Global Supply Chains - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 28

China

Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s New Playbook in Central Asia

In the Kyzylorda Region, near the town of Shieli, the silos and conveyor belts of a Chinese-backed plant rise out of the fine brown dust that dominates the landscape. It is the kind of project the Belt and Road was supposed to deliver in Central Asia: heavy industry, fixed capital, and a visible mark on the landscape. But it is also a reminder that China’s role in the region has become narrower, more contested, and less sweeping than the old rhetoric suggested. In photographs, the Gezhouba Cement Plant looks like a self-contained industrial island on the steppe. For nearby villagers, it became something else: a source of jobs and local prestige for some, but also of years of complaints about dust clouds and whether the state was quicker to defend a flagship Chinese-backed project than the people living beside it. Projects like the plant in Shieli also help explain why views of China across Central Asia remain mixed. Beijing is seen as a source of trade, investment, and technology, but that promise is tempered in some places by concerns over transparency, environmental costs, and who really benefits when a project arrives. China has become Central Asia’s dominant trading partner, but investment has not kept pace with the surge in commerce. The gap says a lot about how Beijing now works in the region: with a sharper focus on sectors that matter to its long-term influence. In 2025, trade in goods between China and the five Central Asian states reached $106.3 billion, up 12% year on year. Chinese exports to the region totaled $71.2 billion, while imports from Central Asia reached $35.1 billion. Trade has grown fast enough to reshape the region’s external balance, but long-term investment has been far more selective. Over 2005–2025, the five Central Asian states accounted for about 3% of China’s global overseas investment and construction total. The picture changes once direct investment is separated from trade and construction contracts. China’s FDI stock in the five Central Asian states stood at about $36 billion by mid-2025. Roughly 90% was concentrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The structure of that capital has also changed. Extractive industries still accounted for 46% of the portfolio, but manufacturing and energy together made up more than one third, and greenfield projects rose from 43% to 60%. China has not poured money into Central Asia on the scale once implied by early Belt and Road rhetoric. Instead, it has invested in sectors that strengthen its industrial position. Kazakhstan remains at the center of this relationship. It is China’s biggest commercial partner in Central Asia, and the main destination for Chinese capital in the region. Kazakhstan-China trade reached $43.8 billion in 2024. The country’s portfolio of projects with Chinese participation includes 224 ventures worth about $66.4 billion. Some are still at the planning stage, but the range of projects is telling. Recent developments have included a hydrogen energy technology innovation center in Almaty and a large wind farm with electricity storage. Kazakhstan still sells...

Critical Minerals

Opinion: Supply Chains of Power: How Critical Minerals Are Shaping China–U.S. Competition in Central Asia

