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Central Asian Views on Pro-Palestinian Protests in the West

Pro-Palestinian protests erupted in university campuses and other locations worldwide in response to the ongoing conflict involving the Israeli Defense Forces and Palestinians in Gaza. European cities, including in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, and Belgium, have been major flashpoints where, in some cases, the police resorted to using batons, shields and tear gas on protestors. In the U.S., The New York Times has reported on May 13 that since April 18, over 2,500 individuals had been arrested or detained at 54 college campuses nationwide. The increasingly violent nature of the protests causes alarm. A poll conducted by USA Today and Suffolk University, published on May 8, has revealed that almost 32% of Americans express "very concerned" sentiments about the potential for the protests to lead to violence, while slightly over 35% say they are "somewhat concerned". Some of the messaging coming out of the protests has also been characterized as antisemitic, leading to a congressional bill in the U.S. known as the Antisemitism Awareness Act, which aims to expand the legal definition of antisemitism to curb any speech that provokes violence. Free speech advocates, including some international human rights organizations, have challenged these measures. Remembering their own turbulent times, Central Asians generally support state measures to maintain order Central Asians' perspectives on the pro-Palestinian protests sweeping through Western cities, and the way various governments respond to them, are naturally influenced by their own historical and political contexts, shaped by decades of political transition and international rivalry. Emerging as new democracies just three decades ago, these nations have witnessed a tumultuous mix of violent power struggles among oligarchs, and intense competition from foreign actors vying for control over the region's abundant natural resources and strategic geopolitical position. At the same time, the region hosts a large Muslim population who may sympathize with the Palestinians, even though many do not know the history of the conflict in the Middle East, according to Daniyar Kumpekov, a 46-year-old economist in Kazakhstan. “The Arab-Israeli conflict is beyond the attention of most citizens,” says 21-year-old Kazakhstani student, Anar Zhakupova, adding that they are more concerned about the confrontation between Ukraine and Russia. In Kyrgyzstan, 29-year-old merchant, Dmitry Povolotsky, says that there were only small rallies in support of the Palestinians. There also seems to be a sense of skepticism towards the protests. Kumpekov, for instance, draws attention to a trend of “Islamization” in Kazakhstan’s society”. Mahmut Orozbayev, a Kyrgyz civil servant in his 50s, cautions about terrorist cells in the country, which, he says, “should be feared” from a security perspective. “We have a majority of Muslim citizens. They can gather and condemn Israel's actions. But all this [should be done] within the limits of what is permissible, so that there is no unrest,” he adds. According to Donokhon Ruziboyeva, an Uzbekistan resident in her 20s, pro-Palestinian protests raise awareness, but “they don’t stop the conflict in Palestine”. While the devastation in the Gaza Strip seen on social networks deeply moves Ruzboyeva,...

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Central Asia’s “C5” Security Bloc Can Become a Reality

