Hydropower - The Times Of Central Asia

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Water Security

Central Asia Agrees New Water Limits, but National Quotas Remain Unclear

Water has repeatedly caused friction between Central Asian governments. Uncoordinated releases have flooded communities downstream, while disputes over access have contributed to deadly fighting along contested borders. On October 7, the region's countries agreed on water withdrawals from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya for fall and winter 2026–2027, though published results do not reveal how much water each country will receive. The agreements were reached at the 95th meeting of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) in Avaza, on Turkmenistan's Caspian coast near Turkmenbashi. Participants agreed on national water withdrawal limits and projected reservoir operating schedules, but the figures remain in unpublished annexes to the meeting protocol. Regional cooperation has grown in recent years. In June, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan agreed on water releases and electricity supplies for the 2026 irrigation season, continuing efforts to coordinate reservoir operations across borders. Despite this progress, longstanding tensions remain. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan need water in the winter to generate electricity, while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan need it in the summer for irrigation. Bishkek has revived proposals for its neighbors to share the costs of maintaining reservoirs, while Afghanistan's Qosh Tepa Canal could put further pressure on the Amu Darya. Countries are also trying to resolve discrepancies in river-flow measurements. [caption id="attachment_58085" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Officials from Central Asian countries attend talks on cross-border cooperation and sustainable development in the Amu Darya basin in Turkmenistan. Image: State News Agency of Turkmenistan[/caption] From Flooded Villages to Border Clashes The competing demands of electricity generation and agriculture are particularly evident in the Syr Darya basin. Kyrgyzstan's Toktogul Reservoir sits on the Naryn River, the Syr Darya's main tributary. In winter, Kyrgyzstan releases water to generate electricity, months before downstream farmers need it for irrigation. When these releases exceed the capacity of reservoirs and canals, the excess water can cause flooding. In February 2004, residents of Kazakhstan's Kyzylorda region experienced the consequences of uncoordinated water releases. The Syr Darya overflowed its banks, forcing the evacuation of at least 200 families. Ice had already restricted the river's flow, worsening the flooding. According to NASA, Kyrgyzstan was releasing more water from its hydropower system than the agreements allowed, with the excess flow entering the Shardara Reservoir. Uzbekistan agreed to divert some of the water into the Arnasay lake system, but it was not possible to divert the entire volume needed. As a result, the river flooded areas farther downstream. In the Amu Darya basin, disagreements developed differently. In 2012, then-Uzbek President Islam Karimov warned that disputes over water resources could lead to war. The source of tension was the construction of the Rogun Hydropower Plant in Tajikistan. Tashkent feared that a large dam on the Vakhsh River, a tributary of the Amu Darya, would allow Dushanbe to influence the volume of water reaching Uzbekistan's agricultural regions. The confrontation was accompanied by interruptions in gas supplies to Tajikistan, transport restrictions, and mutual accusations. Dushanbe linked Tashkent's actions to pressure over the Rogun project, although the Uzbek side disputed that...

