Transport and Logistics - The Times Of Central Asia

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Middle Corridor

Middle Corridor Must Cut Delays, TITR Chief Tells TCA

The Middle Corridor has spent the past several years attracting freight away from longer or politically sensitive routes between Asia and Europe. Now its operators must make it function as a single, reliable corridor. “Reducing transit time is achieved not through a single solution, but through the consistent modernization of all key links along the route, from ports and terminals to railway infrastructure and digital tools,” Nurgul Zhakupova, Secretary General of the International Association “Trans-Caspian International Transport Route,” told The Times of Central Asia. [caption id="attachment_54935" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Nurgul Zhakupova, Secretary General of TITR. Image courtesy of the subject[/caption] Known internationally as the Middle Corridor, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) connects China with Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, with onward connections through Turkey. Freight traffic has risen sharply since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine increased demand for routes bypassing Russia. According to official figures, container traffic grew by 36% in 2025 to around 77,000 TEUs, although total freight volume slipped to about 4.12 million tons from 4.48 million tons in 2024. The World Bank estimates that freight volumes along the Middle Corridor could triple and transit times could be halved by 2030 if the necessary investments and reforms are made. The European Union and international financial institutions have meanwhile committed to mobilizing €10 billion for sustainable transport connectivity in Central Asia, with the aim of developing a route capable of linking Central Asia and Europe in around 15 days. For Zhakupova, that means tackling bottlenecks across several countries at the same time. Building a faster railway in Kazakhstan achieves little if cargo then waits for a ship on the Caspian, becomes stuck at a border, or encounters another congested section farther west. [caption id="attachment_54945" align="aligncenter" width="1535"] Infographic: TCA[/caption] Infrastructure Races to Catch Up One immediate challenge is expanding infrastructure fast enough to accommodate container traffic and anticipated future freight growth. Kazakhstan launched the second Dostyk-Moyynty railway line and the Almaty bypass in 2025. Construction of the Moyynty-Kyzylzhar line and modernization of other sections are continuing. The Dostyk-Moyynty project alone stretches 836 kilometers and is expected to substantially increase rail capacity on the China-Kazakhstan axis. One of the Middle Corridor’s most difficult bottlenecks is not on land, but on the Caspian Sea. Growing traffic requires more vessels, while falling water levels and adverse weather complicate port and shipping operations. KTZ Express plans to acquire six multipurpose dry cargo container vessels: four are to be built by China’s Jiangsu Haizhongzhou Shipping Industry and two by the Baku Shipyard. Kazmortransflot is building two container vessels in partnership with Abu Dhabi Ports Group, while Azerbaijan is also considering expanding its fleet with ferries and roll-on/roll-off vessels for wheeled cargo. “Additional limiting factors remain the falling level of the Caspian Sea and adverse weather conditions. In this regard, a range of measures is also being implemented at the ports of Aktau, Baku, and Kuryk to minimize the impact of these factors on the stability of transportation,” Zhakupova told TCA. In Kuryk,...

Middle East Crisis

Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean....

Middle Corridor

Insider’s View: Why Uzbekistan’s Caspian Push Might Be Beneficial for Georgia

Over the past year, Georgia has shifted its focus towards Central Asia, establishing strategic partnerships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The country has long-term plans for the region in several development areas, including trade and transport logistics. However, the current phase of Georgian–Central Asian relations is not solely based on economic pragmatism. It should also be viewed as a means of preserving sovereignty in the face of global challenges that are catalyzing the old-world order to collapse. In this context, strategic connectivity can be defined as a vital component of small states’ long-term stability and security, placing it on a par with defense capabilities. By intensifying political and economic ties with Tbilisi, Tashkent is seeking to reinforce the Western orientation of its foreign policy. This is necessary to successfully balance between the major powers and minimize the risk of becoming overly dependent on neighboring Russia or China, for example. However, this move should not be perceived as a counter to the geopolitical ambitions of non-regional actors in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. It is devoid of political overtones and reflects the parties’ desire to strengthen their sovereignty based on shared economic interests and opportunities. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) is the key driver in this dynamic, and its significance extends far beyond transport connectivity. It is a mutually beneficial initiative whose ultimate goal is to ensure regional stability and sustainable economic growth. Thus, Uzbekistan gains an alternative route to the European Union market — the country’s third-largest trading partner — via the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi on the Black Sea coast. Meanwhile, the Trans-Caspian route provides Georgia with access to the rapidly growing markets of East and South Asia via Uzbekistan and neighboring countries. The new transit corridor concepts promoted by Uzbekistan in the context of the expanding Central Asian partnership deserve special attention. Tashkent and Tbilisi have enormous potential to develop transport cooperation by establishing intercontinental logistics chains: China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey/EU, and India–Pakistan–Afghanistan–Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan–Azerbaijan–Georgia–EU. Both projects involve connecting the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway and the Trans-Afghan Railway Corridor (the Kabul Corridor), which are an absolute priority for Uzbekistan, with the Middle Corridor. This will significantly increase the republic’s exports of transport services by attracting additional transit flows from the South Caucasus, Turkey and Europe, while also expanding the freight base for the aforementioned railway corridors. The issue of jointly promoting new trade routes along the east-west and north-south axes (from Europe to China and India, respectively) through Uzbekistan requires ongoing expert discussion to amplify its relevance. To fully realize its own transit potential, it is insufficient for Uzbekistan to focus solely on the infrastructure development of the Middle Corridor. This is because, even after the launch of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, the country’s ability to attract additional transit cargo flows would remain very limited due to Kazakhstan’s dominance in rail transport between the EU, Central Asia, and China via the Caspian Sea. For Uzbekistan, it is far more important to extend the Middle Corridor to China and India. This would...

