Tajikistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team looks at the role of clusters in Uzbekistan's farming sector, which is key to understanding what Mirziyoyev's comments about farmers receiving some $1 billion in profits from this year's cotton harvest really means. Special guest: Umida Niyazova, the director and founder of the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights.

Precious Metals

Solidcore Tajikistan Agreement Targets Precious Metals Exploration

Kazakhstan-based gold producer Solidcore Resources has signed an agreement with Tajikistan’s Main Department of Geology to explore for precious metals and polymetallic ores in the country. The two sides signed the memorandum on November 7 following talks between the presidents of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in Astana. Solidcore CEO Vitaly Nesis said the company’s newly formed subsidiary, Solidcore Tajikistan, will work with local authorities and partners to identify potential projects. Once approved, the parties will agree separately on a project's implementation and financing. Tajikistan has seen rapid growth in gold mining, with production reaching 14.5 metric tons in 2024, more than four times its 2015 level, according to the International Monetary Fund. Chinese companies dominate the sector. The country's largest gold producer, Zeravshan, is 70% owned by China's Zijin Mining, with the Tajik government holding the remaining 30%. The mine accounts for approximately 70% of national gold output. More than 600 deposits containing about 50 types of minerals have been documented in Tajikistan, according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The bank says governance and regulatory barriers have limited private investment in the sector. At the request of Tajik authorities, the EBRD launched a project to review existing rules and propose reforms. Solidcore, previously known as Polymetal International, sold its Russian operations in 2024 following Western sanctions and shifted its focus to Kazakhstan. The company was founded by Russian businessman Alexander Nesis and is still headed by his younger brother, Vitaly. Its largest shareholder is now a consortium of Omani investors led by a state-owned fund, which held 41.35% of voting rights as of October. The company has been seeking new mining opportunities beyond Kazakhstan, including in Central Asia and the Middle East. In September, the company agreed with Japan Gold to fund a three-year gold exploration program at five sites on Hokkaido and Kyushu. The program has a $25 million budget. In Kazakhstan, Solidcore, formerly known as Polymetal International, operates two gold-mining operations: Kyzyl in the Abai region and the Varvara hub in the Kostanay region. Its development projects include the Ertis Hydrometallurgical Plant, which will process gold-bearing concentrates, and the Syrymbet tin-copper deposit, which was approved for construction in October. In 2025, Solidcore produced 395,000 gold-equivalent ounces and sold 412,000, down 19% and 23%, respectively, from 2024. The company attributed the declines to delays in processing concentrate from Kyzyl at a third-party facility in the first half of 2025. Higher gold prices nevertheless pushed revenue up 13% to $1.5 billion. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, the memorandum was among 20 cooperation documents signed in Astana, including agreements on fuel supplies and cooperation in the electricity and metals sectors.

CSTO

CSTO Without Armenia: What Keeps Yerevan From Leaving and What the Summit Means for Central Asia

Armenia has effectively stopped participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) but has not formally withdrawn from the military alliance. At the November 11, 2026, summit in Moscow, Armenia lost its voting rights because of unpaid membership dues, while the CSTO's five other members — Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus — agreed to develop collective aviation forces and mobile air defense units. Kazakh political analyst Maksim Kaznacheyev explained to The Times of Central Asia why Armenia's leadership is reluctant to sever ties with the CSTO and what the new military agreements could mean for Central Asian countries. Why Armenia Has Not Left the CSTO Yerevan froze its participation in the organization in February 2024, accusing its allies of failing to ensure Armenia's security during armed clashes with Azerbaijan. Armenia stopped paying membership dues and sending representatives to CSTO bodies. At the November 11 summit, CSTO members decided that Armenia would lose its voting rights and the ability to nominate candidates for senior positions because of unpaid contributions. CSTO Secretary-General Taalatbek Masadykov said, however, that the organization was not considering expelling Armenia. Kaznacheyev attributes Yerevan's reluctance to sever ties with the CSTO to Armenia's domestic political situation. "If Armenia leaves the CSTO or the EAEU, pro-Western actions could trigger an internal crisis and destabilize the country," Kaznacheyev said. He believes Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is seeking to avoid deepening divisions within Armenia as his government pursues closer ties with the European Union. Yerevan, however, has pursued different policies toward the two organizations. Armenia has suspended its participation in the CSTO but continues to operate within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). On November 5, Pashinyan said the country was not preparing to leave the EAEU. The CSTO has experienced the departure of member states before. Uzbekistan signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992, declined to renew it in 1999, rejoined the CSTO in 2006, and suspended its membership again in 2012. Kaznacheyev believes Armenia's situation is substantially different. "Uzbekistan's experience does not apply to Armenia because Uzbekistan had a unified political elite when it left the CSTO," Kaznacheyev said. He noted that Tashkent also had a bilateral security agreement with Russia, allowing it to maintain military cooperation outside the CSTO. For Kazakhstan, Armenia's dispute with the CSTO does not create an immediate security threat. Kaznacheyev said Astana's restrained position reflects its limited direct interests in Armenia and its growing transport links through Azerbaijan and Georgia toward Turkey. "That is why Kazakhstan maintains a restrained, neutral position," he said. What the New Air Defense Agreements Mean for Central Asia At the Moscow summit, CSTO members agreed to develop the organization's Collective Aviation Forces and approved plans for mobile air defense units to protect joint military formations. Plans call for incorporating combat aviation units alongside transport and special-purpose aircraft. Kaznacheyev believes the agreements could expand Russian military-technical assistance to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. He argues that Russia could help other CSTO members modernize their air forces and air defenses, particularly in Kyrgyzstan...

