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Electricity

Kazakhstan to Import Electricity from Tajikistan to Address Energy Shortages

Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have signed an agreement on long-term cooperation in the energy sector. The agreement will remain in effect for 20 years, with the possibility of a 10-year extension. The document aims to strengthen energy security, promote environmentally friendly technologies, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Monitoring and telemetry Under the agreement, Kazakhstan will receive scheduled electricity supplies from Tajikistan, particularly from the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP). These imports are intended to cover planned shortages in the North-South zone of Kazakhstan’s unified power system. The price is set at $0.034 per kilowatt-hour (kWh), including VAT at a zero rate. The agreement also includes the introduction of hourly electricity metering at connection points between Kazakhstan's and Central Asia’s power grids, as well as along the Tajik border. Kazakhstan's system operator, KEGOC JSC, will receive real-time telemetry data from Tajikistan via interstate transmission lines to ensure accurate metering and efficient coordination. Electricity deliveries will follow the routes specified in the purchase agreements. The primary source will be the Rogun HPP, with supplies timed to match Kazakhstan's peak shortage periods. A long-awaited step Energy cooperation between the two countries has been under discussion for some time. In August 2024, former Kazakh Energy Minister Almasadam Satkaliev held talks on importing electricity from Tajikistan. These discussions also addressed the issue of unscheduled electricity flows between their power grids. By December 2024, plans were already in place to finalize a 20-year agreement. In February 2025, the deal was confirmed during talks between Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu and his Tajik counterpart, Sirojiddin Mukhriddin. “We agree that Tajik-Kazakh energy cooperation has broad prospects. We have agreed that an intergovernmental agreement on electricity will be signed in the very near future,” the Tajik foreign minister said at the time. The potential of the Rogun HPP and prospects for Kazakhstan A key element of the agreement will be the Rogun hydroelectric power plant on the Vakhsh River. Once completed, its dam will reach a height of 335 meters, making it the tallest in the world. The power plant will have a capacity of 3,600 MW, making it the largest power plant in Central Asia. This makes the project strategically important not only for Tajikistan but for the entire region. The official website of the Rogun HPP states that the facility will be the upper stage of the Vakhsh cascade and will play a key role in ensuring sustainable energy supplies. The agreement is expected to not only enable Kazakhstan to stabilize its energy balance during peak loads, but also open up new opportunities for cross-border cooperation. With the growing demand for green energy, the strategic alliance with Tajikistan could become an important element of the country's energy transition. The resolution enters into force on the day of its signing and effectively launches an intergovernmental mechanism capable of strengthening Kazakhstan's energy security for decades to come.

Water Access

Opinion – Central Asia’s Looming Water Crisis: A Ticking Time Bomb

When people think of Central Asia, they often picture vast deserts, ancient Silk Road cities, and oil pipelines stretching to distant markets. Yet the region’s most urgent and combustible resource is not buried underground — it flows above it. Water, or more precisely the lack of it, is rapidly becoming the defining fault line of Central Asia’s future. For decades, the five Central Asian republics have tiptoed around a growing water crisis. The two major rivers that sustain life in this arid region, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, are now so contested and depleted that what was once a technical issue has metastasized into a geopolitical threat. The region's major rivers, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya are under immense pressure, threatening agriculture, livelihoods, and regional stability. At the heart of the crisis is a tragic irony. The upstream countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are rich in water but poor in energy and cash. They need to release water in winter to generate hydropower. Downstream nations, particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, want water stored until the summer to irrigate vast cotton and wheat fields. The result? Mutual distrust, occasional diplomatic spats, and an accelerating race to dam, divert, and hoard water in a region already gasping under the weight of climate change. A Region Parched Central Asia annually utilizes over 60 billion cubic meters of water for irrigation from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins. However, recent years have seen a decline in river flows, with the actual flow of the Syr Darya being 20–23% less than the norm. Further, the ghost of the Aral Sea — a once-thriving inland lake that has now shrunk by over 90% in its volume and 74 % in surface area — serves as a haunting reminder of the cost of mismanagement. The Soviet legacy of excessive irrigation has morphed into a post-Soviet scramble for control, where water is not just a tool of survival but a lever of power. This desiccation has transformed the region, leading to the emergence of the Aralkum Desert and causing severe ecological and health issues. Climate Change Intensifies the Crisis Climate change is exacerbating water scarcity in Central Asia. A recent study revealed that an extreme heatwave in March 2025, with temperatures soaring 5 to 10°C above pre-industrial levels, was significantly amplified by global warming. Such temperature surges accelerate glacier melt and increase evaporation rates, further reducing water availability. By some estimates, Central Asia could lose over 30% of its freshwater resources by 2050. Yet, rather than galvanize cooperation, this existential threat has sparked more competition. International efforts have largely fallen flat. The International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), the region’s main water cooperation body, is riddled with inefficiencies and lacks enforcement power. External actors like China and Russia have their own interests, often deepening the regional divide rather than healing it. Inefficient Water Management Inefficient agricultural practices remain one of the most profound and persistent contributors to water mismanagement across Central Asia. In...

