• KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10823 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10823 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10823 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10823 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10823 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10823 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10823 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10823 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
16 November 2025

Viewing results 331 - 336 of 1623

Breaking Old Ties: Central Asia’s Delicate Dance Between Russia and the West

Central Asian countries are increasingly asserting their independence in foreign policy, distancing themselves from traditional centers of global influence. Recent developments highlight a nuanced balancing act as states in the region navigate growing tensions between Russia and the West. Kyrgyzstan Pushes Back In Kyrgyzstan, the recent arrest of Natalya Sekerina, an employee of the Russian House in Osh, marked a notable assertion of sovereignty. Sekerina was detained under Part 1 of Article 416 of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, which pertains to the recruitment, financing, and training of mercenaries for armed conflict or attempts to overthrow state authority. Earlier, Sergei Lapushkin, an employee of Osh city hall, and two others were also detained in connection with the case.  All suspects were later placed under house arrest. Nevertheless, the arrests are seen by observers as a clear signal that Kyrgyzstan is not simply aligning with Russian policy, despite its economic dependence on Moscow, particularly due to labor migration. The move was reportedly a response to the April 17 detention of over 50 Kyrgyz nationals in a Moscow bathhouse, where Russian security forces allegedly used excessive force. The Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal note of protest. Russia later stated that the detainees were in the country illegally and some were suspected of links to radical groups.  At the same time, Kyrgyzstan is scrutinizing Western influence as well. In February, U.S. President Donald Trump announced funding cuts and a wind-down of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The announcement triggered debate in Kyrgyzstan, where some voices argued that while USAID had supported civil society, it also fostered instability and economic dependency. Critics claim the agency promoted Western values and helped establish a network of NGOs that played outsized roles in the country’s politics.  Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Seek Equilibrium In Kazakhstan, USAID also came under fire. Parliamentary Deputy Magherram Magherramov criticized the agency for promoting what he described as values alien to Kazakh society, referencing controversial events such as women’s rights marches and LGBTQ+ parades in Almaty. He called for a formal review of foreign-funded NGOs.  Meanwhile, Uzbekistan witnessed a diplomatic rift during an April visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the “Grieving Mother” memorial in Samarkand. Lavrov commented on the absence of a Russian-language inscription, provoking widespread backlash on Uzbek social media. Sherzodkhon Kudratkhodzha, rector of the University of Journalism and Mass Communications, responded sharply: “We are not their colony.” He also cited ongoing discrimination against Uzbek migrants in Russia, which, he argued, has been met with silence from Russian officials.  A More Independent Foreign Policy Central Asian nations are increasingly holding intra-regional and international meetings, often excluding Russia. On April 25, intelligence chiefs from the region gathered in Tashkent to coordinate on regional security threats.  The following day, a meeting of foreign ministers from Central Asia and China took place in Almaty. It was attended by Kazakh Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and counterparts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a...