CSTO

Russia Tries to Keep the CSTO Relevant in Central Asia

Russia used the November 11 CSTO summit in Moscow to promote closer military cooperation with allies increasingly looking elsewhere for partners. Plans to develop the collective aviation force and supply equipment for Tajikistan's Afghan border would keep their militaries working with Russia, but Armenia's estrangement shows how far confidence in Russian protection has fallen. The summit barred Armenia from voting and appointing representatives to senior posts in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov announced the restrictions, citing its failure to meet its membership obligations. Armenia remains a member, but has withheld contributions and frozen participation after accusing the alliance of failing to defend it. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan continue to participate. They still want military training, cooperation against terrorism, and help securing the region's southern border with Afghanistan. Moscow can offer those services, even as the Ukraine war damages its standing and China, Europe, and the U.S. expand their economic presence. At the previous summit in Bishkek, Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Russian weapons and closer military integration. The Moscow meeting continued that effort. Equipment and joint operations keep Russia involved in its neighbors' defense planning, while agreed declarations allow it to claim diplomatic support beyond Belarus. The Damage in Armenia Armenia's break with Moscow developed through successive security failures. The CSTO provided no military assistance after Azerbaijani attacks on Armenian territory in 2022, leading Yerevan to freeze its participation in 2024. The dispute over unpaid contributions followed the loss of confidence in the alliance, rather than causing it. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict deepened that rupture. Russian peacekeepers deployed after the 2020 war did not prevent Azerbaijan's September 2023 offensive. More than 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled, leaving Moscow's claim to be a reliable protector badly damaged. Nagorno-Karabakh was internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory and fell outside the CSTO's collective-defense guarantee. Russia's peacekeeping mission there was separate from the alliance. But that distinction offered little reassurance to an Armenian government that had already failed to obtain military assistance after attacks on Armenia itself. Kazakhstan has a different experience. During the January 2022 unrest, CSTO troops guarded key facilities. Moscow can therefore point to an actual deployment when arguing that membership remains useful, though Armenia's experience makes it harder to promise that help will arrive whenever another member requests it. The Border Program in Tajikistan Tajikistan takes over the CSTO chairmanship in January 2027, and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon used the summit to call for closer attention to carrying out existing commitments. Strengthening the organization should rest on “mutual trust, consideration of the interests of member states and consistent fulfillment of commitments undertaken,” Rahmon said. The Afghan border program has taken years to negotiate. The CSTO decided to develop it in 2013, but leaders approved it only in November 2024. Its published timetable assigned preparations to 2025, priority deliveries to 2026–2027, and further reinforcement through 2029. The border equipment program was still awaiting financing arrangements in April. On October 21, Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov said Tajikistan had selected suppliers and...

