opinion - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 57

SCO Summit

Opinion: Victory Day Parade Puts China’s Military Might and Alliances on Full Display

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit coincided with China’s lavish commemorations of the "80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the broader World Anti-Fascist War." The culminating moment, a grand military parade, was followed by a formal reception hosted by President Xi Jinping for visiting foreign dignitaries. All five Central Asian heads of state attended the parade. As the summit concluded, Xi seized the opportunity to issue a pointed warning to the West, particularly the United States and President Donald Trump, who had made it clear that he was closely following events in Tianjin and Beijing. In a post on Truth Social, Trump wrote, "Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un as you conspire against the United States of America." Kim Jong Un’s high-profile visit to Beijing, including a prolonged meeting with Putin, signaled the emergence of a visible military alignment between North Korea and Russia. This visit served as a strategic complement to China's Victory Day display of military might. [caption id="attachment_35739" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: president.uz[/caption] For the first time, China publicly exhibited components of its strategic nuclear triad: the air-launched Jinglei1 missile, submarine-launched Julang3, and land-based ICBMs such as the Dongfeng61 and Dongfeng31 (and reportedly the DF5C). Analysts saw this as a deliberate signal to the U.S., regional powers like India and Russia, and potential international arms buyers, positioning China as a formidable strategic actor. Also on display were China’s anti-drone “triad”, missile-gun systems, high-energy lasers, and high-power microwave weapons, highlighting advances in counter-drone technology. Additionally, the parade showcased hypersonic and cruise missiles, unmanned aerial and underwater systems, and even robotic dog units, demonstrating China’s futuristic military capabilities. While noting the parade's impressive visuals, analysts cautioned that the true readiness of many showcased systems, for example, torpedo drones or laser weapons, remains uncertain. [caption id="attachment_35741" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: president.uz[/caption] Diplomatically, the summit also reinforced Sino-Russian ties. Putin, who described relations with China as “unprecedentedly” close, and Xi signed over 20 bilateral agreements, including a major energy deal, Power of Siberia 2, a gas pipeline delivering 50 billion cubic metres annually to China via Mongolia. Meanwhile, China announced a trial visa-free entry policy for ordinary Russian passport holders, effective from September 15, 2025, to September 14, 2026, allowing visits up to 30 days for tourism, business, or family purposes. Together, the military spectacle and deepening diplomatic and people-to-people ties affirm Xi’s confidence as he prepares for crucial negotiations with President Trump, an unmistakable projection of strength and strategic resolve.

SCO Summit

Opinion: China’s Diplomatic Power Play Unfolds in Tianjin

On August 31, the next SCO Plus summit will begin in the Chinese city of Tianjin and run through to September 1. Judging by the list of participants, China, under Chairman Xi Jinping, is positioning itself to challenge the United States for influence over the global geopolitical agenda. As part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, Xi will host a formal banquet for the attending heads of state, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Xi is also scheduled to chair the 25th meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State and lead the expanded SCO Plus session - the largest since the establishment of the organization - where he will deliver a keynote address. Clues to the themes of Xi’s speech can be found in the diverse array of leaders expected to attend. Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Bin confirmed at a Beijing press conference that among the SCO member states, participants will include Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Several leaders from non-member states will also join, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh; Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev; Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto; and Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, whose participation suggests Ashgabat’s cautious but growing interest in regional dialogue. Also in attendance will be the prime ministers of Armenia (Nikol Pashinyan), Cambodia (Hun Manet), Nepal (Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli), Egypt (Mostafa Madbouly), Malaysia (Anwar Ibrahim), and Vietnam (Pham Minh Chinh). The summit will also host key international institutional leaders, including UN Secretary-General António Guterres; SCO Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev; CIS Secretary-General Sergey Lebedev; ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn; CSTO Secretary-General Imangali Tasmagambetov; EAEU Chairman Bakytzhan Sagintayev; and AIIB President Zhou Ji. Kazakhstan will be prominently represented. In addition to President Tokayev, three high-profile Kazakhs mentioned above - Yermekbayev, Tasmagambetov, and Sagintayev - will attend in their capacities as heads of international organizations. Their presence signals Astana’s growing diplomatic weight and reflects the strategic outreach led by Tokayev, himself a former UN Deputy Secretary-General. This background likely contributes to the rapport between Kazakhstan and Guterres. The summit will also inevitably draw attention due to the presence of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders, figures central to the ongoing realignment in the South Caucasus. Both Baku and Yerevan have increasingly distanced themselves from Moscow, favoring closer ties with Turkey and the United States. The recent peace agreement between Aliyev and Pashinyan, signed in the presence of President Trump, underscored the growing American role in the region and the diminishing influence of Russia. While Moscow appears willing to tolerate this shift, Tehran views it with deep concern, especially after its recent 12-day conflict with Israel. Russia, for its part, seems to be signaling disengagement from the region. Its silence in response to Baku and Yerevan’s Western overtures suggests strategic apathy, if not withdrawal. Beijing, of course, is...

