• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
21 November 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 124

Kazakhstan Oil Exports: Talks With Azerbaijan on Higher BTC Shipments

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are discussing ways to increase shipments of Kazakh oil across the Caspian Sea and through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. In the first nine months of 2026, shipments from Aktau through the pipeline rose 24% year on year to 1.16 million metric tons. At a meeting in Baku on November 3, Askhat Khassenov, chairman of the management board of KazMunayGas (KMG), and Rovshan Najaf, president of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), discussed increasing oil transit through Azerbaijan, according to SOCAR. KMG said the companies were studying geological data from prospective exploration areas in both countries and considering deploying Kazakhstan’s Satti drilling rig at offshore fields in Azerbaijan. The meeting followed another disruption to Kazakhstan’s oil exports through Russia. On November 2, a drone attack on the Samara production and dispatch facility forced a suspension of pumping through the Atyrau–Samara pipeline. Shipments resumed the following day. Earlier attacks had also affected infrastructure belonging to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which handles most of the country’s oil exports. In 2025, Kazakhstan exported 64.8 million metric tons of oil through the CPC and approximately 9.3 million metric tons through the Atyrau–Samara pipeline. Kazakh oil has been transported along the Aktau–Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan route since 2023. Tankers carry the crude across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, where it enters the pipeline running to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, providing an export outlet that bypasses Russia’s pipeline network. In 2024, KMG and SOCAR agreed to gradually increase transit volumes to 2.2 million metric tons annually. Kazakhstan’s target for 2026 is 1.7 million metric tons. On October 1, Daulet Arykbayev, director of the Oil Transportation and Refining Department at Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, told Platts that Azerbaijan was willing to raise annual transit volumes to 2.7 million metric tons. He said shipments could reach 7 million metric tons a year over the next few years. The BTC pipeline has a capacity of 1.2 million barrels of oil per day, according to Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Energy. Platts reported in October that it was carrying around 500,000–600,000 barrels a day. The spare capacity offers room for additional Kazakh shipments, although transporting crude across the Caspian Sea adds to the cost. In its 2025 Annual Report, KMG described negotiations with SOCAR over lower tariffs and efforts to assess how Kazakh crude affects the quality of the Azeri Light export blend. That year, shipments from Aktau to Baku were suspended from August to October because of technical restrictions related to oil contamination in the BTC system. According to KMG, 1.3 million metric tons were transported along the trans-Caspian route during the year, 7% less than in 2024. Azerbaijani statistics show that total oil shipments through the BTC pipeline fell 8.3% year on year to 18.86 million metric tons in January–September 2026, despite increased shipments of Kazakh crude.

Russia–Azerbaijan Military Cooperation Expands Amid Baku–Ankara Tensions

Russia and Azerbaijan have signed a program to build and modernize facilities for repairing armored vehicles used by the Azerbaijani military. The agreement was announced on November 1, two days after the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) summit in Ankara, which Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev did not attend amid growing tensions with Turkey. "An entire program has been signed that provides for the modernization and construction of facilities to repair armored vehicles in service with the Azerbaijani army," Dmitry Shugayev, director of Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, told Zvezda television. Shugayev also mentioned the possibility of future deliveries of Pantsir-S1 air defense systems. Arms Supplies and the Karabakh Wars Russian defense companies have long supplied equipment to Azerbaijan’s armed forces. Azerbaijan has purchased T-90S tanks, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, artillery, and air defense systems. Maintaining this equipment requires spare parts, specialized facilities, and technical documentation. Russia supplied weapons to both sides of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russian equipment accounted for approximately 60% of Azerbaijan’s imports of major weapons and 94% of Armenia’s between 2011 and 2020. Deliveries became more difficult after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In December 2024, Aliyev spoke about delays in fulfilling existing contracts because Russian defense manufacturers were occupied with orders for their own armed forces. Baku nevertheless intended to continue purchasing Russian weapons. Weapons from other suppliers played a significant role in Azerbaijan’s military operations during the 2020 war. Turkey supplied Bayraktar TB2 armed drones as well as TRG-300 guided missiles. Israel provided Hermes drones and Harop loitering munitions, which are designed to crash into targets. It also supplied Spike anti-tank missiles, LORA (Long-Range Artillery) ballistic missiles, and Barak-8 air defense systems. Drones were used for reconnaissance and strikes against Armenian military equipment, artillery, and air defense positions. According to SIPRI, Israel accounted for approximately 69% of Azerbaijan’s imports of major weapons between 2016 and 2020. Military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey expanded following Baku’s victory in the 2020 war. In September 2023, Azerbaijan established control over the entire territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Following the military operation, almost the entire ethnic Armenian population of the region, approximately 100,000 people, fled to Armenia. In February 2024, Aliyev visited an airbase where Turkish-made Bayraktar Akıncı heavy combat drones were displayed. These aircraft can carry heavier weapons than the TB2. Why Baku and Ankara Are at Odds In October, a dispute erupted between Baku and Ankara over school uniform rules introduced in Azerbaijan in September. Restrictions on wearing hijabs drew criticism from Turkish politicians and public figures. Azerbaijani authorities regarded the criticism as interference in domestic affairs and barred 31 Turkish citizens from entering the country. In comments on X reported by The National on October 17, Vasif Huseynov of Azerbaijan’s state-run Center for Analysis of International Relations and Multiculturalism said the restrictions on religious clothing reflected Baku’s efforts to protect the state’s secular character and counter external ideological influence, particularly from Iran. In...