Logistics Infrastructure

Landlocked Kazakhstan Builds a Logistics Network from China to the Black Sea

Although Kazakhstan is landlocked, companies based in the country already hold stakes in logistics terminals at Lianyungang on China’s Yellow Sea coast and in Poti on the Black Sea. Projects farther west are at various stages of development. The strategy allows Kazakhstan-based operators to remain involved as freight travels between Asian ports and European markets, including beyond Kazakhstan’s borders. One of the main facilities is at the Chinese port of Lianyungang. The China-Kazakhstan Logistics Cooperation Base began operating in May 2014. It was jointly developed by Lianyungang Port and Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ), Kazakhstan’s national railway operator. Cargo arriving by sea can be transferred to rail for shipment through Kazakhstan toward Central Asia and Europe. In a written response to The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Transport said the Lianyungang terminal handled 2.39 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) from 2015 through 2025. Annual throughput rose from 167,000 TEU in 2015 to 271,700 TEU in 2025. A further 140,100 TEU passed through the terminal during the first half of 2026, down 3.2% year on year. According to Samruk-Kazyna, the network extends inland to a terminal in Xi’an and includes Khorgos Gateway at the Kazakhstan-China border. The fund said a dry port in Chengdu would be added in 2027. At the western end, Kazakhstan-based PTC Holding and Georgian partners developed a multimodal terminal that opened in Poti in June 2025 after investment of more than $30 million. The operator currently lists annual throughput capacity at up to 100,000 TEU. Between the terminals in China and Georgia lies Kazakhstan’s rail network, which carries cargo to the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk. These links form Kazakhstan’s section of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, known as the Middle Corridor. The route connects China with Europe across the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus. Kazakhstan is pursuing further terminal projects along the route. In July 2026, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were preparing to begin construction of a joint intermodal terminal at Alat. Work was awaiting completion of the Port of Baku’s updated master plan. In June 2026, Kazakhstan’s government said work would begin on terminals in Budapest and Constanța. Later that month, KTZ Express signed an agreement with Midia Marine Terminal for a joint project at Romania’s Port of Midia. The European projects have yet to reach the operating stage. The value of this terminal network becomes clearer from the way the Middle Corridor operates. Containers must move between rail and ships for the Caspian crossing, so faster transit across Kazakhstan cannot determine the total journey time. The World Bank has identified the Caspian and Black Sea crossings as bottlenecks requiring greater vessel availability and higher port productivity. Transit times vary by destination. Turkish officials reported in August 2025 that a freight train from China had reached Turkey in 15 days, while earlier journeys often took more than 20 days because of customs procedures and weather on the Caspian Sea. A 15-day journey should therefore be treated as a benchmark rather than a guaranteed...

Middle Corridor

Aral–Caspian Highway Project Advances Kazakhstan’s Bid for Eurasian Logistics Leadership

