Energy Transition - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 15

Energy Transition

Investments, Resources, and Digital Transformation: How Central Asia Can Preserve Its Strategic Balance

Rising global demand for critical resources, the accelerating green transition, and the digitalization of the economy are turning Central Asia from a peripheral region into one of the key arenas of geoeconomic competition. Kazakhstan and its neighbors are increasingly in the focus of the United States, China, the European Union, and the Gulf states—as sources of raw materials, sites for infrastructure projects, and markets for the implementation of digital solutions. Under these conditions, the key question is no longer the volume of investment, but control over its quality, structure, and long-term consequences. The resource factor: from raw materials to a geoeconomic asset Central Asia is now becoming a strategic storehouse for the global green transition and high-tech industries. The region possesses enormous reserves of critical raw materials: Kazakhstan leads the world in uranium production, at about 40% of the global market, while deposits of copper, lithium, cobalt, uranium, and rare metals across Kazakhstan and the wider region are making Central Asia an increasingly important link in clean-energy and high-tech supply chains. Investment activity in the extractive sector is stimulating the development of related high-tech industries within the region. Global players are increasingly coming not simply for raw materials, but with proposals to localize processing. Thus, in November 2024, Kazakhstan’s first tungsten processing plant began operating at the Boguty deposit in the Almaty region. The project, valued at $300 million, is being implemented by Aral Kegen, a subsidiary of Jiaxin International Resources Investment. In addition, in the East Kazakhstan region, with the participation of the German mining company HMS Bergbau AG, two new industrial enterprises specializing in lithium extraction and processing are planned by 2029. Work is underway on the construction of a mining and processing plant, as well as a pegmatite ore processing facility. This allows the countries of the region to move away from the “quarry” model toward the model of a technological hub, where natural wealth becomes leverage for gaining access to Western and Eastern innovation. Investment transformation: from capital to ecosystems The traditional model, focused on extraction, is gradually giving way to the formation of value-added ecosystems. This presupposes the development of processing, the creation of high-tech production, and the formation of a scientific base. Kazakhstan’s national companies, such as Tau-Ken Samruk, Kazatomprom, and KazMunayGas, act as a strategic “anchor” for foreign capital, taking on the primary risks and bureaucratic burden. They absorb part of the early project risk, from licensing and exploration to infrastructure and coordination with the state, making entry into Kazakhstan easier for major foreign investors. This allows the state to retain control over strategic assets while using private capital for accelerated modernization of the sector. The main emphasis today is shifting from raw material extraction to the localization of higher value-added stages. Through the creation of joint ventures, national companies are introducing Western technologies and building plants with high added value, from the production of nuclear fuel assemblies to the manufacture of polyethylene and metal refining. In this way, they integrate Kazakh business...

Critical Minerals

Opinion: Supply Chains of Power: How Critical Minerals Are Shaping China–U.S. Competition in Central Asia

Central Asia is no longer a distant frontier for global geopolitics. It is developing into a central arena of competition for critical minerals, supply chains, and industrial power, where minerals are no longer simple commodities but have instead become key components of contemporary statecraft. In essence, this transformation highlights a recognition in Washington and other capitals that critical mineral supply chains are fundamental to next-generation energy systems, the development of artificial intelligence (AI), and strategic defense capabilities. Even as the global economy is multipolar, critical mineral supply chains remain highly concentrated and dominated by China. Control of rare earths is increasingly geopolitical, with clear economic, political, and security consequences. The significance of that imbalance is now shaping U.S. foreign policy, Central Asia’s development strategies, and the future of global economics. China’s Strategy: Control the Chain, Not Just the Mine Though many years in the making, China’s critical minerals strategy is still often misunderstood as focused primarily on resource access. However, Beijing’s efforts are far broader and more effective. Not only securing raw materials, the Chinese leadership has also worked to control the entire supply chain—from extraction to processing, refining, and manufacturing. China’s long-term focus and investments began in the 1980s with efforts that culminated in the Made in China 2025 plan for national and overseas manufacturing. In 2023 alone, Chinese firms invested more than $120 billion in overseas mining and processing, targeting key elements used in energy supply chains. Beijing also fed its industrial base by providing over $220 billion for the production of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable infrastructure. As a result, China now controls approximately 60% of lithium processing, more than 70% of cobalt refining, and over 90% of battery material manufacturing. Strategically, China controls roughly 90% of global rare earth refining and associated technologies. Early investments in supplies enabled Beijing to subsequently concentrate funds into refining capacity to feed its industrial sector. This integrated approach has shifted the power dynamic for global supply chains tied to the critical minerals economy. As evidenced by Beijing’s near monopoly on processing, market control is not just associated with geological supplies but with processing capacity. China’s willingness to weaponize access not only to rare earths but also to processing technology demonstrates Beijing’s market muscle. This distinction is critical. Rare earth elements are not inherently scarce, but they are rarely found in concentrated deposits, making them difficult to extract and refine. Over decades, Beijing developed unique refining capabilities and subsidized an industrial base that disincentivized competition and encouraged processing to shift to China. The Vicious Circle Prohibitive investment costs, long development timelines, and market volatility have discouraged Western investment in alternative supply chains. Each stage (mining, processing, refining, manufacturing) is interdependent: miners won’t invest without buyers and offtake agreements, processors and refiners need secure financing and stable mineral supply, and manufacturers need steady inputs. Such interdependence creates an investment standoff and heightens perceptions of risk. By integrating all stages, Beijing exerts influence across global markets, from pricing to production. This has conditioned global markets...

