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How Can Britain Benefit From the Middle Corridor?

On July 2nd, a roundtable held at the House of Lords, the upper chamber of the British parliament, brought together diplomats, trade envoys, logistics professionals, and academics to promote the Middle Corridor – the overland route connecting China to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The session aimed to highlight the strategic and economic case for British involvement in the corridor. However, in a crowded political landscape, the pitch struggled to gain airtime. On the same day, British economic minister Rachel Reeves shed tears in parliament’s lower chamber, sparking fears of political instability, and, a few miles away, the Wimbledon tennis season had just begun. In short, Westminster and the British media were elsewhere. Nonetheless, speakers made their case for the corridor’s importance to China-Europe freight. The Middle Corridor has gained attention as an alternative to the Northern Corridor – a rail network that runs from China through Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus, all members of the Eurasian Economic Union (a shared customs zone). The Northern route could, in theory, deliver goods from China to Europe in as little as ten days. But its viability has been damaged by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the sanctions regime that followed. Since then, cargo traffic along the Middle Corridor has surged. “Before the war in Ukraine, 99% of goods travelled along the northern corridor, and just 1% along the Middle Corridor,” said Dr Chris Brooks, Global Director of Risk, Quality and Compliance at Bertling Logistics. “Now it’s about 90% along the Middle Corridor.” In raw numbers, the increase has been stark. Back in 2021, cargo volume transported through the Middle Corridor was around 800,000 tonnes; that stood at 4.5 million tonnes at the end of 2024. “It is never going to be an alternative to the maritime route,” Brooks said, estimating that even with major investment, capacity would top out at around 16,000 tonnes per month, which is dwarfed by maritime trade between China and Europe, which totals around 800,000 tonnes a month. However, he did call the route a “strategic insurance policy,” citing its neutrality, flexibility, and compliance with Western sanctions. For automotive, electric, and fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) with short shelf lives, the route will prove particularly useful. “Whether you're going through the Red Sea or around the Cape of Good Hope, maritime typically takes anything between 35 and 52 days. The Northern Russian corridor is 10 to 20 days. The Middle Corridor can actually do similar.” But Brooks added that infrastructure and the weather remain limiting factors, meaning that lead times are anything between 14 and 45 days, with some shipments taking up to two months. “We have as many as 400 trucks queuing up… not because of customs – they’re just queuing to get onto the ferry from Baku to Kazakhstan… Drivers are waiting anything from one week to one month,” he said, adding his concerns that the corridor also has limited capacity to move large cargo. [caption id="attachment_33653" align="aligncenter" width="960"] Image: middlecorridor.com[/caption] Many speakers...

