• KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
19 November 2026

Viewing results 49 - 54 of 1994

CICA’s Next Chapter in Asian Cooperation

At the October 15 summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Baku, Kazakhstan proposed a mechanism for preventive diplomacy to address disputes before they escalate. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said the mechanism would give each member state a role in decision-making and help translate political commitments into coordinated action. If adopted, the proposal could increase Astana’s influence among Asia’s larger powers by making its founding initiative more enduring. Influence Through an Asian Agenda Kazakhstan already coordinates CICA’s military-political dimension, working with Türkiye on military exchanges, training-center visits, and seminars that include mediation. Kazakhstan could draw on these exchanges when seeking members’ agreement on a mandate for preventive diplomacy. They provide experience of organizing cooperation in a politically sensitive field, although a standing role in addressing emerging disputes would require a separate political agreement defining what members authorize the mechanism to do. The Think Tank Forum offers another example of Kazakhstan’s influence over CICA’s institutional development. China initiated the Forum in 2014; its transformation into a permanent CICA advisory body followed in October 2021, when member states acted on Tokayev’s initiative. Azerbaijan hosted the first meeting outside China in September 2025, at which the handover to the Indian Council of World Affairs was announced; the latter now chairs the Forum for 2026–2027. Kazakhstan thus helped turn a Chinese initiative into a permanent CICA advisory body that Azerbaijani and Indian institutions subsequently helped sustain. China also contributes funding and seconded personnel to the Secretariat; Kazakhstan can build influence by securing agreement on standing arrangements through which other members pursue their priorities. At the Baku summit, Tokayev also proposed establishing a CICA Water Partnership to promote joint research, technology exchange, and water-saving measures. He suggested that Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan could jointly advance a proposal for an International Water Organization under the United Nations. These proposals could give Kazakhstan a role in shaping cooperation on water security within CICA and, through a joint regional initiative, at the UN. Kazakhstan's Foundational Role in CICA's Development Kazakhstan conceived CICA in 1992 and has led its institutional development, including the effort to transform it into a full-fledged international organization. The initiative has a constituency extending well beyond Central Asia. Fifteen states adopted CICA’s first founding declaration in 1999. With Laos’s accession at Baku, CICA now has 29 members, ranging from China, India, Pakistan, and Russia to Iran, Israel, and South Korea. The 2022 Astana summit launched CICA’s transformation into a full-fledged international organization. The Road Map endorsed by member states in 2023 specified reforms through which to pursue that transformation. The reforms cover the Charter, implementation of confidence-building measures, procedural rules, and the Secretariat’s organization. These changes affect CICA’s capacity to carry agreements forward between high-level meetings. Within CICA, the consensus rule makes collective agreement a condition both of institutional change and of policy coordination. Kazakhstan thus has an interest in the procedures through which future cooperation will be organized. Cambodia’s pre-summit ratification of the convention on the Secretariat’s...

Russia and Kyrgyzstan Sign Military Cooperation Plan for 2027

Russia and Kyrgyzstan signed a military cooperation plan for 2027 on October 15, a day after Russian lawmakers approved measures to simplify arms deliveries to Bishkek. Defense ministers Andrei Belousov and Ruslan Mukambetov signed the agreement in Cholpon-Ata, on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul, ahead of a meeting of defense ministers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The plan's contents have not been made public. Russia's Defense Ministry said the two sides discussed military personnel training, military-technical cooperation, and the operation of the joint Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan. Russia's military presence in Kyrgyzstan consists of four facilities, including Kant Air Base, around 20 kilometers from Bishkek, which Russian forces have used since 2003. It is part of the forces of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The other facilities are a Russian Navy communications station in Chaldovar, a seismic monitoring station in Mailuu-Suu, and a naval weapons testing base near Karakol on Lake Issyk-Kul. Belousov inspected the Issyk-Kul facility on October 14. The base tests anti-submarine weapons and systems designed to protect ships and submarines from torpedo attacks. The joint military base operates under bilateral agreements. Its current structure took shape after Russia's military facilities in Kyrgyzstan were brought together under an agreement signed in 2012, which entered into force in 2017. On October 14, Russia's State Duma ratified a protocol simplifying military-technical cooperation with Kyrgyzstan. Signed in November 2025, the protocol allows military equipment to be supplied under contracts between authorized organizations without additional import and export licenses. It also simplifies procedures for spare parts, repairs, and maintenance. The changes could speed up deliveries to the Kyrgyz military, although no new contracts have been announced. In 2025, Russia and Kyrgyzstan signed a strategic military partnership program covering 2026–2030. The two defense ministries have now agreed on their work for the coming year. Kyrgyzstan also maintains military ties with other countries. In February 2026, representatives of U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Air Force, and the Montana National Guard discussed joint training plans for fiscal year 2027 with Kyrgyz military officials.

