• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10803 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10803 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10803 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10803 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10803 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10803 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10803 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10803 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 295

Uzbekistan Uncovers Large-Scale Corruption, Files Charges Against Senior Interior Officials

Uzbekistan has launched criminal proceedings against senior officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs as part of a sweeping anti-corruption campaign that has exposed extensive financial violations across the country. At a government meeting on January 27, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced that investigations had uncovered 53 trillion Uzbekistani som ($4.38 billion) in financial irregularities and misappropriated funds. Of that, damage linked directly to corruption schemes totaled 4.2 trillion som ($347.3 million), according to a statement from the president’s press secretary. Authorities reported that 1.3 trillion som ($107.5 million) in damages has already been recovered, and 55 individuals have been arrested nationwide in connection with corruption-related activities. Among the highest-profile cases is one involving the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Criminal proceedings have been initiated against Deputy Interior Minister Bekmurod Abdullayev and Rustam Tursunov, head of the ministry’s Penitentiary Department. Investigators allege that 186 billion som ($15.38 million) in budget funds were embezzled through fraudulent state procurement schemes within the ministry. “Every single som of state money will be placed under strict and effective control. Responsibility is inevitable, and punishment will be severe,” Mirziyoyev said during the meeting. In addition to budget-related losses, audits also identified more than $8 billion in debt associated with foreign trade operations. Mirziyoyev described the findings as alarming and announced the introduction of internal compliance and anti-corruption systems across government bodies and state enterprises. He also addressed personnel management within law enforcement. Despite mandatory retirement ages, 55 for colonels and 60 for generals, over 300 officers exceeding these limits are reportedly still in leadership roles. By contrast, all top officials in the Ministry of Emergency Situations are currently under 50 years old. Mirziyoyev underscored the need to promote a new generation of professional and accountable young leaders while also harnessing the expertise of retired or soon-to-retire officers through mentorship and youth engagement programs. The meeting concluded with directives to conduct a critical review of officials responsible for oversight and security in state institutions. The initiative is part of a broader effort to strengthen financial discipline and governance throughout the public sector.

Analysis: Three Decades of Parliamentary Reform in Central Asia — and What Changed

Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced his reform plans on January 20, including structural changes to the government. Arguably, one of the least consequential of those changes is replacing the current bicameral parliament with a unicameral parliament. Across Central Asia, over the last 35 years, parliaments have repeatedly switched from unicameral to bicameral parliaments, or vice versa, the number of deputies has increased and decreased, and in some cases, parallel bodies have come into existence and later disappeared. Kazakhstan When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, each of the former republics, including the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, had a unicameral, republican Supreme Soviet elected in 1990. These Supreme Soviets continued functioning after independence until 1994, and in the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, until 1995. In Kazakhstan, in December 1993, the majority of the 360 deputies in the Supreme Soviet voted to dissolve the body. In March 1994, there were elections to the new parliament (Supreme Kenges) that had 177 seats. During the tumultuous year of 1995, the parliament was dissolved by then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who ruled by decree until snap parliamentary elections in December of that year. However, on August 29, 1995, voters approved a new constitution in a national referendum. That constitution created a bicameral parliament with 67 deputies in the Mazhilis, the lower house, and 50 deputies in the Senate, 10 of them directly appointed by the president. Deputies to the Mazhilis were chosen in popular elections. Senators were chosen in indirect elections involving deputies from local, provincial, and municipal councils of large cities. In the snap parliamentary elections of October 1999, 10 seats were added and chosen by party lists, while the original 67 continued to be contested in single-mandate districts. That structure lasted until 2007. Constitutional amendments adopted in late May that year increased the number of seats in the Mazhilis to 107, of which 98 were to be chosen by party lists. Nazarbayev’s Nur-Otan party won all 98 of the party list seats in the August elections. The remaining nine representatives came from the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, a group representing the various ethnic groups in Kazakhstan that Nazarbayev created in 1995. Eight additional members of the Assembly were given seats in the Senate. The Assembly held its own elections to fill those seats. Kazakhstan conducted a constitutional referendum in June 2022, in part aimed at mollifying discontent that lingered from the mass unrest in early January that year, which left 238 people dead. Some amendments stripped away powers in the executive branch that had accumulated during the 28 years Nazarbayev was president, and more power was given to parliament. Another amendment removed the nine Mazhilis seats reserved for members of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan. One amendment reduced the number of Senate members appointed by the president back to 10, after it had been raised to 15 under a 2007 amendment. Kyrgyzstan A referendum in Kyrgyzstan on constitutional amendments in October 1994 created a bicameral...

