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Corruption

Kazakhstan vs. Eni: Who Is the Key Figure in the Swiss Lawsuit?

Kazakhstan’s $166 billion legal campaign against the oil majors, Shell, ExxonMobil, TotalEnergies, and Eni has expanded to Switzerland. According to Bloomberg, PSA LLP, representing Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, has launched proceedings aimed at strengthening the country’s position in ongoing international arbitration. Astana is seeking roughly $15 million plus interest from several companies and individuals accused of corruption in projects managed by subsidiaries of Italy’s Eni. The Swiss case centers on evidence already presented in courts in the U.S. and Italy, which Kazakhstan aims to use to prove allegations of bribery in arbitration hearings. Documents submitted by Kazakhstan to a U.S. court claim that contractors providing services to Eni implemented an “illegal scheme” to secure inflated contracts. One such contract was allegedly amended eleven times, with its value rising from $88 million to more than $490 million. While several contractors were convicted by an Italian court in 2017, no Eni employees were found guilty. Kazakh journalist Oleg Chervinsky, known for his coverage of the oil and gas sector, has highlighted that Kazakhstan is requesting the Swiss court to look into Maksat Idenov, a former first vice president of KazMunayGas, who led negotiations with Kashagan project partners between 2007 and 2008. Chervinsky recalls a dramatic episode in 2010, when Idenov resigned from KazMunayGas via a letter sent from abroad using DHL. He subsequently took a senior role at Eni. A U.S. court has approved his questioning for use in the Swiss proceedings, and his representative says he has already testified. “New revelations await us!” Chervinsky asserted. That confidence may be justified. A glance at Idenov’s career reveals his central role in Kazakhstan’s energy sector since 1992, when he began as chief legal counsel at the state holding MunaiGas. In 1993, he became assistant to the Minister of Oil and Gas Industry, and by 1995, he was serving as deputy head of the Energy Department for Europe and Central Asia at the International Bank for Reconstruction in Washington, D.C. He returned to Kazakhstan in 1999 as an advisor to then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev on Caspian energy and oil and gas export pipelines. In that role, he worked on the legal status of the Caspian Sea and other strategic projects. Idenov joined Shell in 2004 as regional vice president for strategic and commercial development in the Middle East, South Asia, and the Caspian region. In 2007, he became the first vice president of KazMunayGas. Three years later, in July 2010, he was appointed senior vice president for strategic planning at Eni. During his time at KazMunayGas, Idenov appeared in U.S. embassy cables later released by WikiLeaks. In one, he reportedly told the U.S. ambassador during a private dinner that the four most influential figures around President Nazarbayev were the Presidential Chief of Staff, Sarybay Kalmurzaev, Head of the Presidential Administration, Aslan Musin, State Secretary and Foreign Minister, Kanat Saudabayev, and the tandem of Prime Minister Karim Massimov and Nazarbayev’s son-in-law, billionaire Timur Kulibayev. Another cable described the rationale for Idenov’s appointment as lead negotiator on...

Oil and Gas

Kazakh Oil Service Providers Urge Government to Curb Chinese Dumping

The Oil and Gas Council of Kazakhstan (PetroCouncil) has appealed to Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov to address what it describes as unfair pricing practices by Chinese subcontractors in the oil and gas chemical industry. PetroCouncil, an association representing around 150 Kazakh oil service providers, engineering firms, and manufacturers, published an open letter to the prime minister on its Telegram channel. The letter highlights growing concern over the involvement of foreign companies, particularly from China, in major industrial and oil and gas chemical projects across Kazakhstan. “By offering services at prices up to 70% below market rates, they are effectively driving out domestic companies,” the council stated. “This creates risks of reduced Kazakhstani content, loss of tax revenue, job cuts, a decline in engineering expertise, and potential threats to quality and industrial safety.” PetroCouncil argues that the current situation demands systematic government intervention. The organization has proposed several measures aimed at restoring fair competition and supporting domestic industry players. Among its recommendations is a cap on price dumping in tenders, setting a minimum price threshold no more than 20% below the average market rate. The council also suggests strengthening the weight of the “Kazakh content” criterion when evaluating bids and introducing a “second-best price” principle, favoring local companies when cost differences with foreign bidders are minimal. Further proposals include stricter oversight of foreign worker permits, enhanced enforcement of labor laws, and the establishment of a national registry of domestic producers involved in oil and gas chemical projects. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Russian energy giant Lukoil has announced plans to divest its international assets in response to Western sanctions. Kazakh authorities are assessing potential implications for the projects in which Lukoil is currently involved within the country.

