• KZT/USD = 0.00226
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
27 September 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 316

Opinion: How Europe Balances Conditions and Interests in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan has enjoyed preferential access to the EU market under GSP+ since 2021. The program removes tariffs on thousands of products for countries that commit to implementing international conventions on human rights, labor standards, environmental protection, and governance. Uzbekistan is one of two Central Asian countries, alongside Kyrgyzstan, participating in GSP+. Tajikistan receives the less generous standard GSP preferences, while Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are outside the scheme because they are classified as upper-middle-income economies. Uzbekistan makes extensive use of the program. In 2024, its preference utilization rate, the share of eligible exports entering the EU duty-free, was 92.2%. EU imports from Uzbekistan nearly doubled between 2021 and 2024. Those benefits come with conditions. The European Commission assesses whether Uzbekistan is implementing the conventions required under GSP+. It must consider findings from the UN and International Labour Organization monitoring bodies, but it can also use evidence from governments, international organizations, civil society groups, and other sources. If the Commission has “reasonable doubt” that Uzbekistan is meeting its commitments, it can open a withdrawal procedure. Uzbekistan can respond and provide evidence of compliance. The Commission then decides whether to close the case or withdraw preferences from some or all products. The system gives Brussels a formal role in assessing whether Uzbekistan continues to meet the conditions attached to preferential market access. It also requires the Commission to decide how different evidence should be interpreted and when shortcomings are serious enough to justify action. There is no automatic formula that produces that decision. The EU–Uzbekistan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, or EPCA, creates a separate mechanism. It makes respect for human rights an essential part of the partnership, and a serious breach can lead to partial or full suspension of the agreement. The European Parliament’s May 2026 resolution called for implementation of the agreement’s human-rights and rule-of-law commitments and for those commitments to be assessed within three years. The EU’s own report records setbacks in media freedom, civil society, and judicial independence. It also recognizes progress on labor standards and protections for women and children. The Commission must assess compliance with each required convention; progress in one area does not remove obligations in another. That means the Commission must decide how much weight to give different evidence and when concerns are serious enough to affect trade preferences. Decisions on Uzbekistan’s domestic reforms, however, remain with the Uzbek government. Concurrently, cooperation between the EU and Uzbekistan has expanded. Brussels is pursuing closer ties with Uzbekistan on transport connectivity and critical raw materials. Uzbekistan’s position on regional transport routes, critical raw materials, and access to a growing Central Asian market also gives Tashkent leverage in its dealings with Europe. The new GSP rules apply from January 2027, raising the number of required conventions from 27 to 32. Existing beneficiaries retain their preferences during a transition period and must reapply by the end of 2028. The EPCA has applied provisionally since March 1, 2026, while full ratification remains pending. The next GSP+ review will show how...

EU Deepens Central Asia Ties as Rights Record Varies Across Region

The European Union is rapidly deepening its trade, investment, and political ties with Central Asia, even as its latest assessment points to worsening human rights conditions across much of the region. The latest assessments are contained in the EU’s annual Human Rights and Democracy in the World country reports, which separately examine all five Central Asian states. In Kazakhstan, the EU notes judicial and political reforms, as well as continued implementation of measures aimed at strengthening protection against gender-based violence. Brussels also points to a shrinking space for civil society, growing pressure on journalists and independent media, increased oversight of NGOs, and continued restrictions on peaceful assembly. As part of the UN Universal Periodic Review, Kazakhstan accepted 259 of the 294 recommendations it received. The assessment of Kyrgyzstan is notably harsher. The EU says the human rights situation continued to deteriorate and highlights the new media law, mandatory registration for all media outlets, a 35% cap on foreign ownership, and prosecutions of media workers that it describes as seemingly politically motivated. Another source of concern was the closure of the National Center for the Prevention of Torture, whose functions were transferred to the Ombudsperson’s Office. In Tajikistan, the main concerns include pressure on independent media and human rights defenders, restrictions on freedom of expression and association, reports of torture and ill-treatment in detention, and the situation of Pamiri activists and journalists. Citing Human Rights Watch, the EU report says at least seven journalists were imprisoned on charges related to their reporting or coverage of protests. Turkmenistan remains subject to some of the region’s most extensive restrictions. Brussels points to continuing restrictions on freedom of movement, expression, the media, association, assembly, and religion, as well as reports of torture and ill-treatment in prisons. The EU also notes some improvements in detention conditions, gender equality and gender-based violence, and cooperation with the International Labour Organization on eliminating forced labor. The EU’s assessment of Uzbekistan is quite severe. According to the EU, the human rights and democracy situation continued to steadily deteriorate in 2025, with backsliding in nearly every area. Brussels points to legal action and imprisonment targeting journalists, bloggers, and human rights defenders, restrictions affecting NGOs, and worsening media freedom. The full report on the July 2022 protests in Karakalpakstan had still not been made public by the end of 2025. The EU nevertheless notes some positive developments, including new measures to protect children, changes to divorce law, and improved representation of women in parliament. The severity of these assessments contrasts with the pace at which Europe is expanding its relationship with the region. The first EU-Central Asia summit, held in Samarkand in April 2025, elevated relations to a strategic partnership. Brussels also announced a €12 billion Global Gateway investment package covering transport links, critical raw materials, digital connectivity, water, and energy. The Times of Central Asia has reported on efforts to move from political agreements toward specific projects. Human rights, however, remain part of the relationship with Brussels. This has been...

