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Military Procurement

Why Central Asia Is Diversifying Its Arms Suppliers

India could become another supplier of major weapons to Central Asia. Indian Masterminds reported in July that Samir V. Kamat, former chairman of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), said India had exported Akash surface-to-air missile systems to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The reported deliveries remain unconfirmed by the recipient governments. Publicly available accounts give no contract values, quantities, or delivery schedules. DRDO says an initial Akash battery has been flagged off for export to friendly foreign countries, without naming the recipients. Akash is a mobile medium-range surface-to-air missile system designed to counter aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and drones. If the reported deliveries are confirmed, they would mark the first publicly known Akash exports to Central Asia following India’s deal with Armenia. The region’s armed forces still rely heavily on Soviet- and Russian-designed equipment, but governments are increasingly buying newer systems from other suppliers. Russia retains a strong position where countries need to maintain Soviet- and Russian-designed equipment already in service. Other suppliers are winning orders for drones and aircraft, extending their role in the region’s defense procurement. The figures illustrate the persistence of Russian influence. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia accounted for 83% of Kazakhstan’s imports of major arms in 2021–25. These figures measure transfers of major weapons, rather than the full range of military supplies and support. Russia’s exports of major arms, however, fell by 64% in 2021–25 compared with the previous five-year period. Nearly three-quarters of its exports went to India, China, and Belarus. SIPRI attributes much of the fall to reduced deliveries to Algeria, China, and Egypt. The most visible shift has occurred in Uzbekistan. In late August, official footage showed Chinese-built J-10CE fighter jets carrying Uzbek markings. At least six aircraft could be seen. For three decades, Soviet-designed MiG-29s and Su-27s formed the backbone of Uzbekistan’s fighter fleet. Operating the J-10CE requires different training and maintenance arrangements, alongside compatible weapons and ground equipment. The transition moves a key component of the Uzbek Air Force outside its traditional supply chain. On September 25, Brazil’s Embraer delivered the first C-390 Millennium military transport aircraft to the Uzbek Air Force. The handover ceremony took place at the company’s facility in Gavião Peixoto, making Uzbekistan the first C-390 operator in Central Asia. The late-2024 contract includes training to operate the aircraft and covers its upkeep with technical support and spare parts. The aircraft can carry payloads of up to 26 metric tons and can be configured for troop and cargo transport, aerial refueling, medical evacuation, and search-and-rescue missions. Kazakhstan’s military has put Turkish Aerospace Industries’ ANKA drone into service after military trials. In its review of 2024, Kazakhstan’s Defense Ministry reported discussions with Baykar, another Turkish drone maker, on a roadmap for local production of tactical drones and loitering munitions. The latter can remain airborne while searching for a target before striking it. The same review said the Turkish side had offered to provide Bayraktar Kalkan and Bayraktar Mini reconnaissance drones, along with the...

Military Deaths

Deaths During Caspian Military Drills: Kazakhstan Investigates Commanders’ Actions

Fourteen servicemen in Kazakhstan’s Armed Forces were killed during military exercises on the Caspian Sea on September 24, and five Armed Forces officials were detained. On the same evening, around 100 relatives and Aktau residents gathered outside the city morgue as a serviceman read out the names of the dead. People demanded the chance to identify the bodies, and screams and crying could be heard after some names. September 25 was declared a day of national mourning in Kazakhstan. The Ministry of Defense later reported that 17 had been swept into the sea; three were rescued, one of whom was hospitalized, and 14 died. A criminal case was opened under provisions covering negligence in the performance of military duties resulting in serious consequences and violations of navigation rules. The Khazar Qorgany 2026 exercises began on September 22 in Kazakhstan’s sector of the Caspian Sea. More than 500 military personnel took part, along with ships and boats from the Naval Forces, hydrographic vessels, Coast Guard units of the National Security Committee’s Border Service, and Air Defense Forces aircraft. Relatives of one serviceman said that officials from the akimat, the local executive authority, the police, and the military enlistment office came to the family’s home to tell them their son had died. Members of other families said that some of the conscripts were about a week away from completing their military service. Based on the published birth dates of 12 servicemen on the Ministry of Defense’s initial list, they were between 19 and 23 years old; nine were born in 2006 or 2007. Among those killed was 20-year-old sailor Serzhan Ayapbergen from the Mangystau region. Before joining the military, he competed in sambo and judo, won silver at the Kazakhstan championship and the Commonwealth of Independent States Games in sambo, won judo competitions, and earned the title of Candidate for Master of Sport. Deaths among military personnel in peacetime have been debated in Kazakhstan for years. In April 2023, First Deputy Chief Military Prosecutor Maksat Kaziyev said that 270 servicemen had died since the beginning of 2020: 78 in 2020, 96 in 2021, 85 in 2022, and another 11 in the first months of 2023. According to prosecutors, 36% of the deaths were related to illness, 24% to road accidents, and 20% to suicide. Between 2018 and 2022, 86 suicides and 20 attempted suicides were recorded among military personnel. These figures cover career military personnel, contract soldiers, and conscripts, and include different causes of death. They do not show how many people died specifically while performing military duties. The deaths of conscripts, young men performing compulsory military service, are particularly sensitive in Kazakhstan. [caption id="attachment_57024" align="aligncenter" width="800"] Detention of the suspected commander / Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan[/caption] In November 2025, journalists questioned Defense Minister Dauren Kosanov about deaths among servicemen, hazing in Kazakhstan’s armed forces, and violence in military units. After a reporter said that news of serious incidents appeared almost every month, Kosanov responded with apparent...