Water Security

Opinion: Central Asia’s Old Water Bargain Was Built for Cotton

Central Asia inherited a water bargain built for another economy. In the Soviet system, upstream republics stored water and released it for summer irrigation. Downstream republics used that flow for cotton and other crops. The cost of the exchange stayed inside one plan. Water releases, electricity, fuel, and crop quotas were part of the same political economy. After 1991, the dependence survived, but the plan that balanced it did not. The 1998 Syr Darya agreement already tied reservoir operation to irrigation releases and set compensation for the winter power Kyrgyzstan gave up. The 2000 Chu-Talas agreement went on to share the cost of operating and maintaining shared water infrastructure between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Those agreements were important, and they show why today’s dispute is not new. Central Asia has long known that water regulation carries a cost. What it has not built is a wider settlement that prices storage and seasonal regulation under today’s climate, energy, and market conditions. That question is now open again. In January 2026, Kyrgyzstan’s new Water Code came into force. It recognizes water as a commodity and introduces fees for domestic and external users. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have rejected payment for transboundary river water, saying existing agreements do not provide for it. Downstream governments fear an open-ended bill and a precedent that could turn every dry season into a financial dispute. The old model rested on cotton and central planning. Several conditions have changed. The climate is less stable, energy demand keeps rising, and national economies now want more from water than a cotton plan once did. Uzbekistan’s own reform language has turned against the old cotton model. At the UN General Assembly in 2023, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said “millions of people were forced to pick cotton” in Uzbekistan over a century. In August 2026, he called the old system one that left Uzbeks “slaves to cotton.” That history shapes the water argument. Uzbekistan is not abolishing cotton. It still grows the crop and continues to reform the sector. But as Tashkent moves away from the old cotton-centered model, the regional water logic built around that model also needs revising. The same pressure runs through the Amu Darya, where agricultural adaptation has become an economic and political issue rather than a purely hydrological one. Less predictable river flows make seasonal storage more valuable. Water is also becoming scarcer in parts of the region. Kyrgyzstan sits at the center of that question. It is the only country in Central Asia whose water resources are almost entirely formed within its own territory, and Kyrgyz officials argue that it carries the upkeep for infrastructure that serves its neighbors. They say the country spent about $80 million on the water sector last year and around $259 million over five years. That spending covers the water sector as a whole, including infrastructure whose benefits reach beyond Kyrgyzstan’s borders. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan reject paying for river water, saying existing agreements do not require it. But storing that water and releasing it...

Water Security

Opinion: Chinese Firms Expand Their Role in Kyrgyzstan’s Water Infrastructure

Kyrgyzstan plays a central role in Central Asia’s water system and is of growing interest to China. According to figures cited by President Sadyr Japarov in April 2026, approximately 50 billion cubic meters of surface runoff are generated annually within the country. About 12 billion cubic meters are used domestically, while around 7 billion, or 14% of the total, flow to China. Kyrgyzstan has five main water-management basins. The Issyk-Kul–Tarim management area includes both the closed Issyk-Kul basin and rivers flowing toward China, making its transboundary component a distinct area of bilateral cooperation. The Aksu River, which originates in Kyrgyzstan and feeds the Tarim River in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is particularly important. Estimates put its contribution at 70–80% of the Tarim’s flow. Given Xinjiang’s importance to China’s domestic stability and the Belt and Road Initiative, these shared waters have economic and long-term geopolitical significance for Beijing. Legal and Regional Context Kyrgyzstan and China established a strategic partnership in 2013, but no publicly available bilateral agreement specifically governs the allocation and management of their shared waters. Neither country is a party to the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes or the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The significant asymmetry in the countries’ economic and negotiating capacities makes the absence of a dedicated water-sharing framework a potential source of vulnerability for Kyrgyzstan. Its importance could grow as water stress intensifies and economic activity in the shared basins expands. For Central Asia, China’s involvement has broader implications. Kyrgyzstan is an upstream country whose rivers supply its downstream neighbors. Chinese participation in water infrastructure adds another external actor to a sector that has historically been one of the most sensitive areas in regional relations. The Changing Nature of China’s Presence China’s involvement in Kyrgyzstan’s water sector includes bilateral assistance for irrigation as well as construction contracts financed by multilateral institutions. These channels coexist, making it important to distinguish Chinese funding from work undertaken by Chinese companies. Kyrgyzstan’s chronic electricity shortage and need to modernize its water and energy infrastructure have created opportunities for greater Chinese involvement. The upgrading of bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership in the new era in 2023 provided an additional political framework, with hydropower identified as a priority for practical cooperation. Agreements totaling more than $1 billion were signed at the Kyrgyz-Chinese business forum in Urumqi in August 2023, underscoring the broader expansion of economic ties. Chinese companies are also winning contracts funded by international financial institutions. In September 2025, a Sinohydro Bureau 16–Sinohydro joint venture signed a contract for water-conveyance structures and the powerhouse for the second generating unit at Kambarata-2, financed by the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development. The tender had been launched in 2024. The Asian Development Bank lists a $12.8 million contract dated July 2025 for an Issyk-Kul wastewater treatment plant, awarded to a joint venture involving China Road and Bridge Corporation. That contract includes three years...

