• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10528 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10528 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10528 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10528 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10528 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10528 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10528 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10528 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%

Viewing results 115 - 120 of 1295

Inside Uzbekistan’s Regional Defense Strategy: An In-Depth Interview with Michael Hilliard

Michael Hilliard is Director of Defense & Security Analysis at the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, where he leads a specialist project analyzing the armed forces of Central Asia. The Oxus Society’s latest report, focusing on Uzbekistan’s military, has just been released. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Hilliard about the report, Uzbekistan’s evolving defense doctrine, and its future role as a military power in the region. TCA: In light of the new report on Uzbekistan’s military, how would you characterize Uzbekistan’s overarching security and defense doctrine, especially in relation to the broader Central Asian region? Michael Hilliard: Uzbekistan’s primary defense doctrine is essentially internally focused. Since independence, and particularly since the events in Andijan in 2005, Tashkent has concentrated on transforming its forces into a rapid-response military with specializations in counterterrorism, crowd control, and dispersal operations. When you speak with officers or policymakers within the defense establishment, 2005 is a recurring reference point. During those early hours, protestors overran a motor rifle unit and seized weapons. Many defense personnel still believe that if they had been able to react faster, the final outcome in the square might have been different. This need for rapid adaptability has driven much of Tashkent’s defense policy since then. TCA: The report notes that Kazakhstan has now overtaken Uzbekistan as the region’s leading military power and that this gap is likely to widen. To what extent does this reflect Tashkent’s greater emphasis on regional cooperation and the resolution of border disputes, rather than competition? Hilliard: Kazakhstan’s economic dominance makes this outcome unsurprising. The country now accounts for just under 60% of Central Asia’s total GDP as of 2024. With that level of wealth, Astana naturally has greater resources to allocate to defense. However, Uzbekistan traditionally spends a higher proportion of its budget on the military. Despite having only half of Kazakhstan’s GDP, it has often matched Kazakhstan’s defense spending in real terms. If Kazakhstan simply accelerates its defense spending to the regional average, it will quickly surge ahead. Ultimately, it’s an issue of economics; Kazakhstan has more money to spend. TCA: What is the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in shaping Uzbekistan’s regional military posture? Hilliard: While some once had ambitious visions for the SCO, today it’s primarily intelligence-focused. Joint exercises are still held but remain limited, and RATS’ influence has declined somewhat following China’s controversial maneuvering within the organization. At present, RATS focuses more on identifying individuals or groups, such as traffickers or terrorist networks, that all member states have a shared interest in apprehending. It’s quite different from the CSTO, where Moscow wields far greater control. TCA: How might Tashkent view the recent clashes between Taliban and Pakistani forces, given that Pakistan currently chairs RATS? Hilliard: Tashkent’s attention is mainly on northern Afghanistan, not the Taliban-Pakistan clashes in the southeast. These incidents appear limited, so they’re unlikely to alter Tashkent’s calculus significantly. However, they do make cross-regional initiatives such as the Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI)...

Tajikistan’s Government to Introduce AI Browser for Administration

Tajikistan has announced plans to integrate AI into government operations for the first time, aiming to support data-driven decision-making across public administration. The announcement was made at the AI CONF conference in Dushanbe, one of Central Asia’s largest forums focused on AI. During the event, more than 20 agreements and partnerships were signed, totaling over $117 million. The headline development was an agreement between Perplexity AI, Epsilon3.ai, and the Ministry of Industry and New Technologies of Tajikistan to launch the Comet AI Browser, described as the world’s first agent-based AI browser tailored specifically for the public sector. “This collaboration contributes to the formation of a sovereign artificial intelligence ecosystem in the region,” said Epsilon3.ai co-founder Najima Noyoftova. “By combining Perplexity's cutting-edge technology with our experience in creating government AI systems, we are laying the foundation for self-sufficient digital governance and setting a new standard for responsible AI innovation in Central Asia.” The Comet browser will replace manual document search and analysis processes, allowing officials to receive real-time analytical reports and policy recommendations. The goal is to accelerate administrative workflows and improve transparency across ministries. Comet uses natural language processing and deep data analysis to interpret queries, compare sources, and deliver conclusions. It can assist with gathering statistics, drafting regulatory documents, and monitoring procurement activities or economic trends. By automating routine tasks, it is expected to reduce staff workloads and lower the risk of human error. The project’s pilot phase is scheduled for fall 2025, during which 140 employees at the Ministry of Industry will be trained to use the browser. If successful, the platform will be rolled out to additional government agencies in 2026.

