• KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
16 November 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 442

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team looks at the role of clusters in Uzbekistan's farming sector, which is key to understanding what Mirziyoyev's comments about farmers receiving some $1 billion in profits from this year's cotton harvest really means. Special guest: Umida Niyazova, the director and founder of the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights.

Turkmenistan Cotton Harvest: Forced Labor Persists Amid Reform Talks

In Turkmenistan, teachers, healthcare workers, and employees of state-owned enterprises continue to pay from their salaries to avoid being forced to pick cotton, according to independent reporting. The independent news outlet Turkmen.news reported in October that employees of an oil depot in the Dashoguz region paid approximately $19 a month despite earning around $110. Bank employees paid $3.50 three times a week, while school employees in Turkmenabat paid $1.50 up to 10 times a month. These dollar amounts are approximate, based on an unofficial exchange rate of around 19–20 manat to $1, compared with the official rate of 3.5 manat. The government is discussing measures to combat forced and child labor with the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the European Union (EU). At an international conference in Ashgabat on November 4, representatives of the ILO, United Nations agencies, and trade unions discussed the protection of labor rights. The government’s account of the meeting made no mention of the cotton harvest or the forced mobilization of workers. Public Employees and Soldiers Sent to Cotton Fields The cotton harvest officially began on September 9, with a national production target of approximately 1.25 million metric tons of raw cotton, including 275,000 metric tons from the Dashoguz region. Public-sector employees were reportedly being assigned to fieldwork before the official start. On August 20, the independent outlet Chronicles of Turkmenistan reported that cleaners and maintenance staff from public institutions in the Lebap region would work 15-day shifts in cotton fields. Doctors, nurses, and teachers were to participate on weekends. Turkmen.news documented forced mobilization in four of the country’s five regions: Ahal, Dashoguz, Lebap, and Mary. Workers from municipal services and road maintenance organizations were among those required to pick cotton or pay for replacements. The outlet reported that some replacement pickers were children as young as 12. In a separate October 22 report, it described military conscripts harvesting cotton in the Mary and Lebap regions, with daily quotas of 40–50 kilograms. A conscript said soldiers were supposed to receive one manat (about $0.05) per kilogram, but that the unit commander took the money. The accounts involving soldiers and minors rely partly on anonymous sources. The reports contain no response from the authorities to these allegations. What ILO Monitors Found Since 2023, Turkmenistan has allowed ILO observers to monitor cotton harvests. Cooperation is conducted under agreed road maps, the latest of which covers 2026. In May, the ILO and the EU launched a joint project for 2026–2027 to prevent child and forced labor in cotton production. At consultations in Ashgabat on October 27–28, participants discussed hiring cotton pickers under simplified labor agreements that would include insurance against workplace injuries. The ILO’s 2025 monitoring report found that observers saw children in the fields during 38% of visits, up from 23% in 2024. Among farmers interviewed, 34% reported the presence of children, compared with 17% a year earlier. In the Dashoguz region, observers saw children in 59% of fields visited. Observers reported interference during 35% of field visits...

Opinion: What is on the agenda for Central Asia at COP31?

The 2026 United Nations Climate Change Conference, better known as COP31, is taking place in Antalya, Türkiye, from November 9 to 20. Delegations from almost 200 countries will participate in the event, including all the Central Asian republics, but Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan will play an outsize role in coordinating their messaging and ensuring the regional environmental agenda gets the time it needs in the spotlight. The buzzword for the C5 in Türkiye is “cooperation.” Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources will host a meeting for Central Asia’s five environmental ministers at its national pavilion to discuss regional cooperation and joint climate initiatives. Uzbekistan is committed to contributing to common positions on glacier retreat, water security, adaptation needs, and equitable access to climate finance through the multilateral Mountain Group and the Group of Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs). Turkmenistan will continue pushing for the formation of the Ashgabat Climate Dialogue as a new multilateral platform for promoting climate change initiatives. In line with its Mountain Agenda, the Kyrgyz Republic will be lobbying for support to establish the Global Mountain Resilience Center in Bishkek. Mobilizing affordable climate finance is critical for all the republics. According to the Climate Policy Initiative, global climate finance reached $2 trillion in 2024, against estimated annual mitigation finance needs of $7.8 trillion through 2030. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Aziz Abdukhakimov, Presidential Adviser on Environmental Issues and Chair of the National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change of the Republic of Uzbekistan, stated: “Access to adequate, predictable and affordable climate finance remains essential for developing countries to achieve their climate goals. For Uzbekistan, the implementation of our national climate commitments is estimated to require approximately $33.7 billion for mitigation and $15.7 billion for adaptation by 2030.” Closing, or at least narrowing, that gap requires building support among international financial institutions, multilateral development banks, development partners, and private investors. The GEF Council, meeting in Samarkand ahead of the Eighth GEF Assembly, endorsed a $3.9 billion replenishment package (GEF-9), demonstrating donor interest and tangible commitment to climate projects, including for a restoration project in the Chu and Talas river basins shared by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and for a risk mitigation facility to attract private investment into Uzbekistan’s renewable energy sector. But there is hope that commitments at COP31 will go further. In September 2026, during Climate Week NYC, President-Designate Murat Kurum announced that Uzbekistan would be one of the first five pilot countries to receive support under the Climate Implementation Bridge (BRIDGE), the flagship initiative of COP31. This represents an important opportunity to translate national climate priorities into investment-ready projects and facilitate access to international financing. In his interview, Abdukhakimov stated that Uzbekistan’s focus will be “mobilizing investment in renewable energy, energy efficiency, climate-resilient infrastructure, sustainable water management, agriculture and ecosystem restoration.” At the same time, Kazakhstan will be presenting its plans to establish a national climate investment platform, plus a framework partnership program for developing the circular economy across Central Asia. Tajikistan will be...

