• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
06 September 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 10

Kazakhstan Takes Center Stage in U.S. House Critical Minerals Hearing

Kazakhstan’s growing role in global critical-mineral supply chains came into sharp focus on Capitol Hill on September 2. During a nearly four-hour hearing of the full U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, lawmakers and expert witnesses repeatedly presented the country as a major resource producer, an established U.S. supplier and a strategically important partner in Central Asia. The hearing, titled "Strategic Partnerships to Secure Critical Resources and Supply Chains," covered a broad range of issues, including domestic mining, processing capacity, Africa and trade policy. Kazakhstan nevertheless emerged as one of the hearing’s most frequently cited country examples. Three of the five witnesses explicitly supported removing Jackson-Vanik Amendment restrictions from Kazakhstan and other qualifying Central Asian states, while another encouraged Congress to consider doing so. Their position was reinforced by members of both parties. The discussion followed a congressional delegation to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Mongolia led one week earlier by Committee Chairman Jason Smith. Opening the hearing, Smith said all three countries possess significant critical resources, operate amid a strong Chinese and Russian economic presence and are looking to the United States as a stronger trade and investment partner. Kazakhstan entered the debate as an existing and reliable contributor to U.S. supply chains. Smith noted that the country already provides more than a quarter of U.S. uranium imports. Uzbekistan was discussed largely in terms of its plans to nearly double uranium production by 2030, while Kazakhstan’s importance rested on current production, established commercial ties and its capacity to support immediate diversification of American supplies. Former U.S. Ambassador John Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, described Kazakhstan as the world’s largest uranium producer, the holder of the second-largest manganese reserves and one of the leading producers of titanium. He also pointed to its substantial copper, lithium and tungsten resources. According to Herbst, the United States currently receives only about 2.1 percent of Central Asia’s mineral exports. That limited share, he argued, leaves considerable space for American companies to expand their presence in a region that is actively seeking investment, technology and alternatives to dependence on Russia and China. Kazakhstan’s significance was also linked to its position at the heart of the Trans-Caspian, or Middle Corridor. Participants described the route as an increasingly important connection between Central Asia and Western markets. Combined with new transport links through the South Caucasus, the corridor could give Kazakhstan greater access to global markets while strengthening the resilience of supply chains serving the United States and its allies. For Kazakhstan, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment became the hearing’s defining political issue. Smith said his recent meetings in Central Asia showed that regional partners regard the Soviet-era measure as an obstacle to deeper economic ties. Witnesses added that the continued application of Jackson-Vanik and the absence of permanent normal trade relations make the trade relationship less predictable and raise questions about the durability of Washington’s commitment. Herbst called for Congress to remove the remaining Jackson-Vanik restrictions on Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries. He acknowledged that reforms...

U.S. Imposes 12.5% Tariff on Kazakhstan Over Third-Country Import Controls

Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian economy included in a new U.S. tariff action covering 60 trading partners. An additional tariff of 12.5% has been imposed on a range of Kazakh goods, excluding products listed in the annexes to the final decision. The rate applies to goods entered for consumption in the United States from July 24, 2026. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration said about 95% of the country’s exports to the United States would remain outside the measure because of the exemptions. It also said the new tariff replaces an expired temporary 10% surcharge and will not be added to it. Kazakhstan already prohibits forced labor in domestic employment under Article 7 of its Labor Code. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) did not allege that Kazakh exporters use forced labor. Its finding concerned a separate gap: Kazakhstan lacks a customs prohibition capable of excluding foreign goods produced wholly or partly with forced labor. The investigation was launched in March under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, a mechanism that allows Washington to respond to foreign practices it considers discriminatory or restrictive to U.S. commerce. In June, USTR concluded that the policies of all 60 economies under review warranted action. The final decision followed more than 1,600 written comments and testimony from over 100 witnesses. Most of the economies were divided into two rate groups, while the European Union, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Switzerland received special treatment linked to existing most-favored-nation tariffs. This was not a Kazakhstan-specific finding. USTR identified the same deficiency in 53 other economies, including Australia, Japan, Norway, Singapore, and South Korea. Together, the 60 economies under investigation accounted for 99.4% of U.S. imports. A 10% tariff was imposed on countries that had introduced at least a partial ban on imports associated with forced labor or made corresponding commitments to Washington. Kazakhstan was placed in the 12.5% category alongside Australia, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and several other U.S. trading partners, as well as China and Russia. The immediate cost to Kazakhstan will depend largely on the scope of the exemptions. Washington exempted raw materials where tariffs could leave the U.S. market without sufficient domestic supply, products whose higher cost could cause wider economic disruption, and goods that the United States cannot produce in sufficient quantities or obtain elsewhere. The 12.5% rate therefore does not mean that all Kazakh exports will become more expensive in the American market. The structure of bilateral trade further limits the likely damage. Kazakhstan’s exports to the United States are concentrated in commodities, particularly oil, uranium, metals, and semi-processed materials. Many serve U.S. energy and industrial needs. The Kazakh government’s estimate that about 95% of exports remain exempt indicates that the largest trade flows should avoid the additional tariff, although the U.S. notice does not provide a Kazakhstan-specific calculation. According to U.S. figures, goods trade between the two countries reached $5 billion in 2025. U.S. imports from Kazakhstan rose by 73%...

