opinion - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 35

Hungary

Hungary’s Political Shift Puts Central Asia Partnerships Under Scrutiny

Hungary’s political transition following the defeat of Viktor Orbán’s party and his resignation as prime minister is drawing attention not only in the EU and the United States, but also in Central Asia, where Budapest has built growing energy and investment ties. The key question is whether the policy of cooperation with Central Asia developed under Orbán will continue under the new leadership. In recent years, under Orbán, Budapest has actively developed its Central Asian foreign policy, primarily driven by the desire to find alternatives to Russian energy supplies. That push reflects Hungary’s long-standing reliance on Russian oil and gas, which has shaped its search for alternative suppliers beyond Europe. Resource-rich Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan became natural partners for diplomatic engagement. Orbán succeeded in building trust-based relationships with the presidents of the Central Asian republics, grounded in what Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó, described as “sincere friendship” in an interview with Uzbek media. “In Hungary, we have always viewed Central Asia as one of the fastest-growing regions in the world, with enormous potential. Our efforts to build these relations did not begin today, but decades ago,” he said. Hungary became the first Central European country to sign a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan in 2014. Currently, the Kazakhstan-Hungary Business Council is in operation, along with a joint agricultural direct investment fund. In 2024, bilateral trade approached $200 million, and from January to August 2025, it grew by another 22.1%, exceeding $164.6 million. Hungarian investments in Kazakhstan’s economy have surpassed $370 million, while the current investment portfolio includes 16 projects worth about $700 million in engineering, agriculture, and logistics. These links also intersect with wider efforts to expand east–west transport routes through the Caspian region, offering Hungary indirect access to Central Asian energy and trade flows. In May 2025, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held talks with Orbán in Budapest, where both sides highlighted rising trade volumes and a joint investment portfolio of about $500 million. Hungary’s OTP Bank entered into Uzbekistan’s financial market in 2023, acquiring a 73.71% stake in Ipoteka Bank, becoming its principal owner and the majority shareholder of the country’s fifth-largest bank. As early as 2019, Hungary had intensified cooperation with Turkmenistan. After talks at the Turkmen Foreign Ministry, Szijjártó told the media that Hungary views Turkmenistan as an important country from the perspective of European security. “We very much hope that Turkmenistan’s gas resources will be integrated into the overall energy flow of Central Europe,” he said. However, uncertainty remains over whether this policy direction will continue under Orbán’s successor, Péter Magyar. Oil and gas analyst Oleg Chervinsky has suggested that political changes in Hungary could affect cooperation with Kazakhstan’s national company KazMunayGas (KMG). Chervinsky notes that, having secured a constitutional majority in parliament, Magyar has a mandate to “implement reforms in both foreign and domestic policy [which could] reshape the constitutional structure of the right-wing populist authoritarian system built around Orbán.” The analyst points to Hungary’s oil and gas company MOL Group, which in recent...