opinion

“Where a Russian Soldier Treads, That’s Ours”: Kazakhstan in the Crosshairs of Putin’s Neo-Imperial Playbook

In June 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a chilling declaration at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum: ‘There’s an old rule – wherever a Russian soldier sets foot, that’s ours.’ Far from a metaphor, this line encapsulated the Kremlin’s evolving foreign policy doctrine. It is a doctrine where military occupation becomes territorial acquisition, and where presence becomes ownership. But this ideology did not appear overnight. It has been systematically constructed through years of rhetorical groundwork, beginning with Putin's 2014 remark at the Seliger Youth Forum: ‘Nursultan Nazarbayev created a state on territory where there had never been a state. The Kazakhs never had statehood.’ In 2021, speaking at a Moscow press conference, Putin went further, describing Kazakhstan as ‘a Russian-speaking country in the full sense of the word.’ These comments expose a geopolitical logic that fuses cultural affinity, historical denial, and military dominance. They form the pillars of what scholars like Marlene Laruelle and Timothy Snyder describe as Russia’s ‘narrative imperialism’: the use of historical revisionism and linguistic hegemony to delegitimize the sovereignty of neighboring states. Nowhere is this doctrine more clearly manifest than in the cases of Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In Ukraine, the justification for annexing Crimea in 2014 and launching a full-scale invasion in 2022 relied heavily on the protection of Russian-speaking populations and claims of historical unity. In Kazakhstan, the groundwork is rhetorical – but eerily similar. In 2014, Putin reversed Nikita Khrushchev’s legacy by annexing Crimea, which Khrushchev had transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. At the same time, Kremlin-aligned voices began revisiting Khrushchev’s failed plan to remove five northern regions of Kazakhstan to form Russian 'Virgin Lands'. This was not a mere administrative reform: the plan involved transferring the fertile, Slavic-populated regions of Akmolinsk, Kostanay, Pavlodar, North Kazakhstan, and East Kazakhstan regions from the Kazakh SSR to the Russian SFSR. The objective was both economic and political -- to consolidate agricultural output under Moscow's direct jurisdiction and reduce the autonomy of the Kazakh republic by undermining its territorial coherence and ethnic composition. These areas were the backbone of Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands Campaign and held great strategic value. The proposal sparked resistance from within the Kazakh leadership, most notably from Premier Zhumabek Tashenov, who openly opposed the Kremlin's intentions. As a result of his opposition, he was dismissed from his position, but he succeeded in preserving Kazakh territorial integrity. These northern regions, like Crimea, are demographically significant: they are home to a large ethnic Russian population, many of whom speak only Russian, consume Russian media, and express nostalgia for Soviet-era unity. Cities like Petropavlovsk, where Russians still outnumber Kazakhs, mirror the pre-2014 situation in Donetsk and Luhansk. In 2023, a group calling itself the ‘People’s Council of Workers’ in Petropavlovsk released a video declaring independence based on the 1937 Constitution of the Kazakh SSR. Prosecuted for inciting separatism, they nonetheless reflected growing latent support for Russian intervention. Even earlier, in 2014, Russian ultra-nationalist Eduard Limonov made headlines by urging Russia to annex Northern Kazakhstan during...