Washington Links TRIPP and Jackson-Vanik Repeal in Push Toward Central Asia

A notable strategic shift is taking place in U.S. foreign policy, one that could have a long-term impact on the economic architecture of Eurasia. After decades in which Central Asia and the South Caucasus were viewed largely through the lens of security, counterterrorism, and competition with Russia and China, Washington is increasingly emphasizing trade, investment, transport routes, and access to critical minerals. One of the clearest signs of this shift came during a recent hearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where Senator Steve Daines and Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed the implementation of the U.S.-backed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) framework, as well as the need to remove the outdated Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions. At first glance, these may appear to be separate issues: the peace process in the South Caucasus and Cold War-era trade legislation. In reality, however, they are closely connected. Together, they point to a broader U.S. effort to link Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Western markets through trade, transport, and investment. In recent years, Republican Senator Steve Daines of Montana has emerged as one of the most active advocates of expanding America’s presence in Central Asia. As co-chair of the Senate Central Asia Caucus and one of the leading proponents of legislative efforts to repeal Jackson-Vanik restrictions, Daines has consistently argued for stronger trade and investment ties between the United States and the countries of the region. During the hearing, Daines placed particular emphasis on the importance of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, describing it as one of the most underappreciated diplomatic efforts of recent years. According to the senator, resolving the conflict could open the door to a large-scale economic transformation of the wider region. Particularly noteworthy was his reference to a geopolitical concept associated with former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. In Daines’ formulation, Central Asia represents the “bottle,” while Azerbaijan serves as its “cork.” Opening transport routes through the South Caucasus, he argued, would allow flows of oil, gas, critical minerals, and other resources to move toward Western markets rather than toward Russia, China, or Iran. Daines said this approach helped address some of the most difficult issues in the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement process and laid the foundation for what he called a “landmark agreement” after nearly four decades of conflict. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described TRIPP as an initiative capable of fundamentally transforming Armenia’s economic role in the region. According to Rubio, the framework not only addresses the issue of transport access, which had long been a source of disagreement between Baku and Yerevan, but also creates an opportunity for Armenia to become a major trade and logistics hub connecting Europe and Asia. Rubio described TRIPP as central to the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement framework, emphasizing that the project could generate substantial investment flows and attract U.S. companies to infrastructure and transport projects across the region. Washington’s argument is that trade, transit, investment, and infrastructure can give the political settlement a stronger economic base. Unlike many previous peace...

Daines Retirement Leaves Uncertainty for Senate Central Asia Caucus

Senator Steve Daines has announced that he will not seek re-election in 2026, a decision that could have implications for congressional initiatives focused specifically on Central Asia. Daines has been among the most active advocates in Congress for strengthening U.S. engagement with the region, particularly on trade policy and economic cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In 2024, Daines partnered with Democratic Senator Gary Peters to launch the U.S. Senate Central Asia Caucus, a bipartisan forum intended to raise the region’s profile in Washington and encourage cooperation on trade, investment, and security. The initiative reflected growing interest in Congress as Central Asia has gained strategic importance amid shifting global supply chains and efforts by governments in the region to diversify partnerships beyond Russia and China. One of the caucus’s key policy priorities has been the repeal of the Cold War-era Jackson–Vanik Amendment, which still applies to multiple former Soviet states. Its continued presence in U.S. law is widely viewed as an outdated barrier to deeper economic engagement. Momentum for its repeal has grown as policymakers seek to expand trade with Central Asia and modernize the legal framework governing U.S. economic relations with the region. Supporters argue that removing the amendment would encourage American investment in sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and critical minerals while aligning U.S. trade policy with Washington’s broader strategic outreach to Central Asia. Debate in Washington over normalizing trade relations has increasingly been framed as part of a wider push to strengthen economic ties with the region. With both Daines and Peters expected to leave the Senate by 2027, the caucus’s founding leadership will soon depart Capitol Hill, potentially narrowing the window for congressional action on the issue.

