• KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 162

World Bank: Over 65,000 Premature Deaths a Year in Central Asia Linked To Air Pollution

Air pollution remains one of the most pressing environmental and public health challenges in Central Asia, with significant consequences for human life and regional economies. A new World Bank assessment highlights the scale of the crisis, linking poor air quality to more than 65,000 premature deaths in 2021 across the region. The report identifies pollution from fossil fuel combustion, especially for heating and transportation, as a major contributor to declining air quality in both urban and rural areas. Transboundary sand and dust storms are compounding the problem, affecting multiple countries simultaneously. In many Central Asian cities, concentrations of fine particulate matter (PM2.5) exceed safe limits by a wide margin. During the winter, levels can spike to six to twelve times higher than the World Health Organization’s recommended thresholds. The economic burden is also staggering: the annual health costs associated with air pollution are estimated at $15-21 billion, representing 3-5% of the region’s GDP in 2022. Human-Caused Emissions Dominate According to experts, 50-80% of PM2.5 exposure is due to human activity, primarily the burning of solid fuels for heating in households and small businesses. While natural dust is a contributing factor in some areas, anthropogenic sources remain the dominant driver. The World Bank argues that this crisis can be mitigated with the right policy interventions. Effective strategies include reducing emissions from household heating, traffic, and industrial operations, as well as expanding urban green spaces. To better coordinate efforts, the Bank advocates for an “airshed approach”, a governance model that promotes joint responsibility between national and local authorities to improve air quality. Additional recommendations include strengthening air quality laws and monitoring systems, updating standards, raising public awareness, and enhancing cross-border cooperation among Central Asian states. Impact on Children A separate report by UNICEF underscores the disproportionate toll air pollution takes on children. In 2021, approximately 6,441 children and teenagers across Europe and Central Asia died from air pollution-related causes, 85% of them under the age of one. UNICEF stressed that these deaths were entirely preventable. Experts maintain that improving air quality could yield wide-ranging benefits, including increased productivity, reduced healthcare costs, and enhanced quality of life. They urge governments to integrate air quality management into climate and development plans to unlock additional financial and technical assistance.

After U.S. Bombs Iran, Central Asia Calls for Diplomacy and Restraint

In the early hours of June 22, the United States launched airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, triggering widespread concern across Central Asia. Despite the potential economic upside for Kazakhstan, with the possibility of rising oil prices, the region’s governments have uniformly called for restraint and a peaceful resolution. The operation, dubbed “Midnight Hammer” by the U.S. Department of Defense, reportedly targeted facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. While Washington claimed success, the Iranian authorities asserted they had evacuated uranium from the Fordow site in advance, calling the mission a failure. Military experts continue to debate the extent of the damage. Coordinated Responses from Central Asian Capitals The foreign ministries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan issued similarly worded statements expressing concern over the rapidly deteriorating situation. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the U.S. airstrikes marked a dangerous escalation and emphasized the need for negotiations grounded in the UN Charter. “Kazakhstan is part of the group of Caspian countries and is developing cooperation with Iran in various areas. Our country believes that all disagreements, including nuclear issues, should be resolved through negotiations,” the statement said. It also urged international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and establish security guarantees for nations adhering to the non-proliferation regime. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry echoed this sentiment and advised citizens to avoid traveling to Israel and Iran. It also urged those currently in those countries to leave high-risk areas where possible. Kyrgyzstan called on all parties to exercise “maximum restraint” and avoid steps that could exacerbate the crisis. Turkmenistan reaffirmed its policy of "positive neutrality," stressing the importance of diplomacy and adherence to international law. Ashgabat stated that it “does not accept the use or threat of force as a means of resolving political and other disputes”. Tajikistan, meanwhile, issued the strongest statement, condemning the U.S. and Israeli strikes outright and warning that the conflict could lead to a prolonged regional war. Dushanbe called on the UN, IAEA, and other global bodies to prevent violations of international law and work towards peace and environmental safety. The Economic Subtext: Rising Oil Prices While official reactions were uniformly cautious, analysts in Kazakhstan noted the economic implications. Expert Olzhas Baidildin pointed out that shares in KazMunayGas surged by 11% following the strikes, with its market capitalization rising to 10.3 trillion KZT ($19.8 billion). Baidildin previously argued that Iran is unlikely to follow through on threats to block the Strait of Hormuz. Nevertheless, he noted that such a move would dramatically increase the strategic importance of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian energy producers to major consumers such as China and India. Financial analyst Andrei Chebotarev agreed, stating: "Iran’s threat to close the Strait of Hormuz is no longer the ace it once was. The West has diversified away from Gulf oil, while the real impact would fall on China, the region’s largest importer. Meanwhile, the U.S. could benefit from a price surge through its shale exports". It is estimated that China purchases approximately 90% of Iran's oil exports...