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Launch Trans-Caspian Fiber-Optic Cable

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have launched the first fiber-optic communications link across the Caspian seabed. The approximately 380-kilometer cable connects Aktau and Sumgait, with Presidents Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Ilham Aliyev inaugurating the line in Baku on October 15. Russian operators have long dominated Kazakhstan’s international connectivity. A 2025 Internet Society report identified them as the country's principal suppliers of international bandwidth. The new route will give operators the option of directing data through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey toward Europe, providing redundancy independent of existing routes through Russia. This is particularly important during outages or congestion on existing connections. Part of the broader Digital Silk Way initiative, the cable could also benefit Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, both of which rely on Kazakhstan for international internet connectivity. The cable, supplied by a Chinese manufacturer, uses optical fiber made in Japan and terminal equipment from Western suppliers, according to the Caspian Policy Center. It has a design capacity of at least 400 terabits per second and was developed through CaspiLink, a joint venture between Kazakhstan’s Kazakhtelecom and Azerbaijan’s AzerTelecom. The project had been under discussion since 2019. In 2024, planned investment was estimated at more than 23 billion tenge (approximately $50 million). Marine surveys began in August 2025. Underwater cable laying began in July 2026 and was completed on August 5, with the line inaugurated on October 15. Kazakhstan also hopes to use the new connection to attract technology companies. Bagdat Mussin, chairman of Kazakhtelecom’s management board, said the cable could support Kazakhstan’s Data Center Valley, a complex under development in Ekibastuz for cloud computing and artificial intelligence. Mussin also told reporters that adjustments to the line would continue through the end of 2026, with the benefits expected to be felt no earlier than early 2027, according to Tengrinews. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, Kazakhstan must also secure reliable electricity supplies and sufficient demand for its planned data center capacity. Kazakhstan's Ministry of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development estimates that the new route could help more than double the country's international data transit to 21.6 Tbps in the coming years. How much traffic will initially use the cable, including traffic redirected from existing routes through Russia, remains unclear.

Russian Lawmakers Propose School Fees for Central Asian Migrants’ Children

Russia relies on millions of workers from Central Asia, but lawmakers want to charge some of their children, typically aged 15–17, for the final two years of public schooling. The move comes after tougher enrollment rules that have left thousands of migrant children struggling to attend Russian schools. The proposal, submitted to the government by deputies from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) on October 14, would require foreign citizens and stateless people to pay for education in grades 10 and 11. LDPR leader Leonid Slutsky argued that migrant families should bear the costs of educating their children in Russian upper-secondary schools, allowing public funds to be redirected toward Russian students. The party claimed that more than 130,000 foreign children attend grades 10–11, costing the state over 37 billion rubles (about $440 million) annually. However, these figures contradict data from Russia's Ministry of Education analyzed by the data project Tochno, which found approximately 130,000 foreign pupils and another 3,000 stateless pupils enrolled across all school grades in 2025–26, with only 4% of foreign pupils attending grades 10–11. That would put the number of foreign pupils in the final two grades at roughly 5,200, casting doubt on the LDPR's estimated savings. Growing Pressure on Migrant Families The proposed fees follow a series of Russian restrictions that have already made it more difficult for Central Asian families to educate their children in Russia. Since April 2025, foreign children seeking admission to Russian schools have been required to demonstrate sufficient Russian-language proficiency and provide documentation establishing their legal residence. Enrollment among children from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan fell by 27% in the 2025–26 school year, from approximately 122,000 to 89,000. In January 2026, Tajikistan's Minister of Education and Science Rahim Saidzoda reported that approximately 9,000 Tajik children had returned from Russia during 2025 following difficulties continuing their education there. Kyrgyzstan's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) raises a separate legal question. The EAEU treaty recognizes the right of migrant workers' children to receive education in the country where their parents work, subject to that country's legislation. However, it does not explicitly guarantee free tuition, leaving unclear whether children of workers from EAEU member states would qualify for exemptions. For migrant families, the immediate consequences would depend on the eventual tuition charges and exemptions. Some parents might choose vocational education for their children after grade nine, while others could leave them with relatives in their home countries rather than incur additional schooling expenses in Russia. Additional education costs could discourage migrant workers from bringing their families to Russia, even as the country continues to rely on Central Asian labor. Central Asia's Dependence on Remittances The proposed fees would affect families whose earnings are often vital to their home countries' economies. Tajikistan is the most dependent on remittances relative to the size of its economy, Kyrgyzstan relies particularly heavily on earnings from Russia, and Uzbekistan receives the largest remittance inflows in absolute terms. According to The Times of Central Asia's Central Asia Balance...

