Trade Corridors - The Times Of Central Asia

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Railway Infrastructure

Kyrgyzstan Opens New Railway as Japarov Alleges North-South Highway Embezzlement

Kyrgyzstan has opened a 63-kilometer railway between Balykchy and Kochkor, completing the first stage of a domestic route intended to reach the Kara-Keche coalfield and eventually connect the country’s divided rail network. President Sadyr Japarov travelled to the new Kochkor station by train on July 25. The line extends rail service from the western edge of Lake Issyk-Kul into Naryn Region, where difficult mountain terrain has long limited transport links. “We have revived the culture of railway construction, our engineering potential, and professional experience,” Japarov said. “This historic achievement proves that our country can independently carry out large infrastructure projects.” For the first three decades after independence, Kyrgyzstan laid no new railway track. Construction of the planned 186-kilometer Balykchy-Kochkor-Kara-Keche line began in March 2022. Japarov said crews carried out about one million cubic meters of blasting work and cleared eight kilometers through mountainous ground. The route also crosses wetland and rocky areas near the Orto-Tokoy reservoir, existing roads, and utility lines. According to Japarov, construction of the track cost $955,000 per kilometer, which he compared with offers from foreign companies ranging from $4.8 million to $6.8 million per kilometer. “We understood that this was too expensive, so we decided to take the risk and do the work ourselves,” he said. The $955,000 figure appears to cover the track itself rather than the full cost of the line. In June 2025, Kyrgyz Temir Jolu estimated the 63-kilometer project at 9.472 billion som, or about $108 million at the official exchange rate, roughly $1.72 million per kilometer. Japarov’s speech did not set out what work was included in the foreign proposals. The state railway financed the first stage from its own resources. An October 2025 cabinet decree allows Kyrgyz Temir Jolu to retain half the net profit it would otherwise pay into the state budget from 2026 through 2030, which can be used to fund the route to Makmal and the company’s wider development. Turning to the alternative North-South highway between Balykchy and Jalal-Abad, Japarov said its projected cost was $2.5 million per kilometer and alleged that “more than half” of this sum had been embezzled. He did not identify any company, official, or investigation supporting the claim. Questions over the highway’s costs predate Japarov’s accusation. A January 2023 Audit Chamber review found overstated work on the Aral-Kazarman section and said credit savings had been redirected contrary to the loan agreement. Three months later, local outlets cited security-service sources saying the GKNB had opened a case into suspected $123 million price inflation on the same section. No public outcome has been announced. Construction of the 433-kilometer highway began in 2014 and has suffered repeated delays. The route opened for seasonal traffic from June to November 2026, but the Transport Ministry expects year-round operation only in 2028 after further safety work. The new railway gives Kochkor a direct connection to Kyrgyzstan’s northern rail system. It does not yet join the country’s northern and southern lines. Before the opening, Kyrgyzstan’s railway network covered 425...