Central Asia and Israel, a Pragmatic Relationship That Never Truly Blossomed

The conflict between Israel and Iran is having both international and regional repercussions. The situation has been further inflamed by the U.S. bombing of several Iranian nuclear sites over the weekend, with Tehran responding by threatening retaliation on U.S. soil through the use of sleeper terrorist cells and the possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which over a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes. While Israel's geographical position places it at the heart of the Middle East, Iran's location brings the Islamic Republic into close contact with Central Asia. The consequences of the conflict are therefore likely to be felt heavily in the Central Asian region. The close relations between Tehran and the capitals of Central Asia, due in part to their geographical proximity, are often highlighted. Less explored is the nature of the relationship between Tel Aviv and Central Asia and the lines along which it has developed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On both the Israeli and Central Asian sides, despite all the differences, relations began in the early 1990s, mainly based on certain mutual interests. From Israel's point of view, relations with Central Asia would mean expanding the circle of Muslim countries with which it had friendly ties, gaining greater influence in the region, and reducing its diplomatic isolation. From the Central Asian perspective, the appeal lay in increasing the number of its international partners, coupled with a desire to access Israeli know-how in numerous fields, and the possibility, through relations with Tel Aviv, of having a privileged channel of dialogue with the United States. More than three decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, relations remain good for the most part. “The positive relationship between Israel and Central Asia is driven by a combination of strategic, economic, and geopolitical factors,” Dr Zeev Levin, Coordinator of the Central Asian Research Unit at the Harry S. Truman Institute, told The Times of Central Asia. “One of the primary drivers is mutual interest in security and counterterrorism. Economically, Israel’s expertise in water management, agriculture, and technology is highly attractive to the arid, resource-seeking nations of Central Asia that aim to modernize their infrastructure and diversify their economies beyond oil and gas. Additionally, fostering ties with Israel provides a means of diversifying the foreign policy portfolios of the Central Asian republics.” This positive relationship, however, seems to have lost momentum in recent years due to several factors. Central Asian republics have increasingly oriented towards the East, moving closer to China and other players such as South Korea, Japan, and India, or towards other partners, such as the European ones, with Italy at the forefront in this regard. As Levin points out, the relation has cooled due to several factors: “Central Asian republics did look to Israel in the first decade of independence, but in the last decade to a much lesser extent, since Turkey and China are less complicated and cheaper options. For Israel, the region was never a priority or a point of...