Drones

Kazakh Military Advances Domestic Drone Production

Kazakhstan’s Airborne Assault Forces (AAF) are establishing an independent production base for unmanned aerial systems (UAS), signaling a strategic shift toward greater self-reliance in military technology. According to the Ministry of Defense, approximately 100 drones have already been assembled and deployed across various branches of the armed forces. Unmanned units were formally established within the AAF two years ago. Since then, military personnel have gained hands-on experience in drone operations and developed in-house capabilities for maintenance, repair, and assembly. This has significantly reduced dependence on foreign supplies and accelerated the integration of unmanned systems into the military structure. A dedicated workshop for the production and servicing of drones began operations in December 2025. Within two months, the facility had launched a full production cycle from hardware assembly and software configuration to testing and delivery. “The 100th drone was recently assembled here,” the Ministry of Defense reported in a statement. The facility is staffed by contract personnel who have completed specialized technical training. All drones undergo mandatory testing before being dispatched to military units. Military experts note that the development of domestic UAV production is driven by the evolving nature of warfare. Recent armed conflicts have underscored the growing role of drones in reconnaissance, fire correction, target designation, and unit coordination. In 2026, systematic training of UAV operators will begin at the AAF’s training center. Instruction will be led by specialists with operational experience across various UAV platforms. Kazakhstan’s UAV units have already seen active deployment during the Desant-2025 military exercises, held from September 2-12, 2025, at the Koktal training ground in the Zhetysu region. More than 3,000 AAF personnel participated in the drills. The military's drone development effort mirrors a broader trend in Kazakhstan, where drones are increasingly used in civilian sectors. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, a pilot project for drone-based delivery services is set to launch in Almaty in 2026. Elsewhere, researchers in East Kazakhstan are employing drones and artificial intelligence to monitor soil and crop conditions, while engineers in Karaganda have unveiled prototypes of safety-enhancing UAVs for public use.

Military

Food Conditions in the Turkmenistan Army Under Scrutiny

Conscripts returning from military service in Turkmenistan have reported severe food shortages, stark inequality between soldiers and officers, and institutional indifference. Against a backdrop of chronic malnutrition, instances of illness, interpersonal conflict, and even fatalities have been documented. According to former soldiers, food rations in the Turkmen armed forces are grossly inadequate and fall far short of nutritional standards. Daily meals typically consist of boiled pumpkin, stewed cabbage, beets, and rice porridge for breakfast and dinner. Lunch includes a thin soup reportedly containing only "pieces of carrot" and little else. Bread quality is a major concern. Flatbread made from locally sourced flour is often undercooked, forcing conscripts to eat it half-raw, leading to widespread gastrointestinal issues. Meanwhile, soldiers from wealthier families reportedly fare much better. Their relatives send money, which conscripts use to pay canteen cooks for preferential treatment. These soldiers are served separately, receiving meat dishes, salads, fruit, soft drinks, and properly baked bread. In some regions, such as the Balkan region, entrepreneurs have been officially allowed to open cafes near military checkpoints. There, soldiers can purchase rice, samsa, and other local dishes, funded either by family support or their own limited savings. One tragic incident occurred this summer at a base in the Balkan region. A fight broke out outside the canteen when a soldier from a well-off family refused to share his meal. The altercation escalated, ending in the death of one private and a lengthy prison sentence for the other. Discontent is also reportedly growing among officers. Despite earning relatively high salaries for the region, between $860 and $1,140 per month, many do not receive housing, forcing their families to pay substantial rents, which significantly reduces their disposable income. Graduates of the Ministry of Defense’s Military Institute are required to serve a minimum of five years before becoming eligible for discharge. However, approval for resignation remains at the discretion of the command, and with ongoing personnel shortages, such requests are frequently denied.

Middle Powers

Which Central Asian States Qualify as Middle Powers in 2025?

