloc declined to intervene during the final phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. Yerevan’s disenchantment, however, predates 2023 and stretches back to the 2021–2022 border clashes, when it also felt the organization had failed to provide meaningful support. Kazakhstan, by contrast, remains a key beneficiary: the rapid CSTO deployment in January 2022 played a central role in stabilizing the country during a period of acute domestic unrest. As the current Secretary General, Imangali Tasmagambetov - an influential figure from the “Old Kazakhstan” elite - completes his term, the position is scheduled to rotate to Taalatbek Masadykov of Kyrgyzstan. Ushakov confirmed that Tasmagambetov will deliver a final report on the Organization’s activities and security concerns before officially stepping down on January 1. Masadykov, currently Deputy Secretary General, is expected to assume the role seamlessly. While Masadykov brings diplomatic gravitas, the question remains whether he can restrain Moscow and Minsk from pushing CSTO allies toward confrontation with NATO. Tasmagambetov leaves behind a significant legacy and an...

CSTO

CSTO Working Group on Military Training and Scientific Cooperation Opens in Bishkek

A working group meeting on military training and scientific cooperation under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) opened in Bishkek today, bringing together delegations from Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan to coordinate officer education, joint curricula, and research collaboration across the bloc. The two-day session runs August 21–22 under Kyrgyzstan’s 2025 chairmanship. AKIpress reported the start of proceedings and its focus on aligning training and scientific work across member states. Officials have said the agenda will center on harmonizing military-education standards, expanding joint training for specialized branches, and mapping priority research areas that can be shared among defense academies and laboratories across the alliance. Outcomes from the Bishkek meeting are expected to inform the CSTO’s rolling program of joint trainings and institutional cooperation in 2026 and beyond. Recent Track Record in Central Asia Today’s meeting builds on a stepped-up schedule of CSTO drills and staff talks in Central Asia. In September 2024, Kyrgyzstan hosted the active phase of “Interaction-2024,” “Search-2024,” and “Echelon-2024” exercises designed to synchronize command-and-control, reconnaissance, logistics, and support elements of the alliance’s collective forces. The Kyrgyz leg concluded with combined operations demonstrations and evaluation of interoperability gains. In October 2024, Tajikistan hosted “Rubezh-2024,” focused on Central Asia’s rapid-deployment forces and scenarios involving incursions by illegal armed groups, hostage rescue, and air-defense coordination. The CSTO reported that the exercise’s operational objectives were achieved and that joint tactics were refined during the active phase at the Harbmaidon range. This year, the organization also ran a strategic command-staff training for its Joint Staff and national ministries on March 17–20, 2025, rehearsing planning and coordination procedures for regional contingencies - part of the bloc’s annual joint-training cycle. Policy framework and next steps The Bishkek working group is meeting against the backdrop of decisions taken by defense ministers in Bishkek on May 28, 2025, when CSTO members approved the Plan of Military Cooperation for 2026–2030 and the Plan of joint training for 2026 - documents that set training priorities, exercise calendars, and institutional cooperation goals across the alliance. By aligning academy programs and research agendas, and pairing them with the long-term exercise plan, the CSTO is aiming to standardize specialist training (from signals and EW to logistics and UAV operations), expand exchanges among defense universities, and convert lessons from recent drills into updated curricula. As chair, Kyrgyzstan is expected to circulate agreed proposals from this week’s sessions to the Council of Defense Ministers for inclusion in the 2026 training calendar and for incorporation into the 2026–2030 cooperation framework.