Gas Exports

The Power of Siberia 2 Project and Central Asia’s Gas Bargaining Power

The proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PoS-2) pipeline from Russia to China has re-entered the headlines on the strength of a new memorandum between Gazprom and CNPC. Russia calls the memorandum “legally binding,” but China has avoided the phrase, because the only thing that is legally binding is an agreement to negotiate. The memorandum affirms a design capacity up to 50 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y), a route via Mongolia, and a total trunk length of roughly 2,600 kilometers (km) on the Russian side before crossing Mongolian territory. Feasibility work has highlighted a 1,420-millimeter (56-inch) pipe diameter, and an indicative cost cited in some trade reporting near $13–14 billion. The political signaling is strong, but pricing terms remain unresolved. For Central Asia, the significance is immediate: even without a final sales contract, the expectation of future Russian volumes tightens China’s negotiating posture with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, the three states already connected to China by the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline (CAGP). Central Asia's Gas Supplies to China China’s westbound import corridor from Central Asia consists today of three parallel pipelines that together provide a nominal capacity of 55 bcm/y (Lines “A” and “B” at 15 bcm/y each, and Line “C” at 25 bcm/y). Construction of the first two lines began in 2008, with operations starting in 2009–2010; Line C entered service in 2014. Line D, planned at 30 bcm/y through Uzbekistan–Tajikistan–Kyrgyzstan to China, has been delayed for years; if completed, it would raise corridor capacity toward 85 bcm/y. Turkmenistan is the anchor supplier. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) estimates its deliveries to China at 32.9 bcm in 2022 (roughly 81% of the country’s gas exports that year), with long-term sales structured on formulas linked to the price of oil. Interfax reports that in the second quarter of 2025, the price for Turkmenistan’s gas fell below $290 per thousand cubic meters (mcm). This figure is consistent with oil-price linkage rather than hub-indexed European benchmarks. Recent industry and regional reporting puts Turkmenistan’s deliveries averaging approximately 35 bcm/y in the mid-2020s. Kazakhstan had committed to supply up to 10 bcm/y, but domestic constraints have kept actual flows lower. S&P Global cites 4.4 bcm in 2022 and 5.86 bcm in 2023, with winter interruptions to protect domestic consumers; of the 29.8 bcm of commercial gas produced in 2023, 19.4 bcm was consumed at home. Uzbekistan’s volumes have been more variable as Tashkent balances domestic demand, imports, and swap operations. Jamestown noted a fall in Uzbek gas export value to China from $1.07 billion in 2022 to $563.5 million in 2023, before a rebound in 2024 and 2025 according to Chinese customs-based press summaries. PoS-2’s Route, Mongolian Gatekeeping, and Central Asian Implications The geography of the route matters for Central Asia. On the Russian side, public summaries describe a corridor from Yamal via Urengoy through Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk, then across Buryatia toward Kyakhta near the Mongolian border. In Mongolia, official communications stress underground installation across the steppes and local economic benefits, but final...

