Tajikistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be discussing the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway with special guest, Almaty-based journalist for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Chris Rickleton.

Prisons

Russia Seeks Transfer of 200 Tajik Women Prisoners After Dushanbe Approval

Russia’s human rights commissioner Tatyana Moskalkova has received a positive response from Emomali Rahmon regarding the possible transfer of around 200 Tajik women currently serving sentences in Russian prisons, according to TASS. Moskalkova said she had written to the Tajik president requesting that the women be allowed to continue serving their sentences in Tajikistan on humanitarian grounds. “In each case, we must carefully weigh issues of justice, mercy, and humanism,” she said in an interview with TASS. She noted that while most cases confirm that crimes were committed, the severity of punishment should not always be maximal. “Sometimes leniency helps a person reform, repent, and change for the better. That is why we try in each case to find arguments that could support leniency, especially for women,” she said. According to Moskalkova, foreign women prisoners face additional challenges, including limited access to family visits and difficulties receiving parcels from relatives. These factors were among the reasons behind her appeal to Tajik authorities. She also pointed to broader policy developments in Russia’s penal system, citing improvements in detention conditions under the country’s penal reform strategy through 2030. Moskalkova highlighted recent legislation limiting pretrial detention for women with young children who have committed non-violent offenses. In addition, she said she has repeatedly asked courts to grant deferrals of sentences for women with children under the age of 14, thanking the judiciary for what she described as “understanding and positive decisions” in such cases. Earlier this month, Moskalkova said Russia was prepared to facilitate the transfer of more than 3,000 Uzbek nationals convicted in Russia to serve their sentences in Uzbekistan. However, she noted that the process remains stalled due to legal constraints, including Uzbekistan’s failure to ratify the 1998 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons.

Economic Growth

Why Strong Economic Growth in Central Asia Masks Underlying Risks

Central Asian countries are significantly outperforming the global average in GDP growth, largely due to differing economic models across the region. However, rapid expansion does not remove deep structural vulnerabilities. As early as March, data showed that the combined economies of Central Asian countries grew by nearly 7% in 2025 compared to the previous year. The World Bank estimates regional growth at 6.2%, while the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) places it at 6.6%. These calculations include Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; Turkmenistan is excluded due to limited statistical transparency. By comparison, growth rates in advanced economies are much lower. The EDB expects around 1.6% growth in the U.S. and approximately 1.1% in the eurozone in 2026, while China’s economy is projected to expand by about 4.6%. Nevertheless, experts note that the region’s economic outlook remains complicated by high inflation, income inequality, and continued dependence on external factors. Investment activity and domestic demand have been the key drivers of growth, according to the EDB. Kazakhstan recorded its highest growth in 13 years (6.5%), with industry leading the expansion: mining grew by 9.4% and manufacturing by 6.4%. In 2026, the non-resource sector is expected to play a greater role. Kyrgyzstan has led the region in GDP growth for the third consecutive year: GDP grew by 11.1% in 2025 and by 9% in January 2026. In Uzbekistan, GDP increased by 7.7% in 2025 (up from 6.7% a year earlier), supported by investment, trade, services, and construction. Tajikistan’s GDP rose by 8.4% in 2025, matching the previous year’s performance. Growth continues to be driven by expanding industrial production and strong domestic demand. Early 2026 data suggest this momentum is holding. Uzbekistan’s Record In April, the World Bank highlighted Uzbekistan’s resilience to external challenges and strong growth dynamics. According to its updated report, the country’s 2025 GDP growth was revised upward by 1.5 percentage points to 7.7%. The outlook is 6.4% for 2026 and 6.7% for 2027. Key drivers include high global gold prices, investment inflows, expanded lending, and ongoing structural reforms. Rising household incomes have also played an important role, supported by remittances, which increased by 37% last year to reach $18.9 billion. By the end of 2025, Uzbekistan ranked among the fastest-growing economies in developing countries in Europe and Central Asia, alongside Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The region as a whole is experiencing its highest growth rates in 14 years. At the same time, analysts point to persistent structural constraints, including a large public sector and the dominance of state-owned enterprises, which hinder private sector development. External risks, including geopolitical instability and potential disruptions in energy and fertilizer supplies, remain significant. In 2025, Uzbekistan’s GDP exceeded €133 billion, compared to approximately €56 billion nine years earlier. Over the same period, GDP per capita rose from about €1,750 to around €3,220, nearly doubling average income levels. Investment in fixed capital increased by more than 15% year-on-year in 2025, while export value grew by over 33%. Persistently high global gold prices played a major role: export...

China

Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s New Playbook in Central Asia

In the Kyzylorda Region, near the town of Shieli, the silos and conveyor belts of a Chinese-backed plant rise out of the fine brown dust that dominates the landscape. It is the kind of project the Belt and Road was supposed to deliver in Central Asia: heavy industry, fixed capital, and a visible mark on the landscape. But it is also a reminder that China’s role in the region has become narrower, more contested, and less sweeping than the old rhetoric suggested. In photographs, the Gezhouba Cement Plant looks like a self-contained industrial island on the steppe. For nearby villagers, it became something else: a source of jobs and local prestige for some, but also of years of complaints about dust clouds and whether the state was quicker to defend a flagship Chinese-backed project than the people living beside it. Projects like the plant in Shieli also help explain why views of China across Central Asia remain mixed. Beijing is seen as a source of trade, investment, and technology, but that promise is tempered in some places by concerns over transparency, environmental costs, and who really benefits when a project arrives. China has become Central Asia’s dominant trading partner, but investment has not kept pace with the surge in commerce. The gap says a lot about how Beijing now works in the region: with a sharper focus on sectors that matter to its long-term influence. In 2025, trade in goods between China and the five Central Asian states reached $106.3 billion, up 12% year on year. Chinese exports to the region totaled $71.2 billion, while imports from Central Asia reached $35.1 billion. Trade has grown fast enough to reshape the region’s external balance, but long-term investment has been far more selective. Over 2005–2025, the five Central Asian states accounted for about 3% of China’s global overseas investment and construction total. The picture changes once direct investment is separated from trade and construction contracts. China’s FDI stock in the five Central Asian states stood at about $36 billion by mid-2025. Roughly 90% was concentrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The structure of that capital has also changed. Extractive industries still accounted for 46% of the portfolio, but manufacturing and energy together made up more than one third, and greenfield projects rose from 43% to 60%. China has not poured money into Central Asia on the scale once implied by early Belt and Road rhetoric. Instead, it has invested in sectors that strengthen its industrial position. Kazakhstan remains at the center of this relationship. It is China’s biggest commercial partner in Central Asia, and the main destination for Chinese capital in the region. Kazakhstan-China trade reached $43.8 billion in 2024. The country’s portfolio of projects with Chinese participation includes 224 ventures worth about $66.4 billion. Some are still at the planning stage, but the range of projects is telling. Recent developments have included a hydrogen energy technology innovation center in Almaty and a large wind farm with electricity storage. Kazakhstan still sells...

Climate Change

Central Asia’s Climate Risks Could Cost Up to 130% of GDP by 2080

By 2080, climate change is expected to have a profound impact on the economies of Central Asian countries, with potential losses ranging from 20% to 130% of GDP. The most severe effects are projected for mountainous nations. These estimates were presented at a CAREC technology forum by Iskandar Abdullaev, a senior research fellow at the International Water Management Institute in Uzbekistan. According to Abdullaev, climate change is no longer solely an environmental issue but an increasingly significant economic factor. Key risks include droughts and water scarcity, floods, heatwaves, and glacier melt. The projected economic impact varies across the region. Tajikistan could face losses of between 80% and 130% of GDP, Kyrgyzstan 70% to 120%, Kazakhstan 40% to 80%, Uzbekistan 30% to 45%, and Turkmenistan 20% to 60%. Abdullaev emphasized that mountainous countries – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – are particularly vulnerable, as climate change directly affects water resources. Glacier melt reduces river flows, creating challenges for both energy production and water supply. Droughts and extreme heat are already placing pressure on agriculture, with declining crop yields and reduced pasture productivity. Without adaptation measures, the region’s long-term sustainability could be at risk. Experts stress that mitigation and adaptation efforts are essential to reduce these risks. These include modernizing irrigation systems, adopting climate-resilient agricultural technologies, and expanding renewable energy capacity. This is not the only warning. According to the World Bank, natural disasters are already causing significant economic damage in Central Asia. Losses from extreme events, including floods and earthquakes, can reach up to 6% of GDP, with earthquakes alone accounting for up to $2 billion in damages. At the same time, countries in the region face substantial financing gaps following major disasters. In Tajikistan, this gap could reach up to $1.5 billion. Experts warn that climate change is likely to intensify these risks, further increasing the economic burden on the region.

Iran

Central Asia Recalculates as the Iran War Enters a New Phase

Central Asia’s first response to the Iran war was public and urgent. Governments organized evacuations, welcomed a ceasefire, and watched the Strait of Hormuz because the region’s trade routes, fuel costs, and food prices were already under pressure. The next phase looks different. Following the April 12 collapse of U.S.-Iran talks in Islamabad, Washington moved to block maritime traffic entering and leaving Iranian ports. That step does not formally close Hormuz to all shipping, but it pushes the crisis into a more serious phase for any country or company still treating Iran as a viable corridor. That distinction is important in Central Asia because the region does not need a formal legal closure of Hormuz to feel the shock. It only needs insurers, banks, freight forwarders, airlines, and traders to decide that the southern option has become too risky for routine planning. That process was already underway. The route through Iran had come under strain in southern corridor traffic, food systems, and in the wider pricing of regional connectivity. A U.S. move against Iranian ports is likely to reinforce that view. Official statements across Central Asia still reflect the ceasefire moment more than the latest escalation. On April 8, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev welcomed the truce and said he hoped it would support global trade and prosperity. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire and praised efforts to reduce tensions. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry did the same, calling the truce an “important step toward de-escalating tensions,” and stressing that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire agreement between Iran and the United States. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, had already taken a practical line, saying on March 4 that it was keeping all international checkpoints open and providing passage for foreign citizens, vehicles, and rail stock across the Turkmen-Iranian border. Since then, public messaging has lagged behind the latest escalation. By April 13, Qazinform’s foreign news flow had shifted to the failed Islamabad talks and Trump’s blockade order, while the latest publicly visible official positions elsewhere in the region still reflected the April 8 ceasefire. That does not mean backchannel diplomacy has stopped, but it does suggest that Central Asian governments prefer caution in public as the conflict shifts from direct strikes to pressure on shipping and trade. For the region, the economic logic is now clearer than the politics. Approximately 20% of global oil supplies and one-third of global fertilizer trade move through the Strait of Hormuz, while urea prices surged by almost 46% between February and March 2026. The World Bank’s April Europe and Central Asia Economic Update said growth in the developing economies of Europe and Central Asia is expected to slow to 2.1% in 2026, down from 2.6% in 2025, as the Middle East conflict, wider geopolitical tension, and trade fragmentation weigh on the region. Those pressures were already significant. The collapse of the main post-ceasefire diplomatic effort, followed by oil rising back above $100 a barrel, has made them harder...