International Flights

China–Central Asia Flights Expand as Aviation Booms

Passenger and cargo links between Central Asia and China are expanding, with 117 scheduled weekly flights now connecting Kazakhstan and China, up 52% from a year earlier. Aviation officials from China and the five Central Asian countries are meeting in Tashkent on November 3–5 to discuss opening the market further. Trade between China and Central Asia reached $106.3 billion in 2025, up 12% from the previous year. The expansion of aviation has coincided with rising tourism and the gradual easing of restrictions on airlines across the region. Kazakhstan introduced an "open skies" policy at major airports in 2019, relaxing limits on foreign carriers, while Uzbekistan has also eased access to its market. A Decade of Aviation Growth According to a Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) study published on October 13, Central Asian airlines carried 31.7 million passengers in 2025, almost twice as many as in 2019. Between 2015 and 2025, the number of airline seats available in the region grew by an average of 7.7% annually, nearly three times the global rate. Low-cost airlines accounted for 21% of the region's available seats in 2025, with Kazakhstan's FlyArystan the largest operator in this segment. Air cargo carried by the region's airlines more than quadrupled between 2023 and 2025, reaching 335,700 metric tons. Uzbek operators accounted for approximately 67% of the total. Kazakhstan Leads the Passenger Market Kazakhstan accounted for 48.7% of Central Asia's airline passenger traffic in 2025, the largest share in the region, according to the EDB. By late October 2026, airlines were operating 21 routes between Kazakhstan and China and had carried more than one million passengers between the two countries since the beginning of the year, according to Kazakhstan's Ministry of Transport. In July, the two countries' aviation authorities agreed to increase the permitted number of weekly flights from 124 to 152. The list of approved destinations in China expanded to 11 cities, including Chongqing. The negotiations also addressed the possibility of opening a third air corridor across their shared border to accommodate additional flights. New routes launched this year include FlyArystan's services from Almaty to Xi'an in June and Chongqing in September. Air Astana also began flying between Astana and Guangzhou in June. On October 30, Air Astana and China Southern Airlines signed a strategic partnership agreement intended to make connecting flights between their networks easier. It builds on their existing codeshare arrangements, which allow the airlines to sell tickets on one another's flights. Uzbekistan Expands Passenger and Cargo Flights Uzbekistan has Central Asia's second-largest passenger aviation market. Its airports handled 12.66 million passengers in the first nine months of 2026, up 13% year over year, according to Uzbekistan Airports. Uzbekistan's Ministry of Transport reported in August 2025 that 61 passenger flights and more than 120 cargo and transit flights were operating weekly between Uzbekistan and China. The expansion followed agreements that increased the number of airlines permitted to operate between the two countries and gave carriers greater rights to transport freight through third countries. China Eastern Airlines...

Russia's War in Ukraine

Tajik Prisoners in Russia Say They Face Pressure to Fight in Ukraine

Tajik citizens imprisoned in the Russian city of Volgograd say they are being put under pressure to sign military contracts and fight in Ukraine, allegations which the Russian prison authorities have rejected. The prisoners are asking Tajikistan to facilitate their transfer home. Two inmates contacted Radio Ozodi, the Tajik service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, on October 29. They said about 150 prisoners from Central Asia were facing pressure, including approximately 60 Tajik citizens. The outlet said it knew the men's identities but had withheld them for their safety. The men said that despite difficulties, they had obtained a mobile phone, contacted Tajikistan's embassy in Moscow, and hoped to complete their prison sentences in Tajikistan rather than face military service. “We want to go home. We are ready to serve our sentences there,” one prisoner said, even offering to work without pay on Tajikistan's Rogun hydropower project if that would secure his return. “Here they are taking us to our deaths,” he added. The inmates said Central Asian prisoners were being held in blocks with particularly harsh conditions. They described facilities used for inmates considered dangerous and claimed many convictions were based on false accusations. More seriously, the men alleged that over 100 Central Asian inmates had left one Volgograd prison for the Ukraine war during the previous year. They said about 40 were Tajik citizens and claimed none of those sent had survived. There is no independent confirmation of those figures, the alleged deaths or the circumstances in which the men entered military service. The original report did not identify the prison by name. On October 31, the Federal Penitentiary Service's Volgograd regional directorate issued a denial, stating that claims Tajik inmates were being pressured to sign military contracts “do not correspond to reality.” The outlet said its calls to Tajikistan's embassy on October 30 went unanswered. Earlier Warnings from Volgograd The latest allegations follow an earlier warning from the same Russian city. In April 2025, relatives said eight Tajik prisoners had been taken from Correctional Colony No. 26, apparently for deployment to Ukraine. Another inmate at that facility described attempts to secure military contracts. “First they try to persuade us, then they start threatening us,” he said. He alleged that prisoners who refused were put in punishment cells and denied calls or visits. Russia has recruited prisoners for its war since the invasion began in February 2022. The Wagner private military group initially conducted much of that recruitment before the Defense Ministry took a larger role. Changes to Russian legislation in 2023 and 2024 expanded opportunities for convicted people and criminal defendants to sign military contracts to gain relief from criminal prosecution or punishment under specified circumstances. An August 2026 UK government assessment summarized reports of coercion in Russian detention facilities, including beatings and threats. A Request to Serve Sentences at Home The prisoners are not asking for their convictions to be overturned, but to serve out the remainder of their terms in Tajikistan, beyond the reach of...