• KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
12 September 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 44

Opinion: Afghanistan and Central Asia – Security Without Illusions

Over the past year, Afghanistan has become neither markedly more stable nor dramatically more dangerous, despite how it is often portrayed in public discourse. There has been neither the collapse that many feared, nor the breakthrough that some had hoped for. Instead, a relatively unchanged but fragile status quo has persisted, one that Central Asian countries confront daily. For the C5 countries, Afghanistan is increasingly less a topic of speculative discussion and more a persistent factor in their immediate reality. It is no longer just an object of foreign policy, but a constant variable impacting security, trade, humanitarian issues, and regional stability. As such, many of last year’s forecasts have become outdated, based as they were on assumptions of dramatic change, whereas the reality has proven far more inertial. Illusion #1: Afghanistan Can Be Ignored The belief that Afghanistan can be temporarily “put on the back burner” is rooted in the assumption that a lack of public dialogue or political statements equates to a lack of interaction. But the actions of Central Asian states show that ignoring Afghanistan is not a viable option, even when countries intentionally avoid politicizing relations. Turkmenistan offers a clear example. Ashgabat has maintained stable trade, economic, and infrastructure ties with Afghanistan for years, all with minimal foreign policy rhetoric. Energy supplies, cross-border trade, and logistical cooperation have continued despite political and financial constraints, and regardless of international debates over the legitimacy of the Afghan authorities. This quiet pragmatism stands in contrast to both isolationist strategies and symbolic or ideological engagement. Turkmenistan may avoid making public declarations about its relationship with Afghanistan, but it nonetheless maintains robust cooperation. This calculated calmness reduces risks without signaling disengagement. Importantly, this approach does not eliminate structural asymmetries or deeper vulnerabilities. But it dispels the illusion that distancing reduces risk. On the contrary, sustained economic and logistical ties foster predictability, without which attempts to “ignore” a neighboring country become a form of strategic blindness. In this sense, Turkmenistan’s experience affirms a broader regional truth: Afghanistan cannot be removed from Central Asia’s geopolitical equation by simply looking away. It must be engaged pragmatically or dealt with later, in potentially more destabilizing forms. Illusion #2: Security Is Achieved Through Isolation Closely related to the first is the illusion that security can be ensured by building walls. Security in Afghanistan, and in the broader Afghan-Pakistani zone, is often seen as an external issue, something that can be kept out by sealing borders or minimizing engagement. Yet in practice, security is determined less by geography and more by the nature of involvement. This is reflected in the recent decision by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to participate in U.S. President Donald Trump's “Board of Peace” initiative. While the initiative focuses on resolving crises outside Central Asia, both countries have framed their participation as essential to their own national and regional security interests. As Abdulaziz Kamilov, advisor to the President of Uzbekistan, explained, Tashkent’s involvement stems from three factors: its own security needs, its foreign policy principles,...

