• KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
10 November 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 765

The Taliban’s Road Reaches China, but the Border is Closed

After several years of slow progress, the road connecting Afghanistan to China is finally ready. On October 4, Taliban officials inaugurated the 121-kilometer road through Afghanistan’s remote and arid northeastern Wakhan Corridor. China, however, has not been too keen on the project, and, according to one report, when the Taliban reached the Chinese border, the way was barred, with Chinese border guards ordering the Taliban to leave the area. The Hard Road The Wakhan Corridor was part of ancient trade routes through Asia, but was clearly only used by hardy merchants. The area is one of the most isolated regions on the planet. Nearly all of it is 4,000 meters or more above sea level, mostly bare stone mountains with some grass and a few trees and bushes growing on hillsides and in the valleys. The Wakhan Corridor officially appeared on maps as part of Afghanistan at the end of the 19th century. It was a buffer zone agreed to by representatives of the British and Russian empires. Today, the far eastern section of the Wakhan Corridor is the only place where Afghanistan directly borders China. That 74-kilometer border was easy to ignore due to the remoteness of the area, but not long after the Chinese revolution in 1949, officials in Beijing still ordered it closed. The harsh climate and rugged mountains make most of the corridor virtually unhabitable, but that did not stop some from believing a modern trade route could be opened through Wakhan that would connect Afghanistan to China. Dirt roads reached a few of the larger settlements in the western part of the corridor, villages of, at most, several hundred people. The Taliban just finished building a gravel road and four bridges that finally make it all the way to the Chinese border. By itself, this is far from sufficient to qualify as a legitimate trade route. There is no infrastructure to serve traffic through the region, no petrol stations, no accommodation, no places to buy food or drink, and temperatures are well below freezing for at least half the year. China’s Big Objection The bigger obstacle is that China has no strong interest in opening this route, and in fact, would prefer the Afghan border to remain closed. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is still present in Afghanistan. ETIM is comprised mainly of ethnic Uyghurs from China’s western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the same Chinese region that borders Afghanistan. ETIM’s goal is to topple Chinese rule in Xinjiang. ETIM fighters have been in Afghanistan for at least 25 years, and were allies of the Taliban during the years foreign troops were in Afghanistan. The Islamic State of Khorasan Province is active in northern Afghanistan, and that group has also made specific threats against the Chinese government. The Taliban have promised that they will not allow any group to use Afghan territory to plot or carry out attacks on neighboring countries. However, the Wakhan Corridor is part of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province, and the Taliban have...

Opinion: China’s Regional Strategy Meets Central Asia’s National Bargains

The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway spent decades on the drawing board. Disagreements over its route and financing held it up long after the three governments endorsed the project. In 2024, a Kyrgyz parliamentarian asked railway officials a simple question: “Where will we find $1 billion?” A financing agreement signed in Bishkek on December 16, 2025, cleared a major obstacle. The railway is estimated to cost $4.7 billion. Chinese banks will lend about $2.3 billion to the joint project company over 35 years. China holds 51% of the company, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. The partners will provide the remaining funding as equity. In June 2026, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament approved in the first reading a separate $304.5 million loan from China’s Export-Import Bank to help fund its own contribution. That loan has a 25-year term. The joint company’s debt and Kyrgyzstan’s borrowing for its stake are different obligations, but both affect how much value the country will need to earn from the line. Kyrgyzstan wants business around the railway, including terminals and freight services; Uzbekistan gains a direct rail link toward China, while Beijing gains another route west. The governments agreed to build the line, but tariffs and terminal operations will help decide how the returns are shared. The same division between shared goals and separate deals runs through China’s C+C5 relationship with the five Central Asian states. At the second China-Central Asia summit in Astana in June 2025, the six countries signed a treaty on eternal good-neighborliness. The Chinese Foreign Ministry also published a list of 55 cooperation documents. The first 14 cover the regional China-Central Asia framework. The other 41 involve Chinese institutions and counterparts in individual Central Asian countries, including local authorities and companies. The count reflects how the agreements are organized rather than their financial weight. The regional documents cover road permits, customs procedures and green minerals. The country-specific agreements extend into particular industries and investment relationships. Customs cooperation shows how regional talks can lead to bilateral action. At a meeting on May 21–22, 2025, customs chiefs from China and Central Asia agreed to joint border inspections. The next day, Chinese and Kazakh officials conducted an inspection of Nur Zholy-Khorgos. They agreed to accept more trucks from Kazakhstan and recognize each other’s X-ray inspection images to reduce repeat checks. Kazakhstan’s customs authority explicitly linked the inspection to the regional meeting. The agreement illustrates how governments can address a shared concern through negotiations at an individual crossing. The Astana investment agreements reflected different national priorities. Kazakhstan pursued investment protection and applications for China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, while Kyrgyzstan signed documents on an AI application center and processing industries. These were country-specific arrangements within the wider regional framework. The railway illustrates why some projects require only a few governments to agree. After recurring disagreements over its route and funding, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan reached a financing settlement in 2025. They did not need all five Central Asian governments to negotiate a single position. Kazakhstan already has direct rail links...