How the Ferghana Valley Might Become Central Asia’s Laboratory of Peace

On October 15-16, in the heart of the Ferghana valley, which for decades has been associated with border conflicts, mistrust, and unresolved issues, the heads of Ferghana (Uzbekistan), Batken (Kyrgyzstan), and Sughd (Tajikistan) gathered to discuss the further peaceful development of the region. The forum brought together not just officials but also experts, diplomats, civil society, and international organization representatives from Central Asia, Europe, and other regions. The first Ferghana Peace Forum, entitled “Ferghana Valley: Joining Forces for Peace and Progress”, was not simply another gathering behind closed doors but a table where everyone was offered a seat. The valley, with territory of roughly 20,000-22,000 km² shared by three countries, was one of the main routes for the ancient Silk Road. It embodies diverse cultures and fertile lands, but also, until recently, the unresolved problems and deep contradictions of Central Asia. Complex issues, including water management, border demarcation, and conflicting national narratives. People's connections were severed by visa regimes and land mines. It was, until recently, impossible to imagine today's reality where people are crossing borders without long lines or bureaucratic barriers. The Khujand Declaration, signed in early 2025 by the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, paved the way for the forum. The document marked a historic shift, reflecting the countries' desire for dialogue, open borders, economic cooperation, and cultural exchange. However, it remained only a vision without an implementation mechanism that would turn the declaration into sustainable interaction. The Ferghana Peace Forum promises to fill this gap by becoming the first peacebuilding platform designed specifically for the territory, and managed by the three countries themselves with support from external organisations, rather than by external intermediaries or actors. The Forum's founding communiqué defines its goal as creating a permanent platform for building trust, developing a common development strategy, attracting investment, and forming a new political climate in Central Asia. It is a rare occasion when Central Asian countries organize inclusive platforms for open discussions and the participation of civil society, academia, and business. With more than  300 participants, including officials from the UN, EU, and OSCE, as well as leading international NGOs, the forum promises to become a truly historical event. As one of the Forum participants noted, “If peace is possible in Ferghana, it is possible anywhere in Central Asia, and perhaps anywhere in the world.” Discussions were focused on the practical implementation of regional cooperation. Participants addressed issues that have long fueled tensions in the valley: border procedures, joint water management, trade facilitation, labor migration, and crisis prevention. At the same time, the platform created a space for exploring new areas of cooperation, such as digitalization, education, renewable energy, and tourism. There was a shared understanding that peace cannot be sustainable without economic opportunities and social integration. The timing of the forum could not have been better. With the flow of current geopolitical events, Central Asian countries have a narrow window of opportunity to strengthen the internal cooperation and to institutionalize it, while Russia is distracted by...

Uzbek Parliament Ratifies Border Agreement with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

On October 28, the Legislative Chamber of Uzbekistan’s parliament, the Oliy Majlis, ratified a law approving a trilateral agreement on the junction point of the state borders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, according to the chamber’s press service. The agreement was initially signed on March 31 in the Tajik city of Khujand during a high-level meeting between Presidents Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan, Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan, and Sadyr Japarov of Kyrgyzstan. The leaders also took part in a remote inauguration of the Dostlik (Friendship) stele, which now marks the exact location where the borders of the three countries meet. Lawmakers emphasized that Central Asia is increasingly becoming a region of constructive dialogue, mutual trust, and regional cooperation, moving past a legacy of closed borders and unresolved territorial disputes. Umid Yakubkhodjayev, a member of the parliamentary committee on international affairs, defense, and security, stated that the agreement formally establishes the precise location of the tri-border junction and the delineation of border lines in the area. He noted that the deal would bolster good-neighborly relations, reinforce trust and strategic partnerships, and contribute to the international stature of the Central Asian region. The agreement also lays a legal foundation for expanding cross-border cooperation, enhancing trade, and launching joint infrastructure initiatives in neighboring regions. These efforts are expected to create jobs and raise living standards. The draft law was passed in its first reading and, by exception, was adopted immediately in all three readings. It has now been forwarded to the Senate and will enter into force upon presidential signature.