U.S.-Turkmenistan Relations

Opinion: Gas, Geopolitics, and Realism: U.S.–Turkmenistan Talks Signal Shift

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Turkmen counterpart Rashid Meredov wrapped up bilateral consultations last week in Washington, DC. The encounter suggested a new awareness on Washington’s part of Turkmenistan’s pivotal geostrategic location in the heart of Central Asia and its status as a major hub of natural resources. Since becoming head of state in March 2022, Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov has shifted his country’s foreign policy from one of strategic isolation to what might be called practical realism, whereby priority is given to fair trade and investments that are in line with national interests and long-term development. Like the other Central Asian heads of state, Berdimuhamedov also champions a pragmatic, interest-based foreign policy. Consequently, they find the current, pragmatic U.S. administration with its concern to work out deals (presumably mutually beneficial ones) more congenial than its predecessor, with its penchant for geostrategic maneuvering and ideology. Secretary Rubio recently observed: “A mature foreign policy requires a balancing of interests - that’s a fact.” This way of thinking goes over well in smaller independent states such as Turkmenistan and other Central Asian countries, whose key national priorities include establishing their statehood on a firm basis and safeguarding their sovereignty amid the turbulent great power politics being played out in their vicinity. Oil and Gas Over the years, Berdimuhamedov has insisted that foreign entities seeking access to the country’s vast natural gas reserves must play by Ashgabat’s rules. Home to the world’s fourth-largest gas reserves, Turkmenistan invites foreign participation in its energy sector, provided that agreements are structured as win-win arrangements and don’t give suitors the geostrategic upper hand. In this context, it would make sense for Washington to get the word out about two upcoming conferences in Ashgabat: The Turkmenistan Investment Forum, September 18– 19, 2025, which will serve to attract long-term investment into the country's economy, and the 30th Oil & Gas of Turkmenistan – 2025 International Conference & EXPO (OGT 2025) on 22–24 October. Turkmenistan had a strong 2024 in terms of energy, producing 77.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 8.3 million tons of oil. The OGT 2025 will showcase the country’s resource potential and new investment opportunities, focusing on upstream projects such as the Galkynysh gas field and the Caspian blocks, as well as on initiatives in the areas of renewable energy, methane mitigation, and infrastructure modernization. Moreover, Ashgabat wants to expand its Trans-Caspian and north-south economic corridors and complete the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, among other initiatives in transport and logistics. U.S. companies may want to explore these new opportunities. Travel Limitations to the U.S. Ashgabat is working with the U.S. Department of State to lift recently imposed restrictions on Turkmen citizens wishing to travel to the U.S. Both sides are aiming to ensure that applicants are properly screened before a visa is granted and that recipients comply with its terms. To further deepen ties, Washington should view Turkmenistan’s neutrality towards others on the global stage in security and foreign-policy matters not as an obstacle, but as an advantage that facilitates dialogue. While maintaining its advocacy for democratic principles,...

U.S.-Turkmenistan Relations

U.S.–Turkmenistan Rapprochement: Energy, Neutrality, and Digital Geopolitics

For more than three decades, Turkmenistan has stood apart from its neighbors. Since declaring independence in 1991, it has built its foreign policy around “permanent neutrality,” a status formally recognized by the United Nations in 1995. Neutrality has meant avoiding military alliances, steering clear of regional blocs, and limiting international engagement to carefully managed bilateral relationships. Ashgabat has been especially cautious in its dealings with Washington, keeping contacts minimal while relying overwhelmingly on China to buy its natural gas. That posture is beginning to shift. In 2025, the outlines of a quiet rapprochement between Turkmenistan and the United States are visible. The latest round of Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABCs) in Washington, coupled with Ashgabat’s more active role in the C5+1 regional dialogue, suggests a gradual warming. On September 19, 2023, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov participated in the first C5+1 multilateral summit alongside the U.S. and regional counterparts, highlighting Ashgabat’s more active role in the platform. At the heart of this cautious opening are three themes: energy dependence, security on Turkmenistan’s southern border, and the geopolitics of digital connectivity. Annual Bilateral Consultations: A Structured Dialogue The ABCs were launched in 2010 as part of a U.S. initiative to formalize engagement with all five Central Asian states. They are yearly, structured meetings between senior officials that review the state of bilateral relations across political, economic, and security issues. In August 2025, Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov met Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington for the 11th ABC. According to the U.S. State Department release, the two sides “underscored their commitment to advancing U.S.-Turkmenistan relations, including through security cooperation, increased economic and investment opportunities, the advancement of religious freedom, and deepening engagement through the C5+1 diplomatic platform.” The statement was deliberately brief and omitted sensitive matters such as the partial visa restrictions Washington imposed on Turkmen citizens earlier that year. But the very fact of the meeting, following years of minimal contact, marked a notable warming. From Episodic Contacts to Broader Cooperation The rapprochement has begun to take shape in concrete ways. Trade between the two countries, though still small, nearly doubled in 2024 to reach $218.5 million. Turkmenistan exported textiles, chemicals, and gas-related equipment, while U.S. exports included aviation technology, electronics, and agricultural machinery. Overall, the trade volume remained the second-lowest among Central Asian states, but the sharp increase pointed to a deliberate effort to expand ties. Reflecting this momentum, on June 8, 2025, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov met with the Executive Director of the Turkmenistan–U.S. Business Council, Eric Stewart, to discuss cooperation across sectors, including energy, cybersecurity, green technology, and education. Security cooperation has grown more visible. Turkmenistan’s long border with Afghanistan has long been a vulnerability, and while Ashgabat avoided involvement in the U.S.-led war, it quietly welcomed assistance to reinforce border defenses and counter trafficking. The U.S. has provided equipment, training, and support for Turkmen border services, a low-profile effort documented in a Congressional Research Service report. Turkmenistan has invested over a billion dollars in Afghan infrastructure projects...