Uzbekistan Seeks Recognition of Its Driver’s Licenses in Germany

Uzbekistan is seeking recognition of its driver's licenses in Germany to make it easier for its citizens to work in the country's transport sector. The talks are linked to efforts to place Uzbek citizens in jobs with German transport and logistics companies. No agreement on license recognition has been reached so far. The issue was discussed at a meeting between Elyor Toshtemirov, deputy head of Uzbekistan's Migration Agency, and representatives of the German companies Global Talent Alliance and TSK Logistik. The participants discussed driver training and the requirements of German employers. The Uzbek agency intends to raise the possibility of license recognition with the relevant German authorities. Another proposal involves establishing a joint German-Uzbek driving school to train bus and truck drivers. Training would follow German standards so that graduates could qualify for jobs with transport companies in Germany. Under current German rules, drivers with licenses issued outside the European Union and European Economic Area can generally use them for six months after establishing residence in Germany. After that, they must obtain a German license. Professional truck and bus drivers must also meet separate qualification requirements. The meeting also addressed difficulties Uzbek citizens face in obtaining German work visas. Following the talks, the Migration Agency and Global Talent Alliance signed a cooperation agreement. Its terms have not been disclosed in detail. Uzbekistan has already reached an agreement with the United Arab Emirates on mutual recognition of driver's licenses. The relevant memorandum entered into force on January 27, 2024, allowing citizens of both countries to use their national licenses during short-term visits. It also allows Uzbek residents in the UAE to exchange their licenses without taking theoretical or practical driving tests.

Silent Lynx Hackers Leave Their Central Asian Spy Campaign Exposed

New findings published on October 14 suggest that hackers spying on Central Asian governments have been operating from Kazakhstan. The group, named Silent Lynx by researchers, used hijacked official email accounts to break into government computers. The hackers left some of their own working files unprotected online, allowing researchers to examine how they prepared and adapted their attacks. Their targets included agencies holding information about regional diplomacy and natural resources. The investigation was conducted by cybersecurity firm Recorded Future and Talos, a security research group at computer networking company Cisco. The two companies, both based in the United States, have not established whether the hackers were working for a government. Hijacked Official Email Accounts Seqrite, an Indian cybersecurity provider, gave the hackers the name Silent Lynx in January 2025. Its investigation found that they had sent malicious emails from an employee’s hijacked account at Kyrgyzstan’s central bank. A message from a real official’s address could make a dangerous attachment look like routine business. One message claimed that correspondence intended for Kyrgyzstan’s Finance Ministry had been sent to the central bank by mistake. Attached was what appeared to be a United Nations meeting invitation, packaged with a malicious program. Running it would allow the hackers to issue instructions to the recipient’s computer and send files through a chat they controlled on Telegram, the messaging app. In related attacks, investigators saw the hackers copying documents and collecting passwords saved in web browsers. One victim had left a file called passwords.txt on the desktop, which the attackers stole and could use to access other accounts. German cybersecurity company VMRay and independent researcher Pol Thill documented these thefts in February 2026. The Files That Gave Them Away Researchers Ashley Shen and Julian-Ferdinand Vögele, from Talos and Recorded Future, respectively, found three online folders where the hackers had left attack software and other tools publicly accessible. A program in one folder led them to an account on GitHub, a website where programmers store and share code. GitHub preserves earlier versions of files, so the researchers could see how the hackers had revised their software and changed the internet addresses used to control infected computers. Moving to a new address did not erase the record, allowing investigators to continue tracking the operation. An attack file identified in April exploited a weakness in WinRAR, a program for unpacking compressed files. It was designed to install software that would start when the user next signed in, allowing the hackers to send instructions to the computer. A July 2025 update had fixed the weakness in WinRAR, but the attack could still work on computers where users had not updated the program. VMRay’s earlier investigation found that some operators had infected their own computers, exposing their browsing histories to the researchers. What Were They Looking For? The victims of those earlier attacks included water and hydropower institutions in Kyrgyzstan and water-related bodies in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Access to water records could be valuable in a region where decisions upstream affect...