• KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
29 August 2026

Viewing results 31 - 36 of 2533

Push for Kazakhstan Oil Exports Diversification as CPC Disruptions Expose Capacity Gap

Kazakhstan has spent years looking for more ways to export its oil without relying so heavily on Russia. This summer has shown how difficult that remains. Shipments to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline have been suspended since May, disruptions on the Black Sea in July forced Tengiz to more than halve production, and now Russia is rerouting Kazakh crude from Ust-Luga to Novorossiysk to free Baltic capacity for its own oil. The shift comes as exports from Russia’s western ports ran 15% below plan in the first half of August, with Novorossiysk shipments of Russian Urals and Kazakh KEBCO falling to around 400,000 barrels per day. At least two cargoes of Kazakhstan’s KEBCO crude scheduled for loading at Ust-Luga in late August will instead be shipped through the Black Sea. No KEBCO loadings are currently planned at the Baltic port in September. The move will free up about 100,000 barrels per day of export capacity at Ust-Luga for Russian crude. Kazakh producers support the arrangement because shipments through Novorossiysk are currently more profitable. From a commercial standpoint, the decision is understandable. But Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk give Kazakhstan access to two different seas while remaining Russian ports. And Novorossiysk, where the KEBCO cargoes are now being redirected, had itself suspended crude loadings only a few days earlier. On August 14, loadings at the Sheskharis terminal, Novorossiysk port’s main oil-export facility, were halted following a drone attack. The facility handles around 700,000 barrels per day and loads Russian Urals and Siberian Light as well as Kazakhstan’s KEBCO. Operations resumed on August 16, and one of the first tankers to load was carrying Kazakh crude. Another 80,000-ton KEBCO cargo was due to begin loading on August 18. Kazakhstan’s far larger vulnerability, however, is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Its marine terminal near Novorossiysk is separate from Sheskharis. In 2025, the country exported 78.7 million metric tons of oil, of which 64.8 million tons were shipped through CPC. Volumes through the pipeline rose by 18% compared with 2024, largely as production increased following the Tengiz expansion. The July disruptions showed how quickly problems on that route can affect production inside Kazakhstan. After drone attacks near the CPC terminal forced restrictions on loadings, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production fell by about 21% by July 22 to roughly 1.63 million barrels per day, from a July average of 2.07 million barrels per day. Tengiz output dropped from a July average of around 925,000 barrels per day to about 406,000. A few days later, the situation deteriorated further. On July 26, Kazakhstan produced around 1 million barrels per day of oil and gas condensate, down from an average of 2.16 million barrels per day in June. Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak all had to reduce production. On July 27, CPC resumed loadings after a week-long suspension. CPC accounts for more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, so replacing it quickly with other routes is impossible. The pipeline typically carries around 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day....

