• KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
12 October 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 21

Oman Set to Join Eurasian Development Bank as First Gulf Shareholder

Oman is set to become the eighth shareholder of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) and the first Gulf state to join the institution. An agreement was signed in Astana on October 6 during Sultan Haitham bin Tarik Al Said’s state visit to Kazakhstan. The EDB’s current shareholders are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Oman would become the first member from outside the former Soviet Union. The agreement, signed by Omani Finance Minister Sultan bin Salim Al Habsi and EDB Chairman Nikolai Podguzov, sets out the terms of the EDB’s operations in Oman. “This agreement reflects our shared intention to build a bridge between Central Asia and the Gulf region,” Podguzov said. Russia remains the bank’s largest shareholder, although its stake was reduced from about 66% to 44.8% in 2023. By the end of June 2026, the EDB’s cumulative portfolio comprised 348 projects with total investment of $22.1 billion. The bank finances projects including transport infrastructure, energy, and digital systems. On October 6, Kazakhstan and Oman signed an agreement on the mutual protection of investments, while Samruk-Kazyna and the Oman Investment Authority agreed to establish a joint investment vehicle to finance projects. As a landlocked country, Kazakhstan is seeking additional routes to the Indian Ocean, and the two sides discussed using Omani ports to transport its goods. Oman has proposed developing a trade corridor through its seaports. The talks in Astana also covered direct air links and other logistics projects. Kazakhstan is seeking to increase exports of grain, meat, and other agricultural products to Oman. In 2025, honey from Kazakhstan was exported to the sultanate for the first time. On October 5, the two countries’ chambers of commerce signed a memorandum aimed at expanding business ties, including in agriculture and logistics. Founded by Kazakhstan and Russia in 2006, the EDB has gradually expanded its membership, most recently with Uzbekistan in 2025.

Oman Trade Corridor Could Link Kazakhstan to Indian Ocean

Kazakhstan could gain a new trade route to the Indian Ocean through Oman’s ports, offering an alternative to its traditional northern and Caspian corridors. Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, the sultan of Oman, raised the proposal during talks with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana on October 6. He arrived in Astana on October 5, becoming the first Omani sultan to visit Central Asia “We look forward to developing cooperation in transport and logistics, including the development of a trade corridor through Oman’s ports, as well as strengthening air links between our countries,” the Sultan said. For landlocked Kazakhstan, Omani ports would provide another potential route to the Indian Ocean. Kazakhstan is already developing the Middle Corridor across the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus, while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the United Arab Emirates are studying the CASA railway project through Afghanistan to Pakistani ports. No route, transit countries, cargo volumes, costs, or launch timetable have yet been announced for the Omani proposal. The talks came immediately after Kazakhstan signed an agreement aimed at settling a long-running dispute over Dunga, an oil field in western Kazakhstan near the Caspian coast. KazMunayGas controls a 60% interest in the project through Dunga Operating GmbH, while Oman Oil Company Limited and Thailand’s PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Limited (PTTEP) each hold 20%. The dispute concerned costs accumulated under the production-sharing agreement that Kazakhstan considered non-recoverable. On October 5, the Energy Ministry and KazMunayGas signed an agreement to resolve the disputed issues. The agreement will now be sent to the foreign partners, Oman Oil Company Limited and PTTEP, for signature. A new development plan for 2026-2039 provides for production of 67.4 million barrels of oil, as well as capital and operating investment. Omani capital is also present in Kazakhstan’s gold industry. Maaden International Investment, an Omani state-owned investment fund, held 31.7% of Solidcore’s voting rights as of March 31, 2026, making it the company’s largest shareholder. Solidcore operates gold-mining assets in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan and Oman have assembled a portfolio of five major joint projects worth around $3 billion. Two projects totaling approximately $1.1 billion have already been implemented in the energy and railway sectors, while others, including ore-processing projects, are at various stages of development. Oman Investment Authority and Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund Samruk-Kazyna are among the main partners. During the visit, Samruk-Kazyna and the Oman Investment Authority exchanged an implementation agreement on establishing a joint investment fund and a term sheet for a Rixos hotel project at Blue City in Oman. KazMunayGas and OQ Exploration and Production also agreed to cooperate on investment opportunities in oil and gas exploration and production. The package of agreements covered areas including transport, agriculture, technology, healthcare, mining, and renewable energy. Despite a joint investment portfolio measured in billions of dollars, merchandise trade between the two countries remains modest. On October 5, the Chamber of International Commerce of Kazakhstan and the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry signed a memorandum of understanding. Kazakhstan proposed expanding exports of grain, meat, and...

