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Nationalism

Leonid Slutsky: Scandals, Nationalism, and the Migrant Blame Game

The leader of Russia’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), Leonid Slutsky has long been a figure surrounded by controversy. A hardline nationalist, Slutsky’s career has been marked by allegations of corruption and harassment. Recently, his intensified rhetoric against labor migrants – including proposed restrictions on labor migrants bringing their families into the country, a requirement for foreign workers to learn Russian, and attacks on the former head of the Uzbek National and Cultural Autonomy Council in Moscow - have further spotlighted his controversial political career. “Our people... should not suffer from boors and criminals who consider themselves masters here, gather in packs and attack people,” Slutsky stated regarding migrant workers. “If you want to make money in Russia, learn Russian, and respect our laws and traditions. In any other case, go home. We will not experiment on ourselves or our children. Our great country must be respected.” This shift to the far-right aligns with a broader nationalist trend in Russia and raises questions about Slutsky’s intentions and the potential impact on the country and those working there. Slutsky’s Scandal-Ridden Career Slutsky's political reputation has been marred by allegations of sexual harassment that surfaced in 2018, with multiple female journalists accusing him of inappropriate conduct, including a BBC correspondent whom he reportedly touched inappropriately and whom he was recorded calling a “bunny”. Despite public disquiet, a State Duma ethics panel dismissed the complaints, leading to a media boycott but no political repercussions. This episode, as well as reports of hidden assets and extravagant wealth, including luxury properties and cars, point to a broader culture of impunity within the Russian political elite. Investigations have revealed that Slutsky's family enjoys a lavish lifestyle, including stays at a luxury Turkish villa, private jet travel, and an elite education for his children in Switzerland, despite his declared income in 2020 of $77,000. Additionally, reports link him to high-end vehicles such as Bentleys and a Mercedes-Maybach, often financed through questionable means. To paraphrase a piece by David Szakonyi in the American Political Science Review, in Russia, corrupt politicians work less but support the regime more. A member of the State Duma since 1999, Slutsky succeeded Vladimir Zhirinovsky as head of the LDPR in 2022. Under his leadership, the party has increasingly leaned on ultranationalist rhetoric and populist measures that appeal to disillusioned voters during times of economic strain. His recent attacks on labor migrants echo this strategy. Weaponizing Anti-Migrant Sentiment Slutsky’s outspoken criticism of labor migrants fits into a growing narrative in Russia that blames foreign workers for economic and social problems. Migrants, particularly those from Central Asia and the Caucasus, have been routinely scapegoated in nationalist circles, accused of taking jobs, disrupting social harmony, and contributing to crime. While there is little evidence to support many of these claims, Slutsky is capitalizing on prevailing anxieties as a means to rally support for his party. By portraying himself and the LDPR as defenders of a nostalgia-fueled Russian identity, he hopes to appeal to conservative voters who view...

Migration

Kyrgyzstan Seeks to Expand Labor Quotas for Work in the UK

Seventeen thousand Kyrgyz citizens are expected to work in the United Kingdom this year under a state-sponsored employment program, according to Ulan Jusupov, Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to the UK. Jusupov made the announcement during a session of the Jogorku Kenesh, the Kyrgyz parliament. Addressing lawmakers, the ambassador noted that the number of Kyrgyz nationals seeking employment in the UK continues to grow each year, driven by more favorable working conditions compared to those in other European countries and Russia, where nearly 90% of Kyrgyz migrant workers are currently employed. “In 2022, 4,500 of our citizens went to work in England. That number rose to 7,500 in 2023, and in 2024 it has increased to 10,000,” Jusupov said. The Times of Central Asia has previously reported on the challenges Kyrgyz labor migrants face in Europe, with many choosing to leave Russia due to frequent legal issues and labor disputes. As a result, an increasing number are turning to the Center for Employment of Citizens Abroad (CTHR) for assistance in securing work in alternative destinations. In 2022, CTHR signed a memorandum of cooperation with British recruitment company AGRI-HR to facilitate seasonal employment for Kyrgyz nationals in the UK. While AGRI-HR primarily focuses on jobs in the agricultural sector, CTHR also offers a range of vacancies in a range of other places, including Slovakia, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Russia. According to CTHR, other favorable countries for Kyrgyz workers include Germany, Italy, France, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. Most opportunities in these regions are in agriculture and related fields, and Kyrgyz citizens can legally work there under established programs. During the parliamentary session, members of the Committee on International Affairs, Defense, Security, and Migration urged Jusupov to enhance the embassy’s efforts in safeguarding the rights and interests of Kyrgyz labor migrants in the UK. Lawmakers also called for an increase in labor quotas and requested that the embassy conduct educational outreach for prospective workers, informing them about British culture, labor ethics, and legal rights prior to their departure.