The Hearth of Hospitality: The Importance of the Chaikhana in Central Asia

“Every meal begins with tea and ends with tea. Every guest is welcomed with tea. Every festival and every ceremony – from the celebration of birth to wedding to funeral – must feature tea” - Ketan Desai. Across Central Asia, the chaikhana, or teahouse, holds a cherished place in the region’s social and cultural fabric. Beyond serving cups of steaming tea, it represents history, hospitality, and a space where the rhythms of daily life unfold. For Central Asians, tea isn’t just a drink; it’s a way of life. Every pour, sup, and serving is steeped in tradition. Green tea is considered supreme in the east, while black tea holds court in the west. The offering of tea isn’t just polite, it’s a heartfelt symbol of welcoming and friendship, and to turn it down is practically a cultural crime. Tea is always poured into a piala, a small ceramic or porcelain bowl similar to the Chinese gaiwan or the Japanese chaiwan, but with its own unique steeped allure. A Link to History [caption id="attachment_33095" align="aligncenter" width="1024"] Chaikhana, Samarkand, 1905; image: Prokudin-Gorskiĭ[/caption] The chaikhana has roots stretching back centuries, intertwined with the history of the Silk Road. These teahouses sprang up along trade routes as places where merchants, travelers, and locals could rest and exchange goods, ideas, and stories. Over time, chaikhanas became hubs of cultural exchange, bearing silent witness to the blending of a rich tapestry of traditions. Central Asia is a region shaped by the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent episodes of democratization, political coercion, and repression. Throughout history, the chaikhana also played a role in the region’s intellectual life. Much like coffeehouses in Europe, these spaces often served as platforms for debate, poetry readings, and the airing of progressive ideas. These venues often feature private rooms with enclosed spaces or pull-down shades and outdoor spots with canopies or yurt-like structures, ensuring discretion for guests. Unlike typical restaurants or cafes, which rarely offer such private arrangements, teahouses allow organizations to hold meetings comfortably and confidentially. Teahouses serve a dual purpose by balancing privacy with public engagement, making them invaluable to those seeking both discretion and societal visibility. [caption id="attachment_33096" align="aligncenter" width="1019"] Bukhara Chaikhana; image: Joepyrek[/caption] Teahouses serve as neutral spaces where the general public and government can freely interact. They offer a safe space for open discussions, even for government employees, highlighting their unique role in fostering dialogue. The subversive potential of teahouses cannot be overlooked, as debates frequently occurred outside formal governmental frameworks. They have quietly allowed people to organize and challenge institutional power in subtle yet meaningful ways. Tradition and Architecture Chaikhanas are more than just teahouses; they’re cultural treasures enriched by stunning architecture. From simple wooden benches in rural areas to urban teahouses adorned with intricate carvings, colorful tiles, and ornate patterns, these spaces are as much about artistry as they are about tea. The interiors feature low tables and cushions, encouraging leisurely conversations and fostering a warm, communal atmosphere. Whether beside a flowing stream...

From Reform to Roadblocks: The Uneven Evolution of Motor Insurance in Central Asia

Motor insurance markets across Central Asia exhibit contrasting levels of development, from Kazakhstan’s expanding, digitized sector to Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, where the system remains largely ineffective. Beyond compensating for damages, motor insurance is increasingly viewed as a tool for strengthening financial markets, promoting road safety, and easing the fiscal burden during emergencies. Kazakhstan Kazakhstan leads the region in insurance market volume. According to the Agency for Regulation and Development of the Financial Market (ARDFM), compulsory third-party motor insurance (OSGPO) premiums totaled more than KZT 106 billion ($205 million) in 2023, an 18% increase from the previous year. Since 2019, Kazakhstan has operated an electronic OSGPO registration system, streamlining policy purchases and reducing fraud. Integration with the Ministry of Internal Affairs databases now enables more effective monitoring of compliance. In April 2025, the country introduced a revised bonus-malus system with 18 risk classes, ranging from M2 (highest risk, coefficient 3.5) to Class 13 (lowest risk, coefficient 0.5). New drivers are assigned Class A with a coefficient of 1.8. The updated system accounts for accident history, traffic violations, and the duration of accident-free driving. Despite this progress, voluntary comprehensive insurance (CASCO) remains underutilized; fewer than 5% of car owners hold such policies. Barriers include high costs, limited public understanding, and the persistent mistrust of insurers. Nevertheless, demand for CASCO is growing amid rising accident rates and vehicle costs. Once considered a luxury for owners of new cars, CASCO is increasingly popular among middle-income drivers, particularly those buying vehicles on credit or lease. According to Ranking.kz, CASCO premiums reached KZT 13.4 billion ($26 million) in January-February 2025, slightly below the same period in 2024 ($29 million) but still well above pre-pandemic levels. CASCO now covers a broad range of risks, including accidents, theft, vandalism, fire, and natural disasters. For many Kazakhstani drivers, comprehensive coverage is becoming a central part of their financial strategy rather than a discretionary purchase. Kyrgyzstan In Kyrgyzstan, however, the motor insurance system is largely dormant. Although a compulsory insurance law was passed in 2015, only 8-10% of the vehicle fleet is insured. The absence of a unified digital platform, weak interagency coordination, and low public confidence hinder progress. The authorities intend to relaunch reforms in 2025, focusing on digital integration between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Bank. Beginning July 1, 2025, fines will be imposed on uninsured drivers: 3,000 KGS (around $35) for individuals and 13,000 KGS (about $150) for foreign nationals and legal entities. The new penalties are expected to promote compliance and foster a stronger insurance culture. Uzbekistan Uzbekistan, in contrast, has made substantial strides since 2019. Restrictions on foreign insurers have been lifted, and the Insurance Market Development Agency has spearheaded a digital transformation of the sector. In 2023, motor insurance premiums surpassed 250 billion som, largely from OSGPO policies. The government has expanded policy coverage and supports online issuance to increase accessibility and competition. As of September 1, 2024, all compulsory motor insurance policies will be digitized and issued through a centralized...

