Kazakhstan Featurees - The Times Of Central Asia

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Historical Repressions

Opinion: Ghosts of the Gulag – A View From the Ground

Recently, The Times of Central Asia published an article titled Ghosts of the Gulag: Kazakhstan’s Uneasy Dance With Memory and Moscow. While it is essential to consider outside opinions, it is equally important to articulate how this perspective looks from within. In Kazakhstan, there are three large museums dedicated to the memory of the victims of the communist regime. These are the infamous ALZHIR (Akmolinsk Camp for Wives of Traitors to the Motherland), the museum dedicated to the memory of victims of political repression, KARLAG (Karaganda camp), and a smaller memorial complex to the victims of political repression at Zhanalyk, located about 40 kilometers from Almaty. Historians believe that around 2,500 people are buried there, including prominent members of the Kazakh intelligentsia, such as Akhmet Baitursynov, Mukhamedzhan Tynishpaev, Saken Seifullin, Ilyas Jansugurov, and Beimbet Maily. In addition to these museums, there are monuments to the victims of political repression and the famine of the 1920s–30s in many cities across the country. But it's not just about the number of museums and monuments. What matters most is that the memory of these events is preserved, and it is being carefully studied. In 2020, a state commission for the full rehabilitation of victims of political repression was established by the government. Over several years, 425 scholars, researchers, and experts have participated in its work. More than 2.6 million documents and materials have been declassified. Most importantly, this commission has rehabilitated more than 311,000 victims of political repression within the framework of existing legislation. The results of this work are documented in 72 volumes. There are no sections in these research materials divided by nationality. The approach is the same for everyone: justice and fairness for all. This calls into question the “collective amnesia that obstructs historical reckoning” referred to by Guillaume Tiberghien, a specialist in dark tourism at the University of Glasgow. Regarding any "emphasis on what the prison system ‘contributed’ to the nation” mentioned by Margaret Comer, a memory studies expert at the University of Warsaw, there are conflicts of interest and truths people would rather not face. One of the main purposes of Karlag was to serve as a major base of food supplies for Kazakhstan’s growing coal and metallurgical industries. In addition to industrial development, by 1941 the camp had 70 sheep farms, 45 cattle farms, one horse farm, and two pig farms. By 1950, 4,698 people worked on these farms, including 13 academic scientists. The communist system of corrective labor camps was an integral part of economic development, achieved through what was essentially slave labor. This is the full cynicism of the regime on display: prisoners were expected to “work off” their guilt. “The country is walking a tightrope,” Tiberghien suggests, pointing to President Tokayev’s speech on May 31, the official Day of Remembrance for Victims of Political Repression. “It wants to keep things calm, to avoid upsetting Russia.” In this speech, while calling for the rehabilitation of victims and greater access to archives, Tokayev also condemned the...

Fuel Exports

Central Asia Grapples with Fuel Shortages Amid Market Volatility

The heavy reliance on fuel imports from Russia is placing Central Asian countries in an increasingly precarious position. Disparities in pricing and exchange rates are driving a surge in illicit fuel resales, exacerbating supply challenges across the region. Gasoline and diesel prices continue to climb, and shortages are being felt widely. This dependence on Russian supplies is particularly concerning following U.S. President Donald Trump's ultimatum to Moscow: end the war in Ukraine within ten days or face 100% tariffs on countries trading oil and petroleum products with Russia. The tariffs could take effect as early as next week, placing Central Asian states in a hugely vulnerable position. Kazakhstan: Shortages and Shadow Exports In early July, motorists across Kazakhstan reported widespread shortages of AI-95 gasoline, particularly along the Karaganda-Balkhash and Astana-Pavlodar highways and in the country’s western regions. Some filling stations restricted purchases of AI-95 to 30 liters per vehicle, and AI-98 was only available via coupons. The Ministry of Energy attributed the shortages to increased tourist and transit traffic. Price caps on gasoline were lifted in January 2025, after which they began to steadily rise. According to the Ministry of Energy, fuel in Kazakhstan remains significantly cheaper than in other Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states, prompting the government to gradually align prices with the regional market. Forecasts suggest gasoline prices could rise by up to 50%, further fueling inflation and impacting all sectors of the economy. The government argues that maintaining artificially low fuel prices would require substantial budget subsidies. The resulting price differentials have made illegal fuel exports more profitable, aggravating domestic shortages. To combat speculation, Kazakhstan imposed a ban in January on exporting gasoline and diesel by road and rail. Despite the country’s ongoing efforts to expand domestic production, Kazakhstan is expected to import substantial volumes from Russia in 2025: 285,000 tons of motor gasoline, 300,000 tons of jet fuel, 450,000 tons of diesel, and 500,000 tons of bitumen. Experts caution that significant increases in domestic output may not materialize until 2030. Russia’s decision on July 28 to tighten its gasoline export ban to include large producers is further complicating the situation. The embargo, introduced amid record-high exchange prices, is expected to last through August. Nevertheless, Energy Minister Erlan Akkenzhenov insists the Russian export restrictions will not affect Kazakhstan, citing a standing intergovernmental agreement that exempts the country from such measures. The Rise of Grey Market Schemes Despite official reassurances, fuel prices continue to rise. Energy expert Olzhas Baidildinov warns of a growing shadow market, driven in part by the weakening of the Kazakh tenge against the Russian ruble. With the exchange rate at 6.6 tenge per ruble, the economic incentive for illicit exports from Kazakhstan remains strong. Baidildinov predicts further shortages by the autumn if this trend continues. Kyrgyzstan: Growing Dependence Kyrgyzstan, which has faced repeated fuel shortages in recent years, has seen prices rise sharply. Over the past decade, the cost of AI-92 has climbed by 52%, AI-95 by 57%, and diesel, used in agriculture...