opinion

The Rise of Regionalism in Central Asia: From Divisions to Dialogue

In recent years, Central Asia has undergone a remarkable transformation — from a region historically marked by political divisions and competing national interests, to one increasingly characterised by cooperation and dialogue. Today, Central Asian countries are exploring the idea of strategic autonomy and greater regional solidarity, not as an abstract ambition, but as a practical response to the shared challenges and opportunities they have. A key institutional vehicle for this evolving cooperation is the Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders. Unlike formal international summits, this forum allows for open and informal dialogue between heads of state. It is valued precisely because it enables leaders to discuss sensitive regional matters candidly, without the constraints of protocol. The momentum for regional cooperation is clearly growing, and this forum has become a symbol of Central Asia’s desire to take its future into its own hands. Beyond this, the countries of Central Asia cooperate through platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Organisation of Turkic States, both of which offer multilateral mechanisms for addressing regional security, economic integration, and cultural exchange. Importantly, what was once a region of competing national agendas is now evolving into a space of shared strategic vision, including coordinated positions in international forums such as the United Nations. Additionally, in recent years, the foreign policies of Central Asian countries have demonstrated more and more coordination and regional alignment, especially in their engagement with external partners. This shift is reflected in the emergence of multilateral dialogue formats between Central Asia and key global actors. Notably, the European Union–Central Asia Summit, most recently held in Samarkand in 2025, underlined a shared commitment to regional connectivity, sustainable development, and mutual security. Similar formats have been institutionalised with other global players, such as the C5+1 format with the United States, focusing on green transition, economic reforms, and regional security. Germany has also advanced a Central Asia–Germany high-level dialogue, including the “Berlin Initiative,” aimed at promoting green energy, vocational training, and the rule of law. Meanwhile, Italy has launched its Central Asia + Italy format as part of its strategy to diversify partnerships in Eurasia and promote economic diplomacy. These platforms reflect a common approach, where Central Asian countries are increasingly choosing to engage as a bloc, rather than solely through bilateral channels. This enhances their negotiating capacity, visibility, and strategic coherence on the global stage. While each country maintains its sovereignty and specific foreign policy priorities, there is a growing recognition that regional solidarity amplifies voices and leverage in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape. This shift aligns with the broader regional identity-building efforts under the Consultative Meetings of Central Asian Leaders, and reflects a pragmatic understanding that shared challenges — such as water management, climate adaptation, and migration — are better addressed collectively and in concert with international partners. Common regional challenges also drive this growing convergence. Climate change, water scarcity, and labor migration are issues that transcend borders. One of the most pressing concerns is the region’s vulnerability due to...

Caspian Sea

Opinion: A Sea of Discord? Intensifying Military Drills Threaten Stability in the Caspian Region

On Monday, Russia and Iran launched joint military exercises in the Caspian Sea under the banner “Together for a Safe and Secure Caspian Sea.” Officially, the drills aim to enhance maritime security and naval cooperation between the two countries and are being coordinated by Iran’s Northern Fleet. While such exercises might once have passed without much notice, their timing and frequency reflect a shifting dynamic: the Caspian region is rapidly emerging as a potential hotspot in global geopolitics. Just one month prior, the same waters hosted joint military exercises between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, held in Aktau, western Kazakhstan. These were followed by the “Tarlan-2025” air and tactical drills in Azerbaijan from July 8-10, which focused on enhancing UAV operations and military coordination. Baku’s strategic alliance with Ankara is a key factor here. Azerbaijan, a close Turkish partner, is now engaged in a more strained relationship with Russia. Moscow’s muted reaction to this cooling suggests an awareness that Ankara is increasingly shaping a Turkic military-political bloc, an emerging force in a region of strategic importance to both Russia and China. Earlier this month, Turkey launched its annual Anadolu-2025 special forces exercises. Participants included troops from 33 nations, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and others but notably excluded Russia. For the first time, in 2024, military exercises were held in the Caspian without Russian involvement. The Birleistik (Unity) 2024 drills were conducted at Kazakhstan’s Oymasha training ground and Cape Tokmak along the Caspian coast. Troops from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan rehearsed scenarios including conflict zone identification, night maritime operations, and amphibious landings. Previously, regional military cooperation had been limited to bilateral engagements, such as the 2023 UZAZ exercises (Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan), Kanzhar-2023 (Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan), and Hazri-2023 (Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan). The spike in joint drills during 2024-2025 underscores growing rivalries between regional and global powers. These operations are not mere formalities but reveal emerging security alignments and geopolitical signals. Three distinct blocs appear to be coalescing in the Caspian, with implications for Central Asia as well. The first bloc includes Russia, Iran, and China. These nations have held annual “Maritime Security Belt” exercises since 2019, with the most recent in March 2025 off the Iranian coast. The second bloc comprises Turkey, Azerbaijan, and members of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Defense ties among these countries are becoming a core element of OTS cooperation. At the 10th OTS Summit in Astana in 2023, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized defense as the main guarantor of member state security, citing ongoing regional conflicts and violations of international law. The third bloc, more pragmatic and focused, is the Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan partnership. These countries are cooperating on the basis of the 2018 Caspian Convention to secure maritime communications. Azerbaijan contributes military expertise, particularly in UAV and drone warfare developed during the Karabakh conflicts. Kazakhstan brings diplomatic credibility and promotes regional governance and connectivity, offering a stabilizing complement to Azerbaijan’s military strengths. In sum, the Caspian Sea, once colloquially referred to as “Russia’s lake”, is steadily losing that identity. It is transforming into...

