China - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 910

Investment Projects

Tashkent Signs $3.5 Billion in China Deals for Infrastructure and Exports

The third Uzbekistan-China Interregional Forum, held in the Chinese city of Xi’an, concluded with Tashkent signing more than $3.5 billion in investment and export agreements with Chinese partners, according to the Tashkent city administration. The agreements include $3.35 billion in investment projects and $156 million in export contracts spanning infrastructure, transport, construction, environmental technology, and industrial production. Officials said the deals are aimed at modernizing the Uzbek capital’s urban infrastructure and improving transport systems, public spaces, environmental services, and industrial capacity. The forum comes as China’s economic role in Uzbekistan continues to expand. According to Uzbekistan’s Dunyo news agency, speakers at the Xi’an forum said bilateral trade reached $18 billion last year, while Chinese investment in Uzbekistan totaled $17 billion. China has become one of Uzbekistan’s most important economic partners, with cooperation expanding from trade and construction into transport, energy, industry, and urban development. Dunyo’s report on the forum also presented the Xi’an meeting as part of a broader push to build direct ties between Uzbek regions and Chinese provinces, rather than limiting cooperation to central government agreements. Among the largest planned projects are a $1 billion initiative to develop Bus Rapid Transit, known as BRT, overpasses, and road infrastructure under the EPC+F financing model, and another $1 billion package focused on transport and social infrastructure projects. Additional agreements include $500 million for modern residential complexes in renovation zones and $400 million for drainage, irrigation, and stormwater systems. The city administration said financing is expected to come from Chinese partners without the direct use of Uzbekistan’s state budget or sovereign guarantees, although repayment would still depend on future municipal revenue streams. The projects are planned under the Engineering, Procurement, Construction, and Financing model, known as EPC+F. The financing structure is significant as many of the largest projects are municipal rather than national in scope. It allows Tashkent to pursue major road, drainage, and transport upgrades while presenting the deals as externally financed. Nevertheless, projects of this type can still create long-term obligations if future city revenues are used to cover repayments. The forum also focused on the development of Tashkent’s Yangi Avlod special industrial zone. Agreements worth $130 million were signed with Chinese companies, including Jwise, Zhongke Honghu, CAS Cloud, and UMGG. The projects are expected to support manufacturing infrastructure, digital management systems, and high-tech industrial production in the capital. Yangi Avlod has been promoted as one of Tashkent’s main industrial expansion sites. According to the zone’s official website, it is located in the Yangihayot district and is planned as a 764.5-hectare industrial area with logistics, warehouse, administrative, and commercial infrastructure. Other agreements include investments in decorative stone manufacturing, ceramic production, and smart waste-sorting equipment. Export contracts signed during the forum included three agreements worth a combined $150 million for jewelry exports, as well as deals covering cotton yarn and silver concentrate supplies. Separately, during the official visit to China, Tashkent Mayor Shavkat Umurzakov met with executives from China Railway Construction Corporation to discuss urban renovation projects, transport infrastructure, and...

Electric Vehicles

Chinese Brands Drive Fivefold Surge in Kazakhstan’s Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Sales

Sales of electric and hybrid vehicles in Kazakhstan rose nearly fivefold in the first four months of 2026, as Chinese brands expanded their presence and buyers turned to plug-in hybrids and extended-range models suited to the country’s long distances and harsh climate. According to the Kazakhstan Automobile Union, official dealers sold 2,122 passenger vehicles in the New Energy Vehicles, or NEV, segment between January and April, nearly five times more than during the same period last year. The NEV category includes fully electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, or PHEVs, and extended-range electric vehicles, or EREVs, which combine electric and conventional power systems. Most sales came from hybrid and extended-range models, which accounted for 1,499 units, while fully electric vehicles represented 623 sales. Demand growth became particularly noticeable in March and April after a relatively moderate start to the year. Analysts say electric and hybrid vehicles are gradually moving beyond their status as a niche segment of the Kazakh automotive market. “Today, buyers are increasingly choosing plug-in hybrids and extended-range vehicles,” said Anar Makasheva, president of the Kazakhstan Automobile Union. According to Makasheva, such models offer many Kazakh consumers a compromise between fuel efficiency, driving range, and practicality. The pattern reflects a wider trend in Kazakhstan’s car market, where fully electric vehicles remain attractive but face practical limits linked to charging infrastructure, winter performance, and long intercity routes. Plug-in hybrids and extended-range models offer many buyers a lower-risk transition from conventional cars. Chinese automaker BYD became the clear market leader in Kazakhstan’s NEV segment, selling 1,181 vehicles, an increase of 432% compared with the same period last year. Li Auto ranked second with sales of 384 vehicles, while Geely Galaxy placed third with 367 units sold. The top five also included Zeekr and ROX. The best-selling model in the segment was the hybrid BYD Song Plus DM-i, with 413 vehicles sold during the first four months of the year. It was followed by the Geely Galaxy EX5 EM-i and the BYD Chazor. Other popular models included the Li Auto L6 and the fully electric BYD Yuan Up. In the traditional hybrid, or HEV, category, the Toyota Camry remained the market leader, with dealers selling 274 vehicles. For comparison, Kazakhstan sold a total of 4,242 NEV vehicles during all of 2025, while sales in 2024 amounted to only 1,083 units. The figures also come amid wider growth in Kazakhstan’s automotive sector. In February, the Kazakhstan Automobile Union projected that vehicle production could exceed 209,000 units in 2026, following output of 171,400 units in 2025. The growing popularity of electric and hybrid vehicles comes as the government looks for ways to make the segment more visible and easier to regulate. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Kazakhstan plans to introduce green license plates for electric vehicles to simplify identification by traffic surveillance systems.