Syria

Syria After Assad: What the New Regional Order Means for Central Asia

The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 fundamentally reshaped Syria’s regional position. The collapse of the old power structure weakened Iran’s entrenched military and economic networks and left Russia’s previously secured foothold uncertain. As Damascus enters a new political phase, external actors are recalibrating their strategies in a landscape that looks markedly different from that of the past decade. For Central Asian governments, the shift is not merely regional. Syria is becoming a testing ground for how mid-sized states navigate post-conflict environments shaped by larger powers, and a potential arena for economic and diplomatic outreach. As influence is redistributed and new investment and trade corridors are reconsidered, decisions taken in Damascus will increasingly intersect with Central Asia’s own foreign policy and economic calculations. In this emerging landscape, a power vacuum is being filled by states seeking to advance their interests. From the earliest days of Syria’s post-Assad transition, Turkey has been particularly active. As part of its declared comprehensive support for the new Syrian authorities, Ankara has taken steps to consolidate its position in the Syrian Arab Republic. Turkey is actively participating in infrastructure reconstruction, investing in economic projects, and expanding military-technical cooperation with Damascus. In August 2025, Syria and Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement covering areas including counterterrorism training, cybersecurity, demining, military engineering, logistics, and enhanced coordination between their armed forces. That same month, the two sides agreed to establish an intergovernmental business council under the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board to promote trade and investment cooperation between public and private companies. Turkish exports to Syria reached $3 billion in 2025, reflecting the rapid expansion of Ankara’s economic presence. For Central Asia, Ankara’s activism carries particular weight. Turkey has simultaneously deepened its political, economic, and security cooperation across the Turkic world, meaning its posture in Syria intersects with its broader regional strategy. A central element of Turkey’s Syria policy remains the issue of refugee returns. However, the prospect of large-scale repatriation is complicated by several factors, notably the long-term presence of around 2.5 million Syrian displaced persons in Turkish society and the absence of stable socio-economic conditions in Syria to support reintegration. Over more than a decade of conflict, a generation of Syrians has grown up in Turkey, many of whom are deeply embedded in the country’s social and economic life. Turkey’s obligations under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, including the principle of non-refoulement, further constrain policy options. Taken together, these factors make large-scale return unlikely until Syria achieves sustained political stabilization and adequate living conditions. In the longer term, Turkey’s objective of neutralizing what it describes as the Kurdish threat emanating from Syrian territory will continue to shape its strategy. Israel has also intensified its military and political engagement since the change of power in Damascus. It has taken steps to establish control over areas adjacent to the Golan Heights and to create a buffer zone, arguing that such measures are necessary to safeguard national security against potential terrorist threats. Israeli officials...

Board of Peace

Opinion – The “Board of Peace” and Afghan Diplomacy: A View from Kabul

A new trend is becoming increasingly apparent in global politics: key decisions are being discussed not only within traditional international institutions but also through more flexible political and diplomatic formats. One such initiative is the announcement of the creation of the “Board of Peace” by U.S. President Donald Trump, a structure that, according to its authors, is intended to provide an alternative mechanism for conflict resolution. Reactions have been mixed. Some states view the new platform as an opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of peace efforts; others warn that it could weaken existing institutions, particularly the United Nations, and contribute to a gradual shift toward closed political groupings in which participants' strategic interests outweigh universal rules. At its core, this debate reflects the possibility of a deeper transformation of the international order. Whereas global security architecture was once built primarily around multilateral mechanisms, flexible coalitions and ad hoc alliances are becoming more prominent. In such a system, the role of states capable not only of adapting to change but also of offering independent diplomatic initiatives is growing. It is in this context that Afghanistan is increasingly asking what role it can occupy in a new international configuration. One of the key questions raised in Kabul’s expert community is straightforward: Will the current Afghan authorities be considered in emerging international mechanisms, including the Board of Peace? There is no clear answer. Despite ongoing global discussions on security and economic cooperation, concrete decisions regarding Afghanistan remain limited. Frozen financial assets, sanctions, and uncertainty over the country’s international status continue to impede economic recovery and complicate integration into regional processes. Against this backdrop, Afghan experts argue that the country should avoid remaining on the periphery of the evolving order and instead seek integration through sustained diplomatic engagement and regional cooperation. Central Asia could play a particularly significant role in this process. The states of the region are potentially capable of mediating to reduce tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan and of facilitating the resolution of a conflict that directly affects broader regional security. Such a role appears logical for several reasons. Many Central Asian countries traditionally pursue pragmatic foreign policies, maintaining working relations with multiple centers of power while avoiding rigid geopolitical alignments. This approach has gradually shaped their reputation as relatively neutral and predictable partners. The element of self-interest is equally important. Stability to the south is directly linked to border security, the development of transport corridors, energy projects, and trade. In this context, mediation is not merely a diplomatic gesture but an element of a long-term regional strategy. Moreover, neutrality may prove to be Central Asia’s principal political asset. The region is not generally perceived as a direct party to the conflict and is therefore potentially well placed to offer a platform for dialogue. At the same time, assuming such a role would require readiness to accept greater responsibility. Effective mediation presupposes regional coordination, institutional maturity, and the political will to engage more actively in security matters. The emergence of initiatives such...

