Kyrgyzstan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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U.S. Visa Bond

U.S. Expands Visa Bond Policy for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan

The United States has expanded a visa bond policy that increases the upfront cost of short-term travel for citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and dozens of other countries. Under the policy, applicants for B-1 and B-2 business and tourism visas may be required to post bonds of $5,000, $10,000, or $15,000. The State Department set out the latest rules and the country list on its visa bond policy page. The program now covers nationals from 38 countries. In Central Asia, it was applied to Turkmenistan on January 1, and is scheduled to extend to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan starting from January 21. The bond is refundable when travelers follow visa terms and leave on time, but it can tie up large sums for the duration of a trip and may put U.S. travel beyond reach for many applicants. Turkmenistan, where emigration is tightly controlled, sees low numbers of its citizens entering the United States. Department of Homeland Security data for Fiscal Year 2024 indicates that the total number of Turkmen nationals issued B-1/B-2 visas to the U.S. was 1,759. Tajikistan, meanwhile, saw 1,772 visas granted, and Kyrgyzstan 9,625. By way of comparison, Saudi Arabia saw over 54,000 visas granted. The expansion has already triggered public pushback in Kyrgyzstan. In a post on X on Thursday, Edil Baisalov, the deputy chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Cabinet of Ministers and a prominent ally of President Sadyr Japarov, urged the Kyrgyz authorities to review visa-free access for U.S. citizens. Kyrgyzstan currently allows U.S. travelers to enter without a visa for stays of up to 30 days. “I believe that we should initiate a review of our visa-free regime for U.S. citizens following the new visa requirements announced yesterday by the State Department, under which Kyrgyz citizens are required to pay a visa deposit of up to $15,000 when submitting visa applications,” Baisalov wrote. “Visa policy is a matter of parity and mutual respect. If such high barriers are introduced for our citizens, we cannot pretend that nothing has happened.” Baisalov did not specify precisely what changes Kyrgyzstan might pursue, and any escalation risks provoking a dispute with a far stronger partner. The remarks also come as Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian governments seek closer engagement with President Donald Trump’s administration while managing competing pressures from Russia and China. The measure is a setback for Kyrgyz efforts to ease travel barriers with the United States. Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Zheenbek Kulubaev raised visa issues with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau during a meeting on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York in September. So far, Tajikistan has not matched Kyrgyzstan’s public stance, with no prominent statement appearing on Tajik government channels addressing the bond requirement or signaling reciprocity. Discussion has instead focused on what the new U.S. rules mean for applicants, the implementation timeline, and the bond amounts that may be set at the interview stage. For Turkmenistan, the requirement adds another hurdle to an already narrow path to U.S. travel. The country’s...

U.S. Visa Bond

Kyrgyz Official Concerned Over “High Barriers” in U.S. Visa Bond Policy

Kyrgyzstan should review its visa-free system for American citizens after the United States expanded its visa bond policy to include the Central Asian country, according to a senior Kyrgyz official who said there should be “mutual respect.” The suggestion that there should be some reciprocity following the U.S. measure came from Edil Baisalov, deputy chairman of Kyrgyzstan´s Cabinet of Ministers and a prominent ally of President Sadyr Japarov. Currently, U.S. travelers to Kyrgyzstan can stay for up to 30 days without obtaining a visa. “I believe that we should initiate a review of our visa-free regime for U.S. citizens following the new visa requirements announced yesterday by the State Department, under which Kyrgyz citizens are required to pay a visa deposit of up to $15,000 when submitting visa applications,” Baisalov said on X on Thursday. “Visa policy is a matter of parity and mutual respect. If such high barriers are introduced for our citizens, we cannot pretend that nothing has happened.” However, he did not offer any analysis about what, if any, changes should be made to the visa-free system for U.S. visitors. Any visa dispute with the far more powerful United States could be risky for Kyrgyzstan, which has meanwhile joined with other Central Asian countries in trying to develop closer ties to the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. Nationals from 38 countries, including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, are subject to visa bonds under the U.S. State Department policy, which is part of a wider crackdown on immigration. The policy took effect for citizens from Turkmenistan on January 1 and will be implemented for nationals from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan starting on January 21. “Any citizen or national traveling on a passport issued by one of these countries, who is found otherwise eligible for a B1/B2 visa, must post a bond for $5,000, $10,000, or $15,000. The amount is determined at the time of the visa interview,” the State Department said. B-1 (business) and B-2 (tourism) refer to non-immigrant visas for people who want to stay temporarily in the U.S. Visa holders who have posted bond are also required to enter the United States via designated international airports, including seven in the U.S. and two in Canada. The U.S. visa bond policy is a setback for Kyrgyzstan, which had previously appealed to the United States to relax its visa requirements. Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Zheenbek Kulubaev raised the issue during a meeting with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York in September.

