Trump Administration - The Times Of Central Asia

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U.S.-Central Asia Engagement

Washington Links TRIPP and Jackson-Vanik Repeal in Push Toward Central Asia

A notable strategic shift is taking place in U.S. foreign policy, one that could have a long-term impact on the economic architecture of Eurasia. After decades in which Central Asia and the South Caucasus were viewed largely through the lens of security, counterterrorism, and competition with Russia and China, Washington is increasingly emphasizing trade, investment, transport routes, and access to critical minerals. One of the clearest signs of this shift came during a recent hearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where Senator Steve Daines and Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed the implementation of the U.S.-backed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) framework, as well as the need to remove the outdated Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions. At first glance, these may appear to be separate issues: the peace process in the South Caucasus and Cold War-era trade legislation. In reality, however, they are closely connected. Together, they point to a broader U.S. effort to link Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Western markets through trade, transport, and investment. In recent years, Republican Senator Steve Daines of Montana has emerged as one of the most active advocates of expanding America’s presence in Central Asia. As co-chair of the Senate Central Asia Caucus and one of the leading proponents of legislative efforts to repeal Jackson-Vanik restrictions, Daines has consistently argued for stronger trade and investment ties between the United States and the countries of the region. During the hearing, Daines placed particular emphasis on the importance of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, describing it as one of the most underappreciated diplomatic efforts of recent years. According to the senator, resolving the conflict could open the door to a large-scale economic transformation of the wider region. Particularly noteworthy was his reference to a geopolitical concept associated with former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. In Daines’ formulation, Central Asia represents the “bottle,” while Azerbaijan serves as its “cork.” Opening transport routes through the South Caucasus, he argued, would allow flows of oil, gas, critical minerals, and other resources to move toward Western markets rather than toward Russia, China, or Iran. Daines said this approach helped address some of the most difficult issues in the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement process and laid the foundation for what he called a “landmark agreement” after nearly four decades of conflict. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described TRIPP as an initiative capable of fundamentally transforming Armenia’s economic role in the region. According to Rubio, the framework not only addresses the issue of transport access, which had long been a source of disagreement between Baku and Yerevan, but also creates an opportunity for Armenia to become a major trade and logistics hub connecting Europe and Asia. Rubio described TRIPP as central to the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement framework, emphasizing that the project could generate substantial investment flows and attract U.S. companies to infrastructure and transport projects across the region. Washington’s argument is that trade, transit, investment, and infrastructure can give the political settlement a stronger economic base. Unlike many previous peace...

Caspian Region

Why the Caspian Is Becoming Eurasia’s New Energy Crossroads

Russia’s war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East are accelerating the emergence of a new Eurasian energy architecture, with the Caspian region increasingly at its center. In international politics, moments when several global crises simultaneously create opportunities for new centers of influence are rare. Today, a vast area stretching from Central Asia to the South Caucasus is experiencing just such a moment. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped Europe’s approach to energy security. Tensions in the Middle East have also raised questions about the reliability of traditional energy supply routes. Meanwhile, the global energy transition is driving demand for both clean-energy sources and alternative transport corridors. Against this backdrop, the Caspian region is no longer viewed as a peripheral economic space. It is increasingly emerging as a critical hub in Eurasia’s evolving energy system. Baku Energy Week 2026 shows how far this shift has come, highlighting Azerbaijan’s transformation from a traditional oil and gas producer into a strategic connector linking Central Asia, Türkiye, Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. One of the forum’s most significant political signals came in the form of a message from U.S. President Donald Trump to participants. His remarks went beyond a routine diplomatic greeting and reflected a broader shift toward a more pragmatic view of global energy policy. Trump described the United States as a strong supporter of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas industry and said the U.S.-Azerbaijan energy partnership would become more important in the years ahead. For much of the past decade, Western energy strategies appeared increasingly focused on rapid decarbonization and climate objectives. However, rising energy prices, Europe’s energy crisis, and growing global electricity demand have prompted policymakers to reassess those priorities. Trump openly reaffirmed support for the oil and gas sector and emphasized that the United States remains a long-standing energy partner of Azerbaijan. More importantly, Washington appears to recognize Baku’s strategic role in global energy security. The Trump administration increasingly views energy security as an element of geopolitical competition and is prepared to support projects that diversify supplies of hydrocarbons and critical raw materials. Speaking at the opening of Baku Energy Week, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said Trump’s policies had helped return energy policy to “normality.” Aliyev also noted that the oil and gas industry had faced sustained pressure from advocates of a rapid energy transition. It was therefore no coincidence that Azerbaijan signed a series of agreements during the forum with major American companies, including Chevron, JPMorgan, Oracle, and Comstock Resources. Particularly noteworthy was a cooperation agreement covering critical minerals and rare earth elements. For Washington, access to these resources is increasingly a matter not only of energy policy but also of technological and national security amid intensifying competition with China. In effect, Washington is beginning to view Azerbaijan as an important platform in a changing Eurasian energy map. While Washington is signaling renewed political backing, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains one of the principal architects of the region’s practical integration. Over the past...

