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Gender Quotas

Kazakhstan’s New Kurultai Elections: What the 30% Quota Could Mean for Women in Parliament

Kazakhstan’s new Constitution entered into force on July 1. On August 23, voters will elect the country’s first unicameral Kurultai, a 145-member legislature that replaces the former Mazhilis and Senate. Political parties are already submitting their lists, with nominations open from July 2 to July 13. Those lists must meet an inclusion requirement that has taken on new significance under the new electoral system: at least 30% of candidates must come from three combined categories, women, young people, and people with disabilities. How many women will actually enter the new parliament will become clear only after the votes are counted. But it is already possible to assess what the rule can achieve, and where its weaknesses lie. What the Law Requires The quota is less straightforward in practice. It does not guarantee that 30% of seats will go to women. The rule sets a combined 30% target that includes women alongside young people and people with disabilities. A party could comply with the rule while doing relatively little to increase women’s representation, if enough candidates from the other eligible categories are included. The rule carries added weight because Kazakhstan’s new Kurultai will be elected through a nationwide proportional party-list system. Under this model, placement on party lists can count as much as the overall number of women nominated. Kazakhstan has also lowered the threshold for registering political parties from 40,000 to 20,000 members, a change intended to make it easier for new political forces to participate. Seven parties have been cleared to compete in the August 23 election. Kazakhstan’s Starting Point Before the transition to the new unicameral legislature, women’s representation in Kazakhstan’s parliament remained limited. By the end of 2025, women held 17 seats in the Mazhilis, or 17.3% of the chamber. As of July 2025, women held 10 of 50 seats in the Senate, or 20%. By comparison, the global average for women’s representation in national parliaments stood at 27.5% at the end of 2025, after rising by just 0.3 percentage points over the year. Kazakhstan enters its first Kurultai election from a position below the global average. How Neighboring Countries Have Addressed the Issue The region already offers examples of how differently gender quotas can work. In Uzbekistan, the quota for women candidates in elections to the Legislative Chamber was raised from 30% to 40% and applied for the first time in the 2024 elections. Unlike Kazakhstan’s rule, Uzbekistan’s quota applies specifically to women rather than to a combined group. The result was noticeable: the number of women MPs rose from 48, or 32%, to 57, or 38%, out of 150 seats. As of July 2025, women also held 16 of 65 Senate seats in Uzbekistan, or 24.6%. An even sharper increase took place in Kyrgyzstan. In the 2025 parliamentary elections, women’s share of seats rose by 12.9 percentage points, the largest increase among countries that renewed their parliaments that year. The change came from a redesign of the electoral system rather than from a symbolic quota....

Art and Culture

Kanybek Kalmatov Interview: Kyrgyz Director Takes on Chinghiz Aitmatov

At 25, Kanybek Kalmatov is taking on a subject many older directors might have avoided: Chinghiz Aitmatov, Kyrgyzstan’s most internationally recognized writer and a figure deeply embedded in the country’s cultural identity. Kalmatov, a cinematographer and graduate of VGIK, the prestigious Moscow film school, is making his directorial debut with Aitmatov, billed as Kyrgyzstan’s first full-length feature film about the writer’s life and career. The project has already drawn attention beyond Kyrgyzstan, not least because Russian actor Sergey Bezrukov has joined the cast. For Kalmatov, the film is also personal. He first encountered Aitmatov as a schoolboy through The Little Soldier, and later found that even at film school in Moscow, Kyrgyzstan was often viewed through the writer’s name. Now, after months of research and nearly a year spent developing the screenplay, he says he is ready to take on a life that one film can only partly contain. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Kalmatov about why he chose a biopic rather than an adaptation, how he approached Aitmatov’s life at such a young age, and why he hopes the film will send younger viewers back to the writer’s books. TCA: You have chosen an ambitious project for your directorial debut. How did the film come about? Kanybek Kalmatov: Since childhood, there have been two stories I always dreamed of filming. The first is about my parents, because they have an incredible love story. The second is about Aitmatov. It wasn’t only his works that fascinated me. It was the scale of his personality, how determined he was and how many different things he managed to do at the same time. I fell in love with Aitmatov when I was about 12, after reading The Little Soldier. It’s about a boy whose father died in the war. Since then, Aitmatov’s works have always stayed with me. Even at VGIK, where I studied, people often saw me through that lens: “You’re from Kyrgyzstan? The homeland of Aitmatov?” For us, he’s not just a writer; he’s part of our cultural code. So I felt that, sooner or later, this film was bound to enter my life. TCA: Were you afraid the project might not work? Kanybek Kalmatov: No. Probably because I believe strongly in intention. Any big undertaking starts with that. If your motivation is right and you understand why you’re doing it, things begin to fall into place. From the start, my intention was pure. I never saw this film as a way to gain fame or prove something to anyone. I wanted to tell the story honestly of someone who means so much to our culture. TCA: Don’t you think one has to “grow into” Aitmatov first? Kanybek Kalmatov: There are topics you need to mature into. But if you wait for the perfect moment, you may never make anything at all. Maybe if I waited another 15 years, I would approach this story differently. Or maybe I’d never dare. Personally, I respect people who aren’t afraid...

