Trump Administration - The Times Of Central Asia

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U.S.-Central Asia Engagement

Central Asia Looks to a Possible Trump Visit

U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed an interest in visiting Uzbekistan, according to one of his special envoys, raising the possibility that Central Asia could eventually receive its first visit by a sitting American president. Paolo Zampolli, Trump’s Special Envoy for Global Partnerships and long-time Trump associate, made the comment in an interview with Uzbekistan 24 while visiting the country. “I know that he wants to come to Uzbekistan,” Zampolli said, adding that Trump had personally told him he wanted to make the trip. Zampolli said he was encouraging the idea, but gave no timetable, and there has been no announcement that a visit is being scheduled. Trump had already publicly indicated that he may visit Kazakhstan. Asked during the November 2025 C5+1 summit if he might become the first U.S. president to visit the country, Trump replied, “I think it’s very possible that we’ll do that.” The comments come as U.S. engagement with Central Asia is accelerating. Trump hosted all five Central Asian presidents at the White House in November 2025. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has invited him to Kazakhstan, while Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has also invited him to Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio is reported to be planning a mid-October visit to Samarkand for a C5+1 ministerial, with a delegation expected to include representatives of more than 100 U.S. companies. Sergio Gor, Trump’s Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, has also been involved in Washington’s engagement across the region. In Uzbekistan, he co-chairs the American-Uzbek Business and Investment Council with Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of the presidential administration. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan bring different economic and strategic profiles to Washington’s expanding engagement with Central Asia. Why Kazakhstan Matters Kazakhstan is Central Asia’s largest economy. Its GDP reached about $306 billion in 2025, accounting for more than half of the combined economy of the five Central Asian states. Its share of accumulated foreign investment is even larger, with Kazakhstan holding roughly two-thirds of the region’s inward FDI stock, according to The Times of Central Asia’s Central Asia Balance Sheet. Its strategic importance extends beyond those measures. Kazakhstan produces close to 40% of the world’s uranium and is a major oil producer and exporter, supplying primarily European markets. It also holds substantial critical mineral resources and occupies a central position on the Middle Corridor connecting China and Europe. Recent U.S.-Kazakh commercial agreements include several large transactions. Wabtec has a $4.2 billion locomotive agreement, while Tau-Ken Samruk and Cove Capital have signed transaction documents for at least $1.1 billion in tungsten development. Other agreements cover agricultural machinery, air-traffic management, and additional Boeing aircraft. Kazakhstan also has a distinct diplomatic role in Trump’s engagement with the Muslim world. In November 2025, Kazakhstan joined the Abraham Accords, becoming the first Central Asian and first non-Arab Muslim-majority country to join the framework. Why Uzbekistan Matters With about 39 million people, Uzbekistan is the most populous country in Central Asia. It is also the only state that borders all four of the other...

C5+1

Rubio to Lead Major U.S. Business Delegation to Uzbekistan for C5+1 Talks

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio will lead a delegation including executives from more than 100 American companies to Uzbekistan in October. The visit will bring a substantial business contingent to talks with Central Asia’s foreign ministers in Samarkand. Sergio Gor, the U.S. special envoy for South and Central Asia, announced the visit in a statement published by the U.S. Embassy in India. Gor said the talks would focus on “deepening regional economic connectivity, enhancing energy security,” alongside cooperation on shared regional priorities. The delegation is expected in mid-October, alongside a C5+1 ministerial meeting. The C5+1 format brings together the United States and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Bringing executives from more than 100 companies gives Rubio’s visit a substantial commercial component. The delegation’s composition should indicate which sectors Washington is ready to back following last year’s C5+1 agreements. In November 2025, Rubio announced his intention to visit all five Central Asian countries in 2026. Speaking ahead of the Washington C5+1 summit, he suggested such a tour could take a week. The Samarkand announcement gives a destination and timeframe for his regional engagement, although it does not establish an itinerary covering all five states. President Donald Trump hosted the five Central Asian presidents in Washington on November 6, 2025. Commercial agreements featured prominently in the summit, reflecting a greater focus on investment within the C5+1 framework. The U.S. Commerce Department said the “Deal Zone” business event held alongside the November 2025 C5+1 summit featured more than $25 billion in announced commercial deals. Air Astana’s agreement covered up to 15 Boeing 787-9 aircraft, comprising five firm orders, five options, and five purchase rights. Tajikistan’s Somon Air announced plans to acquire up to four Dreamliners and ten 737 MAX jets. Uzbekistan Airways finalized an order for eight additional Boeing 787-9 aircraft during the summit. Boeing said the purchase brought the airline’s total order to 22 Dreamliners, converting options from an earlier agreement into firm orders. In mining, Cove Capital and Kazakhstan’s Tau-Ken Samruk agreed to develop the Severny Katpar and Verkhne Kairakty tungsten deposits. The projected $1.1 billion investment includes two processing plants and a metallurgical facility. Kazakhstan’s technology announcements included a memorandum for $2 billion in advanced AI-chip procurement, involving NVIDIA, Freedom Holding, and the country’s digital ministry. Critical minerals cooperation has also advanced since the Washington summit. During a February 4 visit to the U.S. capital, Uzbek Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov attended a ministerial meeting devoted to the sector and held talks with Rubio. Saidov and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau signed a memorandum on mineral supplies, covering the mining and processing of critical minerals and rare earths. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry said the country was seeking foreign technology and investment to develop the industry, with an emphasis on value-added production. For Tashkent, the unresolved question is how much mineral processing American investors will finance inside Uzbekistan. October’s talks could clarify whether February’s memorandum will lead to domestic processing facilities, allowing the country to retain more of the...