Central Asia is an emerging economic region that offers the world immense natural resources, a viable trade corridor, and a young, educated workforce. On a diplomatic level, major global powers have sometimes chosen to engage with the five Central Asian nations (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) as a bloc rather than individually, thus giving rise to the term C5+1. The United States, Germany, Japan, and the European Union have C5+1 initiatives grouping the five countries as a block. The C5+1 is not entirely a Western construct as, in addition to Japan, China also has its own C5+1 launched in 2023 that mirrors the U.S. version. Russia’s economic and security cooperation platforms are not all-inclusive when comes to Central Asia and include other CIS countries, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Moldova. Cooperation vis-à-vis Afghanistan shows a united front on regional security On May 18, 2024, the heads of the Security Councils of Central Asian countries gathered in Astana, Kazakhstan, for a meeting aimed at enhancing regional security and cooperation. This high-level assembly brought together senior officials from the five states to discuss pressing security challenges and explore collaborative solutions. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who chaired the meeting, impressed that Afghanistan should be the focus of the region’s common attention as Central Asia’s most dire security challenges relate to this southern neighbor. Afghanistan has been a focal point for the spread of violent extremism and oppressive ideologies, impacting global peace and security. The country's history of conflict and provision of safe havens to extremist groups to train fighters and spread their ideologies have long posed threats to neighboring countries and beyond. In Central Asia, this has led to increased terrorism, with groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and ISIS-Khorasan exploiting Afghanistan's instability to establish bases and train fighters. They have carried out cross-border attacks, spreading violence into countries such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Additionally, the dissemination of radical ideologies from Afghanistan has recruited and radicalized individuals in Central Asia, contributing to other local insurgencies and destabilizing the region. An attack on a Russian concert hall in March 2024 by ISIS resulted in 144 deaths. This event led President Tokayev to note that “there remains high risks associated with the activity of international terrorist organizations”. Narcotics trafficking funds terrorist operations in Afghanistan, fuels region-wide organized crime and increases addiction rates. Effective border control is essential to prevent the movements of militants and drug traffickers from Afghanistan into Central Asia, and thus enhance regional security and stability. In addition to combative and preventive measures, the UN wants Afghanistan to be brought into the international fold to manage these threats. Central Asian countries can facilitate this transition and have already made their own individual bilateral efforts to integrate the “Islamic Republic” into the international arena. Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev, for instance, proposed the creation of a UN Regional Center for Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan, to be based in Kazakhstan. Regional unity helps withstand unwanted external...

Central Asia Opinion Head Home Turkmenistan International Affairs Turkmenistan Turkmenistan Business & Economy Business & Economy Turkmenistan Opinions Opinions Turkmenistan Features

Turkmenistan’s Gas and Türkiye’s Plans to Become a Gas Hub

A series of ongoing political consultations between Turkmenistan and Türkiye continued on 25–26 April, as a Turkmen delegation led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Gurbanov visited Ankara, hosted by Turkish counterpart Burak Akçapar. Beyond the regular bilateral agenda of political-diplomatic, trade-economic and cultural-humanitarian cooperation, the two sides emphasized the implementation of bilateral agreements reached at the third Antalya Diplomatic Forum in early March, particularly the prospects for cooperation in the energy sector. On 1 March 2024, Turkmenistan and Türkiye signed two documents — a memorandum of understanding (MoU) and a letter of intent — aimed at strengthening cooperation in the natural gas sector. In theory, this seems to be a positive development for the two countries as well as for Europe. The two possible routes for Turkmen gas to reach Türkiye and Europe are (1) via the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan, and (2) through Iran's existing pipeline infrastructure via a gas swap agreement. Neither one is likely to happen soon. The project to export Turkmen gas to Europe through a shore-to-shore high volume pipeline, at 31 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) is no longer alive after various parties have failed to realize it over the past quarter-century. It was bruited when it was announced that Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov planned to visit Brussels in late 2023 (which ended up not happening) and definitively killed when the initiative by American company Trans-Caspian Resources (headed by a retired U.S. ambassador to Turkmenistan) failed to persuade Ashgabat to construct short low-volume (8–11 bcm/y) "Platform Option" pipeline in the Caspian Sea. Gas "swaps" and Türkiye’s ambitions The idea of a "Turkish gas hub" arose from Russia's search to depoliticize trade between Gazprom and European firms by facilitating a platform where Gazprom's origination of the gas would be obscured and anonymized. Buyers and sellers could meet through Turkish intermediation. Türkiye, however, seeks to draw advantage by imposing the condition of long-term contracts with Gazprom for gas sales at below-market prices. This would guarantee a role for the Turkish intermediaries and, moreover, ensure for them a profit margin through mandatory service fees. "Swap" operations mean an exchange of gas amongst Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan; however, this would involve only a few billion cubic meters. Even if all participants agree, several questions still remain: Will swap transactions be profitable, given the price of gas in Europe? Even if Iran agreed to a Turkmen gas swap, would Tehran execute the agreement in good faith? In fact, Tehran would prefer to offer its own gas to Turkish and European markets, rather than transit competitive Turkmen gas through his territory. In addition, the gas that Azerbaijan produces for export already has contracted buyers under long-term agreements. Azerbaijan would be interested in the Turkish gas hub only if it should in future produce surpluses of gas that cannot be sold under long-term contracts. Then, such surpluses could be sold at a gas hub under short-term contracts, assuming that transit and profitability are guaranteed. Challenges to Türkiye’s...