Foreign Investment

Kazakhstan Expands Technology Agenda, Inviting Investors into Space and Artificial Intelligence

Kazakhstan is stepping up its focus on the digital economy and high technology, expanding its investment agenda beyond the resource sector. At a meeting of the Foreign Investors’ Council on July 2, officials presented several areas they see as potential new growth drivers: artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, space technology, and the innovation hub of Alatau City. For Astana, the push is part of a broader economic development strategy. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said Kazakhstan’s economy grew by 6.5% in 2025, while GDP has exceeded $300 billion. According to Tokayev, accumulated net foreign direct investment has surpassed $150 billion, making Kazakhstan Central Asia’s largest recipient of foreign investment. Against this backdrop, the government is increasingly focused on the next stage of development: building digital industries that could help shape the region’s economic architecture in the coming years. Artificial intelligence is central to this strategy. Tokayev described AI as one of the key drivers of the global economy and confirmed that 2026 has been declared the Year of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development in Kazakhstan. The country has adopted a new package of sector-specific legislation, including the Digital Code and the Law on Artificial Intelligence, and has created the Ministry of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development. One of the most prominent projects in this sector is Data Center Valley, an infrastructure cluster intended to host large-scale computing and data-processing facilities. According to the president, the project has already attracted interest from Amazon, G42, and other international technology companies. For Kazakhstan, the development of data centers has strategic importance. As global demand for computing power and AI infrastructure grows, countries with access to energy, favorable logistics, and clear regulation are becoming increasingly attractive destinations for international capital. A separate part of the strategy focuses on the space sector. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development Zhaslan Madiyev invited foreign investors to participate in building a joint space ecosystem. According to Madiyev, Kazakhstan sees the sector as broader than traditional satellite infrastructure, viewing it as a technological platform that can combine spacecraft manufacturing, launches, maintenance, Earth observation, and AI-driven analytics. This approach reflects a wider global trend. The space technology market is entering a new phase of growth, driven by private investment, satellite communications, geo-analytics, and big data services. For Kazakhstan, this creates an opportunity to use its accumulated expertise and infrastructure, including its space-sector legacy at Baikonur, which remains leased to Russia until 2050. Another pillar of the digital strategy is Alatau City, an innovation hub being built near Almaty. The authorities view it as an experimental platform for digital assets, fintech, autonomous transport, and artificial intelligence technologies. According to Madiyev, Alatau City is expected to become one of the first sites in the region for testing autonomous vehicles, drones, and tokenized solutions. Tokayev said the city will be built on a “digital by default” principle, meaning that administrative and public services will be designed in digital form from the outset. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Astana...