Pasture Gives Way to Solar Power in Uzbekistan as Audit Remains Unpublished

Each spring, nine households grazed livestock on a stretch of desert pasture in Uzbekistan’s Bukhara Region. The land is now the site of the Nur Bukhara solar and battery plant, but an audit intended to show whether promised livelihood protections worked remains unpublished. Seven of the households came from the nearby settlement of Kirilishon and used the state-owned pasture without permits or formal agreements. A herder and his partner, identified publicly only as H1 and H2, grazed animals there through a short-term agreement with Alat Qorakolchilik LLC, a local livestock company holding a sublease on the land. The nine households included 43 people. The plant began operating in September 2025 and was inaugurated that December. The Uzbek government awarded the project to Masdar, an Abu Dhabi-based renewable energy developer that built the facility and now operates it. Nur Bukhara combines a 250-megawatt solar plant with a 63-megawatt battery system capable of storing 126 megawatt-hours of electricity. Masdar says it can supply more than 55,000 homes, while the World Bank described it as Central Asia’s first utility-scale renewable energy project to combine solar generation with battery storage. During a consultation on May 7, 2023, Kirilishon residents asked for the solar plant to be moved. If construction went ahead, they wanted replacement grazing land near the village and priority consideration for project jobs. H1 and H2 had a documented right to use the pasture, while the seven Kirilishon households did not. However, the safeguards required by Nur Bukhara’s international lenders covered both formal and informal users whose livelihoods would be disrupted by the project. Masdar commissioned a livelihood restoration plan setting out the assistance the households were to receive before construction cut off access to the site. It identified about 260 hectares of replacement pasture, equivalent to one square mile, for H1 and H2. Alat Qorakolchilik also identified approximately 1,000 hectares, or 3.9 square miles, of additional land available to herders. The seven informal households were to be allowed to use replacement pasture without obtaining formal agreements. The larger tract was not described as land reserved exclusively for those households. The published map did not record which final area each household would receive. The livelihood measures also included priority access to project employment and additional support for households considered vulnerable. In an official statement to The Times of Central Asia, a Masdar spokesperson said replacement grazing arrangements were provided before access to the project site was restricted, “maintaining equivalent grazing conditions,” and that “several members of affected households obtained project-related employment opportunities.” The statement cited monitoring by international lenders and an independent third-party review, with the completion audit finalized in September 2025. It reported no related complaints from affected households through the project’s grievance mechanism. The completion audit was not included with Masdar’s response. As of August 20, 2026, it was also absent from Masdar’s Nur Bukhara page and the International Finance Corporation’s project disclosure. Simonyan Consulting, which says it was engaged by the project company to conduct the audit, lists the assignment as “2025–ongoing.” Without the audit,...

Tashkent’s Rise Reshapes Central Asia’s Business Landscape

Tashkent is changing faster than it can adjust to its own growth. The city is already pressing against the limits of its existing airport; a vast new city designed for up to two million people is being built alongside it, and a separate financial jurisdiction drawing on English common law is being created. Uzbekistan is opening up further to foreign investment, and nearly two-thirds of the country’s foreign-invested enterprises are already concentrated in the capital. But being the leading business city in your own country and becoming a regional hub are not the same thing. Tashkent already has strong competitors in Central Asia. Given that competition, it is more useful to examine why companies are choosing Tashkent now and what the city still lacks than to declare it the region’s new business capital. As of July 1, 2026, Uzbekistan had 20,502 operating enterprises with foreign investment. Their number had increased about 1.4 times over five years. China accounted for the largest number, with 6,060 companies, followed by Russia with 3,454, Turkey with 2,293, and Kazakhstan with 1,307. As of June 1, 12,480 of the 19,921 enterprises with foreign investment then operating in Uzbekistan were located in Tashkent. That was almost 63%. Why Tashkent? Part of the answer is obvious: the institutions and services businesses rely on are concentrated there, from government and finance to professional services, technology firms, and skilled workers. That creates a network effect: companies come because partners, clients, and suppliers are already there. But the capital had roughly the same administrative advantages ten years ago without attracting business on anything like the current scale. What changed first was Uzbekistan’s economy itself. After 2016, the country began moving away from its previous closed economic model. One of the first major steps was currency liberalization in 2017. Changes followed in trade, taxation, privatization, and the treatment of foreign investors. The state still plays an enormous role in the economy, but it has become considerably easier for foreign private businesses to operate. Uzbekistan’s GDP grew by 7.7% in 2025. The IMF expects growth of about 6.8% in 2026, while pointing to a longstanding problem: the state’s large footprint in the economy, including major state-owned enterprises and banks, continues to constrain competition and private-sector development. The combination of rapid growth and a gradually more open economy has benefited Tashkent more than any other city in the country. Uzbekistan also has an advantage that cannot be created by government decree. With a population of about 38.5 million, it is Central Asia’s most populous country and has a large domestic consumer base. It is also the region’s only country that borders all four other Central Asian republics. For an international company, Tashkent can serve both as an office for the Uzbek market and as a gateway to neighboring countries. Now, Tashkent is entering territory long occupied by others. For decades, Almaty has concentrated banks, international representative offices, private companies, and professional talent. In 2018, the Astana International Financial Centre began operations, with a...