Energy Security

Putin Visit Puts Nuclear Power and Oil Transit at Center of Russia-Kazakhstan Ties

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan is becoming more than a diplomatic event. It is increasingly being seen as a demonstration of how Russia and Kazakhstan are shaping one of Eurasia’s key energy and logistics axes amid the restructuring of global markets, sanctions pressure, and the continued shift of economic flows toward Asia. Symbolically, ahead of the visit, Putin published a programmatic article in Kazakh media titled “Russia-Kazakhstan: An Alliance at the Heart of Eurasia,” in which he outlined a new framework for bilateral relations. The Russian president focused on nuclear energy, oil and gas cooperation, transport corridors, and Eurasian integration, describing the partnership between the two countries as a factor of stability and development for the wider continent. For Moscow, the current visit carries particular significance. It is Putin’s second state visit to Kazakhstan during a single presidential term. A rare occurrence in international diplomatic practice. Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said the move was intended to emphasize the “unprecedentedly high level of relations between our two countries.” The main outcome of the talks is expected to be the signing of agreements related to the construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant with the participation of Russia’s state nuclear corporation, Rosatom. According to Ushakov, the two sides are expected to finalize “the main parameters for the creation of the nuclear power plant and financing of the project through a Russian state export credit.” For Kazakhstan, the nuclear project is about far more than electricity generation. The country faces growing domestic power demand, aging infrastructure, and the need to ensure long-term energy security. At the same time, the project reflects a broader geopolitical calculation. Nuclear energy has traditionally been one of the most sensitive forms of strategic cooperation. A country building a nuclear power plant enters into a long-term technological partnership involving fuel supplies, engineering maintenance, personnel training, and technical support lasting for decades. Russia’s role in constructing Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant would therefore allow Moscow to preserve a deep technological presence in Central Asia despite its growing international isolation. For Astana, however, cooperation with Russia in the nuclear sector remains a pragmatic choice rather than a purely political one. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer of uranium, yet it still lacks its own nuclear power generation sector. Amid intensifying competition between global power centers, Kazakhstan appears less interested in choosing sides than in strengthening its resilience and turning its geography into a strategic advantage. The same logic is evident in the oil and gas agenda surrounding Putin’s visit. Moscow and Astana are discussing increasing the transit of Russian oil to China through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline from 10 million to 12.5 million tons annually. Ushakov said prospects for the negotiations were “optimistic” and noted that the legal framework for the agreements was already in its final stages. According to KazTransOil, approximately 832,000 tons of Russian oil were transported to China through the route in April alone, while first-quarter transit volumes reached 2.5 million tons. Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russian...

Counterterrorism

China to Supply Tajikistan With Intelligence and Counterterrorism Equipment

China will provide Tajikistan with intelligence, police, and counterterrorism equipment worth more than $7.6 million under a grant assistance program approved by the two governments. The governments of the two countries signed the corresponding memorandum of understanding on May 8. The agreement provides for the transfer of equipment by China for the needs of Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. Under the terms of the deal, the Chinese side will deliver 34 intelligence devices along with additional police and counterterrorism equipment. The shipment is expected to enter Tajikistan through the Karasu border crossing. China will also dispatch eight specialists to Tajikistan to install and configure the equipment and train Tajik personnel. Their mission is expected to last 45 days. The total value of the equipment and services amounts to 52 million Chinese yuan, or approximately $7.64 million. All associated costs will be fully covered by the Chinese side. Tajikistan, for its part, has agreed to handle customs clearance, transportation and storage of the equipment once it arrives in the country. Authorities will also exempt the deliveries from taxes and customs duties and provide the necessary conditions for the Chinese specialists, including visas, accommodation, and security arrangements. A special working group will be established to coordinate with Chinese engineers during installation and personnel training. The document separately emphasizes that after delivery the two sides will jointly inspect the quality, quantity and technical specifications of the equipment before signing a formal acceptance certificate. Future operation and maintenance costs will then become the responsibility of the Tajik side. China remains one of Tajikistan’s largest strategic partners. Following President Emomali Rahmon’s recent state visit to China, Tajik officials said more than 80 cooperation documents were signed as a result of high-level talks and business meetings, while China’s Foreign Ministry referred separately to more than ten state-level cooperation documents. Earlier, Tajikistan’s parliament also approved an agreement under which China would finance the construction of nine border facilities along the Tajik-Afghan frontier. The new grant comes amid renewed scrutiny of China’s expanding role in Tajikistan’s security sector. Reports and speculation about a possible Chinese military facility in Gorno-Badakhshan have surfaced periodically, including in 2021 and again in 2024. However, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have denied the existence of a Chinese military base on the country’s territory.