Central Asia Water Cooperation

Water in Central Asia: Can the Five States Reach an Agreement?

Central Asia is entering a period of growing water stress, as climate change makes supplies less predictable while demand continues to rise. Populations are growing, economies require new energy and industrial capacity, glaciers are shrinking, and agriculture continues to consume most of the available water. The region’s two main rivers – the Amu Darya and Syr Darya – cross national borders, making it impossible for any one country to solve the problem on its own. After decades of disputes, Central Asian states are increasingly trying to manage water jointly. In 2026, that cooperation has produced further practical steps, from plans for automated water accounting in the Syr Darya basin to new proposals for reforming regional mechanisms. The question now is whether the five countries can agree on rules when their water needs remain different. Water and Energy: An Old Conflict The structural conflict is rooted in the region’s geography. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are upstream states and use water in part for hydropower generation, particularly in winter. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are downstream and need large volumes in summer during the irrigation season. During the Soviet period, a centralized exchange system was in place: upstream republics stored water in winter and released it in summer, receiving energy resources in return. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, that unified mechanism disappeared. Interstate agreements preserved a degree of coordination but did not eliminate the tension between upstream energy needs and downstream agricultural interests. Climate change is now adding another layer to the problem. Retreating glaciers in the Pamir and Tien Shan mountains are altering the timing and reliability of river flows, while populations and consumption are increasing. Countries across the region are planning new power plants, industrial facilities, mining projects, and data centers, while agriculture remains the largest consumer of water. From Seasonal Quotas to Joint Management The main formal mechanism for coordinating river allocations remains the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia (ICWC), established in 1992. Through it, countries coordinate water withdrawal limits and reservoir operating regimes in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins. In late 2025, the countries agreed on water allocations for 2026: for the Amu Darya, the total withdrawal limit for the water-management year from October 2025 to October 2026 was around 55.4 billion cubic meters, while the Syr Darya allocation for the non-growing season was approximately 4.2 billion cubic meters. The five-state framework does not, however, cover every major user of the Amu Darya. Afghanistan is outside the regional allocation system, while its Qosh Tepa Canal, now under construction, has added another source of uncertainty over future downstream flows. Such agreements keep the shared system functioning, but many decisions are still made ahead of each new season. Climate change and rising demand require a longer-term model. In February of this year, Kazakhstan proposed developing a Central Asian Framework Convention on Water Use, while joint infrastructure projects, including Kyrgyzstan’s Kambarata-1 hydropower plant with the participation of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are gradually adding shared economic interests...

