Transport and Logistics - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 138

Reshuffle

Tokayev Names Zhanassova Deputy Prime Minister in Transport Shake-Up

Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has replaced his transport minister and given the incoming officeholder the rank of deputy prime minister. The November 3 appointment puts Asel Zhanassova in charge of the ministry as Kazakhstan prepares a major infrastructure expansion. Zhanassova, previously deputy head of the Presidential Administration, succeeds Nurlan Sauranbayev. Her appointment decree formally combines the positions of deputy prime minister and transport minister, raising the portfolio’s standing within the government. Zhanassova becomes one of six deputy prime ministers, including First Deputy Prime Minister Nurlybek Nalibayev. The change comes less than a week after Tokayev announced plans to accelerate construction and expand freight routes linking China and Europe. Several major transport projects face deadlines in 2027, giving the new minister an immediate delivery agenda. Akorda gave no reason for Sauranbayev’s dismissal and announced no new appointment for him. His departure came six days after Tokayev criticized road quality and officials passing responsibility between central and local government. A New Minister with a Digital Background Zhanassova brings experience in digital technology and the management of Kazakhstan’s national postal operator. Born in Almaty in 1987, she graduated from the University of Cambridge in 2010 with a computer science degree. She studied under Kazakhstan’s Bolashak scholarship program. According to her published biography, her early career included technology and cybersecurity positions at an international company in London. She subsequently worked at Kazakhstan’s central bank and headed the state technology holding Zerde. She later held senior digital roles at the Astana International Financial Centre before becoming vice minister of trade and integration. From 2022 to 2025, she chaired Kazpost, a position that gave her experience managing a nationwide delivery network. Zhanassova became an adviser to Tokayev in June 2025 and deputy head of the Presidential Administration in December of that year. Her latest promotion moves her into a cabinet role combining transport management with deputy prime minister responsibilities. Sauranbayev had been appointed transport minister on June 30, 2025. His departure marks another leadership change in a ministry already subject to presidential scrutiny. His predecessor, Marat Karabayev, was dismissed in June 2025, following criticism of transport infrastructure and delays affecting transit development. An Extensive Construction Agenda In his October 28 State of the Nation Address, Tokayev outlined plans to allocate 6.5 trillion tenge, approximately $14.3 billion, from the National Fund to infrastructure by 2029. He also proposed designating 2027 as a year of large-scale construction. Transport forms a substantial part of that agenda. The 272-kilometer Bakhty–Ayagoz railway is scheduled to open in 2027, adding a border crossing with China. The project is expected to increase annual rail freight capacity between the two countries by 20 million metric tons. The Aral–Caspian Highway is another major undertaking. The approximately 800-kilometer route will connect Beineu in western Kazakhstan with Saksaulsk, near the Aral Sea. Construction began in August, with Tokayev saying the highway would shorten the freight route between China and Europe by approximately 1,000 kilometers and cut delivery times by three days. The government’s summary of the address...