Afghanistan

Opinion: Afghanistan and Central Asia – Security Without Illusions

Over the past year, Afghanistan has become neither markedly more stable nor dramatically more dangerous, despite how it is often portrayed in public discourse. There has been neither the collapse that many feared, nor the breakthrough that some had hoped for. Instead, a relatively unchanged but fragile status quo has persisted, one that Central Asian countries confront daily. For the C5 countries, Afghanistan is increasingly less a topic of speculative discussion and more a persistent factor in their immediate reality. It is no longer just an object of foreign policy, but a constant variable impacting security, trade, humanitarian issues, and regional stability. As such, many of last year’s forecasts have become outdated, based as they were on assumptions of dramatic change, whereas the reality has proven far more inertial. Illusion #1: Afghanistan Can Be Ignored The belief that Afghanistan can be temporarily “put on the back burner” is rooted in the assumption that a lack of public dialogue or political statements equates to a lack of interaction. But the actions of Central Asian states show that ignoring Afghanistan is not a viable option, even when countries intentionally avoid politicizing relations. Turkmenistan offers a clear example. Ashgabat has maintained stable trade, economic, and infrastructure ties with Afghanistan for years, all with minimal foreign policy rhetoric. Energy supplies, cross-border trade, and logistical cooperation have continued despite political and financial constraints, and regardless of international debates over the legitimacy of the Afghan authorities. This quiet pragmatism stands in contrast to both isolationist strategies and symbolic or ideological engagement. Turkmenistan may avoid making public declarations about its relationship with Afghanistan, but it nonetheless maintains robust cooperation. This calculated calmness reduces risks without signaling disengagement. Importantly, this approach does not eliminate structural asymmetries or deeper vulnerabilities. But it dispels the illusion that distancing reduces risk. On the contrary, sustained economic and logistical ties foster predictability, without which attempts to “ignore” a neighboring country become a form of strategic blindness. In this sense, Turkmenistan’s experience affirms a broader regional truth: Afghanistan cannot be removed from Central Asia’s geopolitical equation by simply looking away. It must be engaged pragmatically or dealt with later, in potentially more destabilizing forms. Illusion #2: Security Is Achieved Through Isolation Closely related to the first is the illusion that security can be ensured by building walls. Security in Afghanistan, and in the broader Afghan-Pakistani zone, is often seen as an external issue, something that can be kept out by sealing borders or minimizing engagement. Yet in practice, security is determined less by geography and more by the nature of involvement. This is reflected in the recent decision by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to participate in U.S. President Donald Trump's “Board of Peace” initiative. While the initiative focuses on resolving crises outside Central Asia, both countries have framed their participation as essential to their own national and regional security interests. As Abdulaziz Kamilov, advisor to the President of Uzbekistan, explained, Tashkent’s involvement stems from three factors: its own security needs, its foreign policy principles,...