Kyrgyzstan Sanctions Risks Reshape Business

Kyrgyzstan is stepping up action against companies that could expose its banks and wider economy to Western sanctions. On August 18, the authorities moved to forcibly liquidate another 19 legal entities, while major banks are closing the accounts of dozens of clients deemed too risky. Bishkek has not formally joined Western sanctions against Russia, but those restrictions are increasingly determining whom Kyrgyz businesses can work with and which banks they can use to move money. The names of the 19 companies have not yet been disclosed. The authorities stated that they were selected after reviewing around 40 organizations considered to pose heightened sanctions risks. This is not the first such move. In May, the authorities ordered 50 businesses to cease operations after sanctions risks were identified. Their full names were not made public either. First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Daniyar Amangeldiev said at the time that Western partners provide information about suspicious companies, which Kyrgyz authorities then investigate. He warned that sanctions against Kyrgyzstan itself could disrupt international payments and access to technology. How the Pressure Built Western scrutiny of Kyrgyz companies began well before the current cleanup. In the summer of 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned four companies registered in Kyrgyzstan: RM Design and Development, Progress Lider, GTME Tekhnologii, and Cargoline. Washington said they had supplied Russia with electronics and other restricted goods, while Cargoline had shipped millions of dollars’ worth of foreign-made aviation equipment. The focus later expanded from goods to financial networks. In January 2025, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Keremet Bank, saying it had coordinated with Russian officials and sanctioned lender Promsvyazbank on a scheme to facilitate cross-border transfers. In practice, U.S. sanctions severely restrict a bank’s ability to deal with American companies or use the U.S. financial system. Within days of Keremet Bank’s designation, Visa restricted cards issued by the bank so that they could be used only through Keremet’s own ATMs and payment terminals. In August 2025, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on Grinex, Tengricoin, Old Vector, and Capital Bank of Central Asia as part of a crackdown on financial and cryptocurrency networks that London said Russia was using to circumvent Western restrictions. By early 2026, however, the risk was beginning to shift from sanctions against individual Kyrgyz companies and banks to restrictions affecting the country as a whole. During a February meeting with EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan, Amangeldiev discussed financial monitoring, sanctions risks, and greater transparency in foreign trade rather than Kyrgyzstan adopting EU sanctions itself. Bishkek was effectively trying to show that it could tackle sanctions evasion without joining the EU sanctions regime. The prospect of broader measures was already worrying businesses. Askar Sydykov, head of Kyrgyzstan’s International Business Council, said reports that the EU could use its anti-circumvention mechanism against the country were causing serious concern among businesses and government agencies. Those efforts were not enough to prevent broader action. In April, the EU used its anti-circumvention mechanism against Kyrgyzstan for the first time, prohibiting exports to...