The Middle East’s New Rivalry Runs Through Central Asia

Eighty years after Winston Churchill described an Iron Curtain dividing Europe from Stettin to Trieste, another geopolitical rivalry is emerging across the Middle East, with the swing states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus poised to play a pivotal role. From Gwadar to the Golden Horn, the new Mecca Pact brings together Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. From Pune in India to Piraeus in Greece, the proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC, represents a different vision of regional integration, linking India, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Europe. At the heart of the struggle is the Turkey–Israel rivalry for regional leadership in the wake of the Iran war. But the contest will be shaped not only by the Middle East's principal players, but also by countries on its periphery, particularly in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. When Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan walked out of a regional summit in Baku as Israeli President Isaac Herzog began speaking on October 15, he was accompanied by representatives of Iran, Pakistan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian Authority, and others opposed to Israel’s actions in Gaza. But none of the five Central Asian leaders followed him. Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev went further. On the sidelines of the summit, he held a bilateral meeting with Herzog, speaking about the “dynamic development” of Kazakhstan-Israel relations. The episode illustrated that the more Turkey plays the Israel card, the more difficult it becomes to maintain cohesion across the Turkic world. The Competition for Swing States At a Hudson Institute discussion in Washington on October 26, analysts examined competing regional alignments as the Middle East prepares for an era of reduced American engagement. [caption id="attachment_59471" align="alignnone" width="300"] From left, Ken Moriyasu, Chaim Martin, Soner Çağaptay, Aslı Aydıntaşbaş and Michael Doran at a Hudson Institute event on Oct. 26. Image: Hudson Institute[/caption] Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, director of the Turkey Project at the Brookings Institution, said the Mecca Pact is “an early experiment” in managing a post-American region. “In the long run, whether it's a Democratic or Republican administration, the notion of reducing U.S. footprint in the region is a very dominant theme, and you only have to look at the American public to see that,” she noted. Soner Çağaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, suggested the pact could best be understood through the countries it excludes, both beginning with the letter "I." Israel and Iran are seen as “part of the regional problems, not the solutions,” he said, adding that the Mecca Pact envisions a broad coalition of countries establishing a new security architecture without either country at its center. India is the third "I," said Chaim Martin, Israel's minister of economic affairs to the United States. "That too is an ‘I’ that is specifically not in that pact," he said. Israel views India as a key strategic partner, with both democracies navigating complex regional environments. Erdogan's Azerbaijan Problem Despite the ambitions of the Mecca Pact,...

Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan Ties Could Reorient Central Asian Integration

The five Central Asian presidents met with Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev in Avaza on October 8 for the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s participation brings a principal outlet for Central Asian trade into the six governments’ economic deliberations. Within their consultative format, the states can coordinate industrial projects with the transport services through which regional producers reach foreign markets. If Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan connect cross-Caspian transport more closely to industrial cooperation, the corridor could become an organizing axis for regional integration. The Case for Trans-Caspian Integration Closer Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan cooperation would make cross-Caspian transport more dependable if trains reach Kazakhstani ports in time for Caspian sailings and cargo arriving at Azerbaijani terminals connects with onward services through Georgia. A 2023 assessment by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), also called the World Bank, identified trade among Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Europe as a driver of corridor demand, giving regional exporters a place alongside China–Europe transit traffic. Onward connections from the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway now under construction could run through Turkmenistan and across the Caspian to Azerbaijan, providing an alternative to routes through Iran. Conflict involving Iran strengthens Azerbaijan’s position as the more dependable western outlet for Europe-bound exports. Greater predictability could offset the cost of a Caspian crossing by reducing the stocks firms must hold against delays and the losses caused by interrupted deliveries. Extending the operating coordination developed with Kazakhstan to these southern connections could make Azerbaijan commercially preferable for Central Asian exporters serving European markets. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan occupy the principal positions in this prospective reorientation. Together, they represent approximately one-third of the six countries’ population but account for more than three-fifths of their nominal GDP. Yet bilateral merchandise trade amounted to only $470.7 million in 2025. Their combined economic weight is thus disproportionate to the commerce presently linking them. The infrastructure and institutions connecting industrial investment to markets across the Caspian could give the two countries a basis for organizing wider regional integration, provided firms sustain commercial relationships through those connections. The Bilateral Basis for Regional Integration Export commitments depend on the cost and timing of the complete transport service. At Avaza, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev attached “particular importance” to developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. His Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, advocated joint investment, manufacturing, and entry into foreign markets. For firms undertaking joint production, the commercial viability of Aliyev’s proposal would depend on transport coordinated from departure to delivery. Kazakhstan is developing the Middle Corridor along with the eastern branch of the International North–South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Iran through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. At Avaza, Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov supported the development of North–South corridors in addition to East–West routes. Tokayev also highlighted the continuing importance to Kazakhstan of the North–South route in cooperation with Russia. Kazakhstan’s multi-vector approach thus extends to transport infrastructure: the Middle Corridor strengthens westward access without displacing the commercial connections maintained...