After High Hopes, Central Asia Views Iran Trade Routes with More Caution

Like some Central Asian neighbors, Uzbekistan is urgently reviewing possible changes to some trade routes because of conflict in the Middle East, even though that could entail sharply higher transport costs. The contingency planning follows a surge in trade talks between officials from Iran and countries in Central Asia earlier this year, prior to the intense strikes that Israel and Iran launched at each other this month. A ceasefire between Israel and Iran appeared to be holding on Wednesday, but questions remain about Iran’s ability to build a nuclear bomb even after the U.S. attacked Iranian nuclear sites. U.S. President Donald Trump said the sites were “obliterated,” but, according to some Western media organizations, a preliminary U.S. intelligence report concluded that the U.S. attacks may have only set back Iran’s nuclear program by months. A June 25 statement by the Central Intelligence Agency says that “Iran’s nuclear program has been severely damaged by the recent, targeted strikes.” Against this murky backdrop, and the partial uncertainty over Central Asia’s extensive web of trade links, Uzbekistan is reviewing transport and logistics arrangements to keep its economy and connections with international partners running as smoothly as possible. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev discussed options with key advisers at a meeting on Monday. “The military actions that have taken place in the Middle East in recent days have further aggravated the already unstable situation. This cannot but affect Uzbekistan's foreign economic relations and access to world markets,” Uzbekistan’s presidential office said. “In particular, the need to diversify export routes and redirect cargo to other, safer ports was noted. According to preliminary estimates, this could lead to an increase in transportation costs by up to 30%. In this regard, instructions were given to coordinate alternative routes with partner countries and support export-oriented enterprises,” the presidency said. It said the trade and transport ministers, as well as other key officials, have been instructed to help business groups with export-import operations and finding new sales markets. Maintaining price stability in the domestic market and sustainable production rates are also key concerns. Last month, Uzbek and Iranian officials met in Tehran and agreed to expand trade between their countries to an annual $2 billion, four times the current amount. Iranian ports offer Central Asian exporters access to the Indian Ocean and international markets beyond. “The five Central Asian republics — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan — are increasingly seeking alternatives to the traditional transit routes that have tied them to Moscow or made them dependent on Chinese infrastructure,” said a commentary posted by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, an Israel-based group that studies Mideast security and foreign policy. “Iran offers an appealing option: a gateway to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, access to European markets via Turkey, and industrial and technological partnerships that diversify the region’s economic relationships,” said the analysis, which was published on June 4, shortly before the recent round of fighting between Israel and Iran. Officials in Kazakhstan have warned of disruption to southern...

Central Asia and Israel, a Pragmatic Relationship That Never Truly Blossomed

The conflict between Israel and Iran is having both international and regional repercussions. The situation has been further inflamed by the U.S. bombing of several Iranian nuclear sites over the weekend, with Tehran responding by threatening retaliation on U.S. soil through the use of sleeper terrorist cells and the possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which over a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes. While Israel's geographical position places it at the heart of the Middle East, Iran's location brings the Islamic Republic into close contact with Central Asia. The consequences of the conflict are therefore likely to be felt heavily in the Central Asian region. The close relations between Tehran and the capitals of Central Asia, due in part to their geographical proximity, are often highlighted. Less explored is the nature of the relationship between Tel Aviv and Central Asia and the lines along which it has developed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On both the Israeli and Central Asian sides, despite all the differences, relations began in the early 1990s, mainly based on certain mutual interests. From Israel's point of view, relations with Central Asia would mean expanding the circle of Muslim countries with which it had friendly ties, gaining greater influence in the region, and reducing its diplomatic isolation. From the Central Asian perspective, the appeal lay in increasing the number of its international partners, coupled with a desire to access Israeli know-how in numerous fields, and the possibility, through relations with Tel Aviv, of having a privileged channel of dialogue with the United States. More than three decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, relations remain good for the most part. “The positive relationship between Israel and Central Asia is driven by a combination of strategic, economic, and geopolitical factors,” Dr Zeev Levin, Coordinator of the Central Asian Research Unit at the Harry S. Truman Institute, told The Times of Central Asia. “One of the primary drivers is mutual interest in security and counterterrorism. Economically, Israel’s expertise in water management, agriculture, and technology is highly attractive to the arid, resource-seeking nations of Central Asia that aim to modernize their infrastructure and diversify their economies beyond oil and gas. Additionally, fostering ties with Israel provides a means of diversifying the foreign policy portfolios of the Central Asian republics.” This positive relationship, however, seems to have lost momentum in recent years due to several factors. Central Asian republics have increasingly oriented towards the East, moving closer to China and other players such as South Korea, Japan, and India, or towards other partners, such as the European ones, with Italy at the forefront in this regard. As Levin points out, the relation has cooled due to several factors: “Central Asian republics did look to Israel in the first decade of independence, but in the last decade to a much lesser extent, since Turkey and China are less complicated and cheaper options. For Israel, the region was never a priority or a point of...