Labor migrants

Essential but Unwelcome: Central Asian Migrants in Russia

The Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow on March 22, 2024 triggered strong anti-migrant sentiment in Russian society. Since then, the nation’s authorities have been imposing stricter migration rules. But how does this impact millions of Central Asian labor migrants and their families living and working in Russia? Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia became a major destination for migrant workers from Central Asia. According to the official Russian statistics, there are currently almost four million citizens of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan living in Russia, along with approximately 670,000 illegal migrants. Rosstat (the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation) reports that 260,400 migrants arrived in Russia from January to July this year, with 60% (about 156,200) coming from Central Asian countries. The majority of them are citizens of Tajikistan. In 2023, over one million Tajiks have moved to Russia in search of work. With a large community of its citizens in Russia, the Tajik government seems to be working to not only improve their legal status in the Russian Federation, but also to coordinate some of their actions, particularly in the field of culture. On April 9, in Dushanbe, a meeting took place between Tajikistan’s Minister of Labor, Migration, and Employment of the Population, Solekhi Kholmakhmadzoda, and leaders and activists of the Tajik diaspora living in Russia. Tajikistan initiated the summit after Russia began testing migrant children on their knowledge of the Russian language before admitting them to school. Starting April 1, a law came into effect that prevents Russian schools from enrolling migrant children who do not speak Russian or are in Russia illegally. This measure is just the tip of the iceberg in the Kremlin’s plans to regulate the migrant issue in the country. Alexey Nechaev, the leader of the New People party – one of the handful of the so-called systemic opposition parties in Russia – said on March 19 that “artificial intelligence should be made a new tool for monitoring migrants… It is unfair that Russian citizens are digitized from head to toe, while migrants continue to live with paper documents without any problems,” Nechaev stressed, pointing out that monitoring migrants’ activities through AI could “help keep a closer eye on what foreigners are doing and make it easier to track illegal money flows.” Last year, the Liberal Democratic Party – another ‘systemic opposition’ group – proposed restricting the rights of migrant workers to bring their families into Russia. This initiative raised concerns in neighboring Kazakhstan. The ambassador of the largest Central Asian nation expressed unease to Moscow about such ambitions, referring to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the foundation of which, as he highlighted, is based on ensuring the four freedoms – the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. Russian reports, however, claim that, as a result of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s membership in the EAEU, their citizens living in Russia have a much better status than those from other Central Asian states. Despite that, on...

economic slowdown

Tajikistan Predicts Economic Slowdown Amid Declining Remittances

Tajikistan's economic growth is projected to decelerate to 7.5% in 2025, largely due to weakening domestic demand, according to the latest regional economic review by the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD). Migrant Remittances: A Key Factor The anticipated slowdown is primarily attributed to a decline in remittances from labor migrants, which have historically formed a substantial share of Tajikistan’s GDP. EFSD analysts forecast that from 2025 to 2027, the volume of transfers will gradually normalize after peaking between 2022 and 2024. Despite this decline, the EFSD maintains that Tajikistan’s balance of payments will remain stable, helped in part by reduced capital outflows, including foreign currency purchases. Previously, the World Bank reported that migrant remittances accounted for 45% of the country’s GDP in 2024, the highest proportion globally. By comparison, remittances made up 24% of GDP in Kyrgyzstan and 14% in Uzbekistan. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) expects this share to fall to 37% in 2025. Inflation Pressures Rise EFSD economists also warn of mounting inflationary pressures. Inflation is projected to approach the upper limit of the National Bank of Tajikistan’s target corridor, 5% with an acceptable deviation of ±2 percentage points. Over the medium term, inflation is expected to stabilize within the target range. Food prices remain the primary risk to price stability, the EFSD cautioned. Exports, External Risks, and Trade Barriers The ADB has also published a forecast supporting a more restrained outlook, highlighting falling global prices for Tajikistan’s key exports, metals and agricultural goods, including aluminum, as an added drag on growth. Additionally, regional trade barriers are posing challenges. Uzbekistan recently raised import duties on Tajik cement, a move seen by analysts as part of a broader trend of protectionist policies in neighboring countries. External conditions are also exerting pressure. Economic slowdowns in Russia and China, Tajikistan’s primary trading partners, could suppress both export revenue and remittances, the majority of which come from migrant workers in Russia. GDP Projections and Sector Breakdown According to the ADB’s baseline scenario, Tajikistan’s GDP growth is expected to slow to 7.4% in 2025 and 6.8% in 2026. In contrast, Tajik authorities aim to maintain growth at no less than 8%. In 2024, the economy grew by 8.4%, a 0.1 percentage point increase over the previous year. GDP totaled 153.4 billion somoni (approximately $14 billion). The sectoral composition of GDP included agriculture (22.8%), industry (16.9%), trade (15.2%), transportation (9.3%), construction (8.1%), taxes (9.4%), and other services (18.3%). Despite the projected slowdown, ADB experts remain cautiously optimistic. They cite sustained investment in energy and industrial sectors, expanded agricultural and service output, and continued, albeit diminished, remittance inflows as key factors that will support Tajikistan’s economic momentum.