Iran Protests and Regional Stability: An Afghan Perspective

The protests that spread across Iran in late 2025 and early 2026 reflected more than short-term public discontent, instead exposing the cumulative effects of a prolonged socio-economic crisis. Persistently high inflation, declining real incomes, and falling living standards have placed sustained pressure on households and weakened the social contract between the state and society. Against this backdrop, the unrest increasingly acquired a foreign policy dimension. Strong statements from U.S. officials warning of consequences in response to Iran’s handling of the protests, combined with Tehran’s rejection of what it described as external interference, heightened the risk of the crisis becoming internationalized. Thus, the protests in Iran ceased to be an exclusively domestic issue and became a factor of regional instability. A key feature of the current situation is that the Iranian crisis is developing simultaneously on three fronts: socio-economic, where protests are fueled by deteriorating living conditions; political, linked to a crisis of confidence and governability; and geopolitical, where internal processes are used by external actors as a tool of pressure. Consequences for Afghanistan For Afghanistan, developments in Iran carry direct and practical significance. Since late 2024, Iran has become a source of large-scale returns of Afghan migrants, both voluntary and forced. By 2025, this process had become systematic, placing a heavy burden on Afghanistan’s western provinces, particularly Herat. In the event of prolonged instability and a deepening economic crisis in Iran, the likelihood of additional waves of migrant returns would increase. This would place further strain on Afghanistan’s labor market, healthcare system, social infrastructure, and already limited economic resources. In a fragile economy, the return of large numbers of migrants intensifies competition for jobs and raises the risk of local social tensions. The trade and logistics dimension is equally significant. Iran remains Afghanistan’s key economic partner and a vital transit corridor, including through the Islam Qala border crossing. Any deterioration in Iran’s socio-economic conditions has a direct impact on trade flows, supply chains, and broader regional economic stability. Significance for Central Asia The ongoing protest movements and the deterioration of the situation in Iran, driven by a systemic economic crisis and growing political and social discontent, could have a significant impact on political and economic dynamics, as well as security, across Central Asia. On the one hand, governments in the region are responding with cautious concern, mindful of the potential spillover effects of instability and rising internal discontent. A prolonged crisis in Iran increases the risks of migration pressure, border instability, and cross-border threats, all of which directly affect regional security. On the other hand, a further deterioration of Iran’s internal situation could disrupt trade, transit, and energy ties with Central Asia, weakening Tehran’s regional influence and reshaping the balance of power. Under such conditions, the role of other regional and external actors, including Russia, China, Turkey, and Western countries, is likely to grow as they gain opportunities to strengthen their positions in the region. As a result, the crisis in Iran is evolving beyond a domestic challenge and is...

Opinion: Central Asia and the Venezuelan Crisis

For Central Asian countries, the central challenge in international politics is no longer choosing alliances, but coping with external shocks and global turbulence that originate far beyond the region.  The unfolding crisis in Venezuela is a case in point. At first glance, the situation concerns Latin America and the global oil market, but its implications extend well beyond, directly affecting Central Asia’s strategic interests. The core issue is not oil per se, but the reemergence of force as a legitimate instrument for altering political and economic conditions. For a region positioned at the crossroads of major power interests and reliant on external stability, this shift is profoundly consequential. The Venezuelan crisis should be understood as a precedent, one that signals how global power centers may act as established norms erode. For Central Asia, this heralds a more unpredictable international environment in which regional states must navigate competing interests without the benefit of stable rules. While Venezuela is often reduced to an oil story, the broader economic stakes involve control over the architecture of strategic resource flows. This resonates with the situation in the C5, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, where resources such as oil, gas, uranium, and rare earth metals are also of significant external interest. The logistics and transit of these resources are increasingly entangled in geopolitical bargaining. The Venezuelan example reinforces a growing trend: the nexus of economics and security is tightening, and access to resources is increasingly secured through political leverage. In this context, Iran holds particular relevance. For Central Asia, Iran is not an abstraction; it represents transit routes, energy corridors, access to southern seas, and a component of regional balance. Heightened pressure on Tehran directly affects both the opportunities and risks facing the region. When viewed through the lens of Iran, developments in Venezuela serve as a psychological and political precedent, broadening what appears acceptable within Washington’s strategic calculus. While a direct replication of the Venezuelan scenario in Iran is unlikely, given the vastly different military, political, and regional risks, the mere lowering of the threshold for force-based solutions is significant. The cost of direct confrontation with Iran would be far higher, with potential repercussions for the entire Middle East security architecture. Operation Absolute Resolve has objectively increased the confidence of those who favor the use of force against Iran. This confidence is likely to grow if United States actions in Venezuela carry minimal international consequences, avoid triggering uncontrollable regional escalation, and are perceived as domestically successful. In either case, Venezuela’s “success” has already lowered psychological barriers to coercion, strengthening arguments for hardline scenarios and re-legitimizing force as a policy tool, rather than a measure of last resort. Broadly speaking, the Venezuelan crisis highlights a global shift from rules to precedents. For the five, and increasingly for the emerging six that includes Azerbaijan, the fragmentation of international norms raises costs and leaves each country more vulnerable to external pressure. In this environment, coordination and consistency on issues such as transit, security, and sanctions are...