Central Asia is no longer a distant frontier for global geopolitics. It is developing into a central arena of competition for critical minerals, supply chains, and industrial power, where minerals are no longer simple commodities but have instead become key components of contemporary statecraft. In essence, this transformation highlights a recognition in Washington and other capitals that critical mineral supply chains are fundamental to next-generation energy systems, the development of artificial intelligence (AI), and strategic defense capabilities. Even as the global economy is multipolar, critical mineral supply chains remain highly concentrated and dominated by China. Control of rare earths is increasingly geopolitical, with clear economic, political, and security consequences. The significance of that imbalance is now shaping U.S. foreign policy, Central Asia’s development strategies, and the future of global economics. China’s Strategy: Control the Chain, Not Just the Mine Though many years in the making, China’s critical minerals strategy is still often misunderstood as focused primarily on resource access. However, Beijing’s efforts are far broader and more effective. Not only securing raw materials, the Chinese leadership has also worked to control the entire supply chain—from extraction to processing, refining, and manufacturing. China’s long-term focus and investments began in the 1980s with efforts that culminated in the Made in China 2025 plan for national and overseas manufacturing. In 2023 alone, Chinese firms invested more than $120 billion in overseas mining and processing, targeting key elements used in energy supply chains. Beijing also fed its industrial base by providing over $220 billion for the production of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable infrastructure. As a result, China now controls approximately 60% of lithium processing, more than 70% of cobalt refining, and over 90% of battery material manufacturing. Strategically, China controls roughly 90% of global rare earth refining and associated technologies. Early investments in supplies enabled Beijing to subsequently concentrate funds into refining capacity to feed its industrial sector. This integrated approach has shifted the power dynamic for global supply chains tied to the critical minerals economy. As evidenced by Beijing’s near monopoly on processing, market control is not just associated with geological supplies but with processing capacity. China’s willingness to weaponize access not only to rare earths but also to processing technology demonstrates Beijing’s market muscle. This distinction is critical. Rare earth elements are not inherently scarce, but they are rarely found in concentrated deposits, making them difficult to extract and refine. Over decades, Beijing developed unique refining capabilities and subsidized an industrial base that disincentivized competition and encouraged processing to shift to China. The Vicious Circle Prohibitive investment costs, long development timelines, and market volatility have discouraged Western investment in alternative supply chains. Each stage (mining, processing, refining, manufacturing) is interdependent: miners won’t invest without buyers and offtake agreements, processors and refiners need secure financing and stable mineral supply, and manufacturers need steady inputs. Such interdependence creates an investment standoff and heightens perceptions of risk. By integrating all stages, Beijing exerts influence across global markets, from pricing to production. This has conditioned global markets...

C6+1

Opinion: Trump Has Golden Opportunity to Launch C6+1 on Sidelines of UN

Representatives of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan — along with Azerbaijan, are expected in New York for the United Nations General Assembly in September. Historically, meetings between the Central Asian states and the United States – the C5+1 – have taken place on the sidelines of the United Nations. It is the most natural and logistically efficient venue for President Donald Trump to re-engage with the C5 partners he hosted at the White House last November. As of now, only foreign ministers are expected to attend the UNGA. But this could change if Trump extends an invitation to the leaders, according to a Central Asian diplomatic source. This time, however, he has the opportunity to add Azerbaijan, transforming the format into a C6+1. Baku has already been invited to participate as a full member in Central Asian gatherings, and Washington should build on that momentum. Azerbaijan is uniquely positioned: close to both Israel and Turkey – two of America’s most important regional partners – it sits astride one of the most important connectivity corridors linking Europe and Asia. Its inclusion would turn the C5+1 into a genuinely trans‑Caspian framework that reflects the emerging realities of Eurasian integration. The move would also link two major diplomatic achievements of Trump’s second term: the launch of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a 43-km strategic transit corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia, and Trump’s elevation of the C5+1 to a White House-level summit. While TRIPP was discussed at the C5+1 meeting in November, bringing Azerbaijan into the next gathering would allow the administration to present itself as the architect of a new Eurasian trade and energy map. Strategically, a C6+1 format carries significant implications for great-power competition with China. This is because Central Asia is so crucial to Beijing’s grand strategy. In its recently adopted 15th five-year plan, neighborhood diplomacy is listed as the top priority — ahead of relations with major powers or developing countries. Beijing seeks to build a “community with a shared future” with 17 neighboring states, including all five in Central Asia, to “create a favorable external environment” for national rejuvenation, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated. For China, Central Asia is a vital “hinterland” for energy and resource security, and a buffer against maritime disruptions. The United States does not need to dominate the Eurasian Heartland or force Central Asian states to choose between Washington and Beijing. It simply needs to ensure that any Chinese westward access runs through a vast landmass of countries that maintain constructive relations with the United States. A C6+1 format helps shape that environment without confrontation. A stable Middle Corridor – the energy and trade route running through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea and through Azerbaijan to Turkey and the Mediterranean – also benefits America's energy-hungry allies in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea. Both increasingly look to Kazakhstan as an alternative oil supplier as they...