Oil

What Will Kazakhstan Make of the Novorossiysk Constraint?

Russia’s July decree requiring FSB approval for foreign vessels entering Novorossiysk introduces a new procedural constraint into the regional export environment. Modest in scope, the measure nevertheless grants Moscow a latent mechanism for influencing Kazakhstan’s primary oil export route via the CPC pipeline, and by extension, its westward orientation. The CPC terminus, long treated as infrastructurally neutral, has been “recoded” as a site of discretionary oversight. This development coincides with the gradual erosion of the energy governance model inaugurated by foreign concessions at Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan, where Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) created juridical islands largely external to domestic legal and fiscal regimes. It is possible that a new phase is emerging whereby infrastructural flows are re-anchored in sovereign discretion, as an accumulation of procedural instruments favors regional currencies and reduces Western intermediation. Kazakhstan’s energy model was built on upstream Western capital and downstream Russian transit. The fragility of that erstwhile equilibrium has now been revealed, even though the disrupter is not a single actor but a convergence of pressures. This dual-dependency now appears more vulnerable, unsettled by converging geopolitical and institutional pressures. The superficial continuity of physical infrastructure masks deeper shifts in logistical autonomy, fiscal sovereignty, and international alignment. Structural Exposure and Strategic Compression The fiscal layer exposes the shifts. Revenues from Western-operated concessions are routed into the National Fund, which reinvests them into foreign debt instruments, often issued by the same economies that operate Kazakhstan’s extractive infrastructure. Kazakhstan’s export of physical assets and reinvestment into external liabilities constitutes a structural contradiction. The state’s constitutional control over subsoil resources is not matched by operational authority. The CPC pipeline, though formally multinational, is routed entirely through Russian territory. The new decree does not immediately alter its function, but it inserts a potential instrument of political leverage. The bargaining terrain has consequently already shifted: what was previously a matter of contractual detail is now entangled with external discretion. For the present, the decree’s practical impact is limited, but it reveals the current system’s embedded asymmetry. Moscow’s move signals a readiness to formalize political leverage. It lays the groundwork for a possible reconfiguration of Eurasian energy flows under post-conflict conditions. In this vision, transactions would be conducted through sovereign institutions, denominated in rubles, tenge, or other regional currencies. The intent is clear: to reduce reliance on Western frameworks and to re-anchor Russia’s “peripheries” within its institutional orbit. The maneuver unfolds within a broader context of strategic adjustment. Europe is searching for non-Russian energy inputs. Turkey is expanding corridor-based integration. China’s Belt and Road Initiative continues to institutionalize long-term infrastructural absorption. Kazakhstan has become a contested node within overlapping geopolitical networks that pull it in different vectorial directions. Against this backdrop, the once legal-technical re-negotiations over Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan are situated within a tectonically shifting geopolitical matrix. Trans-Caspian connectors, digital corridors, and regulatory frameworks are coalescing into a new infrastructural logic. The decree has little practical effect for now, but it points to a deeper condition where sovereignty is declared but not...