Tajik-Afghan Border

CSTO to Begin Arms Supplies to the Tajik-Afghan Border in 2026

Beginning in 2026, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) will start delivering weapons and military equipment to bolster the alliance's southern borders, particularly to reinforce the Tajik-Afghan frontier. This development was announced on May 19 by CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov during a meeting of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly in Bishkek. Armed Response to Regional Threats Tasmagambetov highlighted that the initiative stems from the Targeted Inter-State Program (TIP), approved in Astana in November 2024. This program reflects the CSTO's collective resolve to address security vulnerabilities along its southern periphery. “The task now is to implement it in full,” he stated. These security issues were previously discussed during an April 2025 meeting in Dushanbe with Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon. Despite regional stabilization efforts, Afghanistan continues to pose serious risks, including terrorism, arms trafficking, and the narcotics trade. Tasmagambetov emphasized, “The Taliban regime is proving to be a long-term political factor.” He noted that CSTO members, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia, have intensified diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan to support regional stability. The CSTO Secretariat will maintain vigilance and enhance coordination to counter emerging threats. Signs of Regional Progress In contrast to the ongoing security challenges, Tasmagambetov acknowledged promising developments in Central Asia. He pointed to the March 13 state border agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as the March 31 tripoint agreement involving Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. These steps are seen as crucial in easing regional tensions. Tajik-Afghan Border a Strategic Focus Through 2029 The TIP for strengthening the Tajik-Afghan border is scheduled to be implemented in three stages and will run until 2029. Its goals include reinforcing southern Tajikistan’s military infrastructure and improving the region’s capacity to respond swiftly to cross-border threats. The program outlines measures for allied coordination, arms deliveries, and enhancements to logistics, communications, and border infrastructure.

Collective Security Treaty Organization

Controversies and Rejections: What Future Awaits the CSTO?

Armenia has officially refused to contribute financially to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a bloc tasked with ensuring the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of its member states. Meanwhile, the organization’s Secretary General, Imangali Tasmagambetov, has come under scrutiny for remarks he made related to the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Shifting Alliances and Regional Tensions Founded in 1992, the CSTO comprises Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Tajikistan, and Armenia. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan have withdrawn from the organization at various times. While the CSTO regularly conducts joint military exercises and cooperates on counter-terrorism and anti-narcotics efforts, the war in Ukraine has exposed internal divisions and challenged the bloc’s cohesion. Tasmagambetov Responds to Criticism In March, Secretary General Tasmagambetov raised eyebrows in an interview with a Russian outlet, warning that any deployment of EU troops to Ukraine could escalate regional tensions. He stated that the CSTO would be ready to provide assistance “within the framework of the organization’s charter and subject to approval by all member states.” The remarks sparked a backlash, particularly on social media in Kazakhstan, where some users accused Tasmagambetov, the former prime minister, of adopting a pro-Russian stance. Responding in late March, Tasmagambetov recorded a rare video message clarifying his position. “How can one calmly react to baseless claims that I would send my compatriots to war?” he asked. “There will always be those who distort my words. I have always remained loyal to my people; the interests of our country have always come first.” Tasmagambetov went on to urge viewers to think critically about information shared online. This controversy follows an earlier statement by Aibek Smadiarov, spokesperson for Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who said in October 2022 that the CSTO had no plans to involve itself in the Ukraine conflict. “The CSTO's jurisdiction is limited to the internationally recognized territories of its member states,” Smadiarov stated. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, is reviewing a report by a Ukrainian institution that said about 661 Kazakh citizens have fought for Russia since it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The I Want To Live center, which is run by the Ukrainian security services and assists with surrender requests from soldiers fighting for Russia, published a list of what it said were the Kazakh nationals. Of the 661, at least 78 have been killed, according to the center. Without providing details, it said it received the list from its own sources within the Russian military. Kazakh media quoted Igor Lepekha, Kazakhstan’s deputy interior minister of internal affairs, as saying the numbers have to be checked because it is unclear whether they are reliable. Kazakhstan bans mercenary activities in foreign conflicts and has opened a number of related investigations in the last few years. Last year, a court in Kazakhstan sentenced a Kazakh national to more than six years in jail for fighting with Russia’s Wagner Group in Ukraine. Armenia Pulls Back Adding to the bloc’s instability, Armenia recently announced that it would no longer finance the...