Renewable energy

Kazakhstan’s Renewable Energy Share Reaches 7% in National Energy Mix

By the end of 2025, renewable energy sources (RES) accounted for 7% of Kazakhstan’s electricity generation, up from 6.43% the previous year. This modest but steady increase was driven by the commissioning of nine new RES facilities with a combined capacity of 503 MW, including wind, solar, and hydroelectric power plants. While Kazakhstan still lags behind global leaders in the energy transition, it is considered one of Central Asia’s most institutionally structured and balanced markets for green energy development. The country currently operates 162 renewable energy facilities with a total installed capacity of approximately 3.5 GW. The sector remains diversified: 67 wind farms, 49 solar power plants, 43 hydropower facilities, and three biogas stations contribute to the overall mix. A key driver of Kazakhstan’s renewable energy expansion is its auction-based model for project selection, which enhances transparency and attracts private investment. Under the 2024-2027 plan, the government aims to deploy 6.7 GW of new renewable capacity, of which around 4 GW had already been allocated by December 2025. The participation of international players, including Total Eren, Masdar, China Power International Holding, and China Energy, has bolstered the sector’s technological and financial resilience. In comparison, Uzbekistan has emerged as the region’s most dynamic renewable energy market, focusing on large-scale solar and wind projects led by foreign investors. Although the share of renewables in Uzbekistan’s energy mix remains below 10%, its annual capacity additions have outpaced Kazakhstan’s in absolute terms. Unlike Kazakhstan’s market-based approach, Uzbekistan’s model relies more heavily on large, state-structured contracts, which speeds up implementation but limits competition and diversification. Total investment in Uzbekistan’s renewable sector is estimated at roughly $6 billion, with key backing from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the World Bank, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan formally lead the region in renewable energy share due to their reliance on hydropower, which accounts for 80-90% of their electricity generation. However, this heavy dependence makes their energy systems highly vulnerable to seasonal and climatic fluctuations. Turkmenistan remains the regional outlier, with a power sector almost entirely reliant on natural gas despite significant solar potential. Renewable projects there are limited and largely experimental. In this context, Kazakhstan occupies an intermediate position, between the hydropower-heavy economies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the fast-growing but centralized market of Uzbekistan. Its relatively low starting share in renewables is offset by a stable institutional framework, competitive project selection, and strong international participation. Kazakhstan’s targets, to raise renewable energy’s share to 15% by 2030 and to 50% by 2050, are ambitious but feasible, provided green energy development remains aligned with investments in base-load generation.