China and Central Asia Deepen Ties at Almaty Foreign Ministers’ Meeting

The sixth meeting of foreign ministers in the “Central Asia-China” format was held in Almaty, attended by the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan (Murat Nurtleu), China (Wang Yi), Kyrgyzstan (Jeenbek Kulubaev), Tajikistan (Sirojiddin Muhriddin), Uzbekistan (Bakhtiyor Saidov), and a representative of Turkmenistan.  The main topics of discussion included strengthening political dialogue, expanding trade and economic ties, enhancing transport interconnectivity, and jointly countering global challenges. The ministers also addressed sustainable development and environmental security, outlining steps to improve the architecture of multilateral cooperation based on the principles of equality and mutual respect. A key item on the agenda was preparation for the second China-Central Asia Summit scheduled for this year. The foreign ministers engaged in in-depth political coordination and exchanged views on expanding cooperation across various fields. Challenges of Globalization and China's Position Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed concern over growing trends of anti-globalization and protectionism. He criticized the United States for launching a “tariff war” against more than 180 countries, stating that it had undermined international trade rules and the stability of the world economy.  "China will consistently promote a high degree of openness, share opportunities with the world, and take responsibility for upholding international norms," Wang Yi emphasized. China proposed five areas for deepening cooperation with Central Asia: building political trust, promoting trade and investment, improving cooperation mechanisms, jointly celebrating historical anniversaries, and developing humanitarian ties. Positions of the Central Asian Countries The Central Asian foreign ministers highly supported China's proposal to build a "community of common destiny" and expressed intentions to intensify joint efforts under the Belt and Road Initiative. Particular attention was paid to facilitating trade, enhancing transportation connectivity, boosting industrial investment, and promoting agricultural development. The ministers reaffirmed their commitment to combating the "three forces of evil", terrorism, extremism, and separatism and to strengthening cooperation within the United Nations framework. A joint communiqué was adopted following the meeting, reaffirming the parties' commitment to good-neighborliness, sustainable development, and deepening partnership.  Kazakhstan at the Center of Integration Processes Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu highlighted that the leaders of Central Asian countries had set clear guidelines for cooperation in trade, energy, transport logistics, education, and science.  "In 2024, trade turnover between Central Asia and China reached a record $95 billion, with Kazakhstan accounting for 46% of that total," Nurtleu said. He noted that combining the region’s potential with China’s economic opportunities paves the way for a new architecture of strategic partnership. Plans to launch tourist railway routes between China and Central Asian countries were also discussed, and 2025 was declared the Year of Tourism of Uzbekistan in China. Bilateral Meetings on the Margins of the Event On the sidelines of the forum, Wang Yi held separate meetings with his counterparts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.  With Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev, Wang discussed expanding practical cooperation and accelerating the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project. Talks with Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin focused on strengthening strategic partnership and promoting initiatives within the Belt and Road framework. With Uzbek Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov,...

Leonid Slutsky: Scandals, Nationalism, and the Migrant Blame Game

The leader of Russia’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), Leonid Slutsky has long been a figure surrounded by controversy. A hardline nationalist, Slutsky’s career has been marked by allegations of corruption and harassment. Recently, his intensified rhetoric against labor migrants – including proposed restrictions on labor migrants bringing their families into the country, a requirement for foreign workers to learn Russian, and attacks on the former head of the Uzbek National and Cultural Autonomy Council in Moscow - have further spotlighted his controversial political career. “Our people... should not suffer from boors and criminals who consider themselves masters here, gather in packs and attack people,” Slutsky stated regarding migrant workers. “If you want to make money in Russia, learn Russian, and respect our laws and traditions. In any other case, go home. We will not experiment on ourselves or our children. Our great country must be respected.” This shift to the far-right aligns with a broader nationalist trend in Russia and raises questions about Slutsky’s intentions and the potential impact on the country and those working there. Slutsky’s Scandal-Ridden Career Slutsky's political reputation has been marred by allegations of sexual harassment that surfaced in 2018, with multiple female journalists accusing him of inappropriate conduct, including a BBC correspondent whom he reportedly touched inappropriately and whom he was recorded calling a “bunny”. Despite public disquiet, a State Duma ethics panel dismissed the complaints, leading to a media boycott but no political repercussions. This episode, as well as reports of hidden assets and extravagant wealth, including luxury properties and cars, point to a broader culture of impunity within the Russian political elite. Investigations have revealed that Slutsky's family enjoys a lavish lifestyle, including stays at a luxury Turkish villa, private jet travel, and an elite education for his children in Switzerland, despite his declared income in 2020 of $77,000. Additionally, reports link him to high-end vehicles such as Bentleys and a Mercedes-Maybach, often financed through questionable means. To paraphrase a piece by David Szakonyi in the American Political Science Review, in Russia, corrupt politicians work less but support the regime more. A member of the State Duma since 1999, Slutsky succeeded Vladimir Zhirinovsky as head of the LDPR in 2022. Under his leadership, the party has increasingly leaned on ultranationalist rhetoric and populist measures that appeal to disillusioned voters during times of economic strain. His recent attacks on labor migrants echo this strategy. Weaponizing Anti-Migrant Sentiment Slutsky’s outspoken criticism of labor migrants fits into a growing narrative in Russia that blames foreign workers for economic and social problems. Migrants, particularly those from Central Asia and the Caucasus, have been routinely scapegoated in nationalist circles, accused of taking jobs, disrupting social harmony, and contributing to crime. While there is little evidence to support many of these claims, Slutsky is capitalizing on prevailing anxieties as a means to rally support for his party. By portraying himself and the LDPR as defenders of a nostalgia-fueled Russian identity, he hopes to appeal to conservative voters who view...

