Russia's War - The Times Of Central Asia

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Ukrainian Children Arrive in Uzbekistan for Rest and Recovery

Just ahead of Eid al-Adha, a group of Ukrainian children have arrived in Tashkent for a 12-day program of rest and psychological rehabilitation. The Ukrainian Embassy in Uzbekistan reported that the visit was fully organized and funded by the Uzbek government. The children, who come from war-affected regions including Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, and Kyiv, received a warm welcome upon arrival at Tashkent International Airport. From there, they traveled to a mountain camp nestled in a valley near the Tien Shan range. According to the embassy, the initiative was launched at the request of the Ukrainian side and is intended to help the children recover emotionally from the ongoing trauma of air raid sirens and missile strikes. The camp offers a structured program of daily themed events, such as “National Values Day” and “Sports and Health Day,” along with creative competitions and excursions. Evenings are reserved for social gatherings. Ukrainian adults are present to supervise the children throughout their stay. Nearly all major ministries and government agencies in Uzbekistan are participating in the effort, demonstrating strong coordination and compassion. The Ukrainian Embassy emphasized that the initiative reflects Uzbekistan’s genuine interest in supporting Ukrainian children during this difficult period. The program aims not only to provide physical and emotional relief, but also to express solidarity and goodwill from the Uzbek people. Uzbekistan previously provided similar humanitarian assistance to Palestinian civilians, evacuating 100 injured women and children, along with their guardians, from Rafah for medical treatment and care. Uzbekistan’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine has been cautious yet distinct, reflecting its careful balancing act in international diplomacy. Tashkent has refrained from openly condemning Moscow, a key economic and regional partner, but has also demonstrated a firm commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within the framework of its foreign policy principles. Uzbekistan has supported UN General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to the conflict, signaling alignment with global norms, while urging a peaceful resolution through dialogue. Officials have consistently avoided taking sides but have voiced concerns about the war’s human cost and economic repercussions. Beyond formal diplomatic statements, Uzbekistan’s humanitarian actions have highlighted its concern for those impacted by the war. The government’s decision to host Ukrainian children for rehabilitation reflects its broader efforts to provide tangible support to civilians in crisis zones.

Ukraine borders Disinformation Russia's War Telegram Drone Attack Russian Pearl Harbor official response

Operation Spider Web Rattles Russia as Kazakhstan Battles Disinformation

Sunday, June 1, was described by some Russian commentators as the country’s own “Pearl Harbor” following a Ukrainian drone offensive that struck multiple Russian military airfields. Dubbed Operation Spider’s Web, the strikes, targeting air bases in Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur regions were carried out by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and sent shockwaves through Russian society. As criticism mounted over the failures of Russia’s air defense and intelligence apparatus, some voices in Russia began directing attention toward Kazakhstan, attempting to link it, however tenuously, to the Ukrainian operation. The Operation and Its Tactics The Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed the June 1 drone attacks but reported fires at only two bases, in Murmansk and Irkutsk, with no casualties. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky hailed the operation as an "absolutely brilliant result,” emphasizing that it had been in development for 18 months. The method of using vehicles disguised as civilian freight, such as trucks carrying wooden houses filled with drones, was not new. Russian special services have previously intercepted similar transport efforts, and some military bloggers had already documented such tactics. Kazakhstan’s Alleged Involvement According to the Russian authorities, operational preparations for the June 1 attack began in December 2024. Officials in Irkutsk announced a manhunt for 37-year-old Artem Timofeev, a Ukrainian former DJ suspected of organizing the drone launches from vehicles registered to him. Timofeev’s background remains murky: while some sources say he was born in Zhytomyr, others claim Donetsk. He reportedly lived in Kyiv before relocating to Russia’s Chelyabinsk region. The only known connection to Kazakhstan is unconfirmed reports of Timofeev’s departure - along with his wife, an erotic fiction writer - to Astana just days before the strikes. This limited detail, however, fueled speculation on Russian Telegram channels that drone components may have entered Russia via Kazakhstan or that its proximity made it a convenient staging point, with one baselessly claiming that "All the spare parts and explosives arrived via fraternal Kazakhstan." Official Response from Kazakhstan Kazakh officials quickly dismissed these allegations. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Aibek Smadiyarov stated, “There is no official confirmation of this. I will leave it to the theorists among our experts. I cannot comment on conspiracy theories and all sorts of mysteries.” Mazhilis deputy Konstantin Avershin characterized the accusations as “information sabotage” aimed at destabilizing Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia. “I regularly visit such production facilities and can officially state that neither components nor finished products could have fallen into the wrong hands,” he said. Military analyst and retired colonel Darkhan Daniyarov echoed this view, calling the allegations external propaganda. “Kazakhstan complies with all international norms, ensures transparent export controls, and remains a supporter of peace, neutrality, and good neighborliness,” he stated, adding that since 2022, Kazakhstan has introduced strict controls on dual-use goods to prevent their re-export for military purposes. Former KNB Chairman Nartay Dutbayev also questioned the plausibility of the claims, stating it would be easier to obtain explosives within Russia than to smuggle them from Kazakhstan. A Broader Narrative Accusations implicating Kazakhstan...