Middle Corridor

Kazakhstan and Türkiye: Partners Across the Middle Corridor

On October 28 in Ankara, Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held talks in a narrow format and then with their delegations. They met less than six months after chairing the sixth bilateral High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council in Astana on May 14, suggesting a more intensive phase of presidential engagement. The agenda covered transport and logistics, energy, agriculture and investment. Erdoğan reaffirmed the ambition to raise bilateral trade to $15 billion. The Middle Corridor remains central to bilateral cooperation, alongside trade, energy production and corporate investment linking both countries. Complementary Commercial Roles The partnership supports cargo flows both westward to Europe and eastward from Türkiye. In May, KTZ Express and Pasifik Eurasia organized a train carrying 50 forty-foot containers of refrigerators from Izmir toward Chengxiang in China via Aktau and Altynkol. KTZ Express reported an 83-hour transit on the Aktau–Altynkol leg within Kazakhstan. The companies are developing eastbound backhaul, coordinating schedules and transit arrangements to balance cargo flows. Turkish exporters gain a route through Kazakhstan toward Chinese customers, while the operators seek cargo to sustain services in both directions. Kazakhstan’s inland rail network and Türkiye’s connections to European markets give the two countries complementary roles along the corridor. After crossing the Caspian, the Middle Corridor offers shippers an overland continuation through Türkiye alongside maritime routes through Georgian Black Sea ports. KTZ Express also cooperates with Maersk on Black Sea logistics. Azerbaijan and Georgia connect the Kazakhstani and Turkish sections of this route. Ankara and Astana share an interest in attracting cargo through Türkiye within this network of alternative routes. Kazakhstan’s inland rail investment supports the route toward Türkiye. According to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s 2026 project appraisal, the second track on the Dostyk–Mointy line has been completed. A further project would construct a new Mointy–Kyzylzhar section, bypassing congestion in central Kazakhstan to improve corridor alignment and capacity. Farther west, rail services reach Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports, where cargo transfers to maritime transport. Added rail capacity benefits bilateral services insofar as ports and vessels can accommodate the resulting flows. Connecting the Route Azerbaijan’s ports and railways connect Kazakhstan’s Caspian services with routes through Georgia to Türkiye. Crossing between rail networks separated by sea requires coordination of trains, vessels, and port handling. Kazakhstan’s container traffic uses Aktau, while Kuryk handles rail and road-vehicle ferries serving Alat in Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan and Türkiye therefore need cooperation with Azerbaijan and the operators responsible for transferring cargo between rail and sea. Work on the Georgian section of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway was completed in 2026. In June, Türkiye’s Transport Ministry described the completion as a new operational stage for the line, which opened in 2017. The railway carries cargo arriving through Azerbaijan across Georgia into Türkiye. At the June ceremony, Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu emphasized regular cargo flows, operational coordination, and reliable service. Türkiye’s rail improvements toward the Bulgarian border strengthen its European connection and extend the corridor’s commercial reach. The Çerkezköy–Kapıkule section opened in October as part of the wider Halkalı–Kapıkule project;...

OTS summit

OTS Summit in Ankara: Türkiye Looks to Strengthen Its Position as Central Asia Competes for Transit Routes

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev arrived in Ankara on October 28, the day he delivered his annual State of the Nation Address, in which he announced plans to expand transport routes between China and Europe. On October 30, he will attend the 13th summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Turkey is preparing to take over the organization's chairmanship from Azerbaijan, and Central Asian countries are seeking to accelerate freight transportation across the Caspian Sea. Behind the shared rhetoric of Turkic unity lie specific economic interests. Kazakhstan is building railways and expanding its capacity to handle transit cargo from China. Azerbaijan is developing Caspian ports and transport infrastructure in the South Caucasus. Turkey wants to attract more freight moving between China and Europe through Central Asia, increasing its role as a transit hub. A unified route looks much simpler on a political map than it does in the daily operations of transport companies. Between China and Europe, cargo crosses several borders, is transferred from trains to ships and back, undergoes customs clearance, and is subject to tariffs set by different operators. Interest in alternative Eurasian transport routes has grown since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but the competition extends beyond freight. Ankara is looking to strengthen its political presence in Central Asia, where Russia and China retain considerable influence. Summit events begin on October 29 with a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, chaired by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. The nation’s presidents will meet on the following day. Participants are expected to adopt the Ankara Declaration, discuss investment, energy, digitalization, security, and appoint a new OTS secretary-general. Tokayev and Kazakhstan's Route to Europe Tokayev's visit to Turkey follows directly after his State of the Nation Address, much of which focused on infrastructure, including plans to open the 272-kilometer Bakhty–Ayagoz railway in 2027. The line is expected to add 20 million metric tons of annual freight capacity between Kazakhstan and China. Tokayev also discussed construction of the Aral–Caspian highway. The project would establish a new transport connection between western and central Kazakhstan. According to government estimates, it could shorten certain freight routes between China and Europe by approximately 1,000 kilometers and reduce delivery times by up to three days. Both projects are part of a broader effort to increase Kazakhstan's revenue from international logistics. The country currently earns a substantial share of its transit revenue directly from freight transportation. Developing warehouses, terminals, processing facilities, and distribution centers could generate additional income. Turkey occupies an important position in this network. An overland branch of the Middle Corridor passes through its territory en route to European markets; the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway connects Azerbaijan to Turkey's rail network through Georgia. On the sidelines of the Ankara summit, Turkish business associations plan to discuss border crossing operations, transportation costs, and the development of the Middle Corridor. Transport geography, however, does not fit neatly within the OTS's political boundaries. Georgia, through which the railway connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey passes, is not a member...