Kashagan

Kazakhstan Presses Oil Giants as Kashagan Revenues Face Scrutiny

The media in Kazakhstan is once again debating the revision of production sharing agreements (PSAs) with foreign companies in the country’s major oil consortia. PSA LLP, the state-owned operator authorized by the Ministry of Energy to represent Kazakhstan’s interests in the North Caspian Production Sharing Agreement, has released new data on revenues from the Kashagan field, information expected to reignite calls to amend agreements with major Western oil producers in Kazakhstan’s favor. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has publicly backed the discussion. In January, he instructed the government to intensify negotiations with foreign investors. "The implementation of production-sharing agreements for large fields has allowed Kazakhstan to become a reliable supplier of energy to the global market. These projects have made a great contribution to the country’s socio-economic development. However, large investments require a long-term planning horizon. Therefore, the government must intensify negotiations on extending PSA contracts, possibly on revised terms that are more favorable for Kazakhstan,” Tokayev said at an expanded government meeting. The PSA company, headed by Tokayev’s nephew, Beket Izbastin, reported that in 2024, the Kashagan consortium’s total revenue from oil, gas, and sulfur sales exceeded $11 billion. Of this, 80% covered capital and operating costs (“Cost Oil”), while only 20% came from “Profit Oil,” amounting to $2.2 billion. Kazakhstan’s share was 10%, or $220 million. Including the $430 million in taxes paid by the operator, NCOC, the country’s total revenue was $650 million. “With revenues of $11 billion, the republic’s share, including taxes, was only 6%, the lowest among oil companies not only in Kazakhstan but globally,” PSA said. Under the current terms, Kazakhstan’s share of Profit Oil will not increase until three billion barrels have been extracted from Kashagan. Only the first billion has been produced over the past decade. Shareholders are expected to begin paying a 30% income tax soon; KazMunayGas has already transferred an initial $45 million payment from the Kashagan profits. The fairness of this revenue distribution is now a central point of debate. Some observers believe the renewed focus ahead of the next parliamentary session could signal that Tokayev will again raise the issue in his annual address, alongside agreements for Karachaganak and Tengiz, the other pillars of Kazakhstan’s oil sector. Tengiz operates under a contract expiring in 2033, earlier than Karachaganak (2037) and Kashagan (2041). At his press conference in Astana last month, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov confirmed that negotiations with major oil companies had only just begun. “Indeed, there is a view that the country’s interests are significantly infringed upon. We are starting negotiations with our consortium partners to conclude new PSAs for a new period. This will be done in a measured and balanced manner, without sudden moves, while defending the national interests of our country,” Bektenov stated. The question of what exactly constitutes “national interests” remains open. In February, Mazhilis deputy Edil Zhanbirshin linked the issue to Kazakhstan’s dependence on imported fuel. Despite the $3.7 billion spent on modernizing the country’s three oil refineries, annual processing volumes remain below 18...