Iran

The Iran War Is Repricing Central Asia’s Connectivity

Europe’s aviation regulator has extended its current conflict-zone bulletin for the Middle East and Persian Gulf through April 10 and continues to advise operators to avoid Iranian and adjacent airspace at all altitudes. Reuters reported soon after that the squeeze on normal flight paths was pushing more traffic into narrower routes, notably over Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The Strait of Hormuz, meanwhile, has not returned to normal commercial use. A limited number of exempted vessels have crossed, but passage remains selective, politicized, and uncertain rather than routine. The question, consequently, is no longer only whether Central Asia has alternatives to single-route dependence but whether those alternatives remain commercially usable, taking into account the increased risk, delay, insurance, fuel burn, and congestion. What has changed is the cost of maintaining reliable connectivity. The Cost of Reliability The Iran conflict imposes higher operating costs on the wider Eurasian air corridor that is now taking displaced traffic. EUROCONTROL estimates that about 1,150 flights a day continue to be affected by re-routing linked to the Middle East crisis. These add roughly 206,000 kilometers of flying and 602 tons of extra fuel burn per day. Maritime trends are similar. In March, war-risk premiums in or near the Gulf had risen more than tenfold in some cases, with hull war premiums moving from about 0.25% of vessel value to as much as 3%. Air-freight rates on some routes rose by as much as 70% as shippers redirected urgent cargo away from disrupted sea lanes and restricted airspace. Higher surcharges and narrower margins for operational error can make routes lose commercial value even if they remain formally open. The wider macroeconomic setting has also made resilience more expensive. Higher oil prices make every detour costlier, raising freight charges, power costs, and production costs across the region’s trading partners. Even where Central Asian cargo does not move through Iranian waters, the same pattern is still present. Asian policymakers were already confronting a combined oil-price and currency shock at a moment when roughly 80% of the oil shipped through Hormuz normally goes to Asia. The World Bank’s March food and nutrition security update notes that around 20% of global oil supplies and about one-third of global fertilizer trade transit the Strait of Hormuz. Urea prices, for example, surged by nearly 46% month on month between February and March 2026. Importers in Central Asia, as well as in Europe and the South Caucasus, remain under pressure from higher household food costs and tighter producer margins. The price of resilience is now showing up in increased costs for farm inputs, food costs, and household budgets. How the Burden Falls Kazakhstan remains the best placed in the region to absorb the shift. The CPC pipeline still carries about 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports; oil income contributes 52% of the state budget. Earlier disruptions had constrained Kazakhstan to reroute 300,000 tons of crude, and the country continues to rely on supplementary outlets such as Ust-Luga, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, and China when its main...

U.S.-Uzbekistan Partnership

Modernization Without Dependence: Why Uzbekistan Is Deepening Ties with Washington