Strategic Partnership

Uzbekistan and Georgia Sign Strategic Partnership Declaration

Uzbekistan and Georgia have signed a declaration establishing strategic partnership relations, adding a new dimension to a relationship led by trade and Eurasian transit routes. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze held talks on July 3 in Tbilisi during Mirziyoyev's state visit. The sides also exchanged agreements and memorandums on customs, digitalization, education, agriculture, tourism, environmental protection, labor migration, healthcare, and nuclear and radiation safety. The visit was the first by an Uzbek president to Georgia in 23 years. Mirziyoyev held talks with Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili on July 2 and with Kobakhidze the following day. Before the signing, Georgian Foreign Minister Maka Botchorishvili told 1TV that the visit was a "historic opportunity to elevate relations" and tied the agenda to the Middle Corridor. One concrete diplomatic step is Tashkent's decision to open an embassy in Georgia. Uzbekistan currently has no embassy in Georgia and covers the country through its diplomatic mission in Baku, despite diplomatic relations having been established in August 1994. The Uzbek president's office said bilateral trade reached $270 million in 2025 and has passed $100 million since the start of 2026. The governments plan a dedicated roadmap to raise trade to $1 billion in the coming years and reduce the trade imbalance. Following the talks, the Uzbek side said both governments had agreed on "concrete steps to significantly increase trade and deepen industrial cooperation in key sectors." The focus on Georgian ports gives the deal a clear regional dimension. Mirziyoyev and Kobakhidze discussed wider use of Poti and Batumi for Uzbek cargo and backed a logistics hub in Georgia, with an industrial zone and a showroom for Uzbek products. A business forum held before the signing drew about 300 participants, including Georgian businesses from logistics, pharmaceuticals, finance, IT, tourism, and agribusiness. Georgia already serves as a South Caucasus outlet for Central Asian freight moving toward the Black Sea and Turkey. Uzbekistan is seeking more western routes as it develops rail links toward China, Afghanistan, and the Caspian Sea. The Times of Central Asia recently reported that Kyrgyzstan and Georgia discussed linking the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway to Georgian port infrastructure. Mirziyoyev made the same connection in Tbilisi, proposing that the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway corridor be integrated with the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway now under development. That proposal would put Georgia firmly inside Uzbekistan's export planning. Uzbek foreign trade cargo moving along the Middle Corridor has doubled over the past five years to reach 1.2 million tons by the end of 2025. Industrial cooperation is also moving beyond general pledges. The sides signed a cooperation program through 2027 and discussed projects in agriculture, electrical engineering, energy, pharmaceuticals, food processing, construction materials, digital services, and tourism. The leaders also proposed a joint investment fund to support new projects. People-to-people links have grown with direct flights. Tashkent now has air links with both Tbilisi and Batumi, with direct flights operating 13 times per week. More than 21,500 Uzbek tourists visited Georgia in 2025, while Georgian tourist arrivals in Uzbekistan reached 6,800...

Labor Migration

Opinion: Russia’s Migration Crackdown Tests Central Asia’s Labor Alternatives

Russia is no longer the unquestioned labor destination it once was for Central Asian workers. That shift is real, but it is easy to overstate. The Times of Central Asia recently reported that labor migration from the region is becoming more diverse. Workers are looking not only to Russia, but also to South Korea, the Gulf states, the United Kingdom, Poland, Belarus, and other destinations. The old Russia-centered model is weakening, even if it has not collapsed. The question is scale. It now intersects with two other filters: legal status and banking access. Alternative labor markets can absorb some Central Asian workers, but they cannot yet replace the Russian labor outlet. Russia did not function as an ordinary destination. For years, it acted as the region's largest external labor valve: geographically close, linguistically familiar, legally accessible for some, and large enough to absorb millions of workers across construction, services, logistics, agriculture, and municipal labor. South Korea, the UK, Poland, and the Gulf can offer higher wages and more formal recruitment channels. They can also reduce overdependence on Moscow. But they are more selective, more bureaucratic, and much smaller in immediate absorption capacity. That leaves a more important question: can new destinations expand fast enough to offset a narrowing Russian market? For now, the answer is probably no. Diversification Is Real, but Not Replacement The difference between diversification and replacement is crucial. A worker from Kyrgyzstan leaving for seasonal work in the UK, or a worker from Uzbekistan entering an organized recruitment program in South Korea, represents a genuine shift. These routes can be safer, better paid, and less exposed to the social hostility now facing many Central Asian migrants in Russia. But they cannot absorb workers on the same scale. Russia's labor market absorbed Central Asian workers in very large numbers because it had a combination few other destinations can match: proximity, low entry costs, dense migrant networks, Russian-language familiarity, and long-standing informal labor channels. Even as those channels become more restrictive, they remain embedded in household economies across the region. This is why diversification should be read as a partial adaptation, not a full exit. For governments in Tashkent, Bishkek, and Dushanbe, the search for new labor markets is necessary. It reduces exposure to Russian policy shocks. It gives workers more choices. It also helps governments negotiate better legal recruitment schemes. Yet the structural problem remains. If Russia closes the door faster than alternatives can open, pressure does not disappear. It returns home through unemployment, lower remittances, and frustrated expectations. The EAEU Line Russia's migration crackdown does not affect Central Asia evenly. The most important dividing line is not geography. It is legal status. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which allows the free movement of labor among member states. In practical terms, citizens of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have a different legal status in Russia than citizens of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. They do not face the same work-permit and labor-patent system. That does not...