Kyrgyzstan-Pakistan Trade: 12-Fold Growth or Pipe Dream?

One of the most notable of Kyrgyzstan’s agreements at the SCO Summit in Bishkek last week may be its deal with Pakistan to boost annual bilateral trade to US$200 million within the next two years. From a base of roughly US$16 million in 2025, that would represent roughly a twelvefold increase. It's an ambitious target, made more so by associated geoeconomic undercurrents. As long as Bishkek avoids taking sides in any Indo-Pakistan unresolved border or other geopolitical disputes and sticks to trade and commercial issues, Kyrgyzstan should have little to worry about. President Sadyr Japarov emphasized the economic benefits, casting the Joint Statement with Pakistan as a means of bringing greater resources and opportunities to the Kyrgyz people. “The economy should become the foundation of the Kyrgyz-Pakistani partnership,” he told reporters after the talks. Prime Minister Sharif similarly argued that current trade was “not a patch on our friendship, our brotherhood and our very strong relations.” In other words, Sharif thinks that the level of trade between Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan is far too low compared with the strength of their political and diplomatic relationship. The Joint Statement of Japarov and Sharif reads that the two governments “agreed to expand industrial and investment cooperation in the fields of mining and processing industries, agriculture, food, textile and light industries, pharmaceuticals, the halal industry and digital technologies, with particular emphasis on establishing joint ventures, localizing production, exchanging technologies and implementing mutually beneficial investment projects.” The leaders also agreed to promote the Tamchy Special Financial Investment Territory as a platform for international investment, fintech, innovation, and global business. Kyrgyzstan has pushed this priority hard in recent years, with Tamchy SFIT Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Ayaz Baetov and Tamchy SFIT Deputy Chairman and Minister of Economy and Commerce Bakyt Sydykov spearheading the effort. The Trade Picture If historical patterns are indicative of future behavior, growth in trade over the next two years points toward pharmaceuticals (already Kyrgyzstan's largest import category from Pakistan, at over $6 million of roughly $14 million U.S. dollars in 2025), textiles and ready-made garments (Pakistan's largest global export sector), dried fruit, rice and other agricultural goods, and a newer category: virtual assets and engagement in the digital and IT space. [caption id="attachment_55574" align="aligncenter" width="1500"] Trade figures: UN Comtrade via TradingEconomics.com, 2025 data.[/caption] Kyrgyzstan’s side of the ledger is thin by comparison. Its exports to Pakistan totaled $1.6 million in 2025, led by mineral fuels at about $719,000. Raw hides and leather accounted for about $341,000. It is worth being precise about what this agreement actually does. It does not describe $200 million of commerce that will simply appear. The Joint Statement seeks to spur that trade by fixing transit problems, which touch, then, on geoeconomics and unresolved territorial issues. Kyrgyz officials have emphasized improving logistics and pointed to Pakistan's Arabian Sea ports as a route to global markets. The tested route runs through western China and across the Khunjerab Pass, following the Karakoram Highway to Sost...

