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Logistics

Middle East Conflict Disrupts Logistics Routes for Deliveries to Kyrgyzstan

Military activity in the Middle East has caused serious disruptions to logistics routes used to deliver goods to Kyrgyzstan. In particular, the transit of cargo through Iran has completely stopped. This was reported to The Times of Central Asia by the Association of International Freight Forwarders of Kyrgyzstan. According to industry representatives, the auto parts market is already experiencing some of the most significant consequences. A substantial share of goods from the U.S., Europe, and the Middle East is delivered to Kyrgyzstan via the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf. The port is considered a key transit hub through which a large volume of international cargo passes. However, due to the escalating situation in the region, maritime transport along this route has effectively been halted. As a result, many goods that have already been paid for and are intended for delivery to Kyrgyzstan remain stuck in ports of departure or transit zones. “A large volume of cargo used to be transported through the port of Bandar Abbas. We used this route for transit to the Emirates, to Dubai and Sharjah. Now we are effectively cut off from maritime transport. All the countries of the Persian Gulf are closed to us, and there are serious problems with air traffic in this region. A lot of cargo normally goes from Sharjah and Dubai to Kyrgyzstan, but these deliveries have now been suspended,” Igor Golubev, deputy chairman of the Association of International Freight Carriers of Kyrgyzstan, told The Times of Central Asia. According to him, equipment, auto parts, perfumes, and other goods are supplied to Kyrgyzstan from the countries of the Persian Gulf. If the conflict continues and logistics chains are not restored, Kyrgyzstan could face shortages of certain types of products. “Ships from all over the world used to arrive at the port of Bandar Abbas. It served as a transshipment hub from which we received a wide range of goods. Now this transit hub is effectively closed,” Golubev said. The disruptions have affected not only imports but also exports. According to the Association of Carriers, the transit of Kyrgyz cargo to Turkey and Europe, which previously passed through Iranian territory, has completely stopped. At present, more than 30 Kyrgyz trucks carrying goods remain in northern Iran, and their drivers are unable to return home. Additional difficulties have emerged due to fighting between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Kyrgyz logistics companies actively use the port of Karachi in Pakistan, and some cargo has traditionally been delivered to Kyrgyzstan through Afghanistan. This route is now also effectively closed. According to the Association of International Freight Carriers, negotiations are currently underway with Chinese partners on the possible use of alternative logistics corridors. The state-owned organization Kyrgyz Export told The Times of Central Asia that it is closely monitoring the situation and remains in constant contact with carriers. Authorities are also holding talks with Iran and other states in the region while considering alternative routes to restore the import and export of Kyrgyz goods.

Iran

Iran War Highlights Central Asia’s Vulnerable Southern Trade Corridors

The widening war centered on Iran is reverberating far beyond the Middle East, exposing a structural vulnerability in Central Asia’s economic geography: the region’s reliance on transport corridors that pass through or near Iran and the Persian Gulf. As fighting escalates and shipping risks spread across the region, insurers, shipping companies, and logistics firms are reassessing operations across the Gulf. War-risk insurance premiums have surged while some commercial carriers have scaled back bookings to parts of the region amid growing security concerns. Tensions around the Strait of Hormuz have already pushed shipping costs higher as governments and logistics firms weigh the risks of operating in one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. For Central Asia’s landlocked economies, the crisis highlights how much regional connectivity strategies still depend on southern access routes linking the region to global markets. The conflict has also edged closer to the transport routes linking Central Asia with Europe after what were alleged to be Iranian drone strikes on Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan region, damaging facilities at the exclave’s airport and prompting diplomatic protests from Baku. While the strike did not directly disrupt trade corridors, it underscored how quickly the conflict could spill over into the South Caucasus, a key segment of the Middle Corridor. Nakhchivan is a landlocked Azerbaijani exclave bordering Iran and Turkey, separated from mainland Azerbaijan by Armenia, and lies at the frontier where Iranian territory meets the transport networks of the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus also hosts energy infrastructure with wider geopolitical significance. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline transports mostly Azerbaijani crude through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, from where it is shipped to global markets. In 2025, Azerbaijani oil accounted for 46.4% of Israel’s crude imports, most of it moving through this supply chain before being shipped onward by tanker. The pipeline also carries limited volumes of Kazakh crude - 2-3% of Kazakhstan’s overall exports - making it far more significant for Israel’s energy supply than for Kazakhstan’s export system. Iran’s armed forces have denied responsibility for the drone incident, instead accusing Israel of attempting to provoke tensions and disrupt relations between Muslim countries. The Geography of Connectivity Since independence, Central Asian governments have sought to overcome the constraints of geography. Landlocked and long dependent on Soviet-era transport networks running north through Russia, the region has spent three decades developing alternative corridors in multiple directions. Routes leading south have held particular appeal, offering the shortest overland access to ports on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Iran sits at the heart of several connectivity initiatives designed to connect Central Asian rail networks to ports on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Ashgabat Agreement — a multimodal transport framework linking Iran, Oman, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and designed to connect Central Asia with ports on the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman — was created specifically to facilitate international trade and transit between Central Asia and global shipping routes. For countries such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, rail routes...

Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be discussing the impact on Central Asia of the war centered on Iran, its impact on trade routes, and diplomacy among the C6. This weeks guests are: Stephen M. Bland, Managing Editor And Head Of Investigations at The Times of Central Asia and Alex Vatanka of the Washington-based Middle East Institute.

Geopolitics

Soft Power in Times of Geopolitical Turbulence: Kazakhstan’s Strategy as a Middle Power

For Kazakhstan, deeply embedded in global supply chains and international investment flows, soft power is evolving from an image-building asset into a strategic instrument of resilience. In an era of globalization, when even geographically distant conflicts can directly threaten national infrastructure and economic security, Astana’s ability to leverage institutional initiatives and investment interdependence as a form of diplomatic protection has become a decisive advantage. Over the long term, stability tends to characterize states whose infrastructure and economic interests are deeply interconnected with those of major global centers of power. A middle power and rational diplomacy Kazakhstan’s status as a middle power is not a matter of ambition, but a deliberate choice in favor of rational diplomacy, where flexibility and institutional engagement serve as key resources. Multilateral dialogue with the U.S., Russia, China, the EU, Turkey, and countries of the Middle East is being developed not as situational maneuvering but as a core strategy for minimizing external risks and preserving sovereignty. It is precisely the combination of proactive soft power, political neutrality, and economic openness that allows Kazakhstan to transform geopolitical turbulence into a strategic advantage, positioning the country as an indispensable hub of international stability. Ultimately, the rational diplomacy of a middle power transforms the country’s geographical position from a potential zone of conflict into a platform for dialogue, where pragmatism and institutional mediation become the principal guarantees of national sovereignty. The Ukrainian case: infrastructure protection as an element of soft power Developments surrounding Russia's war in Ukraine illustrate how Kazakhstan’s soft power can function as a form of economic protection. The attacks on infrastructure in the Novorossiysk area, through which the Caspian Pipeline Consortium exports oil, highlighted a distinctive mechanism for safeguarding national interests through investment interdependence. Strikes near the Black Sea hub posed a direct threat not only to logistics but also to the assets of major American investors in Kazakh energy projects, including Tengiz. According to reports cited in public discussions, the U.S. urged Ukraine to take into account the interests of American investors in Kazakhstan. If confirmed, such a step would represent an important precedent: even amid an intense military conflict, global actors remain attentive to protecting the economic interests tied to Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure. For Astana, this episode illustrates how decades of building strategic relations with Western partners have created a significant layer of economic security. In this context, soft power manifests itself as a form of “investment protection,” discouraging actions that could damage oil production or transport infrastructure linked to global stakeholders. Institutionalizing neutrality: why Kazakhstan needs a Board of Peace The creation of the Board of Peace by U.S. President Donald Trump and Kazakhstan’s active participation signals Kazakhstan’s transition from ad hoc mediation toward a more structured institutional architecture of soft power. The signing of the Board of Peace Charter by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev formally embeds peacebuilding activities within the state’s foreign policy framework. Kazakhstan’s developing participation in this initiative is also linked to its experience hosting the Congress of Leaders of World...