Afghanistan

Central Asia Builds a Regional Track for Engagement with Afghanistan

The United States and Europe may have stepped back from Afghanistan, but the country’s instability still affects migration, security, trade, and humanitarian pressures far beyond its borders. Given their proximity, Central Asian states cannot and have not disengaged, and their efforts to keep Kabul connected to regional diplomacy and commerce serve interests that are also shared by the West. On June 16, the Center for Strategic Studies of Afghanistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs convened the first Afghanistan-Central Asia Think Tank Forum in Kabul, bringing together leaders and senior representatives from strategic research institutions across the region. Held under the theme "The Strategic Role of Think Tanks in Advancing Regional Cooperation," the forum included delegations from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan alongside their Afghan counterparts. [caption id="attachment_52266" align="aligncenter" width="1080"] Image: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan[/caption] In his keynote address, Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi observed that the international order stands at a delicate crossroads, divided by competing narratives and opposing camps: “Given the developments and challenges in the global structure, the current international order finds itself at a sensitive juncture in history — a period marked, on the one hand, by various illusions and contradictory narratives, and, on the other, by efforts toward cooperation and multilateralism.” In essence, Muttaqi was advocating for an international order that allows Afghanistan and its neighbors to chart their own courses while engaging constructively with willing partners. Speaking to those in his immediate region, he drew attention to shared challenges, among them climate change, water shortages, economic headwinds, and conflict spillover, and asserted that “There is no doubt that, in order to make more effective and constructive decisions and to develop indigenous narratives for our region and shared future, specialists and researchers from academic and intellectual institutions must draft practical and comprehensive roadmaps for future cooperation across various fields.” Muttaqi underscored to participants the growing recognition that regional states stand to gain more through practical cooperation than through isolation or unilateral approaches. He reaffirmed Afghanistan's commitment to advancing the research-based proposals discussed at the April Consultative Dialogue in Kabul to help inform regional political and economic decision-making. His remarks reflected a view that broad-based economic development and good-neighborly relations are mutually reinforcing foundations of societal stability within a shared civilizational context—a perspective widely shared across the Central Asian republics. That is why, for example, he highlighted the need to follow through on economic and connectivity opportunities, citing projects such as CASA-1000, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity transmission project (TAP-500), the Lapis Lazuli Route, and the Afghan-Trans railway. These initiatives are in various stages of development, some having been stalled for decades. Javlon Vakhabov, former Uzbek ambassador to the United States and currently Director of the International Institute for Central Asia (IICA) in Tashkent, travelled to Kabul for the Forum. In his address, he summed up the mood of the participants: “In this emerging Greater Central Asia, Afghanistan is not a periphery. It is the southern gateway of our region, linking Central...

Middle East Crisis

Kazakhstan’s Persian Gulf Port Plan Faces New Iran Risk

Kazakhstan has moved a long-planned southern trade project from talks to contract. The move gives Astana a possible foothold on the Persian Gulf, but it comes as a second night of U.S. strikes on Iran and Iranian retaliation around the Gulf states have raised the cost of using that route. On June 28, Kazakhstan and Iran signed a 27-year BOT agreement to build a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Iran’s Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. The contract gives the project two years for construction and 25 years for operation, with commercial activity expected in the third year. Aman Malgazhdarov of QazExportPromotion signed for Kazakhstan, and Hossein Abbas Nejad of Hormozgan’s Ports and Maritime Organization signed for Iran. The project is designed to plug Kazakhstan into the International North-South Transport Corridor and widen export access to the Persian Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Africa. The $25 million investment covers a 15-hectare logistics center that could handle 1.5 million tons of goods a year. Mohammad Shakibi-Nasab, the head of Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization, said it would “create jobs… increase the operational capacity” of Shahid Rajaee and “boost ports along the North-South corridor.” Malgazhdarov called it the “core of a future Kazakh port” within Shahid Rajaee. That ambition now sits beside a worsening security picture. On July 8, U.S. President Donald Trump declared the interim agreement to end the Iran war “over” after attacks on three cargo ships in the Strait of Hormuz. Asked about the deal, Trump said: “It’s over. I don’t want to deal with them.” The U.S. then launched a new round of strikes, and Iran fired on U.S. sites in Bahrain and Kuwait. U.S. Central Command said the attacks were meant to “further degrade” Iran’s ability to threaten navigation in the strait, with Trump warning, “If it happens again, it will get much worse!” By July 9, the U.S. military said it had struck 170 Iranian targets in 48 hours. Iran had fired at U.S. bases in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, and Iran’s health ministry said U.S. strikes on July 7 and 8 killed 14 people and wounded 78. The attacks hit Bandar Abbas, where Shahid Rajaee is located, and other southern coastal areas. Crude oil prices rose by 5% as the risk widened. For Kazakhstan, the timing is uncomfortable. Shahid Rajaee sits near the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway that connects the Persian Gulf to the open sea. The port offers one of Central Asia’s shortest southern outlets, but the approach depends on a zone where security, insurance premiums, and naval risk can change quickly. A terminal can lower handling costs and improve control over cargo, but it cannot remove war risk at the maritime end of the corridor. The risk may not be limited to the Gulf. The Financial Times reported that a railway bridge near Aqqala in Golestan Province was hit with cruise missiles, citing Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. The bridge lies on the Gorgan-Incheh Borun line, which carries passengers and cargo...