UN General Assembly

Central Asia at the UN: Iran Threats and Sanctions Disputes

U.S. President Donald Trump’s threat to “annihilate” Iran brought the vulnerability of Central Asia’s southern trade routes into focus as the UN General Assembly’s general debate opened in New York. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov challenged unilateral sanctions, while diplomacy over Ukraine raised the prospect of a halt to attacks on energy infrastructure. For landlocked Central Asia, these developments carry consequences far beyond the speeches. Iranian ports provide access to overseas markets, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rely heavily on fuel from Russian refineries, and restrictions on international payments can complicate commerce even where transport links remain intact. Iran and Access to the Sea Addressing the General Assembly on September 22, Trump presented a choice between reaching an agreement with Tehran and carrying out his threat to “annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly.” He also predicted that an agreement could follow the U.S. midterm elections, while defending U.S. military action against Iran. [caption id="attachment_56719" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: UN[/caption] That framing leaves Central Asian countries facing costs regardless of their position on Tehran. Iran provides overland connections to ports serving the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Damage to Iranian infrastructure can therefore disrupt trade between Central Asia and countries that are not parties to the conflict. Uzbekistan’s exposure illustrates the distinction. According to its Ministry of Economy and Finance, goods worth $3.9 billion entered Uzbekistan through Iran in 2025. That represented about 9% of total imports, including approximately $1 billion in technological equipment. Uzbek exports transiting Iran were worth another $1.4 billion. Those figures measure transit, not simply purchases from Iranian suppliers. Pressure intended to isolate Tehran can also obstruct Uzbekistan’s access to equipment and customers elsewhere. Kazakhstan has also sought a larger southern outlet. A 27-year agreement provides for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade says the project would expand access to Gulf markets and destinations in Asia and East Africa. The risks differ by port. Bandar Abbas faces the Strait of Hormuz, while Chabahar sits on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait. Both depend on Iranian infrastructure and remain exposed to the wider conflict and sanctions environment. Developing alternative routes does not make these southern connections dispensable. Nor is exposure uniform. Kazakh officials have emphasized the limited existing role of Persian Gulf shipments in the country’s logistics. For Astana, the threat concerns future diversification as well as current trade. For Uzbekistan, the transit figures show a substantial flow already at risk. Tajikistan, meanwhile, has sought 2.55 million tons of Iranian crude oil and fuel following shortages in Russian supplies. Its search for an alternative leaves Dushanbe exposed to two conflicts, with attacks on Russian refineries disrupting its established supplier, and the conflict involving Iran threatening a potential replacement. Japarov Challenges Sanctions In his General Assembly address, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov argued that unilateral sanctions harm smaller developing states and can become instruments of political pressure. “The right to impose sanctions against a particular state should, in our view,...