Iran

Kazakhstan Signals Nuclear Diplomacy Role as Iran Uranium Dispute Intensifies

Kazakhstan is seeking a place in the next phase of the Iran nuclear dispute, not as a direct mediator between Washington and Tehran, but as a possible technical partner if talks turn to the handling of enriched uranium. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has said Kazakhstan is ready to assist if international agreements are reached. The offer reflects Astana’s long effort to turn its Soviet nuclear legacy, disarmament record, and nonproliferation infrastructure into diplomatic capital. The dispute has become more urgent as U.S.-Iran talks come under growing strain. According to Iran’s Fars News Agency, Washington has demanded the transfer of approximately 400 kilograms of enriched uranium and major restrictions on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Tehran, in turn, has insisted on sanctions relief, the unfreezing of foreign assets, compensation for wartime damage, and security guarantees. U.S. President Donald Trump has described Iran’s demands as “unacceptable.” He later said he had postponed a possible military strike on Iran following appeals from the leaders of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, citing what he called ongoing “serious negotiations.” Against that backdrop, Tokayev said during a May 11 meeting with Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira that Kazakhstan was ready, “as a gesture of goodwill,” to help resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. He said any such role would depend on relevant international agreements being reached and carried out in practice. According to Akorda, Tokayev also reiterated Kazakhstan’s commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under International Atomic Energy Agency oversight. The statement did not amount to an offer to mediate directly between Washington and Tehran. It was narrower and more practical. Kazakhstan is presenting itself as a state with broad international trust, technical experience, and nuclear infrastructure to support a settlement should the main parties agree on one. Tokayev placed that argument directly into the Iran debate at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April. “The core issue is the proliferation of nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons. This must remain the central subject of negotiations in the context of the situation surrounding Iran,” he said. For Kazakhstan, that distinction is central to the way it presents itself internationally. The country has built much of its post-Soviet foreign policy identity around nuclear nonproliferation. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Kazakhstan’s anti-nuclear stance is not only a diplomatic position, but part of the country’s modern national identity. The Soviet Union conducted 456 nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site between 1949 and 1989, leaving long-term environmental and public health damage in eastern Kazakhstan. After independence, Kazakhstan transferred its inherited nuclear warheads to Russia and joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Kazakhstan has direct technical experience with sensitive nuclear material. In 1994, under Operation Sapphire, roughly 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium were removed from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk and transferred to the United States. TCA previously reported that the operation remains one of the strongest examples of Kazakhstan’s role in practical nonproliferation work. Kazakhstan has been involved...

Middle East Crisis

Central Asia Welcomes Ceasefire, Urges Talks as Energy Risks Persist

Central Asian governments have cautiously welcomed the two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran, describing it as a necessary pause in a conflict that has already begun to affect regional stability, trade, and energy flows. Across the region, official statements struck a consistent balance: support for the truce, alongside calls to translate it quickly into negotiations rather than allow it to become a temporary pause in hostilities. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev described the agreement as a “ceasefire and truce” reached through international mediation, including efforts involving Pakistan’s leadership. According to the presidential press service, Tokayev said that “this agreement became possible due to the goodwill and wisdom of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the senior leadership of Iran, as well as all countries involved in the military conflict.” Tokayev went on to express his hope that the agreement would prove sustainable and contribute to global trade and economic stability. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry described the ceasefire as an “important step toward de-escalating tensions” and stressed that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tashkent called for “all parties to exercise restraint, [and] refrain from actions that could further escalate the situation, warning that further escalation risks widening the conflict and undermining regional stability. The statement reaffirmed Uzbekistan's “unwavering position on the need to resolve conflicts exclusively by peaceful means in strict accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the agreement, expressing hope that the ceasefire would open the way to a comprehensive and long-term peace. Dushanbe emphasized that the conflict has “no military solution and its continuation will only worsen the already difficult situation in the Middle East and cause colossal damage to all countries in the region.” The statement urged all parties to “abandon the use of force” and use political and diplomatic mechanisms in accordance with international law and the UN Charter. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry said it “welcomes the achievement of a ceasefire agreement in the Middle East,” highlighting the role of Pakistan’s mediation efforts in reducing tensions. Bishkek reaffirmed that disputes must be resolved exclusively through political and diplomatic means on the basis of the UN Charter and international law, and expressed its “hope for achieving sustainable and long-term peace in the region.” Turkmenistan had not issued an official public statement on the ceasefire at the time of publication, in line with its longstanding policy of neutrality and cautious approach to external conflicts. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the “announced ceasefire” and praised the efforts of mediators who helped broker the agreement. Baku called on all parties to “engage in productive dialogue aimed at resolving existing problems and strengthening mutual trust” and signaled its readiness to “support initiatives aimed at strengthening lasting peace, security, and cooperation in the region.” The convergence in tone reflects more than diplomatic routine. The conflict has already spilled into Central Asia’s political and humanitarian agenda, prompting coordination on evacuations, aid deliveries, and contingency planning....