As global power shifts toward multipolarity, Central Asia’s states are emerging as active regional players. This article assesses which of the five republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—qualify as middle powers in 2025, based on economic strength, diplomatic reach, strategic capacity, and governance. Kazakhstan stands as the region’s only consolidated middle power, balancing fiscal stability, institutional reform, and multi-vector diplomacy. Uzbekistan is a rising aspirant, propelled by reforms but still reliant on external financing and centralized authority. The remaining states remain constrained by dependence and limited institutional depth. Together, they reflect a region increasingly capable of shaping, rather than merely absorbing, global and regional change. A comparative analysis of five Central Asian republics shows how far each has advanced toward this status. 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This article assesses which of the five republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—qualify as middle powers in 2025, based on economic strength, diplomatic reach, strategic capacity, and governance. Kazakhstan stands as the region’s only consolidated middle power, balancing fiscal stability, institutional reform, and multi-vector diplomacy. Uzbekistan is a rising aspirant, propelled by reforms but still reliant on external financing and centralized authority. The remaining states remain constrained by dependence and limited institutional depth. Together, they reflect a region increasingly capable of shaping, rather than merely absorbing, global and regional change. A comparative analysis of five Central Asian republics shows how far each has advanced toward this status. Economic Power Economic autonomy is a defining attribute of middle-power capability, enabling states to project influence, sustain policy independence, and finance external engagement. In Central Asia, dependence on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and remittances often reflects constrained fiscal capacity and limited domestic capital formation, while diversified, resilient economies underpin strategic autonomy. Key indicators—GDP per capita, credit ratings, debt sustainability, and export diversification—illuminate the region’s economic hierarchy. Kazakhstan stands as Central Asia’s only consolidated economic middle power. Resource-backed growth, a prudent fiscal regime, and a sovereign wealth fund (the National Fund of Kazakhstan) have anchored macroeconomic stability. With a “BBB” credit rating or equivalent from major agencies, Kazakhstan demonstrates sound debt management and policy credibility. Ongoing diversification efforts under the new economic policies—from renewables to financial modernization—aim to reduce hydrocarbon dependence and deepen integration into global supply chains. Its role as a trans-Caspian logistics hub enhances both strategic and commercial influence. Uzbekistan, by contrast, is an emerging frontier market propelled by post-2017 reforms in currency liberalization, taxation, and state-enterprise restructuring. Rapid GDP growth and expanding private-sector activity mark its trajectory toward fiscal autonomy, though continued ODA inflows averaging around $1.1 billion to 1.3 billion annually, primarily from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, and bilateral partners such as Japan, the United States, and the European Union, highlight its residual dependence on external concessional financing. To achieve genuine middle power status, Uzbekistan must roughly double its real economic output over the next decade, a scale of growth aligned with the shift...

SCO Summit

Opinion: Victory Day Parade Puts China’s Military Might and Alliances on Full Display

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit coincided with China’s lavish commemorations of the "80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the broader World Anti-Fascist War." The culminating moment, a grand military parade, was followed by a formal reception hosted by President Xi Jinping for visiting foreign dignitaries. All five Central Asian heads of state attended the parade. As the summit concluded, Xi seized the opportunity to issue a pointed warning to the West, particularly the United States and President Donald Trump, who had made it clear that he was closely following events in Tianjin and Beijing. In a post on Truth Social, Trump wrote, "Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un as you conspire against the United States of America." Kim Jong Un’s high-profile visit to Beijing, including a prolonged meeting with Putin, signaled the emergence of a visible military alignment between North Korea and Russia. This visit served as a strategic complement to China's Victory Day display of military might. [caption id="attachment_35739" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: president.uz[/caption] For the first time, China publicly exhibited components of its strategic nuclear triad: the air-launched Jinglei1 missile, submarine-launched Julang3, and land-based ICBMs such as the Dongfeng61 and Dongfeng31 (and reportedly the DF5C). Analysts saw this as a deliberate signal to the U.S., regional powers like India and Russia, and potential international arms buyers, positioning China as a formidable strategic actor. Also on display were China’s anti-drone “triad”, missile-gun systems, high-energy lasers, and high-power microwave weapons, highlighting advances in counter-drone technology. Additionally, the parade showcased hypersonic and cruise missiles, unmanned aerial and underwater systems, and even robotic dog units, demonstrating China’s futuristic military capabilities. While noting the parade's impressive visuals, analysts cautioned that the true readiness of many showcased systems, for example, torpedo drones or laser weapons, remains uncertain. [caption id="attachment_35741" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: president.uz[/caption] Diplomatically, the summit also reinforced Sino-Russian ties. Putin, who described relations with China as “unprecedentedly” close, and Xi signed over 20 bilateral agreements, including a major energy deal, Power of Siberia 2, a gas pipeline delivering 50 billion cubic metres annually to China via Mongolia. Meanwhile, China announced a trial visa-free entry policy for ordinary Russian passport holders, effective from September 15, 2025, to September 14, 2026, allowing visits up to 30 days for tourism, business, or family purposes. Together, the military spectacle and deepening diplomatic and people-to-people ties affirm Xi’s confidence as he prepares for crucial negotiations with President Trump, an unmistakable projection of strength and strategic resolve.