Azerbaijan

Central Asia Can Depend on Azerbaijan for Path to West, Aliyev Says

Azerbaijan is the only “reliable country” that can geographically link Central Asia to the West because alternative routes face geopolitical turbulence, according to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. Aliyev spoke about Azerbaijan’s prospects as a key conduit for commerce across borders as well as its deepening relationship with Central Asia during a wide-ranging interview with local television channels in Baku on Monday. He acknowledged that there is still work to be done before Azerbaijan can approach its full potential as what he called a “living bridge” for international trade. The remarks followed a summit in Uzbekistan in November in which Central Asian leaders supported Azerbaijan’s accession to the region’s Consultative Meeting format as a full participant, even though Azerbaijan is in the South Caucasus. The Consultative Meeting format is a vehicle for high-level collaboration on trade, security, and other issues among Central Asian countries, which have taken steps to resolve border disputes and other sources of tension over the years. “So many projects have been implemented in recent years that these countries have unanimously elected us as a full member. We can also consider this a great political and diplomatic success,” Aliyev said during the interview. His remarks were published by the state Azerbaijani Press Agency, or APA. Referring to international connectivity, transport, and logistics, the president said, “Azerbaijan is the only reliable country that can geographically connect Central Asia with the West today,” and, without going into specifics, he alluded to the difficulties that some other trade channels face. Paths through Russia and Iran to the West, for example, are affected by sanctions and long-running political tensions. “Of course, from a geographical point of view, other routes can also be used. However, taking into account the current geopolitical situation, we can say with complete certainty that alternative routes for the West cannot be considered acceptable,” Aliyev said. He mentioned developing projects such as a November 2024 agreement involving Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to lay a fiber-optic cable along the Caspian seabed, as well as China’s large-scale funding for the construction of another railway to the Caspian Sea via Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. “Freight traffic to the Caspian Sea, and therefore to Azerbaijan, will increase,” the Azerbaijani president said. “Along with Central Asian countries, additional freight from China will naturally increase the demand for the East–West route, the Middle Corridor.” A September analysis by the Washington-based Jamestown research group suggested that prospects are bright for Azerbaijan, which has actively positioned itself as a trade hub since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. “Amid disruptions in both the northern and southern corridors, Azerbaijan has emerged as a critical logistics hub, offering a sanction-free, resilient, and stable environment to facilitate overland trade between the PRC (China) and Europe through the Middle Corridor,” analyst Yunis Sharifli wrote. In addition, Azerbaijan expects cargo from China and Central Asia to travel along a proposed route that would link the main part of Azerbaijan to the separate Azerbaijani area of Nakhchivan, passing through Armenia and then...

Venezuela

Central Asia Watches as Venezuela Drama Unfolds

Governments in Central Asia have not made any public comment, so far, on the U.S. military operation that captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, at a time when relations between Central Asian countries and the administration of President Donald Trump are growing closer. The operation on Saturday involved more than 150 American aircraft and extracted Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, from their compound in Caracas, prompting celebrations from many Venezuelan expatriates who viewed Maduro as a dictator, criticism from countries including Russia and China, and concerns that the complex attack violated international law. Additional questions about Venezuela’s sovereignty emerged after Trump said the United States will “run” the country ahead of a transition and that American oil companies will help to rebuild its oil infrastructure. The U.S. has argued that Maduro himself effectively hijacked Venezuelan sovereignty through electoral fraud, repression and by allegedly funneling illegal drugs to the U.S. Maduro, who has been indicted on narco-terrorism and other charges, denies the allegations. Countries in Central Asia are more than 10,000 kilometers away from Venezuela and their trade with the Latin American country is minimal, suggesting the uncertain and evolving situation there lies far outside their immediate area of interest. In May, Tokayev met Maduro in Moscow and invited him to visit Kazakhstan after describing Venezuela as an important partner. “However, he acknowledged that, due to objective reasons, significant achievements in bilateral cooperation have yet to be realized,” Tokayev’s office said at the time. Still, Tokayev and other Central Asian leaders have spoken in general terms of their adherence to United Nations principles of sovereignty, an issue that is being vigorously debated in some international circles after the U.S. military operation. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, who visited Central Asia in 2024 and 2025, has said that the U.S. military operation that extracted Maduro to New York constitutes a "dangerous precedent" and that he was concerned that the rules of international law had not been respected. The U.S. capture of the leader of oil-rich Venezuela has not had a major impact for now on global oil prices, indicating that Central Asia’s oil and natural gas producers will not see any big fallout. Even so, at a time of ongoing geopolitical tension, a major shock or event in one region could influence distant regions in ways that are difficult to discern. Russia and China, which are close trading partners with Central Asia and nurtured trade and political ties with Maduro’s government, condemned the U.S. military operation in Venezuela. But the Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan – have not joined in the criticism, much as they have refrained from publicly supporting any side over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Central Asia’s balancing act reflects efforts to maintain good ties with major powers even when they are in conflict, and comes during a period of increasing trade collaboration with the United States. The five leaders from Central Asia traveled to Washington in November for a summit with Trump, who later invited...

