• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 62

Central Asia and Israel, a Pragmatic Relationship That Never Truly Blossomed

The conflict between Israel and Iran is having both international and regional repercussions. The situation has been further inflamed by the U.S. bombing of several Iranian nuclear sites over the weekend, with Tehran responding by threatening retaliation on U.S. soil through the use of sleeper terrorist cells and the possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which over a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes. While Israel's geographical position places it at the heart of the Middle East, Iran's location brings the Islamic Republic into close contact with Central Asia. The consequences of the conflict are therefore likely to be felt heavily in the Central Asian region. The close relations between Tehran and the capitals of Central Asia, due in part to their geographical proximity, are often highlighted. Less explored is the nature of the relationship between Tel Aviv and Central Asia and the lines along which it has developed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On both the Israeli and Central Asian sides, despite all the differences, relations began in the early 1990s, mainly based on certain mutual interests. From Israel's point of view, relations with Central Asia would mean expanding the circle of Muslim countries with which it had friendly ties, gaining greater influence in the region, and reducing its diplomatic isolation. From the Central Asian perspective, the appeal lay in increasing the number of its international partners, coupled with a desire to access Israeli know-how in numerous fields, and the possibility, through relations with Tel Aviv, of having a privileged channel of dialogue with the United States. More than three decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, relations remain good for the most part. “The positive relationship between Israel and Central Asia is driven by a combination of strategic, economic, and geopolitical factors,” Dr Zeev Levin, Coordinator of the Central Asian Research Unit at the Harry S. Truman Institute, told The Times of Central Asia. “One of the primary drivers is mutual interest in security and counterterrorism. Economically, Israel’s expertise in water management, agriculture, and technology is highly attractive to the arid, resource-seeking nations of Central Asia that aim to modernize their infrastructure and diversify their economies beyond oil and gas. Additionally, fostering ties with Israel provides a means of diversifying the foreign policy portfolios of the Central Asian republics.” This positive relationship, however, seems to have lost momentum in recent years due to several factors. Central Asian republics have increasingly oriented towards the East, moving closer to China and other players such as South Korea, Japan, and India, or towards other partners, such as the European ones, with Italy at the forefront in this regard. As Levin points out, the relation has cooled due to several factors: “Central Asian republics did look to Israel in the first decade of independence, but in the last decade to a much lesser extent, since Turkey and China are less complicated and cheaper options. For Israel, the region was never a priority or a point of...

Transit of Russian Gas to Uzbekistan Through Kazakhstan Continues to Grow

The volume of Russian natural gas transiting through Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan is on the rise, reflecting deepening regional energy cooperation. Kazakhstan’s Deputy Minister of Energy, Alibek Zhamauov, shared the update during a speech at the international Energy Trends forum, according to Interfax. Gas transit to Uzbekistan via Kazakhstan began in October 2023. In 2024, 5.6 billion cubic meters of Russian gas were delivered through Kazakhstan, surpassing earlier forecasts of 3.8 billion cubic meters. The volume is projected to increase to 7.3 billion cubic meters in 2025, with further plans to reach 11 billion cubic meters per year starting in 2026. The growing volumes highlight Kazakhstan’s emerging role as a vital transit hub for Central Asia. In 2023, the initial year of operation, 1.28 billion cubic meters of gas were transported along this route. Zhamauov stated that the project is part of a broader strategy to enhance regional energy security and develop cross-border gas infrastructure. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy has committed to expanding and upgrading the country’s gas transportation network to accommodate long-term supply agreements with neighboring states. Uzbekistan’s Production Decline Raises Concerns The rising reliance on imported gas comes amid a continued decline in Uzbekistan’s domestic natural gas production. In the first two months of 2025, output fell by 4.2% compared to the same period in 2024. This trend follows a steep drop in production from 61.59 billion cubic meters in 2018 to 44.59 billion in 2024. The shrinking output has sparked concerns over Uzbekistan’s energy security and its broader economic implications. The country’s increasing dependence on regional gas flows highlights the strategic importance of projects like the Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan transit corridor.