Uzbekistan Urges Diplomats to Actively Defend Citizens Abroad

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has directed Uzbekistan’s diplomats to take a more proactive role in protecting the rights of citizens living and working abroad, amid rising public concern over reported abuses during migration checks and raids in foreign countries. The issue was raised during a video conference chaired by Mirziyoyev on the performance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the country's diplomatic missions overseas, according to the president’s press secretary. Mirziyoyev noted that the presence of Uzbek citizens residing abroad illegally remains a pressing issue for the state. In 2025, Uzbekistan secured a migration amnesty for more than 150,000 of its nationals in Russia. During the meeting, officials were instructed to intensify talks with other countries to facilitate legal employment pathways for Uzbek citizens, while also stressing that migrants must comply with the laws of their host countries. The president said that assisting labor migrants, particularly in countries experiencing rising inflows of Uzbek workers, must become a central responsibility of consular staff. Special attention was given to European states, where the number of Uzbek labor migrants has grown in recent years. He also called for the simplification of consular registration procedures and the elimination of excessive bureaucracy. Reports of rights violations during foreign law enforcement raids have triggered significant public backlash. Mirziyoyev criticized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for often responding only with formal diplomatic notes, saying that ambassadors and consuls must provide qualified legal support and actively defend the interests of Uzbek citizens in such cases. The president also raised concerns about the risk of young people and students abroad being drawn into radical movements. He called on diplomats to abandon “cabinet diplomacy” and instead visit construction sites, dormitories, and classrooms to directly engage with citizens and address their needs. As part of the new measures, officials were instructed to establish a free call center for citizens abroad facing difficult situations, enabling rapid coordination with the relevant ministries. Separately, the Foreign Ministry has yet to confirm whether it has issued a diplomatic note in response to recent remarks by Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, who suggested launching a “special military operation” in Central Asia. In an interview with Kun.uz, parliamentary deputy Bobur Bekmurodov said it may be premature to assess the ministry’s response but noted that Solovyov’s comments could warrant declaring him an undesirable person in Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court Updates List of Banned “Extremist” Online Content

Uzbekistan has released an updated list of sources and materials banned for promoting extremism and terrorism, according to the press service of the Supreme Court. The revised register, current as of 10 January 2026, includes online content deemed to pose a threat to public safety and the country’s constitutional order. The Supreme Court reported that the updated list contains 1,593 profiles, channels, and other materials, most of which are linked to content distributed via social networks and messaging platforms. The listed materials were found to promote extremist ideologies, justify violence, or encourage terrorist activity. Telegram was the most frequently cited platform, with 790 channels, groups, and materials included. Facebook followed with 249 entries, while 265 profiles were identified on Instagram. The list also includes 167 YouTube channels and videos, 53 TikTok profiles, and 36 entries from the Odnoklassniki network. Beyond social media, the register includes 13 websites and standalone digital materials classified as prohibited sources. Additionally, 20 books, lectures, and religious chants were assessed as promoting religious extremism or violent ideology. At the same time, some legal experts and human rights advocates caution that broadly defined extremism regulations carry risks of misuse. They argue that vague or expansive interpretations of what constitutes extremist or unconstitutional content could potentially be applied to suppress political dissent, independent journalism, or peaceful criticism of state policies, particularly in online spaces where contextual nuance is often limited. Concerns have also been raised about the potential impact on religious freedom. Critics note that religious materials or sermons not aligned with officially approved interpretations could be vulnerable to restriction, even when they do not explicitly call for violence. Without transparent judicial oversight and clear public access to decisions, observers warn that such measures may unintentionally marginalize lawful religious expression or discourage open theological discussion. The court stated that all materials were evaluated using clear criteria, such as promoting extremist ideas, justifying violence or terrorism, or seeking to undermine the constitutional system. Materials meeting these thresholds were formally recognized as prohibited. Legal grounds for these designations are provided under Uzbekistan’s Criminal Code. Article 244-1 covers extremist content promoting terrorism and allows for criminal prosecution, including prison terms of up to eight years for the preparation, storage, or dissemination of such materials. Article 244-3 addresses the unlawful distribution of religious content that breaches legal standards without directly inciting terrorism. Initial violations under this article result in administrative penalties such as fines and equipment confiscation but repeat offenses may escalate to criminal charges. These actions are part of Uzbekistan’s National Strategy to Counter Extremism and Terrorism for 2021–2026. Under this strategy, state agencies are tasked with identifying and curbing the spread of extremist and terrorist materials online, while enhancing legal, technical, and informational capabilities to counter growing digital recruitment activities.

Uzbekistan Has “Only Just Begun” Reforms, Says Saida Mirziyoyeva

Saida Mirziyoyeva has said that the country’s reform agenda remains at an early stage, arguing that the scale of change should be measured in years rather than months. In her first major interview since becoming Head of the Presidential Administration, Mirziyoyeva said Uzbekistan had “only just begun” large-scale reforms. Expectations of rapid results, she warned, often overlook structural limits, including weak infrastructure, uneven regional development, and tight public finances. Mirziyoyeva spoke about decision-making inside the presidential system and outlined what she described as the administration’s main policy priorities, including water management, education, healthcare, the business climate, and reform of the judicial and legal system. “Our goal is to improve people’s lives,” she stated, emphasizing that improvements in courts and law enforcement were essential for other reforms to succeed. Without legal guarantees, she argued, investment and social policy changes would fail to deliver lasting results. She said the reforms now underway are intended to address long-standing systemic problems rather than produce quick political gains, and rejected the idea that reform momentum has slowed, arguing that many of the most complex changes require time and careful implementation to succeed. Water management featured prominently in her remarks. Mirziyoyeva described it as one of Uzbekistan’s most urgent challenges, pointing to climate pressures, ageing infrastructure, and rising demand. Education and healthcare were also presented as priorities, with reforms focused on improving quality and access rather than simply expanding state programs. The judicial system, however, emerged as the central theme. Mirziyoyeva said that without independent and predictable courts, reforms in other areas would not deliver lasting results. Legal uncertainty, she said, discourages investment and undermines public trust, making the rule of law essential for both economic reform and the protection of citizens’ rights. Mirziyoyeva also addressed the business environment, arguing that excessive regulation and administrative pressure continue to constrain private enterprise. The state, she said, should act as a partner to entrepreneurs rather than an obstacle, and reforms should create conditions in which businesses can operate transparently and competitively. Mirziyoyeva described her role as focused on coordination and execution rather than public visibility. The task of the Presidential Administration, she said, is to ensure that decisions taken at the top translate into practical change on the ground. Public service, she added, should be judged by outcomes, not rhetoric. The interview comes more than nine years after President Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office in December 2016 and launched a reform agenda that marked a break with the isolationist policies of his predecessor. Early measures included the liberalisation of the foreign exchange market in September 2017, easing trade restrictions, and reducing state control over prices. International financial institutions have described Uzbekistan’s economic transition as ambitious, while noting that progress has been uneven. Political reform has proceeded more cautiously. In its 2024 Nations in Transit assessment, Freedom House classified Uzbekistan as a consolidated authoritarian system, citing restrictions on opposition activity and independent media. Against that backdrop, Mirziyoyeva said reforms should be judged by tangible outcomes rather than timelines. Reliable access...

Alisher Sultanov Leaves Office After a Decade of Declining Gas Production in Uzbekistan

Alisher Sultanov was relieved of his post as presidential representative on energy security on December 16, ending some ten years of dubious performance as one of Uzbekistan’s top energy officials. Under Sultanov’s watch as head of the state oil and gas company and then as a top official in Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry, the country’s oil and gas production decreased, and Uzbekistan went from being a gas exporter to an importer. A Career in the Gas and Oil Sector Sultanov started working in Uzbekistan’s energy sector in the mid-1990s and gradually made his way through the ranks at the state oil and gas company Uzbekneftegaz. In 2015, Sultanov became Uzbekneftegaz’s chairman, serving in that position until 2018. In 2017, Sultanov was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the fuel, energy, and industrial sector, and in February 2019, he was named Energy Minister. He stepped down as Energy Minister in April 2022, officially for health reasons, but by 2023 was back as presidential advisor on oil and gas, chemical, and energy matters, though that title was changed in July 2025 to the president’s representative on energy security. Stagnation and Decline Uzbekistan does not have large oil reserves. BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy has continually put Uzbekistan’s oil reserves at somewhere around 600-620 million barrels. Uzbekistan does have significant natural gas reserves of at least some 1.1 trillion cubic meters, however, according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy. The country has been working with international partners to explore for new deposits, particularly in areas of the recently dried out Aral Sea. In 2011, Uzbekistan’s average oil production was some 80,000 barrels per day (bpd), and gas production for that year was some 56.6 billion cubic meters (bcm). Uzbekistan was still sourcing from many fields that had been producing since Uzbekistan was a Soviet republic, and it was not surprising that yields from these depleted fields started decreasing after 2011. Sultanov became head of Uzbekneftegaz in August 2015, and that year, oil production had already dropped to some 60,000 bpd and gas to some 53.6 bcm. Both fluctuated only a little over the next three years, ending 2018 at an average of 64,000 bpd and 58.3 bcm. The 2018 figure for gas was the peak production year of the 2011-2020 period, though it fell well short of the 66 bcm Uzbekneftegaz was predicting for 2018. After Sultanov was named Energy Minister in 2019, the figure for gas production fell significantly. In 2019, gas production was 57.5 bcm, but in 2020, only 47.1 bcm, though oil output held steady at 67,000 bpd and 61,000 bpd, respectively. Gas production increased slightly in 2021 to 50.9 bcm, but then dropped to 48.9 bcm in 2022. The decrease continued after Sultanov stepped down as Energy Minister in April 2022, plummeting to 44.2 bcm in 2023 and 42.2 bcm in 2024. With a rapidly growing population and expanding industrial sector, Uzbekistan’s domestic gas consumption was sharply increasing, rising from 43.6 bcm in 2020 to 54.6...