Kyrgyzstan Opens New Railway as Japarov Alleges North-South Highway Embezzlement

Kyrgyzstan has opened a 63-kilometer railway between Balykchy and Kochkor, completing the first stage of a domestic route intended to reach the Kara-Keche coalfield and eventually connect the country’s divided rail network. President Sadyr Japarov travelled to the new Kochkor station by train on July 25. The line extends rail service from the western edge of Lake Issyk-Kul into Naryn Region, where difficult mountain terrain has long limited transport links. “We have revived the culture of railway construction, our engineering potential, and professional experience,” Japarov said. “This historic achievement proves that our country can independently carry out large infrastructure projects.” For the first three decades after independence, Kyrgyzstan laid no new railway track. Construction of the planned 186-kilometer Balykchy-Kochkor-Kara-Keche line began in March 2022. Japarov said crews carried out about one million cubic meters of blasting work and cleared eight kilometers through mountainous ground. The route also crosses wetland and rocky areas near the Orto-Tokoy reservoir, existing roads, and utility lines. According to Japarov, construction of the track cost $955,000 per kilometer, which he compared with offers from foreign companies ranging from $4.8 million to $6.8 million per kilometer. “We understood that this was too expensive, so we decided to take the risk and do the work ourselves,” he said. The $955,000 figure appears to cover the track itself rather than the full cost of the line. In June 2025, Kyrgyz Temir Jolu estimated the 63-kilometer project at 9.472 billion som, or about $108 million at the official exchange rate, roughly $1.72 million per kilometer. Japarov’s speech did not set out what work was included in the foreign proposals. The state railway financed the first stage from its own resources. An October 2025 cabinet decree allows Kyrgyz Temir Jolu to retain half the net profit it would otherwise pay into the state budget from 2026 through 2030, which can be used to fund the route to Makmal and the company’s wider development. Turning to the alternative North-South highway between Balykchy and Jalal-Abad, Japarov said its projected cost was $2.5 million per kilometer and alleged that “more than half” of this sum had been embezzled. He did not identify any company, official, or investigation supporting the claim. Questions over the highway’s costs predate Japarov’s accusation. A January 2023 Audit Chamber review found overstated work on the Aral-Kazarman section and said credit savings had been redirected contrary to the loan agreement. Three months later, local outlets cited security-service sources saying the GKNB had opened a case into suspected $123 million price inflation on the same section. No public outcome has been announced. Construction of the 433-kilometer highway began in 2014 and has suffered repeated delays. The route opened for seasonal traffic from June to November 2026, but the Transport Ministry expects year-round operation only in 2028 after further safety work. The new railway gives Kochkor a direct connection to Kyrgyzstan’s northern rail system. It does not yet join the country’s northern and southern lines. Before the opening, Kyrgyzstan’s railway network covered 425...

Central Asia Builds a Regional Track for Engagement with Afghanistan

The United States and Europe may have stepped back from Afghanistan, but the country’s instability still affects migration, security, trade, and humanitarian pressures far beyond its borders. Given their proximity, Central Asian states cannot and have not disengaged, and their efforts to keep Kabul connected to regional diplomacy and commerce serve interests that are also shared by the West. On June 16, the Center for Strategic Studies of Afghanistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs convened the first Afghanistan-Central Asia Think Tank Forum in Kabul, bringing together leaders and senior representatives from strategic research institutions across the region. Held under the theme "The Strategic Role of Think Tanks in Advancing Regional Cooperation," the forum included delegations from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan alongside their Afghan counterparts. [caption id="attachment_52266" align="aligncenter" width="1080"] Image: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan[/caption] In his keynote address, Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi observed that the international order stands at a delicate crossroads, divided by competing narratives and opposing camps: “Given the developments and challenges in the global structure, the current international order finds itself at a sensitive juncture in history — a period marked, on the one hand, by various illusions and contradictory narratives, and, on the other, by efforts toward cooperation and multilateralism.” In essence, Muttaqi was advocating for an international order that allows Afghanistan and its neighbors to chart their own courses while engaging constructively with willing partners. Speaking to those in his immediate region, he drew attention to shared challenges, among them climate change, water shortages, economic headwinds, and conflict spillover, and asserted that “There is no doubt that, in order to make more effective and constructive decisions and to develop indigenous narratives for our region and shared future, specialists and researchers from academic and intellectual institutions must draft practical and comprehensive roadmaps for future cooperation across various fields.” Muttaqi underscored to participants the growing recognition that regional states stand to gain more through practical cooperation than through isolation or unilateral approaches. He reaffirmed Afghanistan's commitment to advancing the research-based proposals discussed at the April Consultative Dialogue in Kabul to help inform regional political and economic decision-making. His remarks reflected a view that broad-based economic development and good-neighborly relations are mutually reinforcing foundations of societal stability within a shared civilizational context—a perspective widely shared across the Central Asian republics. That is why, for example, he highlighted the need to follow through on economic and connectivity opportunities, citing projects such as CASA-1000, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity transmission project (TAP-500), the Lapis Lazuli Route, and the Afghan-Trans railway. These initiatives are in various stages of development, some having been stalled for decades. Javlon Vakhabov, former Uzbek ambassador to the United States and currently Director of the International Institute for Central Asia (IICA) in Tashkent, travelled to Kabul for the Forum. In his address, he summed up the mood of the participants: “In this emerging Greater Central Asia, Afghanistan is not a periphery. It is the southern gateway of our region, linking Central...