Kazakhstan Plans 25% Gas Output Increase by 2030

Kazakhstan aims to significantly increase its natural gas production over the next five years, raising output from 59 billion cubic meters to 74 billion cubic meters by 2030. The announcement was made by Deputy Minister of Energy Alibek Zhamauov during the Energy Trends: Gas & Petrochemicals forum in Astana. Production Growth Driven by Major Fields and New Developments In 2023, Kazakhstan produced 59 billion cubic meters of gas, with output projected to rise to 62.8 billion cubic meters in 2024. This growth will be driven by ongoing production at the country’s largest fields, Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan, as well as the launch of new sources, including the Rozhkovskoye, Anabai, and Urikhtau fields. “Our goal is to increase gas production to 74 billion cubic meters by 2030,” Zhamauov stated. “But the key task is to process gas within the country as efficiently as possible to supply our citizens and industry, as well as to create a raw material base for gas chemistry.” Currently, over 85% of Kazakhstan’s gas production comes from the Tengiz (26%), Karachaganak (41%), and Kashagan (19%) projects. By the end of 2024, marketable gas output is expected to reach 28.7 billion cubic meters, including Tengiz (8.7 bcm), Karachaganak (7.5 bcm), Kashagan (4.7 bcm), Zhanazhol (3.3 bcm), and other fields (3.6 bcm). Of this, 21.2 billion cubic meters (79%) will be consumed domestically, while 5.6 billion cubic meters (21%) will be exported. Zhamauov noted that gas production will increase by 5.9 billion cubic meters, reaching 34.6 billion cubic meters by 2030, due to the introduction of new gas processing plants (GPPs). Two GPPs, with capacities of 1 billion and 2.5 billion cubic meters respectively, will be built at the Kashagan field. A 4 billion cubic meter facility will be developed at Karachaganak, while a plant in Zhanaozen will add another 900 million cubic meters per year. LNG Plant in Astana A liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant with a capacity of 75,000 tons per year is also planned for Astana. Chingiz Cherniyazdanov, director of the Kazakh Institute of Oil and Gas (KING), shared details of the project during the forum. “The Astana LNG complex will be located in the capital’s industrial zone,” Cherniyazdanov said. “We will build the first stage with a production capacity of 75,000 tons per year, as well as a hub for LNG storage. Commissioning is scheduled for 2027.” The plant will source feedstock from the Saryarka gas trunkline (Kyzylorda-Zhezkazgan-Temirtau-Astana). A storage facility will be constructed to balance seasonal fuel demand during colder months. KING also plans to use the LNG to launch a vehicle conversion service. Cherniyazdanov added that, following completion of the second string of the Beineu-Bozoi-Shymkent gas pipeline, which will double capacity from 15 to 30 billion cubic meters per year, the LNG plant could expand to a second stage, increasing production to 100,000 tons per year. The pipeline expansion will be carried out in two phases: from September 2025 to July 2027, and from August 2027 to January 2029. Expanded Gas Infrastructure and...

Gas Crunch in Uzbekistan: Industry Falters as Demand Surges

In the first two months of 2025, Uzbekistan's natural gas production declined by 4.2% compared to the same period in 2024, continuing a troubling trend that has seen output fall from 61.59 billion cubic meters in 2018 to 44.59 billion cubic meters in 2024. This persistent decrease raises concerns about the nation’s energy security and economic stability. Once among Central Asia’s energy success stories, Uzbekistan became a net importer of natural gas in 2023, a symbolic turning point for a country whose identity was long intertwined with hydrocarbon abundance. The extent of the strain was demonstrated in December 2024, when gas stations around the country were forced to close during a cold snap as heating systems across the country kicked into action. This led drivers of methane-powered cars, which are common in the country given that it costs about $15 to fill the tank as opposed to $40-50 in a gasoline-powered vehicle, into a desperate hunt for places to fill up. Kilometer-long queues formed, and drivers ferociously competed to be first to the pump. Such scenes have become a familiar sight in the Uzbek winter as gas production has fallen. “Uzbekistan’s gas production is already quite mature,” Anne-Sophie Corbeau of Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy told The Times of Central Asia. “The existing fields are entering a phase of decline. The reserve-to-production ratio was around 18 years based on 2020 data, and the situation is unlikely to be much better now.” Put simply, the country is running out of easy gas. Despite repeated efforts to locate new reserves, particularly in the under-explored Ustyurt region, exploration has so far failed to yield significant breakthroughs. Even if discoveries are made, the timeline to bring new fields online would mean little impact before 2030, at best. In parallel, demand for gas has remained stubbornly high. Corbeau noted that “the country’s energy mix and electricity generation are very dependent on natural gas. And Uzbekistan is one of the countries with the lowest wholesale gas prices in the world.” Those prices have long distorted both domestic consumption and investor interest, keeping demand high while choking off potential upstream capital. [caption id="attachment_30630" align="aligncenter" width="1209"] Image: Wholesale Gas Price Survey 2024 Edition. International Gas Union. https://www.datocms-assets.com/[/caption] This sentiment is echoed by Irina Mironova, Senior Energy Analyst at the New Energy Advancement Hub. “Domestic production is declining faster than consumption,” she said, “and domestic gas pricing is not market-based. It remains below the price of imported gas, which undermines the investment appeal of upstream projects for foreign investors.” The government has undertaken some measures to control demand over the past year, raising the tariffs for electricity and gas by 52.5% and 71% respectively, hitting consumers in the pocket in an attempt to alter the wasteful use of scant resources. On the supply side, the government has declared a bold ambition to raise production to 62 billion cubic meters annually under its Uzbekistan–2030 development strategy, but observers remain skeptical. “They’ve tried to facilitate exploration, especially in the...