ALZhIR Gulag Collective Memory Historical Repressions Soviet Legacy Russia's War

Tokayev Honors Victims While Putin Rewrites Stalin’s Past

On May 31, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan stood at the Museum and Memorial Complex “ALZhIR,” which Stalin had established in 1937 as a camp in the Soviet Gulag. Akmola was the name of Astana at the time, and “ALZhIR” is a Russian acronym for “Akmola Camp of Wives of Traitors to the Motherland.” The former Gulag camp, as its name indicates, was for women (a total of roughly 8,000, not to mention over 1,500 children born in the camp) who were detained solely for their familial associations with accused intellectuals or political dissidents. The full name of the Complex, which opened in 2007, is the Museum and Memorial Complex in Memory of Victims of Political Repression and Totalitarianism. In a solemn wreath-laying ceremony, declaring the imperative to preserve memory and confront the Soviet past directly, Tokayev provided a stark contrast to simultaneous developments in Russia, where orchestrated celebrations and symbolic gestures have contributed to the resurrection and sanitization of Stalin’s legacy. [caption id="attachment_32500" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] The Museum and Memorial Complex “ALZhIR”; image: TCA [/caption] This year, Russia’s state apparatus has initiated a broad and deliberate campaign to reinsert Stalin into the country’s national consciousness. Major new monuments have been erected, existing public spaces have been renamed, and state-controlled media have popularized new narratives of Stalin’s leadership. The unveiling of a statue of Stalin in mid-May at the Taganskaya metro, one of Moscow’s busiest stations, received a significant degree of international attention. It was a meticulous restoration of the bas-relief sculpture, “The People’s Gratitude to the Commander-in-Chief,” a work that had been destroyed during the Khrushchev-era de-Stalinization. Cities like Vologda, where Stalin was exiled from 1911 to 1914, have joined this revival, with local leaders organizing public lectures praising his wartime “strategic genius.” Volgograd’s airport was renamed as Stalingrad International Airport by presidential decree. The 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany provided a ready pretext for these efforts. The resurrection of Stalin’s image in Russia serves more than a commemorative function. It represents a strategic deployment of a historical narrative to justify present-day authoritarian practices. President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly drawn explicit parallels between the sacrifices of the Battle of Stalingrad and contemporary military operations in Ukraine, framing the use of force as a historical imperative. State-controlled media in Russia reinforce this framing, while educational curricula have been revised to highlight Stalin’s leadership while marginalizing the atrocities of his regime. This selective memory is an active construction of ideological hegemony, consolidating state power through the manipulation of historical truth. Yet while Russia is reconstructing a mythic narrative that merges nostalgia with political expediency, Kazakhstan is confronting the traumas of its past. Over the past five years, the State Commission on the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression has reviewed thousands of cases, exonerating over 300,000 individuals. Public debates, academic conferences, and community initiatives have reinforced this commitment, along with the publication of survivor testimonies and the release of new archival materials. These materials cover not just...

