• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10526 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10526 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10526 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10526 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10526 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10526 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10526 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10526 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%

Viewing results 43 - 48 of 587

The “Central Asia 2030” Roundtable in Astana: From External Interest to Regional Choice

Discussions about Central Asia’s long-term strategic future are increasingly shifting from a focus on external attention to one of growing regional agency. On Monday, Astana International University hosted the first roundtable in the series Central Asia 2030: Strategic Horizons and Regional Choices. Speakers included Andrew D’Anieri, Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center; Yerkin Tukumov, Special Representative of the President of Kazakhstan; Ambassador-at-Large Zulfiya Suleimenova; and Dauren Aben, Deputy Director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan. Pragmatism, Regional Choice, and the Logic of the “Grand Bargain” In his remarks, Andrew D’Anieri emphasized that Central Asia is increasingly viewed in the U.S. not as a peripheral zone but as an independent strategic partner. He noted that “environmental, water, and climate issues considered within a regional framework are fully supported by the U.S.” However, he added that “long-term commercial and investment projects are impossible without long-term stability, which in turn requires coordination between neighbors, engagement on sensitive issues, and pragmatic regional cooperation.” D’Anieri also pointed to Afghanistan as “an integral part of regional logic,” and described formats such as C5+1 as evidence of Central Asia’s growing subjectivity. He highlighted the first-ever C5+1 summit at the presidential level in Washington as a landmark event, especially under the administration of Donald Trump, known for its preference for bilateral over multilateral formats. Trump and the Possibility of a Visit: Only with a “Big Deal” When asked whether a visit by President Trump to Central Asia is realistic, D’Anieri offered a candid assessment: “Such a visit is only possible if there is a large, symbolically and economically significant deal.” Whether in aviation, technology, or infrastructure, these high-visibility projects are typically what draw Trump’s engagement. He added that “the region has work to do in developing a package of initiatives that could interest the U.S. president and justify a high-level visit.” Potential areas include mining, transport, and logistics. Reframing Afghanistan’s Role in the Region Special Representative Yerkin Tukumov focused on the importance of reframing the region’s relationship with Afghanistan. For too long, he said, Afghanistan has been viewed primarily “through the prism of security threats,” resulting in a narrow and often misleading approach. Tukumov argued for a broader, more pragmatic view that considers economic, humanitarian, and cross-border dimensions. He described the C5+1 format not as a replacement for bilateral diplomacy, but as “an additional level of coordination where Central Asia can speak with a more consolidated voice without losing national autonomy in foreign policy.” He stressed the need to move beyond “ideological and declarative approaches,” toward practical, interest-based mechanisms of cooperation. Ecology, Water, and the Case for a Global Water Agency Ambassador-at-Large Zulfiya Suleimenova addressed the strategic urgency of regional coordination on water and climate. She emphasized that “water issues are transboundary in nature,” and that efforts to resolve them solely within national frameworks are bound to fall short. “Regional coordination in Central Asia is not a political slogan, but a functional necessity,” she said. Suleimenova argued that jointly promoting...

Opinion – Qosh Tepa Canal: Transboundary Impacts Without a Transboundary Mechanism

In recent months, media attention has increasingly focused on infrastructure projects underway in Afghanistan. Chief among them is the Qosh Tepa Canal, widely seen not only as an irrigation initiative but as a development with significant transboundary implications for the Amu Darya River basin. The canal draws water from one of Central Asia’s most critical transboundary rivers. For downstream countries, primarily Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the Amu Darya is a vital water source, directly linked to agricultural output and the sustainability of rural communities. As such, the conversation surrounding Qosh Tepa extends well beyond Afghanistan’s domestic agenda. Concerns voiced by experts and analysts stem from both the scale of the project and the absence of an inclusive, basin-wide mechanism that includes Afghanistan, which is not a party to the main post-Soviet Amu Darya allocation frameworks. As a result, discussions regarding the canal’s potential impacts are taking place largely outside formal multilateral frameworks. One positive development is the increasing presentation of Qosh Tepa within a broader context, where water flow management is recognized as a factor shaping regional political and economic relations. However, these assessments often highlight not the canal’s stated purpose, but rather the absence of a sustainable mechanism for coordinating discussion of its cross-border effects. [caption id="attachment_43173" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: TCATCA[/caption] A recurring concern among experts is the lack of a structured multilateral platform that enables early-stage evaluation of such projects before they are perceived as risks. Infrastructure development in the region frequently outpaces the establishment of mechanisms for joint impact assessment and management. In this light, Kazakhstan’s initiative to establish a specialized structure within the UN system, the International Water Organization, acquires particular relevance. This proposal is not about building a theoretical global agenda but about addressing a specific institutional gap: the lack of a neutral forum for technical and expert discussion of transboundary water projects at an early stage. The Qosh Tepa Canal, currently a unilateral infrastructure undertaking rather than the result of an international agreement, could serve as a test case for such a preventive mandate. While the project is already underway and its transboundary implications are actively being discussed among experts, it has not yet escalated into a regional dispute. This creates an opportunity for professional dialogue, without entanglement in political or status-related debates. The present situation can be summarized as one of “transboundary implications without a transboundary mechanism.” The project, while entirely within Afghan territory, objectively affects the interests of downstream states, yet it remains disconnected from any multilateral framework for consultation or agreement. Is it in Afghanistan’s interest to engage in multilateral formats? Though the question is often left unanswered, the answer is a clear “yes.” Such engagement would help dispel suspicion not only among Central Asian states, but also in Iran and Pakistan, both of which have voiced concerns over shared water resources. First, it would reduce negative external rhetoric. Currently, Qosh Tepa is largely discussed via external media with alarmist scenarios and with little to no Afghan participation. This reinforces the image...

Turkmenistan Citizen Fighting for Russia in Ukraine Surrenders to Ukrainian Drone

Maksat Meredov, a citizen of Turkmenistan who had been fighting on the Russian side in Ukraine, surrendered to the Ukrainian Armed Forces by signaling a drone with a white flag. The drone operator guided him toward Ukrainian positions. According to the drone operator from the Ukrainian Pomsta (“Revenge”) brigade, military personnel were conducting reconnaissance using a thermal imager when they detected Meredov. After tracking his movements to a hiding place, the area was targeted and destroyed. Meredov then emerged, waving a white object. Recognizing it as a surrender gesture, Ukrainian forces ceased fire. The drone activated its flashing lights and maneuvered to indicate the direction Meredov should follow. Footage showed him cold and exhausted, stopping frequently and attempting to eat snow. In response, Ukrainian troops dropped water, a note, and later a hot water bottle to him via drone. During a filmed interrogation, the captive identified himself as Maksat Dovletmuradovich Meredov, born on March 24, 1980, and a citizen of Turkmenistan. “I recently came to Russia to earn money for myself and my family. The contract was signed on November 14, 2025,” Meredov stated. The video also displayed his documents. According to his passport, Meredov was born in the village of Akmeidan in Karakum district, Mary province, one of the most disadvantaged regions of Turkmenistan, known for persistent water shortages. After the rerouting of the Karakum Canal, reports indicated that some settlements in the region experienced flooding and livestock deaths, while others faced dried irrigation channels, forcing residents to drink from puddles. A Russian-issued document confirmed his identity and showed that Meredov arrived in Russia in June 2025 for work in the Krasnoyarsk territory before moving to the Vladimir region. He later signed a one-year contract with military unit 11097, based in the city of Voronezh. Similar incidents involving Turkmen nationals have been reported. In 2024, a mercenary from the town of Turkmenbashi fought in Ukraine for six months. His family used his earnings to purchase an apartment but later had to sell the property to pay a bribe to close a criminal case against him.

Turkmen Football Fans Moved to Worse Seats for Match with Cristiano Ronaldo’s Al-Nassr

Fans who have bought tickets to the upcoming Asian Champions League match between Turkmenistan's Arkadag and Saudi Arabia’s Al-Nassr on February 11 have been informed, sometimes repeatedly, that their seats are being changed to make room for “organized support” groups. According to a source in Ashgabat, notifications are being sent via users’ personal accounts on ticketing platforms. The vacated sections, the source said, are being allocated to students who are reportedly being trained in advance to provide choreographed support for the home team. Affected spectators are often offered seats with worse visibility, and in many cases, fans, especially families and groups, are being split across different sectors of the stadium, making it nearly impossible to watch the match together. Public frustration has grown as a result. “A 45,000-seat stadium was specifically allocated for this match. If officials had plans for some sections, they could have decided in advance and sold tickets accordingly. If they can’t even organize one match properly, how can we expect them to handle more serious events?” the source said. Some fans have opted not to attend the match at all, despite having already paid for tickets. Others are seeking to resell their tickets, though doing so is complicated. Ticket purchases required passport details, and it is believed that ID checks may be enforced at the gates, making resale risky. Adding to the discontent is the asymmetry in ticketing policy: the Ashgabat city administration’s ticket regulations prohibit buyers from exchanging or returning tickets, while allowing organizers to unilaterally reassign seats. According to reports, the most prominent seating sections will not be occupied by club supporters, but by students compelled to rehearse chants and routines for the game. Arkadag will host Al-Nassr in the last 32 round of the AFC Champions League. The Saudi club’s lineup includes global football star Cristiano Ronaldo. The return leg is scheduled to take place in Saudi Arabia on February 17 or 18.

Jackson-Vanik Repeal Gains Momentum as U.S. Courts Central Asia

For many years, U.S. relations with Central Asia were primarily political in nature, while economic ties developed slowly. However, in the past year, engagement has intensified significantly, with recent agreements suggesting the U.S. is poised to strengthen its economic presence in the region. A recent statement by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reinforces this outlook. Calls to repeal the outdated Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions have been framed by U.S. officials as a way to facilitate trade with Central Asia and strengthen U.S. energy security. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, enacted in 1974, restricts trade with countries that limit their citizens’ right to emigrate. At the time of its passage, Central Asia was still part of the Soviet Union.  The amendment prohibits granting most-favored-nation (MFN) status, government loans, and credit guarantees to countries that violate their citizens’ right to emigrate, and allows for discriminatory tariffs and fees on imports from non-market economies. The amendment was repealed for Ukraine in 2006, and for Russia and Moldova in 2012. However, it remains in effect for several countries, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which continue to receive only temporary normal trade relations. In May 2023, a bill proposing the establishment of permanent trade relations with Kazakhstan, which included repealing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, was introduced in the U.S. Congress. A follow-up bill with similar provisions was submitted in February 2025. Then-nominee and now Secretary of State Marco Rubio previously noted that some policymakers viewed the amendment as a tool to extract concessions on human rights or to push Central Asian states toward the U.S. and away from Russia. However, he characterized such thinking as outdated, stating that, “In some cases, it is an absurd relic of the past.”  Rubio has consistently supported expanding U.S. ties with Central Asia. Expanding Cooperation In 2025, relations between the U.S. and Central Asia deepened significantly, particularly with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which are seen by analysts as the primary beneficiaries of this cooperation. In late October 2025, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and U.S. Special Representative for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. One of the year’s major events was the Central Asia-U.S. (C5+1) summit held in Washington on November 6. Leaders of the five Central Asian states met with President Donald Trump and members of the U.S. business community. Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev also met with U.S. Senator Steve Daines, co-chair of the Senate Central Asia Caucus, with both sides focusing heavily on economic cooperation. At the summit, Uzbekistan finalized major commercial agreements with U.S. companies, including aircraft orders by Uzbekistan Airways and deals spanning aviation, energy, and industrial cooperation. Kazakhstan signed agreements worth $17 billion with U.S. companies in sectors including aviation, mineral resources, and digital technologies. This included a deal granting American company Cove Kaz Capital Group a 70% stake in a joint venture to develop one of Kazakhstan’s largest tungsten deposits, an agreement valued at $1.1 billion.  Further agreements were signed on critical minerals exploration. Kazakhstan and the...

TAPI Gas Pipeline Advances Toward Herat, Afghanistan

Progress on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, one of the largest energy infrastructure projects in the region, was the central focus of recent talks between Turkmenistan’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, Khoja Ovezov, and Afghanistan’s Minister of Mining and Petroleum, Hedayatullah Badri. According to Turkmenistan’s state oil and gas company, Turkmennebit, the Turkmen delegation briefed its Afghan counterparts on the current phase of construction and outlined upcoming steps. Both sides expressed optimism that the pipeline will reach the western Afghan city of Herat by the end of 2026, a key milestone for the project. The TAPI pipeline is projected to span approximately 1,814 kilometers, with 214 kilometers running through Turkmenistan, 774 kilometers through Afghanistan, and 826 kilometers through Pakistan, ending at the Indian border. The Afghan segment is not only the longest outside of Pakistan but also the most challenging, both logistically and politically. The most recent development in the project, the opening of the Serhetabat-Herat section, officially named Arkadagyň ak ýoly (“Arkadag’s White Path”), was marked on October 20, 2025. Once operational, the pipeline is expected to bring substantial economic benefits to the participating countries. Afghanistan could receive over $1 billion annually in transit and related revenues, while Pakistan is projected to earn between $200 million and $250 million. These figures, according to project stakeholders, represent a significant step toward the economic goals of each nation involved. Preparatory work has already been completed on a 91-kilometer stretch of the TAPI route in Herat province. The necessary infrastructure is in place, and worker camps have been established along the pipeline corridor.