Uzbekistan Local Politics - The Times Of Central Asia

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Internet Restrictions

Internet Restrictions in Central Asia: How the Five Countries Differ

There is no single Central Asian internet. Crossing a border can turn a freely accessible website into one that is blocked or reachable only through a virtual private network (VPN). The contrast is starkest in Turkmenistan, where years of censorship have created a black market for access to the open internet. Freedom House’s 2025 Freedom on the Net assessment covers three of the five Central Asian countries. Kyrgyzstan scored 47 out of 100 and retained its Partly Free status. Kazakhstan scored 37, while Uzbekistan scored 29; both were classified as Not Free. Turkmenistan has the most restrictive system in the region. The largest measurement study of its internet censorship to date tested 15.5 million domains and found that more than 122,000 were blocked. Researchers also identified filtering rules that inadvertently made more than 5.4 million additional domains inaccessible. Bypassing these restrictions has developed into a market of its own. In July 2025, VPN keys were being sold for around $50 a month, while access through a connection exempt from government filters cost up to $2,000. Turkmen officials were also alleged to have been involved in selling such access. Such claims are difficult to verify independently inside one of the world’s most closed countries. Even so, the market illustrates the effect of years of blocking: for some residents, a working VPN can provide access to large parts of the internet that would otherwise remain unavailable. The situation in Kazakhstan is different. The internet is far more accessible than in Turkmenistan, although the authorities also use technical controls. A study published by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) found evidence that at least 17 news websites and 73 sites for circumvention tools were blocked between June 1, 2023, and June 1, 2024. The affected sites included independent media and major VPN services. Researchers also found evidence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) man-in-the-middle attacks, in which a third party intercepts an encrypted connection between a user and a website. This can allow the third party to read or alter the data passing through the connection. Similar technology prompted an international dispute in 2019, when internet service providers in Kazakhstan instructed users to install a government-issued security certificate capable of intercepting encrypted web traffic. Major browser developers responded by blocking the certificate or preventing their software from trusting it. Kazakhstan does not, however, operate a closed network. OONI found that some circumvention tools remained accessible, unlike in Turkmenistan, where stable access to the open internet can itself be difficult. Kyrgyzstan’s online environment has traditionally been more open than those of its Central Asian neighbors, though restrictions have increased in recent years. Freedom House kept the country in the Partly Free category in 2025, lowering its score from 48 to 47. It cited the detention of journalists and activists, as well as pressure on online media. Government control has also extended to internet infrastructure. In July 2025, President Sadyr Japarov signed a decree giving state-owned operator ElCat a temporary monopoly on international internet traffic. The decree set the one-year trial...

Former Presidents

What Do Former Presidents Do? From Akayev to Nazarbayev, the Fates of Central Asia’s Ex-Leaders

Central Asia has produced remarkably few former presidents who simply retired from public life. In Kyrgyzstan, former leaders have been driven from office, prosecuted, imprisoned, or forced into exile. Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev has followed a different path, largely withdrawing from public view after losing much of his political influence. Elsewhere, some of the region’s founding presidents died in office, leaving no post-presidential career to examine. The Times of Central Asia has previously examined how political succession has developed across the region. The fate of leaders after they leave office reveals another side of that political tradition. The architect of Kyrgyzstan’s early post-Soviet political model was its first president, Askar Akayev, who remained in office until 2005. Akayev introduced democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan, but gradually tightened the pressure on his opponents as his presidency progressed. His rule was badly shaken by the Aksy shootings in 2002, which followed the prosecution of opposition lawmaker Azimbek Beknazarov and a territorial dispute with China. Akayev’s government had agreed to transfer disputed border territory to China, a decision fiercely criticized by the opposition. In March 2002, demonstrators in southern Kyrgyzstan demanded Akayev’s impeachment. Security forces opened fire during the unrest, killing several people. The shootings became one of the defining political crises of his presidency. In a 2003 referendum, Akayev significantly strengthened presidential powers at parliament’s expense. Economic hardship, unemployment, widespread corruption, and allegations of fraud in the 2005 parliamentary elections eventually helped trigger the Tulip Revolution in March of that year. Akayev had to flee, with rumors at the time claiming that he was smuggled out in the trunk of an official car, wrapped in a carpet. Criminal cases involving corruption were opened against him and members of his family in Kyrgyzstan. The authorities repeatedly sought his extradition from Russia, but were unsuccessful. After leaving Kyrgyzstan, Akayev lived in Moscow and taught at Moscow State University. In 2006, he became a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In August 2021, Akayev reappeared in Bishkek. He unexpectedly flew into the country and was immediately questioned as part of the criminal investigation into corruption surrounding the Kumtor gold mine. Afterward, he said he had come to Bishkek for a week and was prepared to assist investigators. “I came to speak honestly and sincerely about how we built Kumtor, why we built it, and what mistakes may have been made. The investigation will continue,” he said. In 2023, Kyrgyzstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office announced that the criminal prosecution of Akayev had been terminated because the statute of limitations had expired. Tajikistan’s former president Rahmon Nabiyev was also forced from power. The former Soviet politician lost power amid the country’s civil war in 1992. He died at his home in Khujand the following year, at the age of 62, reportedly from a heart attack. According to his wife, Nabiyev spent his final months in Khujand in conditions resembling house arrest and received a pension of just five rubles. While Tajikistan did not repeat the experiment of violently...

