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Azerbaijan

Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan Plan New Parks in Tashkent and Baku

Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have agreed to establish new public parks in each other’s capitals as part of broader efforts to expand bilateral cooperation, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investment, Industry and Trade has reported. The announcement followed an official visit to Azerbaijan from April 22 to 24 by a delegation led by Minister Laziz Kudratov. During the trip, talks were held with Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Economy and senior executives from major companies on joint projects and future cooperation. According to the ministry, both sides identified several priority areas, including mining, construction materials, transport and logistics, urban planning, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals. Particular attention was given to plans to create an “Uzbekistan” park in Baku and an “Azerbaijan” park in Tashkent, alongside expanding pharmaceutical retail networks and developing fruit and vegetable processing projects. Trade between the two countries has been growing steadily. In 2025, bilateral trade turnover reached $307.3 million, marking a 14.6% increase compared to the previous year, the ministry said. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that trade rose by 25% in 2024, while the number of joint ventures approached 300, with a combined project portfolio valued at around $4 billion. The two countries have set a target of increasing annual trade and investment to $1 billion by 2030, supported by a comprehensive cooperation program covering sectors such as industry, infrastructure, agriculture, healthcare, tourism, and banking. Progress has also been noted in transport and energy cooperation. Both sides highlighted growing cargo volumes along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor. Uzbek shipments along the route increased by 25% in 2024, exceeding one million tonnes, aided by the introduction of a new electronic permit system.

AZAL Plane Crash

Russia, Azerbaijan Settle Over Airliner Crash in Kazakhstan in 2024

Russia and Azerbaijan said on Wednesday that they have reached “an appropriate settlement” that includes compensation payments in the case of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane that crashed in Kazakhstan after being damaged by a Russian military strike on Dec. 25, 2024. The agreement reflected efforts by the two countries to resolve a long-running dispute over the crash, which killed 38 of the 67 people on board. The Embraer 190 airliner crashed near the Kazakh city of Aktau after it was struck while trying to land in Grozny, Chechnya, and then diverted across the Caspian Sea. “The steps undertaken confirm the mutual intention to build further mutually beneficial cooperation,” the foreign ministries of Russia and Azerbaijan said in a joint statement. The statement said the settlement was based on an accord reached in October 2025, when Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged in a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev that Russian missile fire had damaged the plane. Putin indicated that the strike was accidental as it occurred while the Russian military was dealing with a Ukrainian drone attack. His comments went some way toward easing Azerbaijan’s anger over what it viewed as Russian attempts to avoid responsibility for the disaster. The two sides “agreed to appropriately resolve the issues arising from the accident,” which occurred “as a result of the involuntary operation of the air defense system in the airspace of the Russian Federation,” the joint statement said. It expressed condolences to relatives and friends of those who died. The two foreign ministries did not release details of the compensation payments. Kazakhstan is still leading an investigation of the crash.

Middle Corridor

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Are Reinforcing the Middle Corridor’s South Caucasus Link

On April 7 Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev visited Tbilisi to hold talks with Georgian Foreign Minister Maka Bochorishvili and sign a 2026–2027 foreign-ministry cooperation program. He called Georgia “a key link” in the Europe–Asia transport architecture and said the common task was to raise corridor capacity, improve service predictability, and ensure tariff transparency. The materialization of the bilateral cooperation is already evident from last June’s opening of the Poti multimodal terminal by a joint Kazakhstani-Georgian company. The real meaning of Kosherbayev's discussions in Tbilisi lies in their context. On April 2 in Baku, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov said Kazakhstan plans an intergovernmental agreement with Azerbaijan this year to strengthen the status of the Middle Corridor (also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor, TITR), and he proposed moving quickly on the Digital Monitoring Center under the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). On April 6 in Tbilisi, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev called the Azerbaijan–Georgia segment the corridor’s “main transport artery.” Then on April 8 in Baku, Aliyev received Kosherbayev together with Kazakhstan’s transport minister. The official readout ranged from the Middle Corridor to joint investment, green-energy, and fiber-optic projects. Kosherbayev’s April 7 stop in Tbilisi thus belongs to a short Kazakhstan-led diplomatic run across the corridor’s western nodes. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Tighten the Corridor Kazakhstan’s early-April engagement in the South Caucasus rests on its eastward-looking framework with China. Two China–Kazakhstan documents were already in evidence in October 2023: a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on deepening the development of the China-Europe Railway Trans-Caspian route, and an intergovernmental agreement on developing that route. China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) subsequently clarified that the agreement focused on stronger transit organization, fewer administrative barriers, and improved logistics and transport operations. In July 2024, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping jointly attended the opening of the Trans-Caspian direct fast transport service; NDRC then recorded a work mechanism with Kazakhstan’s transport ministry to carry that cooperation forward. On January 1, the first Trans-Caspian train of 2026 departed Xi’an for Baku carrying 45 containers of photovoltaic equipment. Chinese reports assert that the route had accumulated 466 runs by the end of November 2025, moved onto a weekly six-outbound and three-inbound timetable, and cut travel times from the roughly 20-day average recorded in 2025 to a standard 15 days, with the fastest runs taking 11 days. On April 3, it was also reported that there were 85 Xi’an Trans-Caspian trains in the first quarter of 2026, up 150% year-on-year, while the Kazakhstan–Xi’an terminal in Almaty handled more than 6,000 containers in that quarter alone, a 60% increase from a year earlier. A separate quasi-official Chinese trade-services portal reported that Trans-Caspian trains had reached daily service and that 371 such trains had run in January–October 2025, up 33%. China’s NDRC also said in late 2025 that Aktau and Baku should be strengthened as hub nodes in this corridor system. Azerbaijan is the indispensable partner without which the route’s western logic does not function. Bektenov’s...