Modernization Without Dependence: Why Uzbekistan Is Deepening Ties with Washington

The recent rise in Uzbekistan-U.S. engagement is often framed as a sudden diplomatic turn, and much of the commentary has focused on what Washington hopes to gain from deeper involvement in Central Asia. Far less attention, however, has been given to what Tashkent is seeking from this relationship. From Uzbekistan’s perspective, this engagement is part of a broader national strategy to expand the country’s foreign policy options at a time when all of the major powers are competing for influence in Central Asia. In November 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev joined the other C5 leaders in Washington for a White House summit focused on economic cooperation, critical minerals, energy, and trade. By February 2026, the relationship had moved beyond talks and into financing and project design, with new agreements involving the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and EXIM, alongside a new critical minerals framework. From Uzbekistan’s side, the core objective is straightforward. Tashkent wants to modernize rapidly without risking becoming overdependent on any single external investor. That means using U.S. interest as leverage and in tandem with, not as a replacement for ties with Russia or China. Washington is courting the region because it wants access to minerals and supply chains that reduce reliance on China and limit exposure to sanctioned or geopolitically sensitive suppliers. Uzbekistan is well aware of this and is using that demand to strengthen its bargaining position for financing, technology, and industrial upgrading. In other words, Uzbekistan is positioning itself as a strategic production and transit partner. The direction of cooperation is revealing. The February 2026 U.S.-Uzbekistan critical minerals pact prioritizes the full-value chain from exploration and extraction to processing, and even proposes a joint investment holding company. This signals that Tashkent is aiming beyond raw-material exports. It wants to break from the post-Soviet pattern of shipping resources while others capture refining, technology, and margins. If it can secure processing capacity, infrastructure, and long-term financing, the deal becomes an instrument of industrial policy. The second objective is finance and implementation capacity. President Mirziyoyev also held separate bilateral meetings with the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Howard Lutnick, and other senior U.S. trade officials. The meetings focused on an investment platform, business council coordination, and support for large industrial and infrastructure projects. EXIM also publicly described the new framework as a way to convert earlier commitments into financing solutions for energy, aviation, critical minerals, and advanced technologies. The third objective is trade normalization and market access. A bipartisan Senate effort has introduced legislation to repeal Jackson-Vanik restrictions for Central Asian states, and President Mirziyoyev raised U.S. support for Uzbekistan’s WTO accession and stronger cooperation under the U.S.–Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). These measures shape the legal and trade environment that ultimately determines investor confidence. Uzbekistan is trying to make the relationship durable by embedding it in institutions. The move also serves a domestic political economy logic. President Mirziyoyev’s government has spent years presenting itself as reformist, investment-friendly, and open for business. Deeper engagement with the United...

Jackson-Vanik Repeal Gains Momentum as U.S. Courts Central Asia

For many years, U.S. relations with Central Asia were primarily political in nature, while economic ties developed slowly. However, in the past year, engagement has intensified significantly, with recent agreements suggesting the U.S. is poised to strengthen its economic presence in the region. A recent statement by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reinforces this outlook. Calls to repeal the outdated Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions have been framed by U.S. officials as a way to facilitate trade with Central Asia and strengthen U.S. energy security. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, enacted in 1974, restricts trade with countries that limit their citizens’ right to emigrate. At the time of its passage, Central Asia was still part of the Soviet Union.  The amendment prohibits granting most-favored-nation (MFN) status, government loans, and credit guarantees to countries that violate their citizens’ right to emigrate, and allows for discriminatory tariffs and fees on imports from non-market economies. The amendment was repealed for Ukraine in 2006, and for Russia and Moldova in 2012. However, it remains in effect for several countries, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which continue to receive only temporary normal trade relations. In May 2023, a bill proposing the establishment of permanent trade relations with Kazakhstan, which included repealing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, was introduced in the U.S. Congress. A follow-up bill with similar provisions was submitted in February 2025. Then-nominee and now Secretary of State Marco Rubio previously noted that some policymakers viewed the amendment as a tool to extract concessions on human rights or to push Central Asian states toward the U.S. and away from Russia. However, he characterized such thinking as outdated, stating that, “In some cases, it is an absurd relic of the past.”  Rubio has consistently supported expanding U.S. ties with Central Asia. Expanding Cooperation In 2025, relations between the U.S. and Central Asia deepened significantly, particularly with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which are seen by analysts as the primary beneficiaries of this cooperation. In late October 2025, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and U.S. Special Representative for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. One of the year’s major events was the Central Asia-U.S. (C5+1) summit held in Washington on November 6. Leaders of the five Central Asian states met with President Donald Trump and members of the U.S. business community. Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev also met with U.S. Senator Steve Daines, co-chair of the Senate Central Asia Caucus, with both sides focusing heavily on economic cooperation. At the summit, Uzbekistan finalized major commercial agreements with U.S. companies, including aircraft orders by Uzbekistan Airways and deals spanning aviation, energy, and industrial cooperation. Kazakhstan signed agreements worth $17 billion with U.S. companies in sectors including aviation, mineral resources, and digital technologies. This included a deal granting American company Cove Kaz Capital Group a 70% stake in a joint venture to develop one of Kazakhstan’s largest tungsten deposits, an agreement valued at $1.1 billion.  Further agreements were signed on critical minerals exploration. Kazakhstan and the...