Middle East Crisis - The Times Of Central Asia

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Antalya Diplomacy Forum

At Antalya Forum, Tokayev Delivers a Stark Warning on Iran and the UN

Last week, the Turkish resort city of Antalya hosted the fifth annual Antalya Diplomacy Forum. Particular attention was drawn to the speech by Kazakhstan’s president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who once again raised the issue of reforming the United Nations. Held since 2021 at the initiative of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the forum brings together political leaders, diplomats, experts, business representatives, media, and civil society. It serves as a platform for bilateral and multilateral contacts, political consultations, and informal diplomacy. This year, alongside Turkey and Kazakhstan, the forum was attended by delegations from Azerbaijan, Qatar, Pakistan, Syria, Georgia, North Macedonia, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, all led by their respective heads of state. A widely circulated photograph from the opening ceremony, showing Erdoğan and Tokayev in conversation, was interpreted by some observers as reflecting the Kazakh president’s standing and the level of engagement between the two leaders. Political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev pointed to what he described as a convergence in messaging between the two presidents. “Opening the forum, President Erdoğan stated that ‘the world is experiencing a crisis of direction alongside a crisis of order.’ He noted that ‘mechanisms designed to protect human rights and international security remain ineffective and often inactive in the face of serious violations.’ Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, judging by his speech, sought, drawing on his experience and position, to respond to the concerns expressed by the Turkish and other leaders,” Ashimbayev said. Another Kazakh political analyst, Andrey Chebotarev, highlighted the broader diplomatic context, noting that Erdoğan is expected to pay a state visit to Kazakhstan on May 14. “In addition to bilateral cooperation, this visit is linked to the upcoming informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States in the city of Turkestan. It is worth recalling that following the previous informal OTS summit, held online on March 31, 2021, Turkestan was officially recognized as the spiritual capital of the Turkic world. Holding a similar summit in person is intended to underscore both the city’s significance and Kazakhstan’s role within the Turkic community,” Chebotarev said. Analyzing Tokayev’s remarks, Chebotarev also pointed to what he described as a consolidation of Kazakhstan’s position on the situation in the Middle East, particularly in the context of tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran. “Astana had previously signaled its distancing from all parties to the conflict, while expressing solidarity with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which, despite not being direct participants, were affected by strikes linked to the broader confrontation. In this context, the Kazakh president’s call for restraint and a cessation of hostilities is not merely an expression of neutrality but reflects the position of an active international actor seeking a diplomatic resolution,” he said. One of the central elements of Tokayev’s speech was his assessment of developments surrounding Iran. He called for greater awareness of global dynamics and emphasized the need to address root causes. “The core issue is the proliferation of nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons. This must be...

Iran

Central Asia Recalculates as the Iran War Enters a New Phase

Central Asia’s first response to the Iran war was public and urgent. Governments organized evacuations, welcomed a ceasefire, and watched the Strait of Hormuz because the region’s trade routes, fuel costs, and food prices were already under pressure. The next phase looks different. Following the April 12 collapse of U.S.-Iran talks in Islamabad, Washington moved to block maritime traffic entering and leaving Iranian ports. That step does not formally close Hormuz to all shipping, but it pushes the crisis into a more serious phase for any country or company still treating Iran as a viable corridor. That distinction is important in Central Asia because the region does not need a formal legal closure of Hormuz to feel the shock. It only needs insurers, banks, freight forwarders, airlines, and traders to decide that the southern option has become too risky for routine planning. That process was already underway. The route through Iran had come under strain in southern corridor traffic, food systems, and in the wider pricing of regional connectivity. A U.S. move against Iranian ports is likely to reinforce that view. Official statements across Central Asia still reflect the ceasefire moment more than the latest escalation. On April 8, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev welcomed the truce and said he hoped it would support global trade and prosperity. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire and praised efforts to reduce tensions. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry did the same, calling the truce an “important step toward de-escalating tensions,” and stressing that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire agreement between Iran and the United States. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, had already taken a practical line, saying on March 4 that it was keeping all international checkpoints open and providing passage for foreign citizens, vehicles, and rail stock across the Turkmen-Iranian border. Since then, public messaging has lagged behind the latest escalation. By April 13, Qazinform’s foreign news flow had shifted to the failed Islamabad talks and Trump’s blockade order, while the latest publicly visible official positions elsewhere in the region still reflected the April 8 ceasefire. That does not mean backchannel diplomacy has stopped, but it does suggest that Central Asian governments prefer caution in public as the conflict shifts from direct strikes to pressure on shipping and trade. For the region, the economic logic is now clearer than the politics. Approximately 20% of global oil supplies and one-third of global fertilizer trade move through the Strait of Hormuz, while urea prices surged by almost 46% between February and March 2026. The World Bank’s April Europe and Central Asia Economic Update said growth in the developing economies of Europe and Central Asia is expected to slow to 2.1% in 2026, down from 2.6% in 2025, as the Middle East conflict, wider geopolitical tension, and trade fragmentation weigh on the region. Those pressures were already significant. The collapse of the main post-ceasefire diplomatic effort, followed by oil rising back above $100 a barrel, has made them harder...