Rare Earth Elements

Central Asia, Vanadium, and the U.S. National Security Strategy

Dated November 2025 and released publicly in early December, the U.S. National Security Strategy links overseas trade and investment, but overlooks Central Asia as a target region for critical minerals. This oversight merits reconsideration in the NSS’s next iteration, given the region’s known natural resource base, openness to foreign investment, proficiency in mining operations, low processing costs, and manageable geopolitical risks. As governments and businesses review supply-chain resilience for critical minerals, vanadium – not one of the 17 rare earth metals – has increasingly become a strategically relevant rather than optional or cyclical commodity. It is widely used in high-strength steel, grid-scale energy storage functions such as redox flow batteries, and infrastructure with defense and industrial applications. A recent letter from the U.S. Congress highlights a critical shortfall of vanadium in the United States: with 14,000 metric tons consumed in 2024, only 3,800 tons were produced domestically. Imports, mainly from Brazil and South Africa, are at risk due to shifting market conditions, meaning the U.S. needs a more structured and focused industrial-like approach to counter unnecessary import dependencies and geopolitical stresses. U.S. supply is secured solely through imports and recycling, given that the mining of vanadium-bearing mineral precursors is minimal to non-existent in the United States. With mining dominated by China and Russia, and with South African production in decline, today’s need to secure primary materials and supply chains means the U.S. must invest overseas until domestic mining is viable. What is needed is vertical integration from mine to final product – vanadium pentoxide (V205), vanadium trioxide (V2O3), and vanadium sulfate (VOSO₄ / V₂(SO₄)₃) for batteries. In an October Development Finance Corporation media release, DFC CEO Ben Black said that “Securing critical minerals is a paramount matter of U.S. strategic interest and economic prosperity.” That’s clearly beyond dispute. Central Asia and Vanadium Central Asia as a region fits within the U.S.’s broader geostrategic goals and geographic diversification plans aimed at building solid asset-based partnerships that go beyond raw material extraction and precarious trading arrangements. Last November's gathering of Central Asia’s five presidents at the White House finally placed the region firmly on the global map. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Paul Kapur has also been clear: “Under President Trump’s and Secretary Rubio’s leadership, we’re elevating the C5+1 partnership as a priority — a strategic priority and an economic priority.” Here, amongst critical minerals, vanadium surely emerges as a priority commodity, given the near absence of U.S. domestic mining. Kazakhstan leads Central Asia in vanadium mining and production, hosting the region’s most productive deposits. Established operations, strong infrastructure, cost advantages, supportive laws, tax incentives, and a free FX regime make the country highly attractive to investors. Kazakhstan has three vanadium assets—Balasausqandiq in advanced production and Lisakovsk and Kurumsak in exploration—making them attractive targets for miners or funds with long horizons and low-cost capital. Kyrgyzstan has scattered, under-explored vanadium deposits, including in the Jetim Mountain Range. Uzbekistan is expanding exploration, but the value is yet to...

Natural gas

Uzbekistan Suspends New Gas Connections for Homes to Conserve Energy

Uzbekistan has halted the issuance of technical permits for new natural gas connections in residential and commercial buildings that use gas exclusively for heating or cooking. Minister of Energy Jurabek Mirzamahmudov announced the decision on October 28, according to Gazeta.uz. The measure applies to newly built properties that consume gas purely for combustion rather than industrial production. “This does not concern only apartment buildings,” Mirzamahmudov said. “According to a Cabinet of Ministers resolution, starting this year, technical permits for gas connection are no longer issued to consumers who use gas solely for burning. However, if gas is used to create added value in industry, that is allowed, because resources are limited.” Existing buildings already connected to the gas network will not be affected. In new developments, gas stoves will be replaced with electric ones, and heating will be provided through centralized or local boiler systems. The minister said that the rational use of resources has become a national priority, particularly given the country’s reliance on certain external energy supplies. “Since there are alternative sources, such as electric stoves for cooking and electricity for heating, they serve the same purpose,” he added. Mirzamahmudov said that the country’s centralized heating network is being expanded during the current heating season, with several projects under development through public-private partnerships. “Urban networks are being modernized, and cogeneration facilities are under construction. For example, on November 18 in Samarkand, during an international forum, we plan to sign a heating supply agreement based on a public-private partnership with a Saudi company,” he noted, likely referring to a project in Nukus involving the Emirati firm Tadweer. The policy shift comes amid a continued decline in domestic gas output. Uzbekistan’s natural gas production fell by 4.2% in the first two months of 2025 compared to the same period last year. Production has steadily dropped from 61.59 billion cubic meters in 2018 to 44.59 billion in 2024. The new restrictions reflect the government’s growing efforts to conserve resources and improve nationwide energy efficiency.