International Diplomacy

Breaking Old Ties: Central Asia’s Delicate Dance Between Russia and the West

Central Asian countries are increasingly asserting their independence in foreign policy, distancing themselves from traditional centers of global influence. Recent developments highlight a nuanced balancing act as states in the region navigate growing tensions between Russia and the West. Kyrgyzstan Pushes Back In Kyrgyzstan, the recent arrest of Natalya Sekerina, an employee of the Russian House in Osh, marked a notable assertion of sovereignty. Sekerina was detained under Part 1 of Article 416 of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, which pertains to the recruitment, financing, and training of mercenaries for armed conflict or attempts to overthrow state authority. Earlier, Sergei Lapushkin, an employee of Osh city hall, and two others were also detained in connection with the case. All suspects were later placed under house arrest. Nevertheless, the arrests are seen by observers as a clear signal that Kyrgyzstan is not simply aligning with Russian policy, despite its economic dependence on Moscow, particularly due to labor migration. The move was reportedly a response to the April 17 detention of over 50 Kyrgyz nationals in a Moscow bathhouse, where Russian security forces allegedly used excessive force. The Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal note of protest. Russia later stated that the detainees were in the country illegally and some were suspected of links to radical groups. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan is scrutinizing Western influence as well. In February, U.S. President Donald Trump announced funding cuts and a wind-down of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The announcement triggered debate in Kyrgyzstan, where some voices argued that while USAID had supported civil society, it also fostered instability and economic dependency. Critics claim the agency promoted Western values and helped establish a network of NGOs that played outsized roles in the country’s politics. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Seek Equilibrium In Kazakhstan, USAID also came under fire. Parliamentary Deputy Magherram Magherramov criticized the agency for promoting what he described as values alien to Kazakh society, referencing controversial events such as women’s rights marches and LGBTQ+ parades in Almaty. He called for a formal review of foreign-funded NGOs. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan witnessed a diplomatic rift during an April visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the “Grieving Mother” memorial in Samarkand. Lavrov commented on the absence of a Russian-language inscription, provoking widespread backlash on Uzbek social media. Sherzodkhon Kudratkhodzha, rector of the University of Journalism and Mass Communications, responded sharply: “We are not their colony.” He also cited ongoing discrimination against Uzbek migrants in Russia, which, he argued, has been met with silence from Russian officials. A More Independent Foreign Policy Central Asian nations are increasingly holding intra-regional and international meetings, often excluding Russia. On April 25, intelligence chiefs from the region gathered in Tashkent to coordinate on regional security threats. The following day, a meeting of foreign ministers from Central Asia and China took place in Almaty. It was attended by Kazakh Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and counterparts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a...