Kazakhstan: The Key Link Connecting China and Europe

China is one of Kazakhstan’s key partners, particularly in the development of its transit potential, with Kazakhstan serving as a strategic gateway for goods moving from China to the Eurasian Economic Union, Central Asia, and the European Union. Today, more than 80% of freight transported by rail between China and Europe transits through Kazakhstan. Railway Connections This year marks the 35th anniversary of the connection between the railways of Kazakhstan and China when the Dostyk-Alashankou crossing became the first international transportation route established in the era of Kazakh independence. For many years, it remained the sole railway connection, until in 2012, a second international border crossing, Altynkol-Khorgos, was opened. Today, freight traffic through these two crossings continues to show consistent and significant growth. Last year, rail freight between the two countries exceeded 32 million tons, which is a historic high. In the first four months of 2025 alone, rail freight volume reached 11.4 million tons, a 13.3% increase compared to the same period in the previous year. According to Kazakhstan’s national railway company, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ), the projected volume between the two countries for 2025 has been preliminarily agreed on at more than 33 million tons. To further increase capacity, Kazakhstan is building a second track on the Dostyk-Moyynty railway segment and constructing a bypass line around Almaty station. Both projects are scheduled for completion this year, which will boost throughput and significantly reduce delivery times for goods moving between Asia and Europe. Additionally, Kazakhstan is currently building the Bakhty-Ayagoz line, which will include the opening of a third border crossing, Bakhty-Chuguchak, which is expected to expand rail capacity with China by an additional 25 million tons. Maritime Development Kazakhstan’s maritime infrastructure on the Caspian Sea is a major focus of development and foreign investment. A key initiative currently underway is the creation of a container hub at the port of Aktau, being developed as a joint venture with the Chinese port of Lianyungang. Construction and installation work is actively in progress. According to the project plan, by the end of this year, the hub will feature a specialized cargo loading complex, a container terminal, and new cargo handling equipment. Once completed, the project is expected to increase container processing capacity from 140,000 TEU to 240,000 TEU, significantly enhancing Kazakhstan’s maritime logistics capabilities. Road Transport In addition to rail and sea, road transport is also a key pillar of Kazakhstan-China transportation cooperation. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Transport, 2.8 million tons of cargo were moved by road for export/import purposes in 2024, a 41% increase from the previous year, whilst transit cargo volumes reached 3.6 million tons, marking a 68% year-on-year rise. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, road cargo volumes jumped by 83%, reaching 822,000 tons. A major driver of this growth is the continued development and operation of the Western Europe–Western China highway corridor. Kazakhstan is also considering the opening of two new border checkpoints to strengthen connectivity between the regions of East Kazakhstan and Almaty...

Interview: Taliban-Ruled Afghanistan Looks to Kazakhstan

ASTANA - War-torn Afghanistan, now led by the Taliban, is in desperate need of funding. The radical group is seizing every opportunity to secure not only financial support but also major infrastructure projects that could help rebuild the country. In late May, a delegation of Taliban representatives, led by Haji Nooruddin Azizi, the Minister of Trade and Industry, visited Kazakhstan to attend the Astana International Forum (AIF). During the summit, they spoke with The Times of Central Asia, discussing their ambitions and plans. It was their first participation in the prominent forum, made possible by Kazakhstan’s 2024 decision to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations. Since then, Kazakhstani political and business leaders have traveled to Kabul on several occasions aiming to establish closer relations with the Islamic Emirate. [caption id="attachment_32607" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Image: TCA, Nikola Mikovic[/caption] Most recently, during a meeting with Azizi, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev emphasized the need to strengthen political ties with Afghanistan. The economy, however, seems to play an equally important role in this relationship, with Astana aiming to increase its bilateral trade volume with Afghanistan to $3 billion in the coming years. Kazakhstan is also eyeing investing $500 million in the construction of the 115-kilometer (71 miles) Turgundi–Herat railway line, a section of the rail corridor linking Turgundi in the north of Afghanistan and Spin Boldak on the country’s border with Pakistan. The route effectively connects Central and South Asia via Afghanistan. Neighboring Turkmenistan is also interested in participating in this project, as the railway aims to connect Central Asia to Pakistan’s Karachi and Gwadar ports, providing Turkmenistan and its neighbors access to vast South Asian markets. The Turgundi–Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak railway line is considered a key segment of the broader Trans-Afghan Railway project, which even Russia has expressed an interest in joining. “It is still too early to discuss who will build the railway, although it is clear that Afghan companies are unlikely to be able to undertake the project,” Mirwais Ghafouri, Senior Advisor of the Afghanistan Railway Authority, told The Times of Central Asia in an interview. In his view, given that Afghanistan is a mountainous country, the entire project will cost at least $2–3 billion. The problem for Kabul is that – due to various sanctions and the fact that most countries still do not officially recognize the Taliban-led government – it cannot count on significant support from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. “But we expect Kazakhstan to invest in this project, as well as in our economy in general. The shortest route connecting Central Asia and South Asia is through Afghanistan. Once the railway is complete, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian nations will be able to use it to export their agricultural products to huge markets such as India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh”, Ghafouri stressed, pointing out that Kabul and Astana are currently working on a project feasibility study. The Taliban appear to be aiming to revive nearly all previously announced projects...