Lavrov in Uzbekistan: Criticism, Controversy, and Clashing Narratives

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s official visit to Uzbekistan this week has triggered significant public and political responses, particularly after remarks he made during a visit to the Motamsaro Ona (Grieving Mother) memorial in Samarkand. While at the memorial, which honors Uzbek soldiers who died during World War II and features inscriptions in Uzbek and English, Lavrov pointed out the absence of a Russian-language text. “There is an inscription in English, but I didn’t see one in Russian. A mother is the most sacred figure,” Lavrov reportedly told his tour guide, according to TASS. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov was present during the exchange. Photographs released by the Russian Foreign Ministry show Lavrov laying flowers at the site, accompanied by an honor guard. Lavrov was in Uzbekistan for a two-day official visit. On April 23, he met with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to discuss bilateral ties and regional cooperation, including trade, energy, and security issues. [caption id="attachment_31165" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Sergey Lavrov lays flowers at the Grieving Mother memorial in Samarkand; image: MFA Russia[/caption] Domestic Responses to Lavrov’s Remarks Lavrov’s observation about the memorial sparked criticism from several Uzbek public figures. Alisher Qodirov, a member of parliament and leader of the Milliy Tiklanish (National Revival) party, stated that “Russian politicians seem to be trying every possible way to portray Uzbekistan as disrespectful to Russian language and culture... Lavrov surely understands that forced respect and invented needs only create the opposite effect.” Sherzodkhon Qudratkhodja, rector of the University of Journalism and Mass Communications of Uzbekistan, was similarly outspoken. “It is inappropriate for a Foreign Minister from another country to come here and criticize us,” he said. “After all, we are not their colony.” Qudratkhodja further criticized Russia’s treatment of Uzbek labor migrants. “Why are our migrants in Russia discriminated against? Why do Russian officials remain silent when local authorities, migration services, or police violate their basic human rights?” he asked. “If Mr. Lavrov wants to speak about sacred symbols like mothers, Uzbekistan can remind him that human rights are sacred, too.” Mutual Recriminations and Educational Policy Lavrov also addressed Uzbekistan’s engagement with the EU, prompting a further response from Qudratkhodja. “No one has the right to interfere in Uzbekistan’s internal affairs,” he said. “This includes independently determining our level of relations with the European Union. It demonstrates our state’s multi-vector foreign policy.” Coinciding with Lavrov’s visit, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Preschool and School Education introduced a new requirement: all graduating students, including those from non-Uzbek-language schools, must now pass an exam in the Uzbek state language, a move widely viewed as part of broader efforts to reinforce national identity. At a joint press conference, Lavrov emphasized the closeness of Uzbekistan-Russia relations. “You feel this closeness when you are here, not only at the official level but also at the human level,” he said. Foreign Minister, Saidov responded by underscoring Uzbekistan’s balanced diplomacy: “Our country does not compare friends. We are close to all our strategic partners and friendly countries.” Labor Migration and Energy Cooperation...