Bride Kidnapping in Central Asia: Why the Practice Persists Despite Tougher Laws

Bride kidnapping for the purpose of forcing women into marriage remains one of the least visible forms of gender-based violence in Central Asia. Although abduction and coercion into marriage are punishable under criminal law across the region, the offenses are defined differently from country to country. Their true scale is difficult to measure. Many victims never report the crime, while some cases are still viewed as a continuation of tradition rather than a violation of criminal law. Over the past decade, governments across Central Asia have begun revising their approaches to the problem. Kyrgyzstan strengthened criminal penalties following several high-profile cases. Kazakhstan did not close a legal loophole that allowed many perpetrators to avoid prosecution until 2025. Uzbekistan has a specific criminal provision covering the abduction of women for marriage, while Tajikistan does not appear to define bride kidnapping as a separate offense. In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, however, assessing the prevalence of the practice remains particularly difficult because of limited research and incomplete official data. The term “bride kidnapping” has not always referred to the same practice. Anthropologists note that historically it covered a range of marriage customs, from mutually agreed elopements and staged abductions to the violent kidnapping of women. Contemporary researchers stress that the presence or absence of a woman’s free consent is the key distinction between these practices. Comparable customs once existed among a number of Central Asian peoples. One documented motive has been the desire to avoid kalym, the traditional bride price paid by the groom’s family to the bride’s relatives. Economic motives, however, did not alter the nature of the crime when a woman did not consent to the marriage. The issue has been studied most extensively in Kyrgyzstan. A nationally representative survey conducted in 2015–2016 by the National Statistical Committee with support from UN Women, UNFPA, and the International Organization for Migration found that 22.1% of marriages involved some form of bride abduction. Of these, 16.3% were reported as taking place with the woman’s consent, while 5.8% occurred without it. The frequently cited claim that more than one in five Kyrgyz marriages begins with bride kidnapping therefore combines consensual and non-consensual practices. It should not be presented as an estimate of forced abduction. The figures were based on respondents’ accounts and may not capture every form of family or social pressure surrounding consent. Known locally as ala kachuu, or “grab and run,” the non-consensual abduction of a woman for marriage is a criminal offense in Kyrgyzstan. In 2013, the penalty for abducting an adult woman for marriage against her will was increased to between five and seven years in prison. The corresponding sentence when the victim was under 17 was increased to between five and ten years. Tougher penalties, however, have not prevented further tragedies. One of the best-known cases was the 2018 murder of Burulai Turdaaly Kyzy, a 20-year-old medical student. After she was abducted, her family contacted the police. Officers brought both Burulai and her abductor to a police station but left...

EU-Turkmenistan Human Rights Dialogue Presses Ashgabat on Rights

The European Union used its latest human rights dialogue with Turkmenistan to press Ashgabat on the gap between outward engagement and domestic control. The 18th annual EU-Turkmenistan Human Rights Dialogue was held in Ashgabat on June 22. It came during a period of slightly more visible contact between Turkmenistan and the outside world, including a rare visit by a Reuters reporting team earlier this year. Reuters said its journalists were able to travel unescorted and report freely, an unusual development in a country long known for strict visa controls and heavily managed media access. Whether that points to a genuine opening remains unclear. Turkmenistan has also spoken of simplifying its visa regime, joining the World Trade Organization, and diversifying its heavily state-led economy. The human rights picture remains highly restrictive. Rights groups continue to rank Turkmenistan among the world’s most closed states for journalists, civil society, and political dissent. The country placed 173rd out of 180 in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index. The Turkmen delegation at the dialogue was led by Deputy Foreign Minister Mehri Byashimova. The EU delegation was headed by Dietmar Krissler, head of the Central Asia Division at the European External Action Service. Brussels’ public account of the meeting focused on areas where it wants Turkmenistan to go further. The EU called for stronger anti-discrimination measures, tougher action against sexual and gender-based violence, the criminalization of domestic violence, and the decriminalization of consensual same-sex relations between adults. The bloc welcomed Turkmenistan’s cooperation with the International Labour Organization on eliminating forced and child labor. That issue has long been central to outside criticism of Turkmenistan, particularly in the cotton sector. Earlier this year, the EU and ILO launched a project aimed at strengthening action against forced and child labor in the country. The dialogue also reached some of Turkmenistan’s most sensitive rights issues. The EU raised concern over human rights defenders, including reports of transnational repression, and handed the Turkmen delegation a list of individual cases. Prison conditions were another focus. The EU cited reports of torture and ill-treatment, and urged Turkmenistan to work more closely with civil society on enforced disappearances. Rights groups have repeatedly called on Brussels to tie closer relations with Ashgabat to measurable progress on such cases. The EU praised Turkmenistan’s efforts to reduce statelessness, while also calling on the authorities to ensure equal access to consular services for all Turkmen citizens living abroad. Turkmen overseas have reported difficulties renewing passports and obtaining basic consular support, leaving some in precarious legal positions. The EU also called for unrestricted internet access and a safer environment for civil society organizations. The meeting reflects the tension in the EU’s current approach to Turkmenistan. Brussels is engaging Ashgabat more actively, as it is with the rest of Central Asia, but continues to keep human rights on the formal agenda. For Turkmenistan, even limited external access and more regular dialogue can be presented as movement. For the EU and rights groups, the test is whether that access leads...