China–Central Asia Flights Expand as Aviation Booms

Passenger and cargo links between Central Asia and China are expanding, with 117 scheduled weekly flights now connecting Kazakhstan and China, up 52% from a year earlier. Aviation officials from China and the five Central Asian countries are meeting in Tashkent on November 3–5 to discuss opening the market further. Trade between China and Central Asia reached $106.3 billion in 2025, up 12% from the previous year. The expansion of aviation has coincided with rising tourism and the gradual easing of restrictions on airlines across the region. Kazakhstan introduced an "open skies" policy at major airports in 2019, relaxing limits on foreign carriers, while Uzbekistan has also eased access to its market. A Decade of Aviation Growth According to a Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) study published on October 13, Central Asian airlines carried 31.7 million passengers in 2025, almost twice as many as in 2019. Between 2015 and 2025, the number of airline seats available in the region grew by an average of 7.7% annually, nearly three times the global rate. Low-cost airlines accounted for 21% of the region's available seats in 2025, with Kazakhstan's FlyArystan the largest operator in this segment. Air cargo carried by the region's airlines more than quadrupled between 2023 and 2025, reaching 335,700 metric tons. Uzbek operators accounted for approximately 67% of the total. Kazakhstan Leads the Passenger Market Kazakhstan accounted for 48.7% of Central Asia's airline passenger traffic in 2025, the largest share in the region, according to the EDB. By late October 2026, airlines were operating 21 routes between Kazakhstan and China and had carried more than one million passengers between the two countries since the beginning of the year, according to Kazakhstan's Ministry of Transport. In July, the two countries' aviation authorities agreed to increase the permitted number of weekly flights from 124 to 152. The list of approved destinations in China expanded to 11 cities, including Chongqing. The negotiations also addressed the possibility of opening a third air corridor across their shared border to accommodate additional flights. New routes launched this year include FlyArystan's services from Almaty to Xi'an in June and Chongqing in September. Air Astana also began flying between Astana and Guangzhou in June. On October 30, Air Astana and China Southern Airlines signed a strategic partnership agreement intended to make connecting flights between their networks easier. It builds on their existing codeshare arrangements, which allow the airlines to sell tickets on one another's flights. Uzbekistan Expands Passenger and Cargo Flights Uzbekistan has Central Asia's second-largest passenger aviation market. Its airports handled 12.66 million passengers in the first nine months of 2026, up 13% year over year, according to Uzbekistan Airports. Uzbekistan's Ministry of Transport reported in August 2025 that 61 passenger flights and more than 120 cargo and transit flights were operating weekly between Uzbekistan and China. The expansion followed agreements that increased the number of airlines permitted to operate between the two countries and gave carriers greater rights to transport freight through third countries. China Eastern Airlines...