BRICS

Tokayev Meets U.S. Envoy Sergio Gor on Sidelines of BRICS Summit

India hosted the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12–13. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the partner countries of this international grouping, which began meeting in 2006 and held its first summit in 2009. Uzbekistan was represented by a delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Jamshid Kuchkarov. Kazakhstan’s delegation was led by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. On Saturday, September 12, the Kazakh president met on the sidelines of the summit with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Sergio Gor, the U.S. president’s special envoy for South and Central Asia. During his meeting with the crown prince, they discussed economic and investment cooperation. In 2025, the United Arab Emirates ranked among Kazakhstan’s four largest foreign investors. Foreign direct investment from the Emirates totaled $1.6 billion. In January–March 2026, bilateral trade between Kazakhstan and the UAE amounted to $45.8 million. Over the past 20 years, Emirati investment in Kazakhstan has exceeded $7 billion, including around $3 billion over the past two and a half years. That same day, President Tokayev met with Sergio Gor, the U.S. president’s special envoy for South and Central Asia. Gor delivered a personal message from President Donald Trump congratulating Tokayev ahead of the 35th anniversary of Kazakhstan’s independence. They discussed the development of the Kazakhstan-U.S. enhanced strategic partnership, including cooperation in artificial intelligence and digitalization. According to the official readout, they also discussed the Kazakh president’s planned participation in the G20 summit, scheduled to take place in Miami in December 2026. Tokayev said: “I am currently preparing to take part in the G20 Summit in Miami. I believe this will also be a good opportunity to discuss the issues on the bilateral agenda. We prefer not fine words, but tangible results and practical steps to advance our mutual cooperation.” Tokayev also reaffirmed his invitation for President Trump to visit Kazakhstan. Contacts between senior Central Asian and U.S. officials have intensified. The U.S. Embassy in Bishkek reported on September 2 that Gor had met with Tokayev and other regional leaders in Kyrgyzstan. In June, Gor met with Kazakhstan’s foreign minister. Also in June, Tokayev met with Ben Black, chief executive officer of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), as part of Astana’s efforts to expand economic cooperation with Washington and attract more strategic investment. On July 10, Tokayev spoke by phone with President Trump. Another meeting of the secretariat of the C5+1 framework for U.S.-Central Asia cooperation took place in Ashgabat on September 9. Gor serves as both the U.S. ambassador to India and the U.S. president’s special envoy for South and Central Asia. Also on Saturday, Tokayev had an informal meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in New Delhi, at the Russian leader’s residence during his visit to India. Reports suggested the meeting was unplanned. No details of their discussion were released. On Sunday, September 13, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev delivered a speech at the plenary session of the BRICS Outreach Summit in New Delhi, focusing on the theme of "Strengthening Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation, and Stability." In his speech, Tokayev noted: “Last year, the volume of transit cargo transportation...

Energy Security

Tajikistan Seeks 2.55 Million Tons of Iranian Oil and Fuel as Russian Supplies Falter

Tajikistan has asked Iran to supply 2.55 million metric tons of crude oil and petroleum products as Dushanbe looks for alternatives to increasingly unreliable Russian fuel supplies. The request includes 2 million tons of crude oil, 300,000 tons of diesel, 150,000 tons of gasoline, and 100,000 tons of aviation fuel, according to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport. The ministry said the volume would require about 51,000 railway tank cars. The proposal was discussed in Tehran on August 15 during talks between Tajik Transport Minister Azim Ibrohim and Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh. It is not yet a purchase agreement, and Tajikistan has not announced a delivery timetable, price, or supplier. The timing, however, places the proposed trade directly inside a worsening sanctions environment. On August 20, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened economic consequences for countries providing support to Iran, promising “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not announced specific new measures linked to that statement. Significant purchases and transport of Iranian petroleum already carry U.S. sanctions exposure. Executive Order 13846 authorizes sanctions against people and financial institutions involved in significant transactions for the purchase, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum from Iran. A temporary U.S. authorization covering Iranian crude and petroleum products, issued in June, was revoked on July 7, with its wind-down period ending on July 17. Russia’s Fuel Crunch Reaches Tajikistan Dushanbe’s request to Iran is driven by a more immediate problem: dependence on Russian fuel. In 2025, Tajikistan imported about 1.7 million tons of fuel and lubricants, more than 1.2 million tons of which came from Russia. Tajik officials said in July that Russia supplied 84% of imported petroleum products. That dependence has become more difficult to manage as Ukrainian drone attacks have reduced Russian refinery output and forced Moscow to protect its domestic market. Russian fuel shortages began spilling into Central Asia in early summer. Tajikistan’s fuel imports fell sharply in July, pushing Dushanbe to seek additional supplies from China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Iran. Russia still accounted for 72.3% of fuel supplied to Tajikistan in the first half of the year, while talks with Kazakhstan had reached presidential level by the end of July. The pressure was already visible in Dushanbe. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others imposed sales limits. On July 10, Energy and Water Resources Minister Daler Juma said Tajikistan had roughly two months of petroleum reserves and was seeking alternative suppliers. The scale of the request is striking. At 2.55 million tons, it exceeds Tajikistan’s total fuel and lubricant imports in 2025, although 2 million tons of the proposed volume is crude oil rather than finished fuel. The Ministry of Transport has asked Iran to help organize dedicated tanker trains and create a “green corridor” giving Tajik fuel cargoes priority on the Iranian rail network. Further transit arrangements would still be needed because Tajikistan and Iran do not share a border. The Refinery Question The large crude component also highlights...

Middle East Crisis

Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean....