The new round of heavy clashes involving India and Pakistan over the disputed region of Kashmir – then settled by a bilateral adherence to a “full-scale ceasefire” – has also been a confrontation involving the players surrounding the two Asian giants.
The involvement of some of them took place in plain sight: take the case of Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a staunch ally of Pakistan, which sent the country a military ship and a group of fighter jets. Or China, which in recent years has invested tens of billions of dollars in Pakistan under the Belt & Road Initiative, and has become by far the largest supplier of military equipment to Islamabad. Beijing immediately called on both sides to engage in diplomacy.
On the Indian front, as reported by recent research on the subject, New Delhi is purchasing weapons from an increasingly varied group of countries, including Russia, France, Israel and the United States. The ceasefire saw direct involvement from Washington, which acted as mediator between the two sides.
Given also its geographical proximity to the Indian subcontinent, when it comes to Central Asia it is clear that the region may be called into question in any confrontation between India and Pakistan – or that, at least, would be heavily affected by it.
During the strikes carried out by India against Pakistan following the deadly attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir, the Indian media emphasized the strategic role that the military base India allegedly operates in Tajikistan could play in a possible open confrontation with Pakistan.
Indian experts pointed out that the base could have given New Delhi the ability to strike Pakistan from the west, seriously compromising Islamabad’s air defense capabilities.
Furthermore, China was also called into question in India’s alleged use of the military outpost, as New Delhi is said to be monitoring China’s movements on the northern front using its presence in Tajikistan.
This base is Ayni Airbase, a Soviet-era military facility located near the Tajik capital Dushanbe. The facts we know for certain point to an Indian involvement in the Tajik base which appears to have ended around 2015. In 2002, India, in collaboration with Tajikistan and Russia, financed an operation to refurbish the base, investing around $70 million in the project.
Among the changes made was the lengthening of the runway, which was intended to ensure that it could be used by aircraft operated by the Indian armed forces.
As also stated in the report on Central Asian armed forces drafted by the DC-based The Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, after a phase in which it seemed that India would play a concrete role in the management of the base, Dushanbe subsequently backtracked, partly due to pressure from Russia.
The same path was followed by New Delhi’s involvement in the Farkhor airbase, initially used to reach Afghanistan by land by landing Indian cargo planes at the base, located near the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Over the years, the logistical importance of the structure gradually declined until it was finally abandoned by India.
Despite the rhetoric of Indian media, New Delhi’s military presence in Tajikistan is therefore essentially non-existent, unlike that of China. Since 2015, with much attention from the international media, Beijing has built two military outposts in Tajikistan and is said to already have agreements with Dushanbe for the construction of a third facility.
Used purely for intelligence and anti-terrorism purposes, it is not certain that these bases will not also house personnel from the People’s Liberation Army, the Chinese army, in the future.
Pakistan has itself deepened its bilateral security relationship with Tajikistan in recent years. One of the most important steps was taken in 2021 with the signing of a memorandum of understanding, according to which Pakistan would begin supplying Tajikistan with domestically produced weapons.
Given the absence of an Indian military outpost in Tajikistan, and more generally in the region, New Delhi nevertheless maintains significant bilateral relations on security affairs with the Central Asian republics.
Proof of this can be found, for example, in the military drills that the Asian giant periodically conducts with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The longest relationship in this regard is with Bishkek: in March 2025, the twelfth edition of the joint exercises, known as Khanjar, was held, which saw the participation, as reported by the Indian Ministry of Defence, of troops from The Parachute Regiment (Special Forces) for India and the Kyrgyz Scorpion Brigade.
In 2024, the eighth edition of the joint exercises between India and Kazakhstan, Kazind, was held on Indian territory, for the first time including the Air Forces and Airborne Assault Forces of Kazakhstan.
A few weeks ago, in mid-April 2025, the sixth edition of Dustlik, the joint exercises held annually by New Delhi and Tashkent, took place as well.
A few weeks ago, another very important step was taken but on the Pakistani side: Kazakh president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev received in Astana General Asim Munir, the Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistan Armed Forces.
During the several meetings that took place, possible collaborations in the field of defense were also discussed, including technical-military cooperation and combat and special forces training. Munir, who is usually active behind the scenes and far from the spotlight, during the recent crisis emerged as one of the most prominent figures, clearly announcing Islamabad’s willingness to respond forcefully to any Indian attack.
As can be seen, the security ties between India and Pakistan and the Central Asian republics are remarkable. The latter’s caution on security issues and close military ties with Russia are factors that would suggest that Central Asia would be spared from a large-scale conflict between India and Pakistan.
On the other hand, however, in such a case, China could be called upon to support its ally Pakistan. As we have seen, Beijing has a significant military presence in Tajikistan, a factor that should not be underestimated when considering the possible repercussions in Central Asia of the instability in the subcontinent.
That said, what is certain is that an open conflict could destabilize the entire area, from Afghanistan to the Central Asian republics, and its impact would be felt on several fronts.