Geopolitics

2025: The Year Central Asia Stepped Onto the Global Stage

For much of the post-Soviet era, Central Asia occupied a peripheral place in global affairs. It mattered to its immediate neighbors, but rarely shaped wider debates. In 2025, that changed in visible ways. The region became harder to ignore, largely not because of ideology or alignments, but because of assets that the world increasingly needs: energy, minerals, transit routes, and political access across Eurasia. One of the clearest signs came in April, when the European Union and the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in Samarkand for their first summit at the head-of-state level. The meeting concluded with a joint declaration upgrading relations to a strategic partnership, with a focus on transport connectivity, energy security, and critical raw materials. The document marked a shift in how Brussels views Central Asia, moving beyond development assistance toward geopolitical cooperation, as outlined in the official EU–Central Asia summit joint declaration. European interest is rooted in necessity. Russia’s war in Ukraine has forced EU governments to rethink energy imports, supply chains, and overland trade routes. Central Asia sits astride the most viable alternatives that bypass Russian territory. It also holds resources essential to Europe’s green transition, including uranium and a range of industrial metals. The region’s leaders spent much of the year framing their diplomacy around these tangible advantages, rather than abstract political alignments. The United States followed a similar track. Through the C5+1 format, Washington deepened engagement with all five Central Asian states, with particular emphasis on economic cooperation and supply-chain resilience. A key element has been the Critical Minerals Dialogue, launched to connect Central Asian producers with Western markets. This initiative formed part of a broader U.S. effort to diversify access to strategic materials and reduce dependence on Russia and China. Russia remained a central but changing presence in Central Asia throughout 2025. Economic ties, labor migration, and shared infrastructure ensured that Moscow continued to matter across the region. At the same time, however, Russia’s war in Ukraine constrained its ability to act as the dominant external power it once was. Central Asian governments maintained pragmatic relations with Moscow, but they increasingly treated Russia as one partner among several rather than the default reference point. Trade continued, security cooperation persisted, and political dialogue remained active, yet the balance shifted toward hedging rather than dependence. Uranium sits at the center of this shift, with the United States having banned imports of certain Russian uranium products under federal law, with waivers set to expire no earlier than January 1, 2028. As Washington restructures its nuclear fuel supply chain, Central Asia’s role has grown sharply. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2024 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Kazakhstan supplied 24% of uranium delivered to U.S. reactor operators, while Uzbekistan accounted for about 9%. Canada and Australia remain major suppliers, but the Central Asian share is now strategic rather than marginal. That economic weight translated into political visibility. In December, U.S. President Donald Trump said he would invite Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend...

Multimodal Transport Corrdior

Can the New Multimodal Route Become a Sustainable Corridor for Central Asia?

The launch of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Caspian multimodal corridor has generated significant interest as another attempt to expand Eurasian transport connectivity. A pilot shipment in the fall of 2025 demonstrated the technical feasibility of the new route: cargo transported from Kashgar, China, passed through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, reached Turkmenistan, and was then delivered to Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea, continuing along the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway toward Europe. Despite its evident geopolitical appeal, questions remain over the route’s long-term sustainability and commercial viability. The central question is whether this demonstration project can evolve into a regularly functioning transport corridor. A Third Alternative Between the Northern and Middle Corridors This multimodal route can be seen as a potential alternative to the two existing pathways: the northern route, China-Kazakhstan-Russia-Europe; and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), or Middle Corridor, which passes through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey. The growing geopolitical risks along the northern route since 2022, combined with capacity limitations on the Caspian segment of the TITR, have spurred interest in a third option, a so-called “southern belt” traversing Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Each country along this route has its own strategic calculus. Uzbekistan is seeking to overcome its “double continental isolation” and elevate its role as Central Asia’s transit hub. Kyrgyzstan is aiming to monetize its geographic position between China and the Ferghana Valley. Turkmenistan is developing the port of Turkmenbashi as an alternative to the increasingly congested hubs of Aktau and Alat. China, meanwhile, continues to diversify its westward overland trade routes. The Uzbek Factor: Geoeconomics vs. Logistics From Tashkent's perspective, this corridor aligns with its long-term transport strategy. Analysts frequently cite Uzbekistan’s ambition to transition from a landlocked to a “land-linked” state with direct access to China, the Caspian Sea, and southern routes to the Indian Ocean. The new route offers Uzbekistan three strategic advantages: alternative access to China via Kyrgyzstan, enhanced status as a regional transit hub, and deeper transport cooperation with Turkmenistan, including potential joint development of the Turkmenbashi port. However, when shifting from geopolitical ambition to logistical execution, serious limitations emerge, many outside Uzbekistan’s control. Kyrgyzstan: A Bottleneck in the Chain Documents from the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program highlight the continued challenges facing multimodal transport in the region, namely slow transit, poor modal integration, border delays, and outdated logistics technologies. Within this corridor, Kyrgyzstan remains the primary bottleneck. Approximately 82% of its foreign trade by weight is transported by road, making the route through this mountainous country highly seasonal, expensive, and unpredictable. According to the International Road Transport Union, Kyrgyzstan’s transport system faces severe constraints from alpine terrain, avalanches, and impassable mountain passes that render winter transport nearly impossible in many areas. It is therefore unsurprising that, following the pilot shipment, no major logistics operators committed to shifting regular cargo to this route. The Caspian Sea: Structural Constraints The Caspian Sea leg, anchored by Turkmenbashi port, presents another critical challenge. The limitations here are systemic rather than national. Key issues include insufficient...