Iran protests

Iran Protests and Regional Stability: An Afghan Perspective

The protests that spread across Iran in late 2025 and early 2026 reflected more than short-term public discontent, instead exposing the cumulative effects of a prolonged socio-economic crisis. Persistently high inflation, declining real incomes, and falling living standards have placed sustained pressure on households and weakened the social contract between the state and society. Against this backdrop, the unrest increasingly acquired a foreign policy dimension. Strong statements from U.S. officials warning of consequences in response to Iran’s handling of the protests, combined with Tehran’s rejection of what it described as external interference, heightened the risk of the crisis becoming internationalized. Thus, the protests in Iran ceased to be an exclusively domestic issue and became a factor of regional instability. A key feature of the current situation is that the Iranian crisis is developing simultaneously on three fronts: socio-economic, where protests are fueled by deteriorating living conditions; political, linked to a crisis of confidence and governability; and geopolitical, where internal processes are used by external actors as a tool of pressure. Consequences for Afghanistan For Afghanistan, developments in Iran carry direct and practical significance. Since late 2024, Iran has become a source of large-scale returns of Afghan migrants, both voluntary and forced. By 2025, this process had become systematic, placing a heavy burden on Afghanistan’s western provinces, particularly Herat. In the event of prolonged instability and a deepening economic crisis in Iran, the likelihood of additional waves of migrant returns would increase. This would place further strain on Afghanistan’s labor market, healthcare system, social infrastructure, and already limited economic resources. In a fragile economy, the return of large numbers of migrants intensifies competition for jobs and raises the risk of local social tensions. The trade and logistics dimension is equally significant. Iran remains Afghanistan’s key economic partner and a vital transit corridor, including through the Islam Qala border crossing. Any deterioration in Iran’s socio-economic conditions has a direct impact on trade flows, supply chains, and broader regional economic stability. Significance for Central Asia The ongoing protest movements and the deterioration of the situation in Iran, driven by a systemic economic crisis and growing political and social discontent, could have a significant impact on political and economic dynamics, as well as security, across Central Asia. On the one hand, governments in the region are responding with cautious concern, mindful of the potential spillover effects of instability and rising internal discontent. A prolonged crisis in Iran increases the risks of migration pressure, border instability, and cross-border threats, all of which directly affect regional security. On the other hand, a further deterioration of Iran’s internal situation could disrupt trade, transit, and energy ties with Central Asia, weakening Tehran’s regional influence and reshaping the balance of power. Under such conditions, the role of other regional and external actors, including Russia, China, Turkey, and Western countries, is likely to grow as they gain opportunities to strengthen their positions in the region. As a result, the crisis in Iran is evolving beyond a domestic challenge and is...

Venezuela

Opinion: Central Asia and the Venezuelan Crisis

For Central Asian countries, the central challenge in international politics is no longer choosing alliances, but coping with external shocks and global turbulence that originate far beyond the region. The unfolding crisis in Venezuela is a case in point. At first glance, the situation concerns Latin America and the global oil market, but its implications extend well beyond, directly affecting Central Asia’s strategic interests. The core issue is not oil per se, but the reemergence of force as a legitimate instrument for altering political and economic conditions. For a region positioned at the crossroads of major power interests and reliant on external stability, this shift is profoundly consequential. The Venezuelan crisis should be understood as a precedent, one that signals how global power centers may act as established norms erode. For Central Asia, this heralds a more unpredictable international environment in which regional states must navigate competing interests without the benefit of stable rules. While Venezuela is often reduced to an oil story, the broader economic stakes involve control over the architecture of strategic resource flows. This resonates with the situation in the C5, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, where resources such as oil, gas, uranium, and rare earth metals are also of significant external interest. The logistics and transit of these resources are increasingly entangled in geopolitical bargaining. The Venezuelan example reinforces a growing trend: the nexus of economics and security is tightening, and access to resources is increasingly secured through political leverage. In this context, Iran holds particular relevance. For Central Asia, Iran is not an abstraction; it represents transit routes, energy corridors, access to southern seas, and a component of regional balance. Heightened pressure on Tehran directly affects both the opportunities and risks facing the region. When viewed through the lens of Iran, developments in Venezuela serve as a psychological and political precedent, broadening what appears acceptable within Washington’s strategic calculus. While a direct replication of the Venezuelan scenario in Iran is unlikely, given the vastly different military, political, and regional risks, the mere lowering of the threshold for force-based solutions is significant. The cost of direct confrontation with Iran would be far higher, with potential repercussions for the entire Middle East security architecture. Operation Absolute Resolve has objectively increased the confidence of those who favor the use of force against Iran. This confidence is likely to grow if United States actions in Venezuela carry minimal international consequences, avoid triggering uncontrollable regional escalation, and are perceived as domestically successful. In either case, Venezuela’s “success” has already lowered psychological barriers to coercion, strengthening arguments for hardline scenarios and re-legitimizing force as a policy tool, rather than a measure of last resort. Broadly speaking, the Venezuelan crisis highlights a global shift from rules to precedents. For the five, and increasingly for the emerging six that includes Azerbaijan, the fragmentation of international norms raises costs and leaves each country more vulnerable to external pressure. In this environment, coordination and consistency on issues such as transit, security, and sanctions are...