Labor Market

Kyrgyzstan Faces Labor Shortages Amid Growing Return Migration

As of February 1, 2025, Kyrgyzstan had 6,305 job vacancies, with the highest demand for blue-collar workers, according to the Ministry of Labor, Social Security, and Migration. The official unemployment rate currently stands at 1.8%. A total of 69,300 people have sought assistance from the employment service, with 49,800 officially registered as unemployed. Since the beginning of the year, 12,246 citizens have applied for job placement, and 1,283 have successfully secured employment. To enhance job seekers' competitiveness in the labor market, the employment service has introduced training programs for in-demand professions. These include computer operation, sales, cooking, cosmetology, hairdressing, manicuring, massage therapy, makeup artistry, translation, accounting, sewing, driving, electric and gas welding, plumbing, and beekeeping. Over the past three decades, hundreds of thousands of Kyrgyz citizens have migrated abroad for work, primarily to Russia. However, in recent years, return migration has been rising due to Russia’s economic downturn, stricter regulations, and increasing anti-immigrant sentiment toward Central Asians. In response to this trend, the Kyrgyz government has prioritized establishing new industrial enterprises to create job opportunities for returning labor migrants.

visas

Russian Foreign Ministry Opposes Visa Regime for Central Asian Countries

Russia’s Foreign Ministry has voiced opposition to the introduction of a visa regime for citizens of Central Asian countries, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated during a session at the State Duma (Russia’s parliament). Lavrov emphasized that tightening Russia’s approach to labor migrants from Central Asia “would not serve our long-term interests.” While acknowledging concerns over violations committed by migrants in various regions, he argued that increased oversight, not additional barriers, was the appropriate response. “We believe that enhancing control over their activities is necessary, but erecting barriers, let alone introducing a visa regime, is not the right course of action,” Lavrov stated. Lavrov noted that Russia’s latest measures regarding migration aim to improve monitoring rather than obstruct labor migration. “We have held multiple meetings with ambassadors from Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states to discuss their concerns and clarify our policies. The EAEU’s founding documents guarantee equal rights for all member states' citizens, allowing them to enter Russia without formal invitations or prior declarations of employment. However, these provisions now require further clarification. Authorities must track migrant arrivals, verify their employment status, and ensure compliance with Russian law. I am convinced this can be done without creating artificial obstacles in relations with our closest allies,” Lavrov stated. In contrast, some Russian politicians have called for stricter migration controls. In late March 2024, just days after the deadly terrorist attack at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, Sergei Mironov, chairman of the A Just Russia - For Truth party and head of its State Duma faction, proposed introducing a visa regime with Central Asian states. Mironov argued that such a policy “should in no way be regarded as an unfriendly gesture toward our neighbors” and expressed hope that Central Asian governments would understand the rationale behind the move. For the past 30 years, Russia has been the primary destination for hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of labor migrants from Central Asia. However, economic challenges, stricter migration policies, and growing anti-migrant sentiment in Russia have increasingly pushed many workers to seek opportunities elsewhere.