Old Kazakhstan in Retreat: The Fate of Nazarbayev’s Allies

Since early 2022, the influence of the so-called “Old Kazakhstan” - the political and business circle that once surrounded former President Nursultan Nazarbayev — has been steadily eroded. Institutions have been reshaped, loyalties tested, and the once-untouchable elite has found itself under unprecedented scrutiny. Yet the names of Nazarbayev and his closest allies still surface regularly in courtrooms, parliament debates, and media headlines. Are these prosecutions and investigations an attempt to build President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s vision of a “Fair Kazakhstan,” or do they mark a new phase of elite score-settling under the banner of reform? The Times of Central Asia examined the fortunes of six figures from Nazarbayev’s inner circle to trace the shifting balance of power. Nurbоl Nazarbayev Recent headlines have revived scrutiny of Nazarbayev's nephew Nurbоl Nazarbayev, the son of his late brother Bolat. Authorities have launched bankruptcy proceedings against him, citing debts of approximately 58 billion tenge ($107 million). His assets and bank accounts have been frozen, and he is subject to travel restrictions. Under the current law, Nurbоl will be barred from taking out loans for five years, registering as an individual entrepreneur, or conducting major financial transactions without notifying the relevant authorities. His assets may be liquidated to repay creditors, with the exception of his primary residence. Once listed as Kazakhstan’s 57th richest businessman by Forbes Kazakhstan, he held ownership stakes in Prime Capital Invest and Prime Capital Holding, was a co-owner of PLS Construction Company and PLS-TM, and the majority shareholder of the Almaty Heavy Machinery Plant. This legal action follows a parliamentary inquiry into a previously sealed court case initiated by the General Prosecutor’s Office. The court ordered the confiscation of assets worth 57 billion tenge ($105.5 million) and imposed a fine of 925 million tenge ($1.7 million), along with penalties totaling 230.4 million tenge ($425,000). Members of parliament, Rinat Zaitov and Ermurat Bapi, have both demanded transparency in the case. Zaitov called for a comprehensive audit of Nurbоl’s assets, including those linked to the Altyn Orda market and land plots in Almaty and its surrounding areas. Shortly afterward, Bapi echoed the call, referencing a complaint from a Karaganda businessman who claimed his company was seized in a raid involving Nazarbayev’s circle. Bapi criticized law enforcement for closing the case, calling it “a betrayal of the President’s vision of a Fair Kazakhstan.” Zhomart Ertayev Zhomart Ertayev, a flamboyant banker once sentenced to 11 years for embezzling 144 billion tenge ($266 million) from Bank RBK, was unexpectedly released earlier this year under an amnesty, according to the Committee of the Penal System. However, a month later, parliament deputy Abzal Kuspan announced that the court’s decision had been overturned, and a formal appeal to the Prosecutor General’s Office led to Ertayev’s re-arrest. Ertayev previously held refugee status and a Russian residence permit, both of which were revoked after Kazakhstan issued an international warrant for his arrest. Kairat Boranbayev Kairat Boranbayev, a prominent businessman and former in-law of the Nazarbayev family, was arrested in 2022 and...