Infrastructure finance

Opinion: Central Asia’s Shift from Silk Road Romance to Infrastructure Finance – What the June Forums Are Building

In mid-June, Tashkent and Baku will host two major international finance gatherings within the same regional window: the fifth Tashkent International Investment Forum in Uzbekistan, and the Islamic Development Bank Group’s 2026 Annual Meetings in Azerbaijan. The overlap in timing is useful less as a calendar coincidence than as a signal of how infrastructure, finance, and regional integration are now being discussed together. In Tashkent, the fifth Tashkent International Investment Forum opens under the theme “Investment Resilience: New Frontiers, New Partnerships.” In Baku, the Islamic Development Bank Group will convene delegates from its 57 member countries under the theme “Regional Integration for Sustainable Prosperity.” Add the Astana International Financial Centre’s increasingly active forum calendar, a new cross-border Islamic finance alliance signed in May among regional industry associations, and a stream of connectivity and green investment pledges from recent regional summits, and the wider region looks increasingly focused on turning connectivity talk into investment structures. The more important question is not how much money is being discussed, but what kinds of projects are becoming investable. One answer keeps surfacing: a multi-thousand-kilometer trade route that carries goods from China across Kazakhstan, over the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, and onward through Georgia and Türkiye to Europe. The Middle Corridor, formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, runs through many of the investment pitches now being made across the region. The forums show how infrastructure, finance, and regional connectivity are increasingly being discussed together. The corridor is one of the clearest tests of whether that agenda can move from conference language into bankable projects. For most of the past century, the world categorized this region under two headings. One is heritage: the caravanserais and blue domes of the old Silk Road. The other is hydrocarbons: the oil and gas beneath the Caspian basin. Both cast the region as a place value came out of or once passed through. The corridor proposes something more ambitious: that value should pass through again, but this time on terms shaped by the region itself. The shift is from selling what lies underground to earning from where the region sits on the map. Freight volumes on the Middle Corridor have risen roughly fivefold over recent years, while transit times have been cut from about a month to roughly two weeks as border procedures and port operations improved. The World Bank’s benchmark study sets out the goal of tripling freight volumes and halving travel time by 2030, and regional projections now point to annual throughput of around ten million tons or more by the end of the decade. For landlocked economies long dependent on a single route to world markets, a second viable artery is less a convenience than a form of strategic insurance. But turning a route on a map into a working corridor requires serious capital. It requires expanded port capacity on the Caspian, additional vessels and ferries, rail upgrades, terminal infrastructure, and the less visible digital and customs systems that allow cargo to clear multiple borders...