Russian Diplomats Report No Complaints From Imprisoned Turkmen Activist Saddam Gulamov

Russian embassy officials in Turkmenistan have visited activist Saddam Gulamov, who is serving his sentence at the LB-E/12 penal colony in Lebap Region. Gulamov was said to have described his detention conditions and food as acceptable, and his health as satisfactory, according to a letter sent by Kamil Magomedov, deputy director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Third CIS Department, to Gulamov’s relatives. According to the document, Russian diplomats met Gulamov in person at the correctional facility in late May. The letter states that during the conversation, Gulamov described his detention conditions and food as acceptable, and said his health was satisfactory. Embassy staff also reported that they had observed no visible signs of health problems. The letter notes, however, that Gulamov intends to file a petition seeking changes to the conditions of his imprisonment. Other inmates at the LB-E/12 colony had earlier told Turkmen.news that, at least until autumn 2025, Gulamov had been held continuously in a disciplinary isolation cell. According to their accounts, the prolonged isolation negatively affected his psychological condition. There were also reports of several suicide attempts. Previously published documents show that Gulamov, who was extradited from Russia, was sentenced to five years in prison. The ruling was handed down by the Ashgabat City Court on May 13, 2024. Before being returned to Turkmenistan, Gulamov had been wanted in his home country over social media posts in which he criticized the authorities and former President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov personally. According to the official wanted persons database, Gulamov was accused of calling for the violent overthrow of the constitutional order and publicly inciting extremist actions through the media. The exact charges under which the final sentence was issued remain unknown. Through Russian embassy staff, Gulamov also informed his relatives that he intends to challenge what he describes as procedural violations with the help of a lawyer. These may concern the circumstances of his arrest and extradition, as well as the trial itself.

Extradited Turkmen Activist Sentenced to Five Years in Prison

Turkmen activist Saddam Gulamov, who was extradited from Russia to Turkmenistan last year, has been sentenced to five years in prison, according to Turkmen.news, citing documents it said were obtained from Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office. The new information appears to revise earlier reports that Gulamov had received an eight-year sentence. Those accounts were based on sources in Turkmenistan’s law enforcement system and on information from inmates at the LB-E/12, also known as the Seydi Prison Labor Camp, where Gulamov is reportedly serving his sentence. According to Turkmen.news, Turkmenistan’s Prosecutor General’s Office requested Gulamov’s extradition. Russian authorities approved the request on December 20, 2023, and transferred him to Turkmen law enforcement agencies on March 1, 2024, after the decision entered into force. The documents cited by the outlet say the Judicial Panel of the Ashgabat City Court sentenced Gulamov on May 13, 2024, to five years in prison. They do not specify the charges or the legal provisions under which he was convicted. Turkmen.news also reported that Russian Embassy employees in Turkmenistan had visited Gulamov in prison and asked about his conditions of detention. No details about the outcome of those visits have been made public. The outlet said records from Turkmenistan’s wanted persons database showed that, as of 2021, Gulamov was being sought under Article 175, Part 2, of the country’s Criminal Code, which concerns public calls to violently change the constitutional order through mass media, and under Article 175-2, Part 2, which concerns public calls to extremist activity through media channels. Both offenses carried maximum prison terms of five years. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Gulamov publicly criticized Turkmen authorities and former president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov on social media in 2020 and 2021. His posts focused on food shortages, economic difficulties, the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the official response to a destructive hurricane. In several posts, Gulamov called on citizens not to be afraid of what he described as authoritarian rule. Human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed concern about the treatment of political activists and government critics in Turkmenistan, one of the world’s most closed countries, where independent political activity and public dissent remain tightly restricted.