Japarov and Tokayev’s High-Level Reshuffles Usher in a New Political Season

Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan recently witnessed high-level political developments that drew attention beyond their borders. In Kyrgyzstan, the national parliament self-dissolved, while Kazakhstan underwent a series of administrative reshuffles. Though both events were driven by reform-oriented policies, observers have offered sharply contrasting interpretations. In Kyrgyzstan, the initiative to dissolve the Jogorku Kenesh (parliament) was led by a group of 32 deputies headed by Speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu. They cited logistical and financial concerns over the proximity of the next parliamentary and presidential elections, scheduled for November 2026 and January 2027, respectively. Holding two major elections in such a short span, they argued, would pose political and economic challenges. As a result, early parliamentary elections will now take place on November 30, under revised electoral rules. The new system divides the country into 30 constituencies, each electing three deputies. Political parties may nominate only one candidate per district, and the overall number of deputies will remain at 90. However, the majority of seats are now expected to go to independents, reducing the dominance of political parties in the electoral process. Some Kazakh observers, long accustomed to viewing Kyrgyzstan as a “democratic island” in the region, interpreted these changes as a move toward greater political openness. Former diplomat and public figure Kazbek Beysembayev contrasted Kyrgyzstan’s reforms with Kazakhstan’s political trajectory, where authorities are reportedly planning to eliminate single-mandate districts in favor of a fully party-based electoral system. He warned this would further consolidate the ruling party’s dominance. “Such a move might be acceptable if laws on political party registration had first been liberalized. But that hasn’t happened,” Beysembayev argued. However, not all analysts share this optimistic view. Central Asia expert Arkady Dubnov sees the Kyrgyz move as a calculated maneuver by the ruling elite. He argues that a political duumvirate, composed of President Sadyr Japarov and State Committee for National Security (SCNS) chief Kamchybek Tashiev, has increasingly consolidated control. According to Dubnov, the early elections are designed to cement this grip on power. “By extending the gap between the parliamentary and presidential elections to 14 months, the authorities are creating space for a politically engineered campaign,” Dubnov explained. “This may pave the way for General Tashiev’s eventual rise to the presidency. His image as the real power broker, from resolving the border conflict with Tajikistan to renaming his hometown Jalal-Abad to Manas, has been solidified. President Japarov would likely retain influence within a reconfigured leadership structure.” In Kazakhstan, meanwhile, administrative reshuffles have continued, drawing significant attention, particularly the replacement of Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu with seasoned diplomat Yermek Kosherbayev. The change followed speculation in early September that Nurtleu had been detained by the National Security Committee, a claim that proved false but nevertheless added intrigue to his removal from the Foreign Ministry. He has since been appointed presidential aide for international investment and trade cooperation. Political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev acknowledged that this role is technically a demotion but argued it still reflects political trust. “Tokayev doesn’t typically reappoint officials who have committed serious...

Opinion: Victory Day Parade Puts China’s Military Might and Alliances on Full Display

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit coincided with China’s lavish commemorations of the "80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the broader World Anti-Fascist War." The culminating moment, a grand military parade, was followed by a formal reception hosted by President Xi Jinping for visiting foreign dignitaries. All five Central Asian heads of state attended the parade. As the summit concluded, Xi seized the opportunity to issue a pointed warning to the West, particularly the United States and President Donald Trump, who had made it clear that he was closely following events in Tianjin and Beijing. In a post on Truth Social, Trump wrote, "Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un as you conspire against the United States of America." Kim Jong Un’s high-profile visit to Beijing, including a prolonged meeting with Putin, signaled the emergence of a visible military alignment between North Korea and Russia. This visit served as a strategic complement to China's Victory Day display of military might. [caption id="attachment_35739" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: president.uz[/caption] For the first time, China publicly exhibited components of its strategic nuclear triad: the air-launched Jinglei1 missile, submarine-launched Julang3, and land-based ICBMs such as the Dongfeng61 and Dongfeng31 (and reportedly the DF5C). Analysts saw this as a deliberate signal to the U.S., regional powers like India and Russia, and potential international arms buyers, positioning China as a formidable strategic actor. Also on display were China’s anti-drone “triad”, missile-gun systems, high-energy lasers, and high-power microwave weapons, highlighting advances in counter-drone technology. Additionally, the parade showcased hypersonic and cruise missiles, unmanned aerial and underwater systems, and even robotic dog units, demonstrating China’s futuristic military capabilities. While noting the parade's impressive visuals, analysts cautioned that the true readiness of many showcased systems, for example, torpedo drones or laser weapons, remains uncertain. [caption id="attachment_35741" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: president.uz[/caption] Diplomatically, the summit also reinforced Sino-Russian ties. Putin, who described relations with China as “unprecedentedly” close, and Xi signed over 20 bilateral agreements, including a major energy deal, Power of Siberia 2, a gas pipeline delivering 50 billion cubic metres annually to China via Mongolia. Meanwhile, China announced a trial visa-free entry policy for ordinary Russian passport holders, effective from September 15, 2025, to September 14, 2026, allowing visits up to 30 days for tourism, business, or family purposes. Together, the military spectacle and deepening diplomatic and people-to-people ties affirm Xi’s confidence as he prepares for crucial negotiations with President Trump, an unmistakable projection of strength and strategic resolve.