Trade Corridors

Opinion: Eurasia’s New Corridors Are More Than a Transit Race

Across Eurasia, new transport corridors are usually described as instruments of rivalry: routes to bypass Russia, ports to outflank competitors, or rail links to shift influence between regions. The conflict around Iran, the rivalry between India and Pakistan, instability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan zone, crises in the Middle East, sanctions, competition over transport routes, and growing struggles for transit influence all reinforce the image of a continent divided by political contradictions. Increasingly, this is the lens through which Eurasia is viewed. The development of transport routes and connectivity is now often explained through the logic of rivalry. Some corridors are described as alternatives to others. Certain ports are positioned against competing ports. Routes are increasingly perceived as tools of competition, circumvention, or geopolitical influence. The continent can also be viewed differently. Alongside political crises, another reality is visible: the continent continues to connect itself through new routes and networks. Railways, ports, energy grids, dry ports, container corridors, digital cables, and trade chains are gradually linking spaces that only recently were seen as separate regions. In many ways, Eurasia has always been a space of movement, exchange, and connectivity. The Silk Road Was a Network, Not a Single Route A recent article by News Central Asia made a simple but important observation: the Silk Road functioned because it belonged to everyone. This idea contains one of the central lessons of Eurasian history. The Silk Road was never a single road. It was not one unified highway built according to a master plan or controlled by a single center. For centuries, the continent was connected by a vast network of caravan routes, maritime pathways, mountain passes, cities, and trade hubs through which goods, people, knowledge, and ideas circulated. Some routes gained importance while others temporarily declined. States, empires, and commercial centers changed. New pathways emerged. Yet the network itself endured. The strength of the Silk Road lay not in one route, but in the multiplicity of connections. When one corridor became unsafe, trade shifted elsewhere. When political conditions changed, commerce adapted to a new geography. The continental network remained flexible and multilayered. This offers an important lesson for today’s Eurasian space as well. Many modern transport corridors did not emerge from nothing. In many respects, they follow historical logic. Railways have replaced caravan paths, dry ports have succeeded old trade hubs, and container routes continue along directions in which goods moved for centuries. Corridors and the Logic of Rivalry Today, most transport and economic corridors are interpreted as competing projects. Nearly every new route is framed through confrontation, alternatives, or attempts to bypass another direction. The Middle Corridor is often described as an alternative to northern routes. The International North-South Transport Corridor is presented as a separate geo-economic axis. Trans-Afghan projects are portrayed as competitors to other links between Central and South Asia. Chabahar and Gwadar are depicted as rival ports. Even the South Caucasus transport hub is increasingly viewed through the prism of struggles over control of routes and flows. Yet historically,...

Economy

Kazakhstan Freezes Projects with Iran Amid Military Conflict

Kazakhstan has suspended several joint projects with Iran amid ongoing military hostilities in the country, Deputy Foreign Minister Arman Issetov has announced. The decision effectively puts on hold plans to expand trade and economic cooperation between Astana and Tehran, despite previously stated ambitions to significantly increase bilateral trade. On December 11, 2025, during the Kazakhstan-Iran business forum in Astana, Tokayev said bilateral trade had exceeded $340 million the previous year. The two sides set an initial goal of raising trade to $1 billion, with a longer-term aim of doubling that figure. However, the escalation of military activity in Iran has forced both sides to reconsider these plans. “The situation is currently very complicated. At this point, many of our projects with Iran have been frozen due to the country being in a state of war. As a result, our businesses and entrepreneurs are now in a wait-and-see position,” Issetov said. “Kazakhstan is not suffering major losses, as the volumes were relatively small and did not significantly impact the national economy. Nevertheless, given our strong partnership with Iran, there is an effect, though not a substantial one,” he added. Despite the growth in trade, Iran’s share in Kazakhstan’s foreign economic relations remains limited. According to the Ministry of National Economy, exports to Iran in 2025 amounted to $239.3 million, while imports totaled $191 million, equivalent to roughly 0.3% of the country’s total foreign trade turnover. The agricultural sector accounted for the bulk of trade: approximately 90% of Kazakhstan’s exports to Iran consisted of wheat and barley. In the first ten months of last year alone, grain shipments reached $280 million, exceeding the total agricultural trade volume for 2024 ($220 million). Government officials believe these volumes can be redirected to alternative markets if necessary. From a logistics perspective, Iran is not considered a critical transit route for Kazakhstan. This was previously confirmed by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin. “I don’t think the conflict will have any impact on our logistics. Shipments through the Persian Gulf were never dominant for us,” he said. Despite its currently limited role, Iran had been viewed as a promising direction for the development of transport corridors. In December 2025, Tokayev announced plans to build a transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port, which was intended to provide direct access for Kazakh exports to global markets. Plans also included strengthening links between Kazakhstan’s ports of Aktau and Kuryk and Iran’s ports of Amirabad and Anzali, as well as integrating Bandar Abbas and Chabahar into regional logistics chains. “It is important for us to develop multimodal corridors connecting Central Asia with the Persian Gulf, and the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway plays a key role in this,” Tokayev previously stated. According to his estimates, cargo traffic along this route could have doubled by 2030. For now, those plans are effectively on hold. - Explore our complete Gulf crisis timeline, bringing together every major development and its implications for Central Asia in chronological order.