Power Grid

Central Asia Electricity Demand Surges in Summer Power Reckoning

At 5:22 p.m. on July 20, after days of extreme heat, Uzbekistan's electricity system hit its highest load on record. Air conditioners were running on overdrive across the country as demand reached 14.2 gigawatts. Over the full day, consumers used 301.9 million kWh, almost 11% more than the previous year's summer peak. The pressure was visible elsewhere. In Kyrgyzstan, electricity consumption jumped 18% year-on-year on July 19. Parts of Bishkek and the Chui Region lost power for periods of up to two hours as operators tried to stop overloaded equipment from failing. In Almaty, where temperatures reached 40°C, 35 repair crews were deployed as record demand triggered faults across parts of the city's electricity network. Central Asia has spent years preparing for power shortages during freezing winters. July demonstrated that 40°C-plus summer days can now pose a different version of the same problem. The Demand Problem Governments across Central Asia have largely approached energy shortages from the supply side: more generation, new plants, stronger transmission, and greater investment. The summer peak exposed another weakness, however: demand is rising faster than many networks can comfortably absorb it. The pressure comes from new apartment blocks, shopping centers, construction sites, cooling systems, and the rapid spread of air conditioning. In Tashkent, Almaty, Bishkek, and other expanding cities, hotter summers also intensify the urban heat-island effect as concrete and glass retain heat and increase cooling demand. Much of the region's electricity infrastructure was built for a different pattern of consumption. That makes demand-side management increasingly important alongside new generation. Building another plant increases the amount of electricity available, but does little by itself to control when households and businesses consume it. Efficiency standards, more responsive tariffs, modern metering, and investment in distribution networks will become more important as peak demand rises. Four Systems, Shared Pressure Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are not facing identical problems, but July highlighted a common vulnerability: electricity systems are being asked to meet demand patterns for which they were not originally designed. Kazakhstan is pursuing major long-term additions to generation. In May 2026, it signed a $16.5 billion agreement with Russia's Rosatom for its first nuclear power plant near Lake Balkhash. Construction is expected to begin in 2027, with the first reactor scheduled for commissioning in early 2034. For a coal-heavy system facing rising demand, the baseload argument is clear. But new capacity will take years to arrive. Tariff reform and modernization of existing infrastructure remain politically sensitive, especially if households are asked to pay more before improvements in reliability become visible. Uzbekistan is racing to add capacity, especially solar, in response to a rapidly growing population and dwindling gas reserves. Solar can reduce daytime strain and free gas for other uses, but it does not resolve the evening peak. Cooling demand can remain high after sunset, when solar output falls. Without sufficient storage, flexible backup generation, and stronger transmission and distribution networks, rapid additions of renewable capacity can coexist with local shortages and outages. Uzbekistan's July records underline the...

Rogun Dam

Italy Commits $150 Million to Tajikistans Rogun Hydropower Plant

The World Bank Group and Italy’s state-controlled development bank, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), have signed a co-financing agreement to support construction of Tajikistan’s Rogun Hydropower Plant, CDP and the World Bank’s office in Tajikistan said. The signing ceremony took place at Tajikistan’s Ministry of Finance in Dushanbe. Under the agreement, the Italian Climate Fund will provide $150 million for the project. The funds will be managed by CDP on behalf of Italy’s Ministry of Environment and Energy Security. CDP said the financing would support construction work on the right bank of the Rogun Dam. The Rogun Hydropower Plant is being financed by a consortium of 12 international development partners led by the World Bank Group, with CDP among its members. According to the World Bank, the project is expected to strengthen Tajikistan’s energy security while supporting the development of a cleaner energy market across Central Asia. The World Bank has already approved $650 million in grant financing for the project through the International Development Association (IDA). Located on the Vakhsh River, the Rogun Hydropower Plant is the centerpiece of the Vakhsh hydropower cascade. The project originated during the Soviet period, although construction of the current scheme was formally launched in 2017. Once completed, currently scheduled for 2033, the facility is projected to have an installed capacity of 3,780 MW. The World Bank estimates the plant will generate 14,400 gigawatt-hours of renewable electricity each year, equivalent to about 60% of Tajikistan’s current electricity production. The bank says the project will help reduce the country’s chronic winter electricity shortages, provide more reliable electricity for around 10 million people, create over 30,000 direct and indirect jobs, and enable electricity exports to neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Despite the new financing, the project continues to face criticism from environmental groups. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the World Bank’s Inspection Panel registered a complaint filed by the environmental coalition Rivers Without Boundaries on behalf of downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The coalition argued that the project’s environmental and social assessments were outdated and warned that filling the Rogun reservoir could reduce water flows to the Amu Darya delta, accelerate desertification, increase soil salinity, and affect livelihoods downstream. In June 2025, the World Bank’s Inspection Panel recommended a full investigation. However, in November 2025, the Board of Executive Directors declined to authorize one, saying the complaint did not meet the mechanism’s technical eligibility criteria. Environmental groups criticized the decision. The World Bank has maintained that the project complies with its environmental and social safeguard framework, citing updated assessments, public consultations, and ongoing monitoring.