Opinion: A Century Apart, Two Official Visions of Uzbek Womanhood

A century ago, in 1926, the Russian-language Uzbek newspaper Pravda Vostoka published an appeal to the “working women of the Soviet East” written by Clara Zetkin – a Marxist and a women’s rights advocate from Germany. In its appeal for women’s unveiling, it asked where the mullahs had been while women suffered through the “dark past” and promised that Soviet law now shone “bright rays” over a liberated and free Soviet present. It closed not with a tribute to women, but with a slogan: “Forward to socialism! Always ready to fight for world revolution!” There was a significant problem with this text. Literacy among Uzbek women was extremely low, particularly in rural areas, and those who could read generally read Uzbek rather than Russian. Historian Marianne Kamp documents this gap in her book The New Woman in Uzbekistan. The article calling women to political consciousness was, therefore, not directly accessible to the overwhelming majority of its stated audience. That gap is not just a flaw in the propaganda or evidence of its exaggerated reach. Rather, it explains how the propaganda worked. A Russian newspaper speaking to Uzbek women who largely could not read it depended on party cadres, activists, public readings, meetings, and other literate intermediaries who could disseminate the message in Uzbek. It did not address an existing constituency so much as construct one – handing local organisers a model of the politically awakened Soviet woman they were expected to promote in villages where practically no woman could have read the article herself. [caption id="attachment_54189" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Uzbek women in the old city of Tashkent before going out into the street on International Women’s Day, March 8, 1924. Photo: Public domain.[/caption] The “working women of the Soviet East” were therefore both an audience and an emerging political category. That category served a larger claim the Soviet state was making about Central Asia: that the region was “backward” and required revolutionary socialist transformation. In Soviet rhetoric, as in some earlier Russian imperial writing, the condition of women became one of the principal measures by which a society’s level of development was judged. A society’s position on the imagined path from feudalism to modernity could be read from whether its women were veiled or unveiled, secluded or employed, illiterate or educated. Transforming women’s appearance and public role offered the state an especially visible means of demonstrating that Central Asia was leaving its supposedly backward past behind. This does not mean that Soviet female emancipation was merely an empty disguise for imperial domination. Many contemporary works by historians such as Adrienne Edgar, Marianne Kamp, and Shoshana Keller showcase the genuine changes produced by Soviet literacy campaigns, education, employment, family law, and women’s political participation. Soviet gender policy did not simply reproduce the restrained paternalism of the tsarist administration. It attempted, and in many ways succeeded, at a much more radical transformation in the realm of gender politics. What it does complicate is who was doing the defining. It is tempting to read...

Kazakhstan Navigates Rival U.S. and China AI Frameworks

Kazakhstan has found itself in an unusual position as the technological rivalry between the United States and China intensifies. Within a matter of weeks, Astana first joined the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative and then became a founding member of the Beijing-backed World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO). Washington is now preparing to warn countries aligned with its AI strategy that participation in competing frameworks may be incompatible, Reuters has reported. For Kazakhstan, such a choice would be uncomfortable for more than political reasons. The United States is home to many of the world’s leading AI and semiconductor companies and offers access to investment and advanced technology. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has critical mineral reserves that Washington is keen to bring into secure supply chains. China is next door, remains one of Kazakhstan’s leading trading partners, and offers countries without their own advanced technologies broader access to Chinese developments. Zamir Karazhanov, a political scientist and director of the Kemel Arna Public Foundation, believes Kazakhstan is unlikely to abandon cooperation with China on artificial intelligence. Much, he says, will depend on how far Washington is prepared to go and whether technological alignment becomes a condition for continued partnership with the United States. Pax Silica was launched by Washington in late 2025. Despite its name, the initiative goes far beyond silicon and chips. It covers the supply chains and physical infrastructure underpinning AI, including critical minerals, semiconductors, energy, and computing capacity. Kazakhstan officially joined Pax Silica on June 25, 2026, becoming the first Central Asian country to enter the initiative. The accession declaration was signed in Washington by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development Zhaslan Madiyev. For Kazakhstan, participation also has a tangible economic dimension: the country has a substantial mineral resource base needed for high-tech manufacturing. The Times of Central Asia has previously examined why joining Pax Silica could help Kazakhstan attract foreign investment into mining, energy, data centers, and manufacturing for the AI economy. U.S. interest in Kazakhstan’s mineral resources predates Pax Silica. In June, Astana hosted a C5+1 critical minerals dialogue involving representatives of all five Central Asian states and U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, Sergio Gor. The American side spoke openly about expanding cooperation with the region on secure supply chains. But in July, Astana took another step, this time toward Beijing. Kazakhstan became one of 29 founding members of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization. The agreement establishing WAICO was signed in Shanghai, where the organization will also be headquartered. Beijing has presented the new organization as a mechanism for international cooperation on AI governance and narrowing the technological gap between countries. Chinese President Xi Jinping has also promoted China’s open-weight AI models as a more accessible alternative for countries that cannot afford or easily access leading proprietary systems. However, Beijing is also considering restrictions on overseas access to some of China’s leading AI models. In July, Xi Jinping pitched WAICO as part of China’s effort to advance its own model of global...