• KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 839

EAEU Leaders Meet in Astana Amid Growing Internal Trade Disputes

Astana is hosting Eurasian Economic Union events on May 28-29, with leaders arriving on Thursday and the main meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council scheduled for Friday, May 29. The first part of Thursday was dominated by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his delegation during Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan. At the Palace of Independence, Tokayev and Putin introduced their official delegations to each other during the Russian president’s state visit, while Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov said the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting would begin on Friday morning in narrow and expanded formats. The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council is the highest body of the Eurasian Economic Union, which came into force on January 1, 2015. Now more than a decade old, the bloc is facing deepening internal contradictions driven largely by external economic pressure on Russia, the Union’s core member. Some of those tensions are linked to the bloc’s expansion beyond its original Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan core. To understand the current state of Eurasian integration, it is necessary to revisit its origins, particularly the role played by Kazakhstan and its first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had sought to preserve a looser union among the Soviet republics as the USSR collapsed. As prime minister and later president of the Kazakh SSR, Nazarbayev understood the economic consequences that would follow the collapse of the integrated Soviet economic system, and how deeply Kazakhstan remained tied to Soviet-era supply chains, infrastructure, and decision-making structures centered in Moscow. Nazarbayev first publicly proposed the idea of Eurasian integration in 1994 during a lecture at Moscow State University. At the time, however, the administration of Russian President Boris Yeltsin showed little interest in the concept. That changed after Vladimir Putin came to power. In 2001, the Eurasian Economic Community, known as EurAsEC, was established, bringing together Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. The founding agreement had been signed in Astana in October 2000. Uzbekistan joined EurAsEC in 2006, but suspended its membership only two years later. Meanwhile, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan launched work in 2007 on creating a Customs Union, which officially came into existence in 2010. In the autumn of 2011, Putin announced plans to establish a Eurasian Economic Union based on a future Single Economic Space. Two years later, Nazarbayev proposed dissolving EurAsEC in connection with the planned creation of the EAEU by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia were invited to join the Customs Union. However, by 2014, when the treaty establishing the EAEU and dissolving EurAsEC was signed, neither Armenia nor Kyrgyzstan had initially been central to the Eurasian project. At that stage, much of the discussion revolved around the possible accession of Ukraine. Russian political commentator and current State Duma deputy Anatoly Wasserman devoted several books to the idea of integrating Ukraine into the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan project, including Ukraine and the Rest of Russia. Wasserman argued that Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine needed to move away from a raw-materials-based economic model by creating a unified market...

Opinion: Silk Seven or the OTS? Central Asia May Not Have to Choose

A new proposal circulating in Washington – the Silk Seven Plus (S7+) initiative – aims to reshape Central Asia by linking its five post-Soviet states with Afghanistan and Pakistan into an integrated economic region. Azerbaijan is also seen as a potential addition. The idea, advanced by the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, is straightforward: connect landlocked Central Asia to the Black Sea and Arabian Sea through new trade corridors. On paper, the bloc looks compelling. The seven countries form a contiguous zone in the heart of Eurasia, potentially turning geography from a constraint to an advantage. “Central Asia needs an organization built by Central Asian states and for Central Asian states,” said Justin Burke, a resident senior fellow at the New Lines Institute, at a recent event in Washington. “If Central Asia can speak with one voice rather than five different voices, that will make it a more reliable investment destination.” There are signs of momentum. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev made back-to-back visits to Pakistan earlier this year, highlighting regional connectivity. Proponents argue that if Afghanistan stabilizes, the Silk Seven could become a formidable cluster. But that is a big “if.” It also raises a deeper question: why construct a new, geographically convenient bloc when an existing organization – the Organization of Turkic States (OTS)—already offers something deeper: shared language, history, and identity? While the Silk Seven spans broadly Muslim-majority countries, it is linguistically and culturally diverse. The grouping spans Turkic-speaking Central Asia, Persian-speaking Tajikistan, and Indo-Aryan Pakistan. ASEAN offers a cautionary example. Despite decades of cooperation, its religious, linguistic, and geopolitical diversity – combined with consensus-based decision-making – has often prevented it from speaking with one voice, particularly on China. In The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington wrote that when ASEAN was created in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, it was an organization of “one Sinic, one Buddhist, one Christian, and two Muslim member states.” Such multicivilizational regional organizations have limits, he said. The Silk Seven risks similar limitations. The OTS, by contrast, rests on a narrower but deeper foundation: its core members—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan—share closely related languages and overlapping historical experiences. Tucked away in the eight-page document issued after the informal OTS summit earlier this month was a revealing signal of intent: clauses dedicated to cataloguing Turkic cultural heritage, promoting youth engagement through Khiva’s designation as the 2026 Youth Capital, and launching a “Turkic Heritage” digital platform. Together, they show that the OTS is actively building a shared cultural space. Yet even as members emphasize common heritage, differences remain over how far the organization should evolve politically. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the summit host, stressed in his remarks that “the Organization of Turkic States is neither a geopolitical project nor a military organization,” but rather “a unique platform” for cooperation across trade, technology, culture, and humanitarian ties. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev struck a more ambitious note, saying that “the Turkic world must grow into one of the influential geopolitical centers of the 21st century,” and pledging...