Kyrgyzstan Loosens Livestock Export Ban, But Only by Air

The Kyrgyz government has made an exception to its current ban on livestock exports, allowing horses to be exported by air under specific conditions. According to an official decree, the temporary export restrictions do not apply to horses transported via aircraft. Other permitted exceptions include the transit of livestock through Kyrgyz territory, the export of animals for participation in international competitions, and the gifting of horses to foreign dignitaries and international organizations. The exclusive right to export horses abroad has been granted to the state-owned enterprise Kyrgyz Agroholding. Customs and border control authorities have been ordered to step up oversight to prevent illegal animal exports. The Cabinet of Ministers initially imposed a six-month ban on the export of cattle, horses, sheep, and goats in response to rising meat prices in the domestic market. Authorities cited the widening price gap between Kyrgyzstan and neighboring countries as a key factor, with significantly higher meat prices abroad prompting farmers to sell livestock across borders.

Tajikistan and the Taliban – Talking and Fighting

Peaceful coexistence is turning out to be complicated for Tajikistan and the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The Tajik government has viewed the Taliban as a threat since the militant group appeared in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. But now that modest efforts are underway to establish some sort of amicable ties, there has been an uptick of violence directly involving the two sides along the Tajik-Afghan border. Let’s Keep This Between Us Tajikistan is the lone government in Central Asia that remained hostile to the Taliban after the latter returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021. In the weeks that followed, the Taliban again exerted control over Afghanistan, and the Tajik government and the Taliban sent reinforcements to their common border. Russia and Pakistan had to intervene to ease tensions. The other Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, have all established a business relationship with the Taliban government since the Taliban again seized control, but Tajikistan has remained aloof. Which is why the visit of Muhammad Yusuf Vafo, the governor of Afghanistan’s northern province of Balkh, to the Tajik capital Dushanbe on October 23 came as such a surprise. The Tajik government did not say anything about Vafo’s trip. The independent Tajik news agency Asia-Plus cited Afghan media as reporting on the visit, during which Vafo met with the head of Tajikistan’s National Security Committee (GKNB), Saimumin Yatimov. Vafo and Yatimov reportedly discussed ways to improve ties in a variety of spheres and pledged not to let any “hostile elements” use their territory to plot or carry out attacks on the country. An estimated several hundred Jamaat Ansarullah militants of Tajik origin continue to operate in Afghanistan. The group allied with the Taliban during the last years foreign forces were in Afghanistan, propping up the government of Ashraf Ghani, and stayed in Afghanistan after the Ghani government fell. Jamaat Ansarullah fighters were among the reinforcements the Taliban sent to the Tajik border during the weeks of tension in late 2021. There were reports soon after the Taliban returned to power that Tajikistan was aiding the National Resistance Front (NRF), a mainly ethnic Tajik group of former government soldiers who continue to wage a guerrilla campaign against the Taliban. NRF leader Ahmad Masoud, the son of the legendary Afghan field commander and ethnic Tajik, Ahmad Shah Masoud, has been in Dushanbe several times since August 2021, and there was a report that the NRF opened an office in Dushanbe in October that year. Shortly after Vafo’s visit to Dushanbe, Taliban sources in Balkh Province told the Pakistani-based Khorasan Diary website that Tajik authorities had banned the NRF, but the Tajik authorities stated that no such decision was made. Yatimov’s meeting with Vafo was not the first time the Tajik GKNB chief had met with Taliban representatives. In September 2024, Yatimov went to Kabul to hold security talks with Taliban officials, though the Tajik authorities never confirmed that meeting. Both parties are concerned about militants from the Islamic State of...