The recent rise in Uzbekistan-U.S. engagement is often framed as a sudden diplomatic turn, and much of the commentary has focused on what Washington hopes to gain from deeper involvement in Central Asia. Far less attention, however, has been given to what Tashkent is seeking from this relationship. From Uzbekistan’s perspective, this engagement is part of a broader national strategy to expand the country’s foreign policy options at a time when all of the major powers are competing for influence in Central Asia. In November 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev joined the other C5 leaders in Washington for a White House summit focused on economic cooperation, critical minerals, energy, and trade. By February 2026, the relationship had moved beyond talks and into financing and project design, with new agreements involving the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and EXIM, alongside a new critical minerals framework. From Uzbekistan’s side, the core objective is straightforward. Tashkent wants to modernize rapidly without risking becoming overdependent on any single external investor. That means using U.S. interest as leverage and in tandem with, not as a replacement for ties with Russia or China. Washington is courting the region because it wants access to minerals and supply chains that reduce reliance on China and limit exposure to sanctioned or geopolitically sensitive suppliers. Uzbekistan is well aware of this and is using that demand to strengthen its bargaining position for financing, technology, and industrial upgrading. In other words, Uzbekistan is positioning itself as a strategic production and transit partner. The direction of cooperation is revealing. The February 2026 U.S.-Uzbekistan critical minerals pact prioritizes the full-value chain from exploration and extraction to processing, and even proposes a joint investment holding company. This signals that Tashkent is aiming beyond raw-material exports. It wants to break from the post-Soviet pattern of shipping resources while others capture refining, technology, and margins. If it can secure processing capacity, infrastructure, and long-term financing, the deal becomes an instrument of industrial policy. The second objective is finance and implementation capacity. President Mirziyoyev also held separate bilateral meetings with the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Howard Lutnick, and other senior U.S. trade officials. The meetings focused on an investment platform, business council coordination, and support for large industrial and infrastructure projects. EXIM also publicly described the new framework as a way to convert earlier commitments into financing solutions for energy, aviation, critical minerals, and advanced technologies. The third objective is trade normalization and market access. A bipartisan Senate effort has introduced legislation to repeal Jackson-Vanik restrictions for Central Asian states, and President Mirziyoyev raised U.S. support for Uzbekistan’s WTO accession and stronger cooperation under the U.S.–Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). These measures shape the legal and trade environment that ultimately determines investor confidence. Uzbekistan is trying to make the relationship durable by embedding it in institutions. The move also serves a domestic political economy logic. President Mirziyoyev’s government has spent years presenting itself as reformist, investment-friendly, and open for business. Deeper engagement with the United...

TRIPP

TRIPP and the Middle Corridor After Vance

U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s Armenia and Azerbaijan tour is being sold as a “peace dividend” for the South Caucasus, but for Central Asia, the significance is the infrastructure potential of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). Vance’s trip is another move in positioning the new Caucasus transit route for the Middle Corridor. His visit necessarily focuses on the Armenia–Azerbaijan fix, but recent diplomatic context makes clear that it is at least equally a Central Asia to Europe proposition. Current constraints on Trans-Caspian connectivity have been the shortage of dependable shipping capacity across the Caspian, port access, and border processing times. As the European Commission pointed out last week, traffic has surged since 2022, but the next jump depends on targeted investment and practical fixes along the route. The Middle Corridor’s Central Asian Axis through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Kazakhstan’s recent moves treat the bottlenecks as practical engineering and scheduling problems. The dredging project at Kuryk aims to deepen the port approach channel to five meters to support year-round navigation. Work is scheduled for early 2026 and backed by ERSAI Caspian Contractor LLC, a joint venture between Saipem and the Kazakhstan-based business group ERC Holdings. ERSAI is a major industrial port and fabrication yard operator specializing in offshore construction, logistics, and port services in the Caspian Sea. The dredging project is tied to broader terminal and shipyard expansion designed to create a key industrial hub. Shipping capacity is the other half of that story. A plan reported late last year envisages six ferries on the Kuryk–Alat line, with the first two entering service in the first half of 2026 and additional vessels added through 2028. Even if timelines slip, the point is to create a predictable schedule. Uzbekistan’s connectivity push has been running on two tracks at once: east to west via the Caspian, and southward toward ports beyond Central Asia. In Washington, a delegation from Tashkent, led by Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov, a week ago signed a memorandum with the United States on critical minerals and rare earths. This move treats extraction and processing as a supply-chain partnership rather than a one-off investment pitch. At the same time, Uzbekistan has been pushing rule-making with corridor partners, not waiting for outsiders to do it. On February 10, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia signed a protocol covering digitalization and freight development along the Middle Corridor, including shared methods for tracking delays and pinch points. This is in line with the necessary streamlining of paperwork. TRIPP as the South Caucasus Link for Central Asia TRIPP is meant to make the Caucasus segment less fragile by adding a second path, other than the recently renovated and expanded Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway route. The U.S-backing and institutional presence are meant to create confidence and reliability. Armenia’s own published implementation framework describes a TRIPP Development Company with an initial 49-year development term and a proposed 74% U.S. share, while stating that Armenian sovereignty, law enforcement, customs, and taxation authority remain intact. This satisfies domestic Armenian...