Nationalism

Leonid Slutsky: Scandals, Nationalism, and the Migrant Blame Game

The leader of Russia’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), Leonid Slutsky has long been a figure surrounded by controversy. A hardline nationalist, Slutsky’s career has been marked by allegations of corruption and harassment. Recently, his intensified rhetoric against labor migrants – including proposed restrictions on labor migrants bringing their families into the country, a requirement for foreign workers to learn Russian, and attacks on the former head of the Uzbek National and Cultural Autonomy Council in Moscow - have further spotlighted his controversial political career. “Our people... should not suffer from boors and criminals who consider themselves masters here, gather in packs and attack people,” Slutsky stated regarding migrant workers. “If you want to make money in Russia, learn Russian, and respect our laws and traditions. In any other case, go home. We will not experiment on ourselves or our children. Our great country must be respected.” This shift to the far-right aligns with a broader nationalist trend in Russia and raises questions about Slutsky’s intentions and the potential impact on the country and those working there. Slutsky’s Scandal-Ridden Career Slutsky's political reputation has been marred by allegations of sexual harassment that surfaced in 2018, with multiple female journalists accusing him of inappropriate conduct, including a BBC correspondent whom he reportedly touched inappropriately and whom he was recorded calling a “bunny”. Despite public disquiet, a State Duma ethics panel dismissed the complaints, leading to a media boycott but no political repercussions. This episode, as well as reports of hidden assets and extravagant wealth, including luxury properties and cars, point to a broader culture of impunity within the Russian political elite. Investigations have revealed that Slutsky's family enjoys a lavish lifestyle, including stays at a luxury Turkish villa, private jet travel, and an elite education for his children in Switzerland, despite his declared income in 2020 of $77,000. Additionally, reports link him to high-end vehicles such as Bentleys and a Mercedes-Maybach, often financed through questionable means. To paraphrase a piece by David Szakonyi in the American Political Science Review, in Russia, corrupt politicians work less but support the regime more. A member of the State Duma since 1999, Slutsky succeeded Vladimir Zhirinovsky as head of the LDPR in 2022. Under his leadership, the party has increasingly leaned on ultranationalist rhetoric and populist measures that appeal to disillusioned voters during times of economic strain. His recent attacks on labor migrants echo this strategy. Weaponizing Anti-Migrant Sentiment Slutsky’s outspoken criticism of labor migrants fits into a growing narrative in Russia that blames foreign workers for economic and social problems. Migrants, particularly those from Central Asia and the Caucasus, have been routinely scapegoated in nationalist circles, accused of taking jobs, disrupting social harmony, and contributing to crime. While there is little evidence to support many of these claims, Slutsky is capitalizing on prevailing anxieties as a means to rally support for his party. By portraying himself and the LDPR as defenders of a nostalgia-fueled Russian identity, he hopes to appeal to conservative voters who view...