China Seeks Closer Intelligence Cooperation with Tajikistan

China has called for closer intelligence cooperation with Tajikistan and stronger protection for Chinese citizens and businesses. Premier Li Qiang raised both issues during October 19 talks with President Emomali Rahmon in Dushanbe, following attacks that disrupted Chinese projects near the Afghan border. According to China’s Foreign Ministry, Li urged the two countries to “strengthen intelligence exchange and sharing” and deepen law enforcement cooperation. He also called for “strong measures” to protect Chinese nationals and enterprises in Tajikistan. Li placed those requests alongside proposals for closer economic ties, including cooperation in infrastructure and minerals. The Chinese account did not announce a new intelligence-sharing agreement or explain how the proposed cooperation would operate. Security concerns have already affected work on a major road connecting Tajikistan with China. Chinese specialists returned under armed protection to the Kalai-Khumb–Vanj section of the Dushanbe–Kulma highway earlier this year after construction stopped following the November 2025 killings. Tajikistan’s Transport Ministry said the specialists returned in April. Radio Ozodi subsequently described Tajik special forces guarding Chinese workers in Darvaz in late May. The project is funded by a $230 million Chinese grant and is being carried out by China Road and Bridge Corporation. The road runs through difficult mountain terrain toward the Kulma Pass on the Chinese frontier. Its reconstruction is intended to shorten journeys and improve year-round access. For workers on sections close to the Afghan border, however, returning to construction also required protection from armed attacks. On November 26, 2025, an assault on a company camp in Tajikistan’s Khatlon region killed three Chinese workers. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry said the attack came from Afghanistan and involved a drone carrying explosives. Four days later, gunmen targeted China Road and Bridge Corporation employees in Darvaz district. Two Chinese nationals were killed. Tajik border officials said the perpetrators came from Afghanistan, but did not publicly identify the organization responsible. Beijing subsequently pressed Dushanbe to protect its citizens. Rahmon convened senior security officials and ordered measures to prevent further attacks. Taliban officials announced two arrests in December 2025 in connection with the killings, but did not publicly identify the suspects. China’s economic connections with Tajikistan have continued to expand. On October 17, state-owned Tajiktelecom and China Mobile International launched a direct fiber-optic link through the Pamirs. The connection has an initial capacity of up to one terabit per second and provides an additional route to international communications networks. The Tajik section extends for 1,010 kilometers, including 435 kilometers through Gorno-Badakhshan, joining China’s network at the Kulma Pass. Together with the highway, the cable illustrates the importance of eastern Tajikistan to the countries’ cross-border infrastructure. For Tajikistan, the immediate issue is protecting the people building and operating these connections. Li’s request brings the protection of those workers into discussions about closer intelligence cooperation at the highest level.

Kyrgyzstan Exports Recover After Sharp Fall in Gold Sales

Kyrgyzstan's exports have begun to recover after a sharp decline in 2025, when the value of its gold exports plunged by nearly three-quarters. In the first eight months of 2026, exports rose by nearly 20%. Even so, for every dollar earned from selling goods overseas, Kyrgyzstan spent more than four dollars on imports. According to a report by the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, exports fell by 41.2% in 2025 to $3 billion. Imports, meanwhile, continued to grow, reaching $13.7 billion. As a result, the country spent $10.6 billion more on foreign goods than it earned from selling its own products abroad. A year earlier, the gap stood at $7.3 billion. The main reason for the decline was a sharp drop in overseas sales of gold, one of Kyrgyzstan's principal sources of export revenue. Their value fell from approximately $2.5 billion in 2024 to $683 million in 2025. Exports of other goods also fell 11.2%. Trade was also affected by weaker demand from Russia and Kazakhstan, two major markets for Kyrgyz producers, as well as temporary restrictions on exports of certain goods, including scrap metal and livestock. Kyrgyzstan's trade is closely tied to neighboring countries. It belongs to the Eurasian Economic Union, alongside Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia. Members trade with one another without standard customs duties on most goods. Russia and Kazakhstan remain the largest buyers of Kyrgyz products and, together with China, supply most imports. The imbalance is particularly pronounced in trade with China. Chinese goods account for more than a third of Kyrgyzstan's total imports, while China receives only around 5% of its exports. Uzbekistan also remains an important market for Kyrgyz products. Outside the region, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are significant destinations. The downturn continued in the first half of 2026, when exports fell another 11.1% compared with the same period a year earlier. By the end of August, however, the picture had changed. Figures for the first eight months showed exports rising 19.5% to $2.3 billion. Gold exports also rebounded sharply, reaching $770.6 million, more than in the whole of 2025. Over half of that amount was exported in August alone. Imports also increased, reaching $9.7 billion. The recovery in overseas sales has therefore not yet significantly narrowed the gap between exports and imports. A trade deficit does not mean Kyrgyzstan is losing the equivalent amount from its government budget. It measures the difference between the value of goods imported into the country and those sold abroad. Imports are paid for by businesses and consumers, with funds coming from various sources, including remittances from migrant workers and investment. Services have become one of the fastest-growing areas of Kyrgyzstan's international trade, providing another source of funds for imports. According to preliminary figures, in 2025 the country earned $3.55 billion from services exports, up 20% from the previous year. Revenue from foreign visitors rose 36.9% to $1.19 billion. In international statistics, this category includes travelers' spending on accommodation, food, shopping, and other services during...