Caspian Green Energy Corridor

Kazakh Parliament Backs Caspian Green Energy Corridor Linking Central Asia to Europe

Kazakhstan’s Mazhilis, the lower house of parliament, has ratified a strategic partnership agreement with Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan on cooperation in green energy production and transmission. The agreement involved the construction of a high-voltage power cable along the seabed of the Caspian Sea. Speaking at a plenary session, Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov noted that the document had been signed by the leaders of the three countries in November 2024 on the sidelines of the COP29 climate conference in Baku. According to the minister, the agreement lays the groundwork for one of the most ambitious energy initiatives in the history of independent Kazakhstan. The project involves the creation of a “Green Energy Corridor” designed to facilitate the export of environmentally friendly electricity, as well as green hydrogen and green ammonia, from Central Asian countries to European markets via the Caspian region. A key component of the initiative is the planned installation of a high-voltage direct current underwater cable system across the Caspian Sea. Officials say the project could provide Kazakhstan with direct access to the European Union’s energy market through interconnection with a similar energy infrastructure initiative being considered in the Black Sea region. The initiative reflects a broader effort by Central Asian governments to position the region as a supplier of low-carbon energy to Europe while developing east-west infrastructure that bypasses traditional Russian transit routes. For Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in particular, exporting renewable electricity and related products such as green hydrogen could open new markets as global demand for cleaner energy continues to grow. Italian consulting company CESI has begun preparing a feasibility study, which is expected to define the project’s financial model and core technical parameters. The cost of preparing the feasibility study is estimated at around €1 million and will be fully covered by grant funding. The Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank have indicated their readiness to allocate up to $2 million in additional support. To coordinate implementation, the Green Corridor Alliance joint venture was established in July 2024. Ownership is divided equally among Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan, with each country holding a 33.3% stake. The company is currently overseeing expert consultations and preparing subsequent phases of the project. According to Akkenzhenov, successful implementation would strengthen Kazakhstan’s position in global energy markets. “The project will help position Kazakhstan as a reliable partner in sustainable energy, capable of contributing to international energy corridors and implementing large-scale technological initiatives,” he stated. The initiative is also expected to expand export potential, stimulate the development of new energy technologies, and reinforce Kazakhstan’s role as a regional energy hub. Following the parliamentary debate, the Mazhilis deputies approved the agreement, emphasising its importance for enhancing regional energy security. The project is intended to deepen the interconnection between the power systems of Central Asia and Azerbaijan and create conditions for stable exports of green electricity. At the same time, the initiative highlights the growing role of the Caspian region in emerging energy corridors linking Central Asia with European markets. Alongside transport projects...