Regional Security

Tokayev Urges Central Asia and China to Strengthen Law Enforcement Cooperation

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev hosted the interior and public security ministers of the “Central Asia-China” format in Astana during the second meeting of regional law enforcement agencies. The meeting was attended by Chinese Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong, Kyrgyz Interior Minister Ulan Niyazbekov, Tajik Interior Minister Ramazon Rahimzoda, Turkmen Interior Minister Muhammet Hydyrov, and Uzbek Interior Minister Aziz Tashpulatov. Participants discussed transnational crime, drug trafficking, cybercrime, and extremism. Tokayev said strengthening cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of Central Asia and China is essential for maintaining regional stability. “Transnational organized crime is becoming increasingly flexible and interconnected. Cybercrime has evolved into a highly profitable global industry,” the president said. According to Tokayev, criminal groups are increasingly using digital platforms to coordinate activities, launder money, and carry out attacks that transcend national borders. He emphasized that Central Asia’s position at the crossroads of major transport and trade routes leaves the region particularly vulnerable to transnational criminal networks. Tokayev said Kazakhstan considers the rule of law a strategic state priority and is continuing the implementation of its “Law and Order” governance concept. He called for stronger efforts to block the financial flows of criminal organizations, suppress the spread of extremist ideology, and detect preparations for terrorist attacks. The president devoted particular attention to cybersecurity threats. “Artificial intelligence in the hands of destructive actors is becoming an information weapon,” Tokayev said. According to him, illegal content and disinformation are spreading online on an industrial scale, while existing mechanisms of international cooperation require substantial modernization. Tokayev also linked security concerns to the expansion of regional transport infrastructure, including the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. “The growth of cargo traffic is associated with certain risks, including transnational crime and the trafficking of contraband, drugs, and weapons,” he said. In Tokayev’s view, the “Central Asia-China” format should evolve into a platform for developing coordinated and practical security measures across the region. Participants in the meeting reaffirmed their intention to expand operational information-sharing, strengthen professional cooperation, and introduce modern technologies into law enforcement activities.

Afghanistan

Opinion: The Southern Dimension of the Middle Corridor – Afghanistan’s Role in Eurasia’s New Logistics Landscape

Afghanistan’s integration into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is extending beyond local logistics and evolving into one of Eurasia’s key geo-economic projects. Amid the global transformation of supply chains, Central Asia has an opportunity to move beyond its role as a transit periphery and become an active participant in shaping new economic corridors, creating a full-fledged “southern dimension” of Eurasian connectivity. Two Routes: Strategic and Operational Two main directions for Afghanistan’s integration into the Eurasian transport system are currently under discussion, each reflecting a distinct development logic: strategic and pragmatic. The “Eastern Branch” (Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar) is traditionally viewed as the primary trans-Afghan route. Its key advantage is direct access to the ports of Karachi and Gwadar, providing the shortest connection between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. At the same time, geography makes the project highly complex. The route passes through the central and eastern regions of Afghanistan, including the Hindu Kush mountain range, where long tunnels and bridges would be required. This would sharply increase construction and maintenance costs, extend implementation timelines, and heighten security and infrastructure risks. According to available estimates, the project could cost around $5 billion and handle 15-20 million tons of cargo annually. However, the lengthy investment cycle and dependence on political stability mean implementation remains a long-term prospect. The “Western Branch” (Turgundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak) represents an alternative logistics corridor based on more favorable geography. Western Afghanistan is characterized by predominantly flat, semi-arid terrain, reducing the need for complex engineering structures and allowing the project to be implemented in phases. This significantly lowers capital costs, shortens construction timelines, and reduces infrastructure risks. The western route’s initial capacity is estimated at 7-10 million tons of cargo annually, making it the more realistic option for medium-term planning. An additional advantage is its geo-economic flexibility. Via Herat, the route could be integrated not only southward through Pakistan, but also westward through Iran, providing access to Persian Gulf ports. This would transform it into a multi-directional corridor capable of serving several logistics flows simultaneously. The Eastern Branch, therefore, remains the strategic option offering the shortest route to the ocean but requiring substantial investment and time. The Western Branch, meanwhile, presents a more pragmatic solution: faster to implement and more flexible from a geo-economic standpoint. The Role of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in the “Western Maneuver” The implementation of the western trans-Afghan corridor depends on close coordination between two key regional players, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which form the northern foundation of the future route by providing access to the Caspian Sea and, beyond it, global markets. Astana and Ashgabat are effectively creating a new geo-economic framework that could transform Central Asia from an isolated region into a strategic crossroads linking the Caspian Sea with the Indian Ocean. In 2026, Kazakhstan moved toward deeper institutionalization of the initiative, making the route through Herat and Kandahar a government priority. Astana’s strategy is multifaceted. In addition to establishing a permanent interdepartmental commission, Kazakhstan is actively seeking to attract international operators such as the Emirati AD...