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will focus on the newly released report from the European Neighbourhood Council on foreign information manipulation in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Samuel Doveri-Vesterbye, one of the report's authors, will be joining the team as a guest.

Central Asia Feels Fuel Strain as Kazakhstan Prices Edge Higher

Kazakhstan's fuel market is moving into a new phase after the end of the government freeze on AI-92 gasoline and diesel. Pump prices have risen by small amounts so far. Retail prices are rising cautiously amid growing pressure from neighbors where fuel costs more. Kazakhstan still has some of the cheapest gasoline in the region, but that advantage creates a risk: cheap fuel attracts cross-border demand and makes it harder to fund the refining capacity the country says it needs. On October 16, 2025, Kazakhstan's government introduced a moratorium on further increases in AI-92 gasoline and diesel as part of a wider anti-inflation package. The decision also put the Energy Ministry, the competition agency, and regional authorities in charge of keeping supplies stable. The measure came after inflation and tariff reforms had raised concerns about household costs. The freeze ended on April 1, 2026, but by mid-April, the Energy Ministry was still trying to calm expectations. Kazinform cited Vice Minister of Energy Kaiyrkhan Tutkyshbayev on April 14 as saying most prices had risen mainly by one tenge after the moratorium was lifted, and that the state would not allow a sharp jump. The tone matched what drivers were seeing: a controlled rise rather than a sudden reset. The memory of January 2022, when an LPG price jump helped spark unrest, still hangs over fuel policy. The end of the freeze also fed into inflation expectations. National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov warned in April that renewed growth in fuel prices and utility tariffs had to be handled cautiously, because a sharp reset could reverse the slowdown in inflation. The National Bank later said reforms in utility tariffs and fuel prices accounted for 32.9% of household inflation expectations in March. That made the fuel moratorium more than a pump-price measure: it was one of the state’s main tools for containing expectations while inflation remained in double digits. An April 9 check by Tengri Auto found that most filling stations in Almaty and the surrounding area were still selling fuel close to the previous price range. Several major networks, however, had already moved AI-92 toward 240 tenge per liter. AI-95, which was not covered by the main freeze, had risen to 328 tenge at one network. A Kazinform market check published on May 25 showed the same gradual pattern. AI-92 was listed at 238-239 tenge per liter in Astana, 238-241 tenge in Almaty, and 224-227 tenge in Shymkent. Diesel stood at 329 tenge in Astana, 330-337 tenge in Almaty, and 332-335 tenge in Shymkent. The figures point to a market that is moving, but still under close control. Fuel is also feeding into Kazakhstan's broader inflation picture. The Bureau of National Statistics put annual inflation at 10.6% in April 2026. Petrol prices were up 16.1% year-on-year and added 0.53 percentage points to annual price growth. Transport as a category added 1.1 percentage points. Fuel is one of the costs households notice most directly, and its effects spread through freight, food distribution, agriculture, taxis,...