Kazakhstan-Turkey Partnership

The View From Ankara – President Tokayev’s Working Visit to Turkey

The official visit of President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Turkey on July 29, 2025, carries a multidimensional and strategic significance that extends far beyond the boundaries of diplomatic protocol. This engagement stands out as part of an ongoing multidimensional process of transformation marked by deepening regional alliances in the fields of science, energy, and logistics. Invited by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Tokayev co-chaired the fifth meeting of the Turkey-Kazakhstan High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council. As a result of this summit, 20 bilateral agreements were signed, encompassing new frameworks of regional integration, especially in the fields of mining, energy, transportation, and higher education. Energy Diplomacy and Resource Geopolitics One of the most striking dimensions of the visit was the negotiation of new cooperation mechanisms aimed at transporting Kazakh oil to global markets via Turkey. According to President Tokayev, currently 1.4 million tons of Kazakh oil are transported annually through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Under the newly signed memoranda of understanding, the parties aim to increase this volume. This development not only strengthens Turkey’s ambition to become a regional energy hub but also holds critical importance for Kazakhstan’s strategy to diversify export routes and secure access to safe ports. Furthermore, the expressed intent of Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) to operate in Kazakhstan signals that the collaboration may extend beyond transport into production processes as well. Kazakhstan's reserves of rare earth elements and strategic minerals are of considerable value to both European and Asian economies prioritizing green energy transitions. In this context, the agreements signed in the mining sector may herald a new phase — one that mandates not only commercial but also technological and scientific R&D collaborations. Strategic Dimensions of the Middle Corridor Another key agenda item during the visit was the development and activation of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly referred to as the ‘Middle Corridor.’ According to data shared by Tokayev, approximately 85% of road freight transported between China and Europe passes through Kazakhstan. This positions Kazakhstan as the backbone of the region’s logistics infrastructure. Turkey’s central role in the Middle Corridor makes it a decisive actor in the route’s integration with Europe. In this regard, Kazakhstan’s efforts to modernize its rail and road infrastructure, alongside its revival of maritime transport on the Caspian Sea, when combined with Turkey’s port capacity and transportation infrastructure, offer significant synergistic potential. These developments also underscore the strategic importance of the Zangezur Corridor and reinforce the value of uninterrupted transportation from China to Europe via Turkey, bypassing the Iranian route. Education and Academic Diplomacy The visit also drew attention for its scientific and cultural dimensions, in addition to its economic focus. Joint initiatives such as Gazi University’s planned establishment of a branch within the South Kazakhstan Pedagogical University can contribute to aligning the Turkish higher education model with Kazakhstan’s ongoing education reforms. Moreover, the Turkish Maarif Foundation’s new school initiatives in Kazakhstan signify a broadening and institutionalization of bilateral cooperation in education. These efforts may extend beyond student exchange programs to encompass joint research...

Automotive Industry

Kazakhstan’s Tax Cut on Old Vehicles Sparks Debate

Kazakhstan will implement an updated Tax Code beginning January 1, 2026, following its signing on July 18. Among the most debated changes is the revision of the transport tax for vehicles over 10 years old. Under the new code, owners of cars aged 11 to 20 years will receive a 30% tax discount, while those with vehicles older than 21 years will benefit from a 50% reduction. The decision stands in contrast to recent trends of increasing the overall tax burden. Yet experts warn that behind the populist optics lie significant environmental and road safety risks. A Political Gesture Ahead of Elections? Tax consultant Aidar Masatbaev views the reform as more political than economic in nature. “People complained that the tax on old cars was too high. Apparently, the advocates of a softer tax policy prevailed,” he said in an interview with inbusiness.kz. Masatbaev added that the measure is unlikely to meaningfully reduce the cost of car ownership. Instead, factors like rising fuel prices and declining real incomes play a more critical role. “The problem is that most people cannot afford to buy a new car,” he noted. Technical and Environmental Risks According to official statistics, more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s vehicle fleet comprises cars over 10 years old. Of these, over 2.2 million vehicles are more than 20 years old. These aging cars not only lag in efficiency but also pose serious safety risks. “Old cars are becoming a source of increased danger. Their consumables are more expensive, and the desire to save on repairs leads to risks on the roads,” Masatbaev warned. He cautioned that offering tax incentives could further entrench the use of obsolete, potentially unsafe vehicles. Additionally, the secondary car market lacks transparency. Many transactions go unregistered, reducing the effectiveness of fiscal measures and minimizing the impact of tax relief on state revenues. Masatbaev also questioned proposals to increase taxes on old vehicles, arguing that such moves would only heighten public dissatisfaction and strain the tax system. He recommended automating debt collection to improve efficiency, but acknowledged this could erode public trust in the tax authority. Kazakhstan’s Aging Car Fleet, by the Numbers According to Ranking.kz, in May 2025, Kazakhstan had 5.34 million registered passenger vehicles, an 11.4% increase from the previous year. Two-thirds, approximately 3.54 million cars, were more than 10 years old. While the share of aging vehicles has slightly declined (from 70.3% in April 2023 to 68.3% in April 2024), the number of cars aged 10-20 years rose 12.4% to 1.27 million. Vehicles over 20 years old now number 2.27 million, a 5.7% increase. The highest concentrations of old cars are found in the Almaty region (449,600), Almaty city (355,200), Karaganda (237,300), Zhambyl (236,200), Turkestan (235,000), and East Kazakhstan (220,100). Zhambyl holds the highest percentage of cars over 10 years old at 83%, followed by Zhetysu (79.3%) and Almaty (78.4%). While tax breaks may offer temporary relief to car owners, analysts argue that without a comprehensive strategy for renewing the vehicle fleet, promoting...