C6+1

Opinion: Trump Has Golden Opportunity to Launch C6+1 on Sidelines of UN

Representatives of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan — along with Azerbaijan, are expected in New York for the United Nations General Assembly in September. Historically, meetings between the Central Asian states and the United States – the C5+1 – have taken place on the sidelines of the United Nations. It is the most natural and logistically efficient venue for President Donald Trump to re-engage with the C5 partners he hosted at the White House last November. As of now, only foreign ministers are expected to attend the UNGA. But this could change if Trump extends an invitation to the leaders, according to a Central Asian diplomatic source. This time, however, he has the opportunity to add Azerbaijan, transforming the format into a C6+1. Baku has already been invited to participate as a full member in Central Asian gatherings, and Washington should build on that momentum. Azerbaijan is uniquely positioned: close to both Israel and Turkey – two of America’s most important regional partners – it sits astride one of the most important connectivity corridors linking Europe and Asia. Its inclusion would turn the C5+1 into a genuinely trans‑Caspian framework that reflects the emerging realities of Eurasian integration. The move would also link two major diplomatic achievements of Trump’s second term: the launch of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a 43-km strategic transit corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia, and Trump’s elevation of the C5+1 to a White House-level summit. While TRIPP was discussed at the C5+1 meeting in November, bringing Azerbaijan into the next gathering would allow the administration to present itself as the architect of a new Eurasian trade and energy map. Strategically, a C6+1 format carries significant implications for great-power competition with China. This is because Central Asia is so crucial to Beijing’s grand strategy. In its recently adopted 15th five-year plan, neighborhood diplomacy is listed as the top priority — ahead of relations with major powers or developing countries. Beijing seeks to build a “community with a shared future” with 17 neighboring states, including all five in Central Asia, to “create a favorable external environment” for national rejuvenation, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated. For China, Central Asia is a vital “hinterland” for energy and resource security, and a buffer against maritime disruptions. The United States does not need to dominate the Eurasian Heartland or force Central Asian states to choose between Washington and Beijing. It simply needs to ensure that any Chinese westward access runs through a vast landmass of countries that maintain constructive relations with the United States. A C6+1 format helps shape that environment without confrontation. A stable Middle Corridor – the energy and trade route running through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea and through Azerbaijan to Turkey and the Mediterranean – also benefits America's energy-hungry allies in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea. Both increasingly look to Kazakhstan as an alternative oil supplier as they...

Food Security

Iran Conflict Drives Food Price Pressures Across Central Asia

The war around Iran is beginning to push up food price risks in Central Asia as disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz raise fertilizer and fuel costs, while Tehran’s halt to some food exports adds pressure in regional markets. The impact is not manifesting as shortages, but as rising costs across the systems that produce, move, and sell food. The United Nations has warned that the crisis is disrupting one of the world’s most important trade corridors for energy and agricultural supplies. A large share of global fertilizer trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and reduced shipping traffic is tightening supply and pushing up prices. Higher fuel costs are adding a second layer of pressure on farmers and transport networks. Fertilizer and fuel are among agriculture’s highest costs. Even modest increases can compress margins quickly, forcing farmers to cut usage or pass costs on, with pressure moving through to retail prices. Central Asia is particularly exposed to this shift in costs. The region relies on imported fuel and fertilizers, and depends on long, multi-stage transport routes. When costs increase at any point in that chain, they accumulate before goods reach markets. The second layer of pressure comes from Iran itself. On March 3, Tehran imposed a ban on exports of food products as part of wartime economic measures. Reporting in Tajikistan indicates that the move could affect the availability and pricing of goods such as dairy, sugar, fruit, and spices, particularly in wholesale and lower-cost retail markets. Iran is not a dominant supplier, but plays a role in specific markets. Tajikistan is the clearest example. Tajikistan has also expanded its economic relationship with Iran in recent years, supported by cooperation in industry and transport. Iranian goods are widely present in retail supply chains, and trade between the two countries has grown steadily in recent years. That growth is part of a broader trend. Iran’s economic ties with Central Asia have expanded under new trade arrangements and bilateral initiatives. Kazakhstan and Iran have discussed increasing trade turnover to $3 billion, reflecting the rising use of Caspian routes and port infrastructure, which are now under threat. [caption id="attachment_46480" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Aralsk Bazaar. Rising transport and fertilizer costs are beginning to push up food prices across the region. Image: Michael J. Bland[/caption] Transport adds a third layer of pressure. As risks rise across the Middle East, airlines and freight operators are avoiding large swathes of Iranian airspace and surrounding routes, forcing rerouting and raising costs across supply chains. European aviation safety authorities have issued conflict-zone bulletins warning of heightened risks in the region, and carriers have adjusted accordingly. Rerouting increases fuel use, extends journey times, and raises insurance costs. Those increases affect cargo as well as passengers, and over time, higher logistics costs feed into the price of imported goods, including food. On land, the same pattern is visible. As southern routes become less predictable, more freight is shifting toward the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route - the Middle Corridor -...