Nuclear power

Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Diplomacy – With China Set to Build Second, Who Will Construct Third Nuclear Power Plant?

Kazakhstan’s famed hospitality, long enshrined in its national proverbs, has also become a guiding principle in its foreign policy. One recent example is the Kazakh government’s diplomatic maneuvering in the selection of partners for its nuclear power program. Leader of the Race Initially, Kazakhstan planned to build a single nuclear power plant by 2035 to address potential electricity shortages. However, following the October 6, 2024, referendum, where 71.12% of voters approved a plant in the Almaty Region, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev instructed the government to explore the construction of at least two additional facilities. This directive, as it turns out, was both timely and strategic. In March 2025, the newly formed Atomic Energy Agency, reporting directly to the president, was tasked with overseeing the selection of international consortium leaders. On June 14, the agency announced that Russia’s state-owned Rosatom would lead the consortium to build Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant. Rosatom CEO Alexey Likhachev welcomed the decision, stating that the VVER-1200 Generation 3+ reactors, already operating in Russia and Belarus and selected by partners in Hungary, Egypt, Turkey, Bangladesh, and China, would be used. These reactors, he emphasized, meet international safety standards and integrate both active and passive safety systems. Tricks Up Their Sleeves Behind the scenes, the selection process revealed a quiet tug-of-war between Chinese and Russian interests. Ultimately, Rosatom prevailed, thanks, in part, to two strategic moves. First, Rosatom’s supporters enlisted Assystem, an ostensibly independent nuclear engineering consultancy, to assist Kazakhstan Atomic Power Plants LLP in the evaluation process. The firm’s analysis favored Rosatom. Second, to pre-empt concerns about Western sanctions, the Kazakh authorities emphasized that Kazakhstan would be the sole owner and operator of the facility. Atomic Energy Agency head Almasadam Satkaliev stated that Kazakhstan would control the entire production cycle from uranium mining to fuel processing and plant maintenance, thereby limiting direct Russian involvement post-construction. This arrangement may allow the creation of a Kazakh legal entity immune to Western sanctions, as it would be wholly state-owned. Whether this could offer Rosatom a loophole for acquiring restricted components remains an open question but one that few may press given the global interest in nuclear safety. Another Contender Emerges Just hours after Rosatom’s contract was announced, Satkaliev made a second, equally strategic statement: China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) would lead the construction of Kazakhstan’s second nuclear power plant. Satkaliev cited CNNC’s “strongest proposals” and revealed plans for a broader agreement on nuclear cooperation with China. “Objectively, few countries can master the entire nuclear cycle. China is one of them,” Satkaliev noted. Back in February, prior to the agency’s creation, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, then also led by Satkaliev, had identified Kurchatov and Aktau as potential sites for future nuclear facilities. Kurchatov lies near the former Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, while Aktau once hosted the Soviet-era BN-350 fast neutron reactor. The timing of Satkaliev’s announcement is no coincidence. Chinese President Xi Jinping is scheduled to visit Kazakhstan on June 16 for the second China-Central Asia Summit. For a nation that...