Transport and Logistics

Uzbekistan’s Logistics Push Aims to Turn Transit Growth into Revenue

Tashkent is trying to turn a fast rise in transit cargo into a larger role in Eurasian trade. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reviewed proposals on July 1 to expand logistics centers, modernize border infrastructure, digitalize warehouse and customs systems, and attract private investment into transport hubs. Transit cargo through Uzbekistan reached 15.3 million tons in 2025, up 54% from 2021. Yet Uzbekistan's share of China-Europe transit freight remains only 1-2%. Annual China-Europe trade is estimated at $800 billion, while freight traffic reaches 120-150 million tons. Officials estimate that an extra 15-20 million tons of international transit cargo could bring $400-600 million in added revenue, attract $3 billion of investment into logistics centers and terminals, and create 50,000 permanent jobs. The logistics push comes as Uzbekistan’s trade base becomes larger and more exposed to transport costs. Uzbekistan's foreign trade turnover reached $81.2 billion in 2025, up 20.7% from 2024, with exports at $33.8 billion and imports at $47.4 billion. The 2026 figures are more uneven. In January-May, turnover rose 3.7% year on year to $32.8 billion, but imports climbed 20.8% while exports fell 15.5%. Gold sales drove much of the export decline. Excluding gold, goods exports grew 29.4%, which gives Tashkent a clear reason to cut freight costs, speed up customs clearance, and expand container capacity. Uzbekistan already has about 4,000 kilometers of international transit corridors and a 4,700-kilometer railway network, but officials say the system remains too thin for the cargo volumes Tashkent wants to attract. Modern transport and logistics centers and dry ports are being developed in Tashkent, Navoi, and Namangan, while Navoi Airport serves Eurasian cargo routes. The July 1 proposals show how much still needs to change. Uzbekistan has 27 logistics centers that meet international standards, with total capacity of 27.2 million tons, but only one is in the highest category. Class A automated warehouses meet only 10-15% of demand. Officials also cited weak capacity at many border checkpoints, refrigerated and customs warehouse shortages, low containerization, and poor digital links. The new plan would specialize six areas as logistics zones. Khanabad would handle China-linked routes toward the Caspian, Europe, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. Angren, Yangiyul, and Akhangaran would distribute transit and foreign trade cargo. Alat would support Middle Corridor routes, and Termez would focus on Pakistan via Afghanistan. Entrepreneurs who build logistics centers in these locations would be offered 50 hectares of land in each area. The government plans to allocate $200 million a year in concessional and low-interest credit lines, with the budget covering external infrastructure. Projects also include customs terminals and parking in Qibray and Termez, a rail border checkpoint in Khanabad, Yangiyul station expansion, and a Class A center in Akhangaran. Digital systems form another part of the package. The proposals call for terminal and warehouse management systems linked to the E-logistika platform. They also include online monitoring, license plate recognition, electronic vehicle registration, and one-stop border clearance. Customs duties and certification rules may be eased for imported warehouse equipment, cargo-handling machinery, spare parts, and...