CAMCA

At CAMCA, Uzbekistan Revives Push for a Stronger Regional Body

Uzbekistan has renewed its call for a stronger regional institution, with senior senator Sodiq Safoev urging Central Asian leaders to move beyond their consultative meeting format. His remarks in Baku return attention to a proposal President Shavkat Mirziyoyev outlined last November, when he called for a Community of Central Asia. Safoev, first deputy chairman of Uzbekistan’s Senate, told the CAMCA Regional Forum on October 1: “I think the time has come to transform the Consultative Meeting … into another institutional structure, not simply a Consultative Meeting, but something more.” S. Frederick Starr, chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, also called for stronger regional institutions at the forum, arguing that institutional development needed to support the expansion of transport and commercial links across the region. At the November 16, 2025, summit in Tashkent, Mirziyoyev proposed a rotating secretariat and stronger rules governing the leaders’ meetings. He also proposed making national coordinators special presidential representatives, giving them greater political authority. The secretariat would coordinate work between summits. The machinery for regular cooperation is already developing. The Council of National Coordinators held its first meeting in Tashkent on January 30–31, 2025, where foreign ministry representatives from all five Central Asian states discussed preparations for Uzbekistan’s chairmanship and a schedule of joint events. Mirziyoyev returned to the institutional argument at the July 31 informal summit in Cholpon Ata, calling for closer contacts between government departments and long-term joint programs, alongside effective cooperation institutions. His agenda included further work on common digital services and investment platforms, as well as industrial links connecting production across national borders. He also urged stronger coordination in the Central Asia Plus diplomatic formats through which the region engages outside powers. Azerbaijan’s participation has widened the scope of those discussions. The five Central Asian presidents accepted Azerbaijan as a full participant in November 2025, extending the format across the Caspian. The six-country grouping, increasingly described as C6, connects Central Asian producers with a country whose ports and onward transport links provide access through the South Caucasus to European markets. At an August 12 discussion in Washington, Uzbekistan’s ambassador Furqat Sidiqov emphasized market access and called for further digitalization of the Middle Corridor. He said Uzbekistan had about 1,500 joint ventures with neighboring states, compared with close to 300 involving Central Asian countries in 2017. Turkmenistan’s ambassador, Esen Aydogdyyev, stressed simpler customs procedures and argued that his country’s permanent neutrality was compatible with deeper economic cooperation. The commercial ambition also extends to joint production. In Baku, Azerbaijan’s minister of the economy Mikayil Jabbarov urged countries to build regional value chains in sectors where their economies complement each other. “We should increasingly produce together,” he said, pointing to companies and financial institutions already operating in one another’s markets. Moving freight across the Caspian requires countries to coordinate customs procedures and transport services. The World Bank’s new Trans-Caspian corridor study identifies fragmented governance and uneven policy implementation as problems that compound infrastructure bottlenecks. It estimates that at least $25 billion is needed through 2040...

CKU Railway

Opinion: China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Opens New Options Beyond Europe