Middle East Crisis

Calls and Meetings: Central Asia’s Diplomats Seek Balance in Mideast War

Central Asian countries are being careful not to criticize any actors during the Mideast war, maintaining ties with the Iranian government while expressing support for Gulf Arab countries that have been targeted by Iranian missiles and drones. The diplomacy on both sides of a war that began with U.S. and Israeli air strikes on Iran reflects a longstanding approach in Central Asia, where leaders have sought to project neutrality and maintain amicable relations with major powers including Russia, China and the United States. Increasingly, those leaders are taking coordinated positions on conflicts such as the one now convulsing the Mideast region, partly in order to preserve trade routes and strengthen a call for regional stability. It all means that Central Asian diplomats are busy these days. A lot of calls and meetings. Alibek Bakaev, Kazakhstan’s deputy foreign minister, discussed the situation in the Middle East with Iranian ambassador Ali Akbar Joukar in Astana on Wednesday. The two sides “reaffirmed their commitment to the implementation of the agreements reached following high-level negotiations,” the Kazakh government said, in an apparent reference to deals, probably related to trade, that were made before the massive strikes on Iran and ensuing upheaval that could affect the global economy. Like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan has reached out to Gulf Arab countries during the crisis and thanked them for helping with the evacuation of Central Asian nationals, including Muslim pilgrims. On Wednesday, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev spoke to Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani about the importance of bringing the war to a quick end, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said. “Deep concern was expressed over unacceptable actions that exacerbate divisions within the Muslim ummah during the holy month of Ramadan,” said the ministry, without specifying who was responsible for the “unacceptable actions.” Just a day earlier, Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov of Uzbekistan spoke by telephone to his Iranian counterpart, Seyed Abbas Araghchi. Saidov expressed condolences over the loss of civilian lives in the war and the pair agreed on the need for dialogue. Among Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in particular have been growing closer to the United States, signing trade deals and joining President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace initiative. Trump has described the Iranian leadership as “a vicious group of very hard, terrible people.” Nations in Central Asia aren’t the only ones looking for a balance in the current crisis. China, which relies heavily on Iranian oil but also values its ties to the wealthy Gulf Arab states, has called for an end to the war. Russia, which has received help from Iran for its war in Ukraine, has condemned the strikes, but Moscow has been developing ties with the Gulf states as well. Among traditional U.S. allies, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has said he supports the strikes in Iran “with regret” because they reflect a further breakdown of the international order, even though Iran is a threat. French President Emmanuel Macron has expressed similar concerns about the strikes, while denouncing the...

CA5+UK

Central Asia and Britain Launch CA5+UK Ministerial Track

On February 26, 2026, the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in London with United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper at Lancaster House for the inaugural “Central Asia–UK” (CA5+UK) ministerial. Official statements described it as the first time since independence that all five Central Asian foreign ministers have met jointly with a UK foreign secretary in a single forum. They also presented the meeting as the start of a structured ministerial channel, intended to convene regularly, that can carry regional priorities while leaving bilateral agendas in place. The United Kingdom is framing the new CA5+UK channel as a replacement for scattered bilateral visits: a single ministerial venue can set shared priorities and route them into investment and services work. For the five Central Asian states, it adds another external track, widening options without forcing institutional choices. Public statements point to a practical agenda focused on trade and investment, transport connectivity, energy transition, and critical minerals, with security present chiefly as background context. The enabling layer of finance, standards, education, and professional services is also included. How the London Program Unrolled On February 25, meetings took place at the British Parliament as part of the London schedule. The five ministers met with House of Commons Speaker Sir Lindsay Hoyle and held a session with the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Central Asia, chaired by Pam Cox. The meetings in Parliament complemented the ministerial session at Lancaster House by widening contact beyond foreign ministries. The discussion emphasized committee-to-committee contacts, visits, and exchange of legislative practice as a complement to intergovernmental diplomacy. Parliamentary relationships and staff channels can carry attention between ministerial sessions, assisting with follow-up after cooperative contacts have been publicly established. They represent a second continuity layer: implementation often turns on routine access and working familiarity rather than on formal statements alone. Between the parliamentary program and the ministerial delegations, they also met with the United Kingdom business community at a reception in London. This was a practical companion to the new format, aiming at the conversion of diplomatic intent into projects that can be financed and executed. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev cogently highlighted the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), which operates under English common law with an independent court and arbitration system and British judges in the AIFC Court. Beyond the plenary session, a ministerial working lunch provided a venue to follow up on such initiatives. Early deliverables were not multilateral but bilateral. Kazakhstan and the United Kingdom signed a strategic roadmap on critical minerals through 2027 and paired it with education moves, including a licensed Coventry University campus in Almaty and plans involving British secondary and higher education institutions. Uzbekistan reported a Memorandum of Understanding on healthcare services that it presented as a platform for building pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, alongside separate discussions with investment and finance counterparts in London. Turkmenistan cited a 2026–2027 cooperation program between foreign ministries, and Tajikistan continued to emphasize investment and cooperation in science and education. CA5+UK Launches with Bilateral Packages...