Central Asia’s Afghan Engagement Faces Persistent Security Risks

Central Asian countries are expanding their trade with Kabul despite concerns about armed groups operating from Afghanistan. Russia has renewed warnings about militants seeking to infiltrate the region and is advocating cooperation with the Taliban authorities to contain them. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are interested in trade, energy, and transport projects connecting the region with South Asia. Tajikistan has traditionally taken a more critical position toward the Taliban and places particular emphasis on securing its lengthy border with Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Russia and China are seeking guarantees from the Afghan authorities against the activities of armed organizations that threaten their security. Speaking on October 16 at a joint conference of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said extremist organizations maintained a significant presence in Afghan provinces bordering Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. According to Lavrov, militants intend to use Afghan territory to expand their activities into Central Asia and Russia. Lavrov identified Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State terrorist organization, also known as ISIS-K, as the main threat, citing Russian security agencies. The group opposes the Taliban, carries out attacks in Afghanistan, and has struck beyond its borders. The name Khorasan refers to a historical region encompassing parts of present-day Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia. ISIS-K’s reach extends beyond Afghanistan’s border regions through propaganda, recruitment, and cross-border networks. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, people from Central Asia have been implicated in ISIS-K activities beyond the region itself, including within migrant communities. Lavrov claimed that militants in northern Afghanistan included ethnic Uyghurs, alongside fighters from Central Asia and the North Caucasus. His reference to Uyghurs echoes Beijing’s security concerns over Xinjiang, where China has used counterterrorism policies to justify sweeping repression. A 2022 UN assessment found that arbitrary detention and restrictions on the rights of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim groups could constitute crimes against humanity. The TASS report provided no evidence supporting his claims about the fighters’ origins. Lavrov also called for joint action against weapons and drug trafficking through Central Asia. The Taliban as a Security Partner Lavrov urged engagement with the Taliban authorities, who returned to power during the U.S. military withdrawal in August 2021. Russia formally recognized their government in July 2025. Moscow argues that the Taliban’s control of Afghan territory makes them responsible for security within the country, and is seeking international support for Kabul’s efforts to improve regional security. While relying on the Taliban to contain armed groups, Moscow is simultaneously questioning their ability to do so. ISIS-K has attacked Taliban officials, giving Kabul a direct reason to confront the organization. That conflict, however, offers no assurance that the Taliban will act against other armed groups operating in Afghanistan. China also favors working with Kabul on security, with concerns extending to the safety of Chinese nationals and regional trade routes. Two attacks launched from Afghan territory killed five Chinese nationals...

Central Asian States Set Out Priorities After Rubio Talks in Samarkand

Central Asian governments backed closer cooperation on mineral processing and transport at the October 19 C5+1 meeting in Samarkand. Separate talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio covered possible aircraft purchases for Kyrgyzstan and further diplomatic engagement with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan announced a $12 billion package of agreements and prospective initiatives during the visit. For the other four Central Asian participants, the published accounts centered largely on cooperation priorities and follow-up discussions. The gathering followed the November 2025 White House summit and accompanied Uzbekistan’s signing of the Artemis Accords. It brought Rubio together with all five Central Asian foreign ministers, combining regional discussions with separate bilateral meetings. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi discussed implementation of earlier presidential agreements with Rubio. The talks addressed attracting American investment and technology, with energy and critical minerals among the priorities. Washington also expressed interest in cooperation on artificial intelligence and communications infrastructure. According to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry, Rubio expressed interest in visiting Kazakhstan after the December G20 summit in Miami. Kyrgyzstan’s talks included immediate obstacles to closer relations. Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev raised sanctions policy and visa restrictions with Rubio, alongside opportunities for American investment. The Kyrgyz side sought solutions that would facilitate educational and business exchanges. Presidential special representative Bakyt Sydykov briefed the U.S. delegation on Kyrgyzstan’s sanctions-related efforts, with Bishkek reaffirming its willingness to work with Washington to prevent sanctions circumvention. In a separate meeting, Kulubaev discussed possible Boeing aircraft deliveries to Kyrgyz airlines with company vice president Michael Schnabel. Financing options included possible involvement by the U.S. Export-Import Bank. The discussions also covered aircraft maintenance and aviation infrastructure. Tajikistan’s Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin discussed expanding trade and investment with Rubio. The ministry’s account also described an exchange on regional security and stability in Central Asia. Turkmenistan reported a more specific diplomatic follow-up. Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov and Rubio outlined a schedule of further meetings and political consultations. U.S. special envoy Sergio Gor also attended the talks. The shared C5+1 statement set out the broader economic agenda. The six governments supported further development of the Trans-Caspian Trade Route and more closely aligned customs procedures. They also backed stronger industrial cooperation within Central Asia. On minerals, the statement envisaged expanded extraction and processing, alongside more production of higher-value goods within the region. It also supported exchanging expertise on geological data. These were collective policy intentions, without country-by-country financing allocations or project completion dates. Security commitments covered stronger border protection and counterterrorism cooperation, alongside efforts against transnational crime. The governments also supported practical cooperation on nuclear security and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.