Kazakhstan has begun building an 800-kilometer highway that will give freight moving east and west a shorter road connection to the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk. The government says the project could cut nearly 1,000 kilometers and up to three days from journeys between Europe and China, while improving Kazakhstan’s access to European and regional markets. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev launched construction of the Beineu–Saksaulsk highway on August 3, and ordered its completion by 2029. He proposed calling it the Aral–Caspian Highway because it will run from Saksaulsk, near the Aral Sea, west to Beineu and the road network serving Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports. At Saksaulsk, three routes meet. The Kyzylorda road runs southeast to the Western Europe–Western China highway. The Ulgaysyn road continues northwest toward Aktobe. The new highway will run west to Beineu, from where roads lead to Aktau and Kuryk. The result is a more direct connection between southern Kazakhstan, the Aktobe corridor, and the Caspian coast, as outlined in the government’s wider road program. The government is reconstructing and expanding the Kyzylorda–Saksaulsk and Ulgaysyn–Saksaulsk sections alongside the new highway. The three projects cover a combined 1,574 kilometers. The authorities expect annual freight volumes along the routes to rise 2.5-fold to 13.2 million tons and say construction will create more than 10,000 jobs. Tokayev described the change as adding “horizontal connections” to Kazakhstan’s historically “vertical transportation networks.” His stated goal is to transform Kazakhstan into “one of the leading logistics hubs connecting Europe and Asia.” The road will feed into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor. Goods can move west from Kazakhstan across the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye, or east along the same route into Central and East Asia. The corridor gives European companies another path into Central Asian markets and gives Kazakhstan additional options for reaching Europe. The corridor is often presented as a China–Europe land-bridge, but the World Bank’s analysis expects most of its future traffic to be generated within the corridor region. Its modeling projects trade between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and the European Union to rise by 28% by 2030, while intercontinental freight remains below 40% of total volume. The commercial case therefore includes Kazakh exports moving west, European goods moving east, and regional cargo that never travels the full distance between Europe and China. Europe is already supporting parts of the network. The EU’s €30 million Trans-Caspian transport program backs preparatory work for the modernization of the Beineu–Saksaulsk road and improvements at Aktau. In June, Kazakhstan and European partners announced $462 million in transport agreements, including financing for the Aktobe–Ulgaysyn road and cooperation with A.P. Moller-Maersk on container shipping along the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan also enters the competition with infrastructure already in use. It has a direct border with China, established railways carrying freight across the country, and operating Caspian ports. Uzbekistan is advancing the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and other routes, but The Times of Central Asia has previously reported that Kazakhstan retains the stronger position for now because several of...

Railway Infrastructure

Kyrgyzstan Opens New Railway as Japarov Alleges North-South Highway Embezzlement

Kyrgyzstan has opened a 63-kilometer railway between Balykchy and Kochkor, completing the first stage of a domestic route intended to reach the Kara-Keche coalfield and eventually connect the country’s divided rail network. President Sadyr Japarov travelled to the new Kochkor station by train on July 25. The line extends rail service from the western edge of Lake Issyk-Kul into Naryn Region, where difficult mountain terrain has long limited transport links. “We have revived the culture of railway construction, our engineering potential, and professional experience,” Japarov said. “This historic achievement proves that our country can independently carry out large infrastructure projects.” For the first three decades after independence, Kyrgyzstan laid no new railway track. Construction of the planned 186-kilometer Balykchy-Kochkor-Kara-Keche line began in March 2022. Japarov said crews carried out about one million cubic meters of blasting work and cleared eight kilometers through mountainous ground. The route also crosses wetland and rocky areas near the Orto-Tokoy reservoir, existing roads, and utility lines. According to Japarov, construction of the track cost $955,000 per kilometer, which he compared with offers from foreign companies ranging from $4.8 million to $6.8 million per kilometer. “We understood that this was too expensive, so we decided to take the risk and do the work ourselves,” he said. The $955,000 figure appears to cover the track itself rather than the full cost of the line. In June 2025, Kyrgyz Temir Jolu estimated the 63-kilometer project at 9.472 billion som, or about $108 million at the official exchange rate, roughly $1.72 million per kilometer. Japarov’s speech did not set out what work was included in the foreign proposals. The state railway financed the first stage from its own resources. An October 2025 cabinet decree allows Kyrgyz Temir Jolu to retain half the net profit it would otherwise pay into the state budget from 2026 through 2030, which can be used to fund the route to Makmal and the company’s wider development. Turning to the alternative North-South highway between Balykchy and Jalal-Abad, Japarov said its projected cost was $2.5 million per kilometer and alleged that “more than half” of this sum had been embezzled. He did not identify any company, official, or investigation supporting the claim. Questions over the highway’s costs predate Japarov’s accusation. A January 2023 Audit Chamber review found overstated work on the Aral-Kazarman section and said credit savings had been redirected contrary to the loan agreement. Three months later, local outlets cited security-service sources saying the GKNB had opened a case into suspected $123 million price inflation on the same section. No public outcome has been announced. Construction of the 433-kilometer highway began in 2014 and has suffered repeated delays. The route opened for seasonal traffic from June to November 2026, but the Transport Ministry expects year-round operation only in 2028 after further safety work. The new railway gives Kochkor a direct connection to Kyrgyzstan’s northern rail system. It does not yet join the country’s northern and southern lines. Before the opening, Kyrgyzstan’s railway network covered 425...