Central Asia Opinion Head Home Kyrgyzstan Justice Justice Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan Features

Growth of Non-Custodial Sentences in the Kyrgyz Republic Since 2020

The Kyrgyz Republic has reported a decrease of its prison population, which speaks to the ongoing humanization of its criminal justice system. In 2023, the prison population amounted to just 7,728 persons, a 20% decrease compared to 2020 (9,658 prisoners). Despite a 22% increase in the number of convictions, from 5,074 in 2020 to 6,202 in 2023, the number of non-custodial sentences has risen by 55 %. This information was relayed at a roundtable discussion organized by the Ministry of Justice and the UNODC Programme Office in the Kyrgyz Republic on 17 April 2024. Within the framework of the EU-co-funded project, JUST4ALL, which focuses on the establishment of a probation and criminal justice information management systems, the UNODC conducted an analytical review on the judicial practice of custodial and non-custodial sentences between 2020 and 2023. This research was aimed at analyzing court decisions on alternatives to incarceration, and collecting data to inform evidence-based technical assistance within the aforementioned project. An intra-agency working group was tasked with conducting an analytical review by representatives from the Supreme Court, the General Prosecutor's Office, the Prison Service, and the Probation Department. Zarylbek uulu Almazbek, Deputy Minister of Justice of the Republic emphasized that this analysis would help identify positive aspects and shortcomings in the current system. "This work is necessary and relevant, and we are convinced that it will contribute, among other things, to the harmonization of regulatory legal acts, as well as improved cooperation and interaction with government agencies," Almazbek stated. Cosimo Lamberti-Fossati, Project Manager for the EU delegation noted that the EU-funded “JUST4ALL project plays a key role in promoting the humanization of the criminal justice system in Kyrgyzstan through strengthening the probation system. The collection and analysis of data on criminal justice is key to informing evidence-based sustainable policies and decision making.” Participants at the roundtable highlighted the positive role of the probation service, and the need for tailored approaches when it comes to the social reintegration and rehabilitation. Further challenges include ensuring staff are well-equipped to address the needs of their clients by creating appropriate working conditions and tackling the high turnover rate of probation officers. The participants also agreed on the need to strengthen multistakeholder synergies when implementing alternatives to detention, bringing stakeholders together and allowing them to have an open exchange in a trusted environment. JUST4ALL builds on the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (the Tokyo Rules), which encourages Member States to develop non-custodial measures within their legal system to provide alternatives, thus reducing the use of imprisonment, as well as to rationalize criminal justice policies, consider human rights, the requirements of social justice, and the rehabilitation needs of the offender. Vasilina Brazhko is a specialist at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Central Asia

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Uzbekistan Seeks to Expand Trade Horizons with Europe