A Resolution to Kyrgyzstan’s Last Border Problem?

In April, Kyrgyzstan signed a border delimitation agreement with southern neighbor Tajikistan, ending a long-running and at times violent feud along the two countries’ frontier. Now Kyrgyzstan is taking steps to resolve its border disagreements with its northern neighbor Kazakhstan. The Joint Project Representatives from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan met in Bishkek on May 22 to discuss the impending construction of an industrial transport-logistics complex on their border. Kazakhstan is building similar complexes along its borders with other neighboring countries (China, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan). The idea for the Kazakh-Kyrgyz facility was approved in May 2024, and work is scheduled to start next year. Economically, it is not a huge project, but symbolically, it could be a breakthrough ending years of aggravation connected to the country’s border crossings. The aim of the complex is “to jointly produce, store and sell medicines, textiles, as well as dairy, meat, and vegetable products.” In itself, the venture is laudable, but the location of the complex is what is interesting. This trade and logistics complex will occupy 3.6 square kilometers of territory in Kazakhstan and 4 square kilometers in Kyrgyzstan at a place not far from the Ak-Tilek (Kyrgyzstan) - Karasu (Kazakhstan) border crossing. Kyrgyzstan’s Ak-Tilek and the other four border crossings with Kazakhstan have been in the news for more than seven years due to long lines of trucks on the Kyrgyz side waiting to cross into Kazakhstan. This has become a sore point in what have usually been good relations between the two countries. The Legacy of Almazbek Atambayev Ever since the Soviet Union disintegrated in late 1991 and the five Central Asian states became independent, relations between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been the best among any two states in Central Asia. This was evident along their border, which compared to the others among the Central Asian states remained lightly guarded and relatively easy to cross. That changed in autumn 2017, due to an incident that was unrelated to the actual Kazakh-Kyrgyz border. Kyrgyzstan was preparing for a presidential election scheduled for October 15, 2017. The president at the time, Almazbek Atambayev, was leaving office, in accordance with the country’s constitution that permitted a president only a single term. Atambayev had picked a successor, Sooronbai Jeenbekov. The leading opponent was popular businessman Omurbek Babanov, who was polling ahead of Jeenbekov in the run-up to the election. In mid-September, Babanov visited Kazakhstan and met with then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Atambayev was furious. On October 7, he said that the “Kazakh authorities want to force their candidate on us.” Atambayev criticized the way Kazakhstan spent revenue, hinting that average Kazakh citizens did not seem to enjoy the fruits of the vast wealth of the country. On October 10, without warning, Kazakhstan closed its crossing points to traffic from Kyrgyzstan. Later, Kazakhstan’s security service said the restrictions were part of a planned border operation and claimed to have registered 112 violations in less than 48 hours. As the line of trucks grew on the Kyrgyz side of...