Middle East Crisis

Central Asia Welcomes Ceasefire, Urges Talks as Energy Risks Persist

Central Asian governments have cautiously welcomed the two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran, describing it as a necessary pause in a conflict that has already begun to affect regional stability, trade, and energy flows. Across the region, official statements struck a consistent balance: support for the truce, alongside calls to translate it quickly into negotiations rather than allow it to become a temporary pause in hostilities. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev described the agreement as a “ceasefire and truce” reached through international mediation, including efforts involving Pakistan’s leadership. According to the presidential press service, Tokayev said that “this agreement became possible due to the goodwill and wisdom of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the senior leadership of Iran, as well as all countries involved in the military conflict.” Tokayev went on to express his hope that the agreement would prove sustainable and contribute to global trade and economic stability. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry described the ceasefire as an “important step toward de-escalating tensions” and stressed that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tashkent called for “all parties to exercise restraint, [and] refrain from actions that could further escalate the situation, warning that further escalation risks widening the conflict and undermining regional stability. The statement reaffirmed Uzbekistan's “unwavering position on the need to resolve conflicts exclusively by peaceful means in strict accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the agreement, expressing hope that the ceasefire would open the way to a comprehensive and long-term peace. Dushanbe emphasized that the conflict has “no military solution and its continuation will only worsen the already difficult situation in the Middle East and cause colossal damage to all countries in the region.” The statement urged all parties to “abandon the use of force” and use political and diplomatic mechanisms in accordance with international law and the UN Charter. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry said it “welcomes the achievement of a ceasefire agreement in the Middle East,” highlighting the role of Pakistan’s mediation efforts in reducing tensions. Bishkek reaffirmed that disputes must be resolved exclusively through political and diplomatic means on the basis of the UN Charter and international law, and expressed its “hope for achieving sustainable and long-term peace in the region.” Turkmenistan had not issued an official public statement on the ceasefire at the time of publication, in line with its longstanding policy of neutrality and cautious approach to external conflicts. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the “announced ceasefire” and praised the efforts of mediators who helped broker the agreement. Baku called on all parties to “engage in productive dialogue aimed at resolving existing problems and strengthening mutual trust” and signaled its readiness to “support initiatives aimed at strengthening lasting peace, security, and cooperation in the region.” The convergence in tone reflects more than diplomatic routine. The conflict has already spilled into Central Asia’s political and humanitarian agenda, prompting coordination on evacuations, aid deliveries, and contingency planning....

Oil Supply

Middle East Crisis: Kazakhstan Could Become an Alternative Supplier of Petroleum Products to Asia

The two-week ceasefire announced after Pakistani mediation between Iran and the U.S. has reduced the risk of immediate escalation in the Strait of Hormuz, but disruptions to one of the key routes of global oil trade have already triggered structural changes in energy markets. Against this backdrop, Kazakhstan and other countries in the region are increasingly being viewed as alternative suppliers of hydrocarbons, at least from the perspective of South Korea and Japan. Despite the agreement on a two-week pause, Iran has made it clear that it retains control over shipping in the strait, including the potential to impose restrictions and coordinate tanker movements with its military. This has heightened concerns among importers, many of whom depend heavily on this route. The most notable shift is taking place in Asia. South Korea, which receives about 61% of its crude imports and 54% of its naphtha imports through the Strait of Hormuz, is sending a high-level delegation to Kazakhstan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia to seek alternative sources of supply. Talks in Astana are expected to focus on oil and naphtha for industrial use. South Korea, Asia’s fourth-largest economy, has proven to be among the most vulnerable to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. In response, Seoul is taking urgent diplomatic and economic measures, with Presidential Chief of Staff Kang Hoon-sik traveling to Kazakhstan as a special envoy for strategic economic cooperation. The delegation includes representatives from relevant ministries and major energy companies, underscoring the urgency of the effort. The purpose of the visit is not only to address a potential short-term shortfall but also to establish sustainable alternative supply channels. South Korea has already secured a 24 million-barrel supply deal with the UAE, and shipments are already arriving at its ports, though officials say that volume is still insufficient given the ongoing instability. The government is coordinating efforts with private fuel importers and logistics operators to ensure uninterrupted supplies until tankers arrive at the country’s ports. Kazakhstan, which possesses large oil fields including Kashagan, is emerging as a key candidate to partially replace Middle Eastern volumes. However, geography imposes clear limitations: oil from the region requires more complex logistics, including transit across the Caspian Sea and onward through the Caucasus or the Black Sea. This is compounded by a projected decline in the country’s oil production. In March, Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov stated that output could fall by 2-4 million tons by the end of 2026 due to disruptions linked to attacks on infrastructure belonging to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), as well as fires at the Tengiz field. Initial projections placed Kazakhstan’s 2026 oil production at 100.5 million tons, potentially a record level. However, the minister indicated that actual output will most likely fall short of this target. Japan is also reassessing its supply strategy. With more than 90% of its oil traditionally sourced from the Middle East, Tokyo is considering increasing imports from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan through projects involving the national company INPEX. Japanese experts note that oil from...