Chelyabinsk Drone Attack Russia's War Ukraine

Ukraine’s Drone Attack: Russian Region Bordering Kazakhstan Cited as Possible Staging Point

Much remains publicly unknown about how Ukraine pulled off a complex drone attack that targeted several Russian air bases, but some initial, unconfirmed Russian reports say the drones were assembled at a rented warehouse in Chelyabinsk, a Russian city in a region that borders Kazakhstan. When asked about the reports, a spokesman for Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said at a briefing on Monday that he was aware of them and could not confirm speculation that Ukraine may have smuggled the drone components into Russia from neighboring Kazakhstan. "I am not an expert in military affairs. Of course, I saw these reports this morning, of course, anonymous Telegram channels are spreading them, there is no official confirmation of this, so I cannot confirm it. I will leave this to the realm of theory for our experts," ministry spokesman Aibek Smatdiyarov said in remarks reported by media in Kazakhstan. The Russian sources said they geolocated the warehouse in Chelyabinsk by studying photos that purportedly show the drones and their containers as well as the interior of the rented building where they were assembled. The photos were published by Ukrainian media. Additional unconfirmed reports say Russian investigators have questioned several truck drivers who said they drove from Chelyabinsk and were duped into delivering the drones to their target areas. The Russian reports have not been confirmed by officials in either Ukraine or Russia. The pro-Russian War on Fakes channel on Telegram said it was “worth noting” that the Chelyabinsk region borders Kazakhstan and that there was a possibility that the drone parts could have been smuggled into Russia from there. It did not offer any direct evidence to support its speculation. International media analysts have described the War on Fakes channel as a disseminator of disinformation, though Russian military bloggers on the war between Russia and Ukraine are closely monitored because they sometimes offer more information than that provided by the Kremlin and other official channels. Some international observers of the war circulated the Chelyabinsk report on social media. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said the “office” of the drone operation was next to a regional headquarters of the FSB, the Russian security agency. He did not identify the region. The border between Russia and Kazakhstan is about 7,600 kilometers, making it one of the longest borders in the world. The two countries have a robust trade relationship. Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries have tried to project a neutral stance in the war between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine’s security service, known by its acronym SBU, said on Telegram that it hit “34% of strategic cruise missile carriers at the main airfields of the Russian Federation” and that it will provide details about the operation “a little later.” Russia’s Ministry of Defense said attacks on military airfields in the Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur regions were repelled. “In the Murmansk and Irkutsk regions, as a result of the launch of FPV drones from the territory located in the immediate vicinity of airfields, several units...