Counterterrorism

Tajikistan Launches Program to Reintegrate Convicted Extremists into Society

Tajik authorities have launched a state-backed program aimed at reintegrating citizens convicted of extremism and terrorism into peaceful civilian life. The initiative, which will run from 2025 to 2029, seeks to reduce the likelihood of re-engagement with radical movements and support the return of these individuals to society. New State Initiative: Goals and Budget According to official documents, the program is set to receive 38.5 million Tajikistani somoni (approximately $3.6 million) in funding. Nearly half of the funds will come from the state budget, with the remainder provided through international grants and extra-budgetary sources. The initiative includes a comprehensive set of measures: physical and psychological rehabilitation, vocational training, employment support, and involvement in patriotic and cultural activities. These components are designed to assist former prisoners in adjusting to life outside correctional facilities. Upon release, participants will be closely monitored to prevent any return to extremist ideologies. Implementation and oversight will be managed by local authorities and specialized agencies under the Ministry of Justice, which is tasked with submitting regular progress reports to the government. Understanding Pathways to Radicalization The drivers of radicalization in Central Asia are complex and multifaceted. Rustam Azizi, a specialist in countering violent extremism, told Asia-Plus that economic hardship alone does not account for why some individuals are drawn to extremist groups such as ISIS, Ansarullah, or the Taliban. “Economic difficulty doesn't automatically lead to radicalization, other negative outcomes like crime or social withdrawal are also possible,” Azizi explained. “Moreover, real-life cases show that not all recruits come from impoverished backgrounds.” Migration, while often discussed as a risk factor, does not directly cause radicalization, according to Azizi. Rather, it can create an environment where individuals are more exposed to recruitment efforts, particularly among youths aged 18 to 26. Azizi identifies three main categories of individuals most susceptible to radicalization: 1. Identity crisis: Often from secular, modernized, or mixed-background families, these individuals turn to religion as a way to find belonging, purpose, or self-worth. Frequently recent converts or newly observant Muslims, they may express a sentiment such as: “I may not be a good Tajik, but I am a very good Muslim.” 2. Individuals with criminal tendencies: For this group, terrorist organizations offer a platform to continue illicit activities under the cover of religious struggle. Notable examples include Abu Khalid Kulobi (Nusrat Nazarov) and Abu Usama Noraki (Tojiddin Nazarov), both of whom were involved in drug trafficking before joining ISIS. 3. Marginalized citizens: Representing the largest group, these individuals often come from remote areas and have limited access to education and economic opportunity. Lacking formal religious training, they are especially susceptible to simplistic, binary religious narratives—such as Muslims versus infidels, halal versus haram, jihad versus martyrdom—and are particularly vulnerable to recruitment. It is this demographic that the new government program primarily targets, with an emphasis on prevention, education, and structured support after incarceration. Authorities believe these efforts will promote national stability and help curb the threat posed by radical movements.

Rogun Dam

World Bank to Investigate Regional Risks of Rogun Dam Project

The World Bank’s Inspection Panel has agreed to review a formal complaint filed by residents of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan concerning the environmental and social risks associated with the Rogun Hydropower Project (HPP) in Tajikistan. The complaint, submitted by the regional environmental coalition Rivers Without Boundaries, targets a $350 million World Bank loan and related technical assistance used to revise the project’s 2014 environmental and social impact assessments. The complainants argue that the current studies are outdated and inadequate, relying on assumptions that are more than a decade old. They contend the assessments fail to account for the downstream effects of storing and diverting water from the Vakhsh River, one of the primary tributaries of the Amu Darya basin, on communities and ecosystems in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Preliminary estimates from the World Bank suggest that filling the Rogun reservoir could decrease the flow into the Aral Sea by 0.8 to 1.2 cubic kilometers annually, potentially cutting today’s levels by as much as 25%. Such a reduction, critics warn, could exacerbate ongoing issues in the region, including desertification, soil salinity, and land degradation. These challenges have plagued villages in the lower Amu Darya since Soviet-era irrigation schemes dramatically reduced the sea’s volume, leading to persistent dust storms and declining water quality. Local farmers are particularly concerned about the dam’s effect on the timing of water availability. If the dam shifts the river’s flow from spring and summer into winter storage, it could disrupt traditional irrigation cycles, forcing expensive infrastructure adjustments. Some communities fear economic collapse and forced migration if water needs go unmet during critical planting seasons. Environmental experts also highlight the cumulative threat posed by the Rogun HPP in conjunction with Afghanistan’s planned Qosh Tepa canal. No comprehensive analysis has been conducted to evaluate the combined impact of these two major water diversion projects on regional hydrology and biodiversity. The World Bank itself estimates that climate change could reduce water availability in the region by 15-30% by 2050, potentially costing Uzbekistan up to 250,000 agricultural jobs and requiring billions in climate adaptation investments. In response, Rivers Without Boundaries has called on the World Bank and its co-financiers, who have collectively pledged over $1 billion, to suspend further funding until a transparent, independent risk assessment is completed. The coalition advocates for a thorough study of alternative project designs, such as a lower dam height, to mitigate environmental and social damage. They also demand genuine public consultation with all Amu Darya basin countries, equitable compensation mechanisms, and legally binding water management agreements. Failure to address these concerns, the group warns, risks triggering an irreversible ecological and humanitarian crisis across Central Asia.