Military

One Military Alliance (CSTO) Monitors Woes of Another (NATO)

A “zombie” alliance, one Western analysis said. A “paper tiger,” said another. The Collective Security Treaty Organization, a regional group of post-Soviet states that includes Russia and several countries in Central Asia, has come in for some harsh criticism over the years because of perceptions that it is ineffective. Now, the CSTO, described in some circles as a smaller, Russia-dominated counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is closely monitoring a widening split in the NATO security alliance between the United States and Europe. It’s a stunning turnaround that raises questions on both sides about whether and to what extent countries would honor alliance obligations as U.S. President Donald Trump shakes up the global order. While he pushes Ukraine to make a peace deal with Russia, Europe is pledging more support for Ukraine, and deadly fighting continues after three years of war. Overnight, Russia attacked Ukrainian energy infrastructure with drones and missiles, officials in Ukraine said Friday. The Collective Security Treaty Organization has appeared to struggle for cohesion and purpose at times. Its members are Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. While Belarus is loyal to Russia, Armenia has frozen its participation in the group because it felt abandoned by Russia during recent military losses to Azerbaijan. None of Russia’s partners in the CSTO have deployed troops to support its war in Ukraine. But a rise in Russia’s military and diplomatic stature, buoyed by perceptions that Trump favors rapprochement with President Vladimir Putin, could inject some momentum into the regional alliance. At the same time, the Central Asian states, at least, are likely to keep a pragmatic course, balancing international relationships and trying to avoid the perception of taking sides. In an interview with the Russian newspaper Izvestia published on Thursday, CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov was asked about reports that some European countries could send troops to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping force. Tasmagambetov, a former Kazakh prime minister, downplayed the possibility, saying it would create “a dangerous situation on a regional scale” and that the CSTO was following the situation. “In addition, it is unlikely that the population of European countries, tired of the growing negative phenomena in the economy and social sphere, will approve of such a decision by their governments. After all, this will be an additional burden on the shoulders of society, even if these contingents are not involved in offensive operations, but will, for example, perform police or surveillance functions,” he said. “If such risks arise, the CSTO will be ready to offer various options for assistance within the framework provided for in the organization’s statutory documents and, of course, approved by all member states,” Tasmagambetov said. Russia has been blunt on the issue, saying it opposes any arrangement in which European peacekeepers are deployed in Ukraine.

Organization of Turkic States

Turkey’s Turkic Gambit: Balancing Influence in Post-Soviet States

Despite its superpower ambitions, which have diminished somewhat since February 24, 2022, Moscow views Turkey’s growing geopolitical influence with increasing concern. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which includes several Central Asian republics, is perceived by the Kremlin as a rival to its regional blocs, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, for Central Asian nations, the OTS is not a political or military alliance but rather a framework for economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. The extent of Turkey’s influence remains limited within these parameters. A Historical Perspective Russia continues to interpret geopolitical dynamics through the lens of century-old concepts, particularly Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turkism, both of which emerged as nationalist movements against the Russian and Ottoman empires. Pan-Turkism gained traction in the Ottoman Empire but lost momentum following its adoption and subsequent rejection by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideology was later revived during the Cold War, when Turkey’s NATO membership positioned it as a force for destabilizing Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Turkic regions within Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Despite Turkish efforts, Pan-Turkic sentiment found limited success, influencing only Azerbaijan, which aligned closely with Turkey after losing the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijan formalized this relationship in the early 1990s with the doctrine of “Two Countries, One Nation.” Baku only began to see concrete benefits from its alliance with Ankara after winning the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The Organization of Turkic States: Reality vs. Rhetoric Although the first summit of Turkic states was held in 1992, the OTS’s precursor, the Turkic Council, was only founded in 2009. The agreement, signed in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, initially included Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining in 2018, and officially became a member in 2019, whilst Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2022), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (2023) hold observer state status. Turkmenistan has frequently been rumored to be considering full membership. Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia have often clashed with the ambitions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan delayed its membership in the Turkic Council until 2019 due to strained relations with Ankara which dated back to the mid-1990s. Turkey, the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics, expected to leverage its Cold War victory over the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region. While Kazakhstan initially welcomed Turkish economic expansion and Pan-Turkic rhetoric, it became increasingly skeptical in the 2000s. Uzbekistan, however, was cautious from the outset and largely resisted Turkish influence. Kazakhstan’s shift in perspective coincided with Ankara’s increased push for deeper Turkic integration. Turkish-backed initiatives in Kazakhstan revealed clear expectations that Ankara would lead such a union, prompting Astana to resist. Kazakhstan, which balances ties with the West, China, and Russia, rejected the notion of falling under Turkish leadership. The Kazakh government neutralized Pan-Turkic voices by integrating key advocates into political positions, redirecting their efforts toward promoting Kazakh nationalism instead. Turkey’s Role in the...