- Opinion by Robert Cutler Uzbekistan's economic landscape has been evolving, with announcements of major reforms and international cooperation aimed at economic modernization and increasing its profile in global markets. Its partnership with the European Union (EU) has focused on critical raw materials. At the same time, Tashkent plans to reduce gas exports in favour of expanding petrochemical production and inviting foreign investment into its mining sector. In October 2023, the European Parliament (EP) had endorsed this policy direction by adopting a resolution on Uzbekistan based on a series of broad programmatic documents regarding Central Asia, including a previous Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Uzbekistan on energy cooperation. The EP also favorably mentioned the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) concluded in July 2022 to "modernize" the EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed with Uzbekistan in 1999. A new MoU signed earlier this month by the European Commission’s Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis and Uzbekistan's Minister of Investment, Industry and Trade Laziz Kudratov foresees an ambitious intensification of the partnership. The agreement is touted as a step towards diversifying supply chains to Europe for critical raw materials (CRMs) required for the energy transition. The EU's strategic economic partnership with Uzbekistan The new MoU follows on the EU's 25 October 2023 agreement with Uzbekistan during the Global Gateway Forum. That agreement had confirmed that Uzbekistan, with its reserves of metals such as silver, titanium, and lithium, would join the so-called Critical Raw Materials Forum. However, a critical evaluation of the MoU shows that a lot of hard work will be necessary to realize its plans and promises. In fact, the MoU represents a list of possibilities for cooperation without a guarantee of follow-through. The new partnership focuses on a number of areas of potential collaboration. These may be grouped under three general categories: (1) integrating CRM value and supply chains and their resilience; (2) mobilization of funding; and (3) cooperation on production, research, innovation and capacity building. The MoU itself admits that further specific cooperation is required to establish an operational roadmap that would specify particular joint actions for implementation. This partnership is in line with the EU's Global Gateway Initiative, which seeks to mobilize up to €300 billion in investments by 2027, although the initiative has been criticized for largely being a re-packaging of previously established programs without significant new funding. As far as Uzbekistan is concerned, the big unspoken problem is the need to enhance the country's economic competitiveness in global markets. Uzbekistan's mineral resources exploration Only about 20 percent of Uzbekistan’s territory has been explored. Potential mineral resources are evaluated at US$5.7 billion, with the country’s explored reserves representing about US$1 billion of this amount. This unexplored potential represents a significant opportunity for further enhancing Uzbekistan's potential global competitiveness in the mineral resources sector, but only if transportation logistics can be economically put into place. According to the U.S. Geological Service, Uzbekistan also has reserves of other minerals - such as calcium, kaolin, rhenium and vermiculite...

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The Taliban and its Neighbors: An Outsider’s Perspective

This is part two of a piece of which part one was published here. The topic of a regional approach to solving Afghanistan's problems is increasingly being discussed in various expert and diplomatic circles. The International Crisis Group (ICG), a reputable think tank whose opinion is extremely interesting as part of an "insider vs outsider" set of viewpoints, writes about this in particular. A report from ICG entitled "Taliban's Neighbors: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan" is one of the first works to summarize the role and place of the region as regards the situation around Afghanistan. In the voluminous work, the authors touch upon almost all aspects - issues of diplomatic recognition, security, terrorist activity, trade and economic relations within the region, water issues and others. In their conclusions, ICG analysts point out that many steps towards regional cooperation aren't related to Western donors, but European countries should nevertheless be interested. Europeans in particular would benefit from a stable, self-sufficient region that isn't a major source of illegal drugs, migrants or terrorism. But sanctions and other Western measures designed to show disapproval of the Taliban are obstacles to a more functional relationship between Kabul and the countries of the region. Significant progress depends on Western support - or at least tacit acquiescence. While such practical steps need not lead to recognition of the Taliban regime, they will contribute to regional peace and security. However, experts are concerned that the emerging regional consensus is directly dependent on security and stability issues in Afghanistan - if regional neighbors feel that the government cannot restore order within Afghanistan's borders and contain transnational threats, the consensus may well collapse. If that happens, regional countries may be tempted to choose sides in another intra-Afghan civil conflict, repeating the destructive pattern of past decades. At the same time, experts believe that the first step toward improving regional security cooperation would be to cool down the rhetoric on all sides and get regional players to agree on security issues, even if they have different priorities. Security information sharing within the region also suffers because the Taliban have yet to build a trusted dialog. They lack credibility because of their complete denial of certain threats. Meanwhile, countries in the region and the world are guided by inflated estimates of militant numbers. The ICG's assessments of the security threats posed by Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) are broadly in line with the consensus - in some ways, the growing concern about ISKP is paradoxical due to the fact that the overall level of violence associated with the group has declined over the past two years. The question of whether ISKP could become a more potent transnational threat in the future remains open. So far, its operations outside of its original territory near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have been limited. On the other hand, ISKP continues to attract recruits from different parts of Central and South Asia and encourages attacks outside Afghanistan - arguably making it the most dangerous armed group in...