Kazakhstan’s Persian Gulf Port Plan Faces New Iran Risk

Kazakhstan has moved a long-planned southern trade project from talks to contract. The move gives Astana a possible foothold on the Persian Gulf, but it comes as a second night of U.S. strikes on Iran and Iranian retaliation around the Gulf states have raised the cost of using that route. On June 28, Kazakhstan and Iran signed a 27-year BOT agreement to build a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Iran’s Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. The contract gives the project two years for construction and 25 years for operation, with commercial activity expected in the third year. Aman Malgazhdarov of QazExportPromotion signed for Kazakhstan, and Hossein Abbas Nejad of Hormozgan’s Ports and Maritime Organization signed for Iran. The project is designed to plug Kazakhstan into the International North-South Transport Corridor and widen export access to the Persian Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Africa. The $25 million investment covers a 15-hectare logistics center that could handle 1.5 million tons of goods a year. Mohammad Shakibi-Nasab, the head of Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization, said it would “create jobs… increase the operational capacity” of Shahid Rajaee and “boost ports along the North-South corridor.” Malgazhdarov called it the “core of a future Kazakh port” within Shahid Rajaee. That ambition now sits beside a worsening security picture. On July 8, U.S. President Donald Trump declared the interim agreement to end the Iran war “over” after attacks on three cargo ships in the Strait of Hormuz. Asked about the deal, Trump said: “It’s over. I don’t want to deal with them.” The U.S. then launched a new round of strikes, and Iran fired on U.S. sites in Bahrain and Kuwait. U.S. Central Command said the attacks were meant to “further degrade” Iran’s ability to threaten navigation in the strait, with Trump warning, “If it happens again, it will get much worse!” By July 9, the U.S. military said it had struck 170 Iranian targets in 48 hours. Iran had fired at U.S. bases in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, and Iran’s health ministry said U.S. strikes on July 7 and 8 killed 14 people and wounded 78. The attacks hit Bandar Abbas, where Shahid Rajaee is located, and other southern coastal areas. Crude oil prices rose by 5% as the risk widened. For Kazakhstan, the timing is uncomfortable. Shahid Rajaee sits near the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway that connects the Persian Gulf to the open sea. The port offers one of Central Asia’s shortest southern outlets, but the approach depends on a zone where security, insurance premiums, and naval risk can change quickly. A terminal can lower handling costs and improve control over cargo, but it cannot remove war risk at the maritime end of the corridor. The risk may not be limited to the Gulf. The Financial Times reported that a railway bridge near Aqqala in Golestan Province was hit with cruise missiles, citing Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. The bridge lies on the Gorgan-Incheh Borun line, which carries passengers and cargo...