The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is often presented as a new route to Europe, but its first benefits are likely to be felt closer to home. It could give Central Asian shippers more choice and governments more room to negotiate transport costs, even where sanctions restrict access to European markets. Excavation of the 209.6-meter Kosh-Dobo North No. 2 tunnel was completed on August 5. Work is also underway on other tunnels along Kyrgyzstan’s mountainous section of the railway. CKU is advancing as falling Caspian water levels make the Middle Corridor more expensive to maintain. That could increase demand for alternative routes, although each comes with its own costs and restrictions. Kyrgyz officials have high expectations. Deputy Prime Minister Edil Baisalov told TCA that “this railroad will virtually transform Kyrgyzstan.” Fulfilling that ambition will require the country to earn more than transit fees. Much depends on Makmal, where a transshipment station and possible logistics center are planned. The Torugart-Makmal section will use the Chinese standard gauge of 1,435 mm, while the Makmal-Jalal-Abad section will use the 1,520 mm gauge common across the post-Soviet rail system. Changing gauge adds time and expense as cargo moves between trains. The planned station will handle transfers between the two systems, as well as cargo sorting and train assembly, operations which could support local logistics businesses, provided there is enough traffic. Warehousing and customs services would give Kyrgyzstan a chance to earn more from that traffic. Whether Makmal develops into a wider logistics hub will depend on the services available and their cost to shippers. The mountainous terrain makes the line expensive and slow to build. It also limits the options for competing routes through the Tien Shan. That may strengthen Kyrgyzstan’s negotiating position, but only if the railway offers a reliable service at competitive rates. The trans-Caspian Middle Corridor avoids Russia and Iran, making it more attractive to European companies concerned about sanctions. Yet, as TCA has reported, falling Caspian water levels are raising the cost of the route through Aktau and Kuryk. Low sea levels around Aktau and Kuryk reduce loading efficiency and increase transport costs. Kazakhstan has dredged Kuryk and launched deeper work at Aktau, aiming for a 7.7-meter depth in the operational part of the port. The Caspian route remains workable, but maintaining it requires continuing investment. If those costs rise, shippers will have more reason to compare alternatives. There are also delays to address. In a recent TCA interview, the TITR secretary general stressed the need to speed up the route and ease Caspian bottlenecks as freight volumes grow. A southern route could avoid Caspian transshipment. From Uzbekistan, cargo can move through Turkmenistan and Iran to Turkey. Uzbek, Iranian, and Turkish officials have already discussed linking this corridor with the CKU railway. Some freight already travels south on existing lines. In September, a 55-container block train was dispatched from Kazakhstan’s Altynkol station after crossing from China. Its announced route ran through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to Iran via the Sarakhs border station. It carried...

Central Asia-South Korea summit 2026

From Critical Minerals to Connectivity: South Korea’s Stakes in Central Asia

On September 16, Seoul hosted the first Korea–Central Asia Summit, bringing President Lee Jae Myung together with the heads of all five Central Asian states. The meeting elevated a dialogue that has run at a ministerial level since 2007 to the level of heads of state. The leaders adopted a Seoul Declaration setting the terms for future engagement and agreed to hold summits every two years. On September 14, trade and industry ministers from South Korea and the five Central Asian states met in Seoul for the first C5+Korea Industry Ministers’ Meeting. They signed a joint statement launching a standing platform for industrial cooperation. Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investment, Industry and Trade used the occasion to push for a shift away from raw-material trade toward joint production and localization. Behind the diplomatic choreography sits a practical problem: the minerals both sides keep discussing cannot move without a route to carry them. A Minerals Agenda with Separate Tracks South Korea relies heavily on imported minerals for its manufacturing industries. Seoul has been developing separate plans with each country. With Tajikistan, discussions have focused on gold and silver, alongside antimony. With Kyrgyzstan, Seoul has been discussing antimony and tungsten. Cooperation with Uzbekistan covers minerals and digital manufacturing. With Kazakhstan, a central issue is moving beyond raw exports toward processing inside the country, as The Times of Central Asia reported ahead of the summit. South Korean firms are pursuing supply diversification independently. POSCO International and LX International have been expanding overseas mineral investments, including graphite and nickel projects, amid Chinese export restrictions. The Transport Connection Consider the Bolashak chrome mine in Kazakhstan, which Eurasian Resources Group launched in late 2024. The company plans to ramp it up to a design capacity of 7.5 million metric tons of chrome ore a year. Production on that scale makes reliable transport an essential part of the commercial equation. An Atlantic Council analysis identifies limited processing capacity and underdeveloped westward routes as obstacles to U.S. mineral partnerships with Central Asia. It presents the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor as a route to Western markets that avoids Russian and Iranian territory. That argument needs a distinction when applied to Korea. The corridor runs westward toward Europe; it is not a prerequisite for minerals to reach South Korea. Its relevance is the wider choice of buyers it could offer Central Asian producers, including potential Korean-backed processing ventures serving those markets. That corridor is being built out. The Aktau container hub has a planned capacity of 240,000 twenty-foot equivalent units. The World Bank-backed Mointy–Kyzylzhar railway is meant to remove a 149-kilometer detour and accommodate 30 train pairs a day, against roughly ten on the existing constrained route. Traffic is already rising: 125 container trains crossed Kazakhstan on the Trans-Caspian route in the first quarter of 2026, up 34.4% year-on-year. Japan has also become involved, pledging in August 2025 to help modernize customs operations at the port of Aktau. The Seoul Declaration also backs Korean participation in transport infrastructure, including modernization and digitalization. In...