Dushanbe Water Talks Put Tajikistan’s Climate Diplomacy in Focus

Conference-related events began in Dushanbe on Monday, May 25, as Tajikistan hosts the Fourth High-Level International Conference on the International Decade for Action “Water for Sustainable Development,” 2018-2028. The week gives Tajikistan a fresh stage for a role it has built for years: using water, climate risk, and glacier protection as its clearest route into global diplomacy. President Emomali Rahmon gave the week an early political signal when he met three senior U.N. officials in Dushanbe: Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana, U.N. Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of ESCAP; Retno Marsudi, U.N. Under-Secretary-General and Special Envoy on Water; and Tshilidzi Marwala, Rector of the United Nations University and U.N. Under-Secretary-General. Their arrival tied the conference directly to the Dushanbe Water Process, a platform Tajikistan has used to keep water on the international agenda. The Tajik presidential press service said 14 U.N. resolutions on water resources have been adopted at Tajikistan’s initiative. For a small, mountainous country with limited geopolitical weight, that record has become a useful diplomatic asset. Tajikistan can convene governments, U.N. agencies, development banks, and water experts around a topic shaped by its geography. The conference runs from May 25 to 28, with Monday set aside for forums, side events, and regional consultations. The main high-level sessions are set to take place on May 26 and 27 at the Kohi Somon Complex, followed by field visits on May 28. Asia-Plus reported that more than 2,500 participants were expected, including representatives from 31 countries and 33 international organizations and financial institutions. The agenda links Tajikistan’s national concerns to a wider U.N. timetable. The Dushanbe events are designed as a preparatory step before the 2026 United Nations Water Conference, now scheduled for December 8-10 in Abu Dhabi, and co-hosted by the United Arab Emirates and Senegal. Tajik officials are also presenting the process as a bridge towards 2028, when the Water Action Decade reaches its final year. Tajikistan has spent more than two decades building this diplomatic niche. The International Decade for Action “Water for Sustainable Development,” 2018-2028 began on World Water Day in 2018 and ends on World Water Day in 2028. The Dushanbe Water Process was then shaped as a regular follow-up platform, including for voluntary commitments made under the U.N. Water Action Agenda. That structure has given Tajikistan repeated opportunities to host, frame, and guide discussion rather than appear only as a country seeking aid. Tajikistan’s glaciers, rivers, hydropower system, and mountain communities all face pressure from climate change. The U.N. glaciers initiative has put new attention on glacier retreat, and Tajikistan has pushed glacier preservation as part of its global water agenda. In Central Asia, melting glaciers and shifting river flows affect more than one country; they shape energy supply, irrigation, disaster risk, and food security. Water also connects Tajikistan to its neighbors. The region’s major rivers cross borders, and upstream water use affects downstream farms and cities. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan hold much of the mountain headwater geography, while Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan depend heavily on reliable flows for...

Central Asia Steps Out of the Post-Soviet Shadow

Central Asia is rarely presented on its own terms. It is more often viewed through exterior lenses like Russian imperial memory, Chinese reach, Silk Road romance, or great-power rivalry. The result is a region made to look secondary to the forces around it, even as its five countries carry deep histories, distinct languages, and identities that cannot be reduced to a backdrop. That old frame is starting to crack. Central Asia is finding new ways to tell its own story. The shift goes beyond tourism or national branding. It is about who gets to define the region, which is still too often seen through the things done to it or extracted from it. Culture depicts the other side of that narrative, a place that has shaped history, not merely endured it, with traditions and ideas that have long carried influence far beyond its borders. [caption id="attachment_49147" align="aligncenter" width="2048"] Sky above Almaty: Qandy Qantar; image courtesy of Saule Suleimenova[/caption] Kazakhstan offers one visible example. The Almaty Museum of Arts opened on September 12, 2025, adding a major institution for modern and contemporary art. Its arrival builds on a broader shift in which private galleries, international platforms, and artists such as Aigerim Karibayeva and Saule Suleimenova are moving Kazakh art beyond folkloric shorthand toward identity, postcolonial memory, and urban life. The reopening of the Tselinny Center of Contemporary Culture, in a former Soviet-era cinema, adds a sharper symbolic layer. A building once tied to Soviet public culture has become a platform for modern Central Asian voices, reflecting a scene increasingly rethinking nomadism rather than simply reproducing it. [caption id="attachment_49148" align="aligncenter" width="1024"] Image: The Tselinny Center of Contemporary Culture[/caption] Uzbekistan has made culture central to its international reemergence. The inaugural Bukhara Biennial brought contemporary art into a city more often seen through its monuments, turning madrasas and caravanserais into exhibition spaces for Uzbek and world artists. The same push is visible in the Tashkent Centre for Contemporary Art, Uzbekistan’s presence at the Venice Architecture Biennale, and design projects such as When Apricots Blossom, which link heritage, craft, and the environmental disaster of the Aral Sea. Artists such as Oyjon Khayrullaeva show a younger generation reworking Islamic ornament, textiles, and public space into new visual languages. At the same time, the State Museum of Karakalpakstan in Nukus, with its Soviet-era censored works, gives the country’s art history deeper heft. In Tashkent, the Islamic Civilization Center is working on a different scale. Recognized by Guinness World Records in 2026 as the largest museum of Islamic civilization, it gives Uzbekistan a stronger role in shaping how that legacy is understood today. [caption id="attachment_49146" align="aligncenter" width="2048"] Image courtesy of Oyjon Khayrullaeva[/caption] Kyrgyzstan’s confidence rests on different ground. The sixth World Nomad Games are scheduled for August 31 to September 6, 2026, with events in Bishkek and around Issyk-Kul. That gives Kyrgyzstan a stage for living nomadic traditions, not a static museum display of them. Its contemporary art scene adds a more intimate layer, with artists such as...