Opinion: Chinese Firms Expand Their Role in Kyrgyzstan’s Water Infrastructure

Kyrgyzstan plays a central role in Central Asia’s water system and is of growing interest to China. According to figures cited by President Sadyr Japarov in April 2026, approximately 50 billion cubic meters of surface runoff are generated annually within the country. About 12 billion cubic meters are used domestically, while around 7 billion, or 14% of the total, flow to China. Kyrgyzstan has five main water-management basins. The Issyk-Kul–Tarim management area includes both the closed Issyk-Kul basin and rivers flowing toward China, making its transboundary component a distinct area of bilateral cooperation. The Aksu River, which originates in Kyrgyzstan and feeds the Tarim River in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is particularly important. Estimates put its contribution at 70–80% of the Tarim’s flow. Given Xinjiang’s importance to China’s domestic stability and the Belt and Road Initiative, these shared waters have economic and long-term geopolitical significance for Beijing. Legal and Regional Context Kyrgyzstan and China established a strategic partnership in 2013, but no publicly available bilateral agreement specifically governs the allocation and management of their shared waters. Neither country is a party to the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes or the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The significant asymmetry in the countries’ economic and negotiating capacities makes the absence of a dedicated water-sharing framework a potential source of vulnerability for Kyrgyzstan. Its importance could grow as water stress intensifies and economic activity in the shared basins expands. For Central Asia, China’s involvement has broader implications. Kyrgyzstan is an upstream country whose rivers supply its downstream neighbors. Chinese participation in water infrastructure adds another external actor to a sector that has historically been one of the most sensitive areas in regional relations. The Changing Nature of China’s Presence China’s involvement in Kyrgyzstan’s water sector includes bilateral assistance for irrigation as well as construction contracts financed by multilateral institutions. These channels coexist, making it important to distinguish Chinese funding from work undertaken by Chinese companies. Kyrgyzstan’s chronic electricity shortage and need to modernize its water and energy infrastructure have created opportunities for greater Chinese involvement. The upgrading of bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership in the new era in 2023 provided an additional political framework, with hydropower identified as a priority for practical cooperation. Agreements totaling more than $1 billion were signed at the Kyrgyz-Chinese business forum in Urumqi in August 2023, underscoring the broader expansion of economic ties. Chinese companies are also winning contracts funded by international financial institutions. In September 2025, a Sinohydro Bureau 16–Sinohydro joint venture signed a contract for water-conveyance structures and the powerhouse for the second generating unit at Kambarata-2, financed by the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development. The tender had been launched in 2024. The Asian Development Bank lists a $12.8 million contract dated July 2025 for an Issyk-Kul wastewater treatment plant, awarded to a joint venture involving China Road and Bridge Corporation. That contract includes three years...

Kyrgyzstan Looks to China to Diversify Fuel Supplies

Kyrgyzstan is looking to turn China into a more regular source of gasoline and diesel as it seeks to diversify its fuel supplies. Bishkek is discussing the construction of oil storage facilities near the Chinese border and a petroleum products pipeline with Chinese energy giants CNPC and Sinopec. Russia supplies around 90% of Kyrgyzstan’s fuel, according to President Sadyr Japarov. A new route could reduce dependence on a single supplier. The talks took place in Beijing on September 23. Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Erlist Akunbekov met with executives from CNPC and Sinopec. Kyrgyz companies are signing petroleum product supply agreements with the two groups, according to the Cabinet of Ministers. The talks come amid disruptions to Russian fuel supplies this year. Bishkek has proposed building oil storage facilities near Torugart and Irkeshtam, the two main road crossings between the countries. The storage facilities are intended to reduce logistics costs. A separate pipeline for petroleum products is also under discussion, providing another potential route for bringing fuel across the border. The talks also cover domestic production in Kyrgyzstan. The two sides are considering the construction of a new oil refinery, as well as joint exploration and development of oil fields. Chinese capital is already present in the sector. The Junda refinery in Kara-Balta, about 60 kilometers west of Bishkek, is controlled by a Chinese investor. The plant has an annual crude-processing capacity of up to 800,000 tons and is undergoing a nearly $194 million modernization program. The upgrade is expected to increase output and enable the refinery to produce Euro 5-standard fuel, which is subject to stricter limits on sulfur and other harmful pollutants. On the same day, Kyrgyz Cabinet Chairman Adylbek Kasymaliev met Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Hangzhou. Kyrgyzstan’s Energy Ministry and China’s National Energy Administration signed an agreement on cooperation in the electric power sector. The government statement did not specify which projects would be covered by the agreement. The proposed pipeline and border storage facilities remain under discussion, separate from the fuel supply agreements being concluded by Kyrgyz companies.