Kazakhstan-Turkey Partnership

Kazakhstan and Turkey Reshape Their Eurasian Partnership

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Ankara consolidated bilateral ties, but it also marked a deeper strategic inflection. The visit marks a broader regional convergence between two major Eurasian actors as they coordinate a strategic regional architecture. Thus, Tokayev’s language emphasized an “expanded strategic partnership,” signaling a move beyond traditional trade or cultural diplomacy. Ankara, for its part, went well beyond symbolic gestures in its response, with binding institutional agreements and substantive infrastructural commitments. The timing of the visit underscores its significance against the current geopolitical backdrop, where Central Asia is once again the object of keen attention from external actors vying for footholds and influence. In this context, the Kazakhstan–Turkey axis appears not as a knee-jerk reaction to outside machinations but as a deliberate autonomous regional vector that enhances the agency of both countries. Strategic Depth of the Tokayev Visit Tokayev’s trip to Turkey represents an assertion of multidimensional regional agency: Kazakhstan’s long-standing multi-vector foreign policy was once a balancing act among great powers, but it has now entered a phase of selective consolidation. This bilateral intensification indexes a shift in the configuration of Eurasian geoeconomics, as strategic weight disperses across an increasingly differentiated agentic field. The Astana–Ankara alignment means that both countries can act with diminished external dependence, even as global architectures become more unstable and contested. Tokayev’s diplomacy suggests the emergence of an equilibrium strategy anchored in regional connectivity rather than bloc affiliation. Ankara’s perspective is equally structural. The shared vocabulary — “coordination,” “deepening,” “integration” — signals a logic of long-horizon strategic cooperation. Complementarities Across the Bilateral Core The current Kazakhstan–Turkey relationship exhibits a structurally complementary relationship rarely sustained at this depth between two regional powers so geographically distant from one another. On one side, Kazakhstan brings economic scale, resource depth, and transit centrality to the Middle Corridor. On the other, Turkey brings not only industrial experience and defense sector credibility but maritime access, NATO membership, and a flexible political reach into Europe, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean basin. The evolution of mutual strategic trust based on converging structural interests binds these capacities of the two sides together. For Kazakhstan, Turkey provides logistical continuity and downstream industrial expansion; Ankara also diversifies Astana's international geoeconomic network. For Turkey, Kazakhstan provides resource access, eastward corridors, and meta-regional relevance beyond the Black Sea. These structural interests converge across multiple material economic sectors: energy, defense-industrial cooperation, agrotechnology, education, and digital logistics. Nor is this convergence driven solely by state policy: both countries’ private sectors increasingly perceive each other as entry points into economic systems adjacent to one another. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) as an Institutional Amplifier The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), now maturing into an institutionalized platform for regional legitimacy with a shared symbolic and infrastructural vocabulary, enables Kazakhstan–Turkey cooperation to transcend the limits of bilateralism while maintaining its coherence. Joint positions on transport, trade, education, and foreign policy are advanced and discussed within a common multilateral setting where proposals are negotiated horizontally with other Turkic states. Through...