Middle East Crisis

Tokayev Welcomes Middle East Truce, Reaffirms Kazakhstan’s Support for Peace Efforts

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has welcomed the "ceasefire and truce” announced in the Middle East, praising the mediation efforts of Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Field Marshal Asim Munir. According to Kazakhstan’s presidential press office, Tokayev stated that “this agreement became possible due to the goodwill and wisdom of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the senior leadership of Iran, as well as all countries involved in the military conflict.” He added that he hoped the agreement would be lasting and would contribute to global trade and the economic prosperity of nations. Tokayev’s statement is consistent with his broader support for diplomatic peace initiatives. On January 22, 2026, Tokayev signed the Charter of the Board of Peace in Davos. At the Board’s inaugural meeting on February 20, Tokayev said Kazakhstan’s decision to join the Abraham Accords was fully aligned with the Board of Peace’s mission and could help advance peace, security, and wider humanitarian and economic cooperation in the Middle East. Kazakhstan has also framed its decision to join the Abraham Accords as part of a larger effort to reduce confrontation and encourage dialogue. In official remarks, Tokayev said the move was intended to contribute to lasting peace in the Middle East and reflected Kazakhstan’s multilateral diplomacy aimed at promoting peace and security. By linking the truce to trade and prosperity, Tokayev underscored Kazakhstan’s view that peace and economic stability go hand in hand. The statement reinforces Astana’s position that dialogue, bridge-building, and sustained diplomacy remain the strongest path toward regional stability and long-term growth.

Iran

The Iran War Is Repricing Central Asia’s Connectivity

Europe’s aviation regulator has extended its current conflict-zone bulletin for the Middle East and Persian Gulf through April 10 and continues to advise operators to avoid Iranian and adjacent airspace at all altitudes. Reuters reported soon after that the squeeze on normal flight paths was pushing more traffic into narrower routes, notably over Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The Strait of Hormuz, meanwhile, has not returned to normal commercial use. A limited number of exempted vessels have crossed, but passage remains selective, politicized, and uncertain rather than routine. The question, consequently, is no longer only whether Central Asia has alternatives to single-route dependence but whether those alternatives remain commercially usable, taking into account the increased risk, delay, insurance, fuel burn, and congestion. What has changed is the cost of maintaining reliable connectivity. The Cost of Reliability The Iran conflict imposes higher operating costs on the wider Eurasian air corridor that is now taking displaced traffic. EUROCONTROL estimates that about 1,150 flights a day continue to be affected by re-routing linked to the Middle East crisis. These add roughly 206,000 kilometers of flying and 602 tons of extra fuel burn per day. Maritime trends are similar. In March, war-risk premiums in or near the Gulf had risen more than tenfold in some cases, with hull war premiums moving from about 0.25% of vessel value to as much as 3%. Air-freight rates on some routes rose by as much as 70% as shippers redirected urgent cargo away from disrupted sea lanes and restricted airspace. Higher surcharges and narrower margins for operational error can make routes lose commercial value even if they remain formally open. The wider macroeconomic setting has also made resilience more expensive. Higher oil prices make every detour costlier, raising freight charges, power costs, and production costs across the region’s trading partners. Even where Central Asian cargo does not move through Iranian waters, the same pattern is still present. Asian policymakers were already confronting a combined oil-price and currency shock at a moment when roughly 80% of the oil shipped through Hormuz normally goes to Asia. The World Bank’s March food and nutrition security update notes that around 20% of global oil supplies and about one-third of global fertilizer trade transit the Strait of Hormuz. Urea prices, for example, surged by nearly 46% month on month between February and March 2026. Importers in Central Asia, as well as in Europe and the South Caucasus, remain under pressure from higher household food costs and tighter producer margins. The price of resilience is now showing up in increased costs for farm inputs, food costs, and household budgets. How the Burden Falls Kazakhstan remains the best placed in the region to absorb the shift. The CPC pipeline still carries about 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports; oil income contributes 52% of the state budget. Earlier disruptions had constrained Kazakhstan to reroute 300,000 tons of crude, and the country continues to rely on supplementary outlets such as Ust-Luga, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, and China when its main...