Uzbekistan and Russia Advance Trans-Afghan Railway Project to Pakistan

Uzbekistan and Russia have taken a significant step toward the practical implementation of the long-envisioned Trans-Afghan railway project, which aims to connect Central Asia to Pakistan via Afghanistan. The transport ministries of both countries, along with Russian Railways and the Uzbek national railway company, Uzbekistan Temir Yollari, have signed documents formalizing the start of the project’s development phase. According to Russia’s Ministry of Transport, the two countries will jointly develop a feasibility study in 2025, assessing freight traffic forecasts and economic viability. Two potential routes have been proposed: Route 1: Mazar-e-Sharif - Herat - Dilaram - Kandahar (Afghanistan) - Chaman (Pakistan) Route 2: Termez (Uzbekistan) - Naibabad (Afghanistan) - Logar (Afghanistan) - Harlachi (Pakistan) Further discussions involving Pakistan Railways and an Afghan delegation are scheduled for the Russia-Islamic World Forum in the Russian city of Kazan on May 15-16. Uzbekistan, which already maintains a direct rail connection to Afghanistan, continues to position itself as a logistics hub for trade between Russia, Central Asia, South Asia, and beyond. In January 2025, Tashkent extended its contract with the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan to operate and maintain the Hairaton to Mazar-e-Sharif railway -- a vital segment of the broader China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan corridor. The corridor’s significance is expected to grow upon completion of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway. Currently, Central Asia’s rail links to China are limited to routes transiting Kazakhstan. In a major development on April 17, Russia’s Supreme Court lifted its 2003 ban on the Taliban, having until then designated the group a terrorist organization. The decision, formally allowing Russian state institutions to engage with the Taliban, opens the door to deeper trade and infrastructure cooperation. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk stated that this policy shift will facilitate the promotion of Russian exports and the realization of Afghanistan’s transport and logistics potential. Uzbekistan has pursued a consistent policy of engagement with Afghanistan, emphasizing economic cooperation over isolation. In October 2024, Abdul Ghafar Terawi began his tenure as the head of the Taliban-led Afghan diplomatic mission in Tashkent. Speaking at the 79th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, Uzbek Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov reaffirmed Uzbekistan’s commitment to regional stability. “Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia,” Saidov told the Assembly. “Addressing the Afghan issue is essential for ensuring sustainable development across the region”. He praised Uzbekistan’s role in implementing the Trans-Afghan railway, which he said would offer landlocked Central Asian economies access to international ports. “This will positively impact the economic development of the entire region,” Saidov noted.

How Tokayev’s Kazakhstan Bridges Global Powers

Amid the ongoing reshaping of the global order, Kazakhstan is seeking to enhance its role as an emerging middle power. Preserving strong relations with all key geopolitical actors, strengthening its position as a de facto leader in Central Asia, and developing closer ties with other influential states on the world stage appear to be Astana’s top foreign policy priorities. The largest Central Asian state is one of the few countries that maintains good relations with geopolitical rivals such as China and the United States, as well as Russia and the European Union. At the same time, Astana is actively developing closer ties with the Turkey-led Organization of Turkic States, while firmly upholding its longstanding commitment to international law. It is, therefore, no surprise that, during the recently held EU- Central Asia summit in Samarkand, Kazakhstan, along with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, backed two UN resolution from the 1980s that reject the unilaterally-declared independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and deem all secessionist actions there legally invalid. Such a policy perfectly aligns with Kazakhstan President’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s 2022 statement, in which he affirmed Astana’s non-recognition of Taiwan, Kosovo, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia, and the entities he described as quasi-states, namely Luhansk and Donetsk. “In general, it has been calculated that if the right of nations to self-determination is actually realized throughout the globe, then instead of the 193 states that are now members of the UN, more than 500 or 600 states will emerge on Earth. Of course, it will be chaos,” Tokayev stressed. In other words, Kazakhstan upholds the principle of territorial integrity for all UN-member states, a stance similar to China’s policy. Despite their history of often supporting the right to self-determination over the principle of territorial integrity, Russia and the West do not seem to oppose Tokayev’s approach. As a result, the President of Kazakhstan remains one of the few world leaders who can attend the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow, regularly meet with EU officials, and participate in China-led initiatives. As the first Central Asian leader to speak with newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump in December 2024, Tokayev is also signaling his intention to deepen relations with the United States. All these actions demonstrate that, for Kazakhstan under Tokayev, the well-known multi-vector foreign policy remains without an alternative at this point. Although it is Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s first president, who initiated this approach, it is Tokayev who has been actively implementing it since he came to power in 2019. That, however, does not mean that "multivectorism" has become Astana’s official ideology. It is rather a tool the energy-rich nation’s policymakers are using to improve their country’s position in the international arena. Nowhere is that more obvious than at the Astana International Forum – an annual summit taking place in Kazakhstan’s capital – where leaders from diverse countries, often with differing goals and values, come together to discuss global challenges, foster dialogue, and seek common ground. The fact that this year Astana will host...