Kazakhstan to Expand Oil, Gas, and Green Energy Production in 2025

The Ministry of Energy of Kazakhstan has released its 2024 fuel and energy sector report and outlined its plans for 2025. The country aims to increase crude oil and natural gas production while expanding renewable energy capacity. Oil Production and Refining In 2024, Kazakhstan produced 87.7 million tons of crude oil. Oil refining met the target of 17.9 million tons, while the production of: Oil products reached 14.5 million tons (exceeding the plan) Liquefied gas totaled 3 million tons Petrochemical products amounted to 540,000 tons In 2025, the country aims to boost crude oil production to 96.2 million tons, driven by the expansion of production at the Tengiz field and continued development at Karachaganak, Kalamkas-Sea, and Khazar. Natural Gas Expansion and Infrastructure Kazakhstan produced 59 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas in 2024 and plans to increase output to 62.8 bcm in 2025. As of last year, 61.8% of Kazakhstan’s population had access to natural gas supplies. The government plans to expand gasification efforts in 2025 through the completion of major gas pipelines and distribution stations. Growth in Renewable Energy and Electricity Generation Kazakhstan generated 117.9 billion kWh of electricity in 2024, with 7.58 billion kWh (6.4%) coming from renewable energy sources (RES). In 2025, the country will implement nine new RES projects with a total capacity of 455.5 MW, further increasing the share of green energy and reducing the carbon footprint of Kazakhstan’s energy sector.

Strategic Cooperation Between Turkey and Turkmenistan Gains Momentum

Turkey and Turkmenistan have accelerated their cooperation in recent years, advancing economic, energy, and diplomatic initiatives that underscore their shared cultural and strategic interests. Their deepening of bilateral ties reflects and expresses both broader regional dynamics and shifts in global energy geopolitics. As The Times of Central Asia reports, the two countries signed a natural gas supply agreement in February 2025 that reinforces Turkey’s ambitions as a regional energy hub while providing Turkmenistan with a new export avenue. Turkmenistan will begin supplying 1.3 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of natural gas to Turkey on March 1 through a swap agreement. Turkmenistan will send gas to Iran for consumption in the northeast of the country, in return for which Iran will transfer an equivalent amount to Turkey. Various press commentaries and diplomatic declarations touting the “export of Turkmen gas to Turkey” are therefore to be regarded skeptically as political grandstanding, even if such an assessment may be supported from a technical standpoint of how the industry calculates flows. Trade and investment relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan have recently seen steady growth, underpinned by Turkish business engagement in Turkmenistan’s infrastructure and construction sectors. Over 600 Turkish companies are active in Turkmenistan, and Turkish direct investment has surpassed $500 million. Turkish contractors have executed projects worth over $50 billion in Turkmenistan since its independence. In this context, the eighth meeting of the bilateral Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation took place in Ankara on February 25. Following the meeting, a large-scale protocol was signed, including 87 points and covering cooperation over a wide range of issues - areas such as trade and investment, energy, transport and logistics, scientific cooperation, agriculture, and healthcare. The bilateral trade turnover between the two countries reached $2.2 billion in 2024, and Turkey aims to more than double this level to $5 billion. However, reaching that target hinges on further liberalization of Turkmenistan’s economic policies and the expansion of investment-friendly regulations, both of which could be challenging. The two sides also discussed how to integrate Turkmenistan into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, “Middle Corridor”) as well as possible cooperation in the field of transport and logistics toward that end. Ankara has successfully positioned itself as a strategic economic partner, but Ashgabat’s tightly controlled economy presents structural barriers that may slow the desired growth. Ankara’s engagement with Ashgabat thus reflects its broader efforts to enhance connectivity across Central Asia. Turkey’s push to integrate Turkmenistan into the TITR aligns with its own ambition to position itself as a logistical bridge between Asia and Europe, complementing its Middle Corridor strategy, which seeks to create an alternative trade route bypassing Russia. However, Turkmenistan’s rigid economic model and cautious foreign policy limit the pace of integration. Practical challenges include regulatory misalignment, infrastructure bottlenecks, and geopolitical sensitivities. Turkey’s Vice-President, Cevdet Yilmaz, affirmed his country’s intention that Turkmen gas and electricity should reach European markets through Turkey. Turkish state-owned companies such as TPAO and BOTAŞ will also seek to develop hydrocarbon fields in Turkmenistan and...