Turkmenistan’s Gas Swap Deals Could Be Collateral Damage from Israeli-Iran Conflict

Turkmenistan has the fourth largest reserves of natural gas in the world, but the country has found it difficult to export substantial volumes. Lack of export pipelines are one of the problems and it seemed Turkmenistan had partially solved this dilemma by arranging gas swap deals. Unfortunately for Turkmenistan, these deals involve Iran as the key country, and the Israeli-Iran conflict sheds new doubt on the ability of Iran to fulfill its part in the swap arrangements. So Close Turkmenistan signed a deal to supply 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually to Iraq in late October 2024. It was the first major gas export deal Turkmenistan had signed in nearly two decades. That last big agreement was signed with China in 2006. It involved building four gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to China to eventually carry a combined 85 bcm of gas, 65 bcm of which would be Turkmen gas. Since the pipelines cross through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, both of those countries are allotted 10 bcm each of the capacity for their gas exports. The fourth branch that would have carried 30 bcm of Turkmen gas has not been built, leaving Turkmen gas exports to China averaging 35 bcm per year. At the moment, China is the only major customer for Turkmen gas. The second largest buyer of Turkmen gas is Uzbekistan, which only purchases about 2 bcm. Not even 20 years ago, Russia was purchasing more than 40 bcm of Turkmen gas, but by 2023 that had dwindled to 5.5 bcm, still leaving Russia as the second largest buyer of Turkmen gas. In July 2024, after negotiations over price broke down, the two parties chose not to renew that contract. That made the agreement with Iraq all the more important for Turkmenistan. However, there are no pipelines connecting the two countries. Yet So Far The Turkmen-Iraqi agreement calls for Turkmenistan to ship 10 bcm of gas to Iran, with Iran then sending 10 bcm of its gas to Iraq. Iran needs gas for its northern regions that are not connected to the domestic pipeline network that sources gas from the fields of in the south of the country. Turkmenistan has two pipelines to export gas to Iran. Both were built after independence in 1991, and could carry up to a combined 20 bcm. Since January 2017, when the Turkmen government made good on a threat to cut off Iran over unpaid bills for gas, almost no gas has been shipped through these pipelines. The first task is to perform maintenance, repairs, and upgrades on these pipelines so that Turkmenistan can physically send 10 bcm of gas to Iran. The Iranian pipeline to Iraq is functional. Iran was exporting gas to Iraq, but international sanctions on Iran hindered Iraq’s ability to pay for that gas. Prior to the agreement with Iraq, Turkmenistan signed a contract in early July 2024 with Iranian officials for the transfer of gas. It is unclear how far along Turkmenistan is in performing its pipeline...