Iran

How an Incident on the Azerbaijan-Iran Border Became a Test for Diplomacy in the Region

The drone strike on Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic on March 5 has become one of the most serious incidents in relations between Baku and Tehran in recent years. Azerbaijani authorities described the incident as a terrorist act and demanded explanations and an apology from Iran. Tehran, in turn, rejected the accusations, suggesting the possibility of a provocation by “third forces.” Following the drone incident, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev held a phone call with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to discuss regional security. According to the Azerbaijani presidency, Aliyev thanked Tokayev for condemning the attack on Nakhchivan and for voicing support for Azerbaijan. What began as a local security incident has raised concerns about regional stability in the South Caucasus. Terrorist Act Against the State Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev issued a statement strongly condemning "this despicable terrorist act. Those who committed it must be brought to justice immediately,” Aliyev said. According to Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one drone hit the terminal building of Nakhchivan International Airport, while another crashed near a school in the village of Shekerabad. Two civilians were reportedly injured. Baku stressed that the attack, allegedly launched from Iranian territory, violated international law and could lead to a dangerous escalation of tensions in the region. Diplomatic Escalation Despite the harsh rhetoric in the first hours after the incident, Baku opted to rely primarily on diplomatic tools. The Iranian ambassador was summoned to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry and handed a formal note of protest requesting official explanations. Azerbaijan said on Friday that it was evacuating staff from its embassy in Tehran as well as its consulate in the city of Tabriz. At the same time, Azerbaijani security forces were placed on high alert. According to Aliyev, the country’s armed forces were instructed to prepare possible countermeasures. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke by phone with Aliyev, condemning the attack and expressing support for Azerbaijan, according to official statements. Reports of alleged Iranian-linked sabotage plots also surfaced, with the Azerbaijani authorities stating that several terrorist attacks had been prevented on the country’s territory. According to the State Security Service, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was behind the plots. Among the alleged targets was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, a strategic energy corridor linking the Caspian region with Turkey and one of the main routes for exporting Azerbaijani oil. According to Azerbaijani sources, other potential targets included the Israeli embassy, a synagogue in the capital, and a leader of the local Mountain Jewish community. The security service reported that three explosive devices had been brought into the country but were discovered and defused before they could be delivered. The development of the crisis has prompted increased diplomatic contact between world leaders. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian amid the growing regional tensions. Shortly thereafter, Russia’s Foreign Ministry called on both sides to exercise restraint and emphasized the need for a thorough investigation into the drone strike. On March 7, the foreign ministers of all the Central...

Iran

OTS Faces Security Test from Turkey to Central Asia

Iran's widening war has now reached the institutional space linking Turkey, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Turkey said on March 4 that NATO air defenses destroyed an Iranian ballistic missile entering Turkish airspace, while Azerbaijan said the next day that four Iranian drones crossed into Nakhchivan, injuring four people, and damaging civilian infrastructure at the exclave’s airport. Iran denied targeting Nakhchivan; in the Turkish case, the missile’s intended target has not been fully clear in public reporting. Even so, the combined effect was unmistakable. By March 7, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) had become more than a bystander to a Middle Eastern war that had earlier seemed outside its main agenda. This is what gave the OTS foreign ministers’ meeting in Istanbul its significance. The Turkish Foreign Ministry announced on March 6 that the informal meeting of the OTS Council of Foreign Ministers would be held in Istanbul on March 7, with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hosting. After the meeting, the ministers adopted a joint statement declaring that threats to the security of any OTS member are a matter of concern for the whole organization. That language does not make the OTS a military alliance. It does, however, show the organization moving more openly into collective political-security signaling when member states come under attack. Why Nakhchivan Matters Nakhchivan is central to the logic of this story. The exclave is an integral part of Azerbaijan, but is separated from the rest of the country. It borders Armenia, Iran, and Turkey, making it significant out of proportion to its size. A military strike there is not a routine border incident. It reaches one of the most sensitive nodes in the wider Turkic political space: it is a meeting point for Azerbaijani sovereignty, Turkish strategic concern, and Iranian proximity. Until recently, Nakhchivan’s special status and borders were anchored in the 1921 Moscow and Kars treaties, which gave Turkey and Soviet Russia a formal say over the exclave’s autonomy and, it could be argued, its external security. But last year, Baku folded Nakhchivan more tightly into Azerbaijan’s domestic legal order by removing those references (along with other changes) from the constitution of the exclave, which has suddenly become a target in a much wider regional confrontation. Baku’s response to the Iranian attack showed that it saw the incident in political as well as tactical terms. President Ilham Aliyev said Azerbaijan would prepare retaliatory measures. Reuters later reported that Azerbaijan had ordered the evacuation of its diplomats from Iran, citing safety concerns. This is understandable, particularly in light of the January 27, 2023, incident when an armed attacker entered Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran and opened fire, killing the head of the embassy’s security and wounding two other staff. Baku called this a terrorist attack, evacuated most of its diplomatic personnel, and suspended embassy operations. Azerbaijani officials also said the March 5 attack on Nakhchivan violated international law, rejecting any implication that it could have been a technical mishap. The stakes widened further after...