Regional Realignment Russia's War

Central Asia’s Sovereignty in the Shadow of the War in Ukraine

The Ukraine war has fundamentally changed Central Asia's strategic positioning, accelerating diversification away from Russian dependence. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are navigating between maintaining necessary ties with Moscow, while asserting sovereignty through expanded partnerships with China, Turkey, and the West. The Sovereignty Imperative When Russian forces crossed into Ukraine in February 2022, the violation of territorial integrity sent immediate shockwaves through Central Asia. For leaders whose nations had endured centuries of Russian and Soviet rule, Vladimir Putin's denial of Ukrainian statehood carried threatening undertones. This concern proved well-founded; since 2014, Russian officials have increasingly questioned Central Asian independence, with Putin dismissing Kazakhstan as never having “any statehood,” and nationalist figures like Zakhar Prilepin suggesting the outright annexation of territories "labor migrants come from." This threat became tangible post-2022. Duma member Konstantin Zatulin warned that "with friends, we don't raise territorial questions... With the rest — like with Ukraine — everything is possible," while media personality Tigran Keosayan told Kazakhstan to "look at Ukraine carefully." Such rhetoric has deepened Central Asia’s resolve to defend its sovereignty, even as economic and security constraints limit dramatic policy shifts. Measured Defiance Despite expectations in some quarters that Kazakhstan would align with Moscow following the Russian-led CSTO intervention during the January 2022 unrest, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev defied such predictions. Sitting beside Putin in June 2022, Tokayev refused to recognize the "quasi-state territories" of Donetsk and Luhansk, drawing fierce Russian criticism. This principled neutrality, supporting neither Russia's war nor “blindly follow[ing]” Western sanctions, has largely succeeded in keeping Kazakhstan shielded from the ire of Moscow. Uzbekistan's President Shavkat Mirziyoyev adopted a similar positioning, with then Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov declaring Uzbekistan's recognition of Ukrainian territorial integrity. Though Kamilov was subsequently reassigned amid reports of Russian pressure, Tashkent has maintained its "balanced and neutral position," refusing to endorse any territorial changes achieved through force. Public Opinion is Divided but Shifting The war has polarized Central Asian societies along generational and ethnic lines. In Kazakhstan, surveys show roughly 27-32% of respondents still accept the Kremlin justifications for its invasion of Ukraine, while 24-28% view Russia as the aggressor. Critically, only 15% explicitly support Russia versus 20% backing Ukraine, with the majority remaining neutral. More telling is the growing anxiety about Russia’s intentions: 26% of Kazakhstanis now consider a Russian attack on their country a possibility. In Uzbekistan, state media control limits public polarization, but the historical memory of Russian colonization has reinforced the appreciation for independence. Prilepin's 2023 annexation comments sparked widespread patriotic indignation, while the government's firm rebuttal drew popular praise. Strategic Diversification Accelerates The war has catalyzed Central Asia's pivot toward multiple partnerships, exploiting Russia's distraction and resource constraints. China is already the region's largest economic partner. China has deepened its influence through the first China-Central Asia summit in 2023 and Xi Jinping's pledge that Beijing "categorically opposes" interference in Kazakhstan's internal affairs. Chinese investment in alternative corridors bypassing Russia has accelerated, while modest military cooperation provides security alternatives to Russian guarantees. Ankara has also leveraged its...

Russia's War Ukraine Migrants

Russia: Thousands of Central Asia-Born Russians Sent to Ukraine Front Line

A senior Russian official has said that thousands of migrants from Central Asia who became Russian citizens were sent to fight in Ukraine after they tried to dodge conscription. "Our military investigations directorate conducts regular raids,” Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, said on Tuesday in remarks that were reported by the Russian state-run TASS news agency. “So far, we've tracked down 80,000 such Russian citizens who didn't just avoid the front lines — they wouldn’t even show up at military enlistment offices. We’ve registered them for military service, and about 20,000 of these 'new' Russian citizens, who for some reason no longer want to live in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Kyrgyzstan, are now on the front lines," Bastrykin said at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum. Bastrykin’s comments contributed a piece to the often murky picture of the involvement of people from Central Asia in Russia’s war effort in Ukraine in the last three years. In addition to conscription measures, Russia has also sought to replenish its ranks by offering contracts and other incentives to foreigners willing to fight. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are among Central Asian countries that ban their nationals from fighting in foreign conflicts and there have been several high-profile prosecutions of citizens who fought for Russia and returned home. It is a sensitive political matter in Central Asia, a region that seeks to project neutrality in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Kazakhstan has said it is reviewing a report by a Ukrainian institution that said about 661 Kazakh citizens have fought for Russia since it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The I Want To Live center, which is run by the Ukrainian security services and assists with surrender requests from soldiers fighting for Russia, published a list of what it said were the Kazakh nationals. Of the 661, at least 78 have been killed, according to the center. Without providing details, it said it received the list from its own sources within the Russian military. Uzbekistan is conducting a similar investigation based on data from the Ukrainian group.