Russia Migration Policy - The Times Of Central Asia

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Migration

Russia Expels 32 Uzbek Migrants as Deportations Rise in Novosibirsk

Russian authorities expelled 32 Uzbek citizens from the Novosibirsk region on October 16 for violating migration regulations. Court bailiffs escorted a reported total of 47 foreign nationals out of the country that day, including citizens of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan. Over the course of the week, 91 people were expelled from the region. The migrants were identified during police raids in two districts of Novosibirsk and the surrounding Novosibirsky district. Those expelled paid for their own tickets home. Violations of Russia's entry and residence regulations can result in fines ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 rubles (approximately $25–62), as well as administrative expulsion. Under Russian law, expulsion generally also means a five-year ban on re-entering the country. Expulsions from the region have risen sharply. By mid-September 2026, authorities had expelled 1,524 foreign nationals from the Novosibirsk region, compared with 958 during the same period a year earlier, an increase of approximately 59%. Uzbek citizens account for a substantial share of those expelled. By July, authorities had removed 618 Uzbeks out of a total of 1,314 foreign nationals, or approximately 47%. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were the next most frequently represented countries. The increase in expulsions comes as fewer foreign workers are obtaining work permits in the region. According to figures presented to regional lawmakers, approximately 27,000 work patents were issued in the first eight months of 2026, down from 34,000 during the same period last year. Russia is also tightening national requirements for migrant workers and their families. In July, Russia enacted legislation requiring migrant workers to demonstrate that they can financially support themselves and dependent family members. The changes also require children covered by the provisions who turn 18 to obtain their own work patent or another legal basis to remain in Russia. The main provisions take effect on January 1, 2027. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, work-related entries into Russia by citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan fell by approximately 15% in the first half of 2026 compared with the same period a year earlier.

Russia Migration Policy

Russia Migration Rules Tighten as Central Asian Work Entries Fall

Entries to Russia for work by citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan fell by 15% in the first half of 2026 amid tighter migration rules and higher costs for workers. The Border Service of Russia’s Federal Security Service recorded about 1.9 million work-related entries by citizens of the three countries between January and June, down from more than 2.3 million in the same period of 2025, according to data published through Russia’s Unified Interdepartmental Information and Statistical System. The restrictions are also separating some migrant workers from their children. Since April 1, 2025, foreign children applying to Russian state schools have been required to prove that they are legally resident in the country and pass a Russian-language test. Those who fail cannot enroll and must wait at least three months before taking the test again. Rakhmat, a Tajik migrant worker preparing to bring his children, aged seven and nine, to Russia, told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that he might have to send them back to live with their grandparents if they fail. Tajikistan’s education minister has said that about 9,000 children have already returned from Russia after being denied school places. Russian Education Ministry figures cited by Asia-Plus show that the number of foreign children attending Russian schools fell by about 44,000 during the 2025–26 academic year. Enrollment among children from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan dropped by 27%, from 122,000 to 89,000. For adult migrants, tighter oversight increasingly comes through their phones. Since September 1, 2025, visa-free foreign nationals working in Moscow and the surrounding region have been required to register through the Amina mobile application. Its central function is to report a migrant’s place of residence while automatically transmitting the phone’s geolocation to the Russian Interior Ministry. Russian authorities present the system as a way to enforce migration rules and reduce corruption. Critics argue that continuous location tracking subjects foreign nationals to intrusive surveillance. Migrants who stop transmitting location data may be placed on Russia’s register of controlled persons, restricting their access to banking and other services and potentially leading to deportation. On September 1, 2026, the Amina requirement will be extended to adults from visa-free countries who remain in Moscow or the Moscow region for more than 90 days for purposes other than work, including foreign students. The experimental system remains limited to the capital region and does not yet apply across Russia. Kyrgyzstan’s Center for Employment of Citizens Abroad has published guidance explaining who must install Amina, what information it transmits, and how migrants can avoid breaching the new registration rules. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Russia's tightening migration policy is prompting Central Asian countries to seek alternative labor markets while expanding employment opportunities at home.

Labor Migration

Opinion: Russia’s Migration Crackdown Tests Central Asia’s Labor Alternatives

Russia is no longer the unquestioned labor destination it once was for Central Asian workers. That shift is real, but it is easy to overstate. The Times of Central Asia recently reported that labor migration from the region is becoming more diverse. Workers are looking not only to Russia, but also to South Korea, the Gulf states, the United Kingdom, Poland, Belarus, and other destinations. The old Russia-centered model is weakening, even if it has not collapsed. The question is scale. It now intersects with two other filters: legal status and banking access. Alternative labor markets can absorb some Central Asian workers, but they cannot yet replace the Russian labor outlet. Russia did not function as an ordinary destination. For years, it acted as the region's largest external labor valve: geographically close, linguistically familiar, legally accessible for some, and large enough to absorb millions of workers across construction, services, logistics, agriculture, and municipal labor. South Korea, the UK, Poland, and the Gulf can offer higher wages and more formal recruitment channels. They can also reduce overdependence on Moscow. But they are more selective, more bureaucratic, and much smaller in immediate absorption capacity. That leaves a more important question: can new destinations expand fast enough to offset a narrowing Russian market? For now, the answer is probably no. Diversification Is Real, but Not Replacement The difference between diversification and replacement is crucial. A worker from Kyrgyzstan leaving for seasonal work in the UK, or a worker from Uzbekistan entering an organized recruitment program in South Korea, represents a genuine shift. These routes can be safer, better paid, and less exposed to the social hostility now facing many Central Asian migrants in Russia. But they cannot absorb workers on the same scale. Russia's labor market absorbed Central Asian workers in very large numbers because it had a combination few other destinations can match: proximity, low entry costs, dense migrant networks, Russian-language familiarity, and long-standing informal labor channels. Even as those channels become more restrictive, they remain embedded in household economies across the region. This is why diversification should be read as a partial adaptation, not a full exit. For governments in Tashkent, Bishkek, and Dushanbe, the search for new labor markets is necessary. It reduces exposure to Russian policy shocks. It gives workers more choices. It also helps governments negotiate better legal recruitment schemes. Yet the structural problem remains. If Russia closes the door faster than alternatives can open, pressure does not disappear. It returns home through unemployment, lower remittances, and frustrated expectations. The EAEU Line Russia's migration crackdown does not affect Central Asia evenly. The most important dividing line is not geography. It is legal status. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which allows the free movement of labor among member states. In practical terms, citizens of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have a different legal status in Russia than citizens of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. They do not face the same work-permit and labor-patent system. That does not...