AIIB Signs $1.1 Million in Grant Agreements for Caspian Green Energy Projects

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Azerbaijan have signed two grant agreements totaling $1.1 million. The funds will support preparations for a submarine electricity cable between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, as well as preliminary planning for offshore wind infrastructure in the Caspian Sea. Most of the funding, $1 million, is earmarked for the first phase of a feasibility study for the Caspian Green Energy Corridor. The grants are being administered by AIIB through the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance. The project envisages laying an approximately 400-kilometer submarine power cable. Uzbekistan is also expected to be connected via overland transmission lines. Experts will assess the technical feasibility of transmitting electricity across the Caspian Sea, as well as the scheme's economic viability and environmental impact. The Asian Development Bank will provide another $1 million for the study, bringing its total funding to $2 million. A separate $100,000 grant will support preliminary planning for shore-based infrastructure for Azerbaijan's offshore wind industry. This includes port facilities and vessels, as well as connections between future wind farms and the power grid. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan agreed to develop the energy corridor in November 2024 at the COP29 climate conference in Baku. In March 2026, the Mazhilis, formerly the lower house of Kazakhstan's parliament, approved an agreement on a strategic partnership among the three countries in the production and transmission of green energy. Kazakhstan formally ratified the agreement in April. The corridor would enable exports of renewable electricity from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Azerbaijan, with the possibility of further deliveries to Europe. Regional cooperation plans also cover the production and export of green hydrogen and ammonia using renewable energy. Azerbaijan's Energy Minister Parviz Shahbazov said the agreements would help develop offshore wind energy and expand opportunities to export electricity from the Caspian region and Central Asia. AIIB Chief Investment Officer Konstantin Limitovskiy stressed the importance of preparatory studies in attracting investment to regional energy infrastructure. AIIB's 12th Annual Meeting will take place in Baku, Azerbaijan, on July 14–15, 2027.

Avaza Summit Highlights East–West and North–South Trade Routes

On October 8, the presidents of five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan gathered in Avaza, on Turkmenistan's Caspian coast, to discuss closer economic and political cooperation. Hosted by Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, the annual Consultative Meeting included Azerbaijan as a full participant for the first time, extending the forum across the Caspian to the South Caucasus. The six leaders adopted a joint statement recognizing East–West and North–South transport corridors as priorities for regional development. The summit highlighted the region's growing importance in Eurasian trade and international supply chains. Beyond expanding transport networks, the leaders proposed closer industrial cooperation and cross-border investment, seeking to capitalize on their geographic advantages while preserving flexibility in their international economic relationships. Transport Corridors in Multiple Directions Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov said, "I believe it is now important to intensify negotiations and practical steps toward establishing transport and logistics connectivity along the East–West and North–South routes." He added, "The Central Asia–Caspian Sea–South Caucasus–Europe corridor should play a key role here." He also emphasized that cooperation among Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as Caspian states could help integrate the wider Central Asian region and other countries into these transport networks. Turkmenistan remained prepared to make its Caspian infrastructure available for mutually beneficial projects. Its port at Turkmenbashi and rail connections toward Iran give it a practical role in both East–West and North–South trade. The Turkmen president's emphasis on North–South connectivity also reflects ongoing transport cooperation with Russia. In May 2026, Turkmenistan reported that Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran were working on an agreement to improve freight movement along the corridor's eastern branch. Turkmen officials also outlined preferential railway tariffs and container services linking Turkmenbashi with Russia's Olya port. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev also highlighted growing demand for the Middle Corridor, while emphasizing the continued importance of the North–South route. "For Kazakhstan, the North–South route in cooperation with Russia remains particularly relevant," Tokayev said. The statement is consistent with Kazakhstan's longstanding multivector foreign policy, which seeks to maintain established trade connections while expanding access to alternative transport routes. Kazakhstan, Central Asia's largest economy, occupies a strategic position at the intersection of major East–West and North–South transport routes. For the region’s landlocked economies, a wider choice of reliable routes can improve access to markets and reduce dependence on individual transit connections. Expanding the Middle Corridor Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized investments on both shores of the Caspian, noting that transit cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor increased by more than 10% in 2025 and by almost 20% during the first eight months of 2026. Azerbaijan has invested in ports, railways, highways and other infrastructure to facilitate trade between Central Asia and international markets. It also serves as a transit route for Kazakh and Turkmen oil exports, giving the country a growing role in connecting Central Asian producers with markets to the west. Tokayev proposed exploring the integration of the Middle Corridor with the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a planned transport link through Armenia connecting mainland Azerbaijan...