Succession

The Tradition of Power – Why Political Succession in Central Asia Follows Its Own Rules

In January 2027, Kyrgyzstan will hold a presidential election, an event that is anything but routine for the Central Asian republic. Over the past three decades, political crises, often surrounding disputed elections, have repeatedly ended in the removal of presidents. Kyrgyzstan remains an outlier in the region, although it, too, has gradually been moving towards a political model that has long become the norm across the rest of Central Asia. This year marks 35 years since the Soviet republics embarked on independent political lives following the collapse of the USSR. Yet many of the mechanisms governing the transfer of supreme power, shaped during the Soviet era, continue to define politics across the independent states. In Central Asia, three decades of independence have produced a distinctive model of political succession. The final years of the Soviet Union became known as the era of the so-called "gun-carriage race." As one ageing General Secretary after another passed away, an unwritten rule appeared to emerge: the official who chaired the state funeral commission for the deceased leader often became his successor. A remarkably similar pattern later emerged in Central Asia – first in Turkmenistan, then in Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan's first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, died in December 2006. The state funeral commission was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Health Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who simultaneously became acting president. It was during those funeral ceremonies that the wider public was introduced for the first time to the family of Turkmenbashi. Under the constitution, parliamentary speaker Ovezgeldy Atayev should have assumed the presidency. Instead, he was stripped of immunity and arrested, clearing the way for Berdimuhamedov to take the acting presidency. After assuming the presidency in 2007, Berdimuhamedov gradually abandoned the more eccentric elements of his predecessor's personality cult while building a political system centered on his own leadership. If Niyazov styled himself Turkmenbashi – Leader of All Turkmens – his successor adopted the title Arkadag, or Protector of the Nation. In February 2022, Berdimuhamedov unexpectedly announced that he would step down following an early presidential election scheduled for March 12. He explained the decision by saying it was time to "give the younger generation an opportunity to govern the country." Few doubted that he was referring to his son Serdar Berdimuhamedov, who by then had already occupied most of the key positions within the state hierarchy. That is precisely what happened. Serdar Berdimuhamedov became president, while his father moved to the chairmanship of the Halk Maslahaty, retaining the title of National Leader of the Turkmen People. Uzbekistan followed a similar pattern, although under different circumstances. Islam Karimov built a highly centralized presidential system that left virtually no room for political competition. This applied not only to political opponents, but also to those closest to the president. His eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, was placed under house arrest while her father was still alive. Following his death, she was convicted and remains imprisoned in Uzbekistan. When Karimov died in September 2016, reports of his death circulated for several days...

Islamic Finance

Uzbekistan Establishes Islamic Finance Council as New Banking Law Takes Effect

The Central Bank of Uzbekistan has established an Islamic Finance Council to coordinate the work of banks, microfinance organizations, the Deposit Guarantee Agency and other institutions operating under Islamic financial principles. The council was created weeks after Uzbekistan’s new Islamic banking law took effect on June 29. It will prepare national standards, issue regulatory and supervisory recommendations, advise financial institutions and represent the Central Bank in its work with international standard-setters. Building an Islamic Finance Framework Islamic finance prohibits interest and generally requires financing to be linked to assets, trade, leasing or risk-sharing. Common structures include murabaha, in which a bank buys and resells an asset at an agreed markup, and ijara, which operates broadly like leasing. Sharia Specialists Form Council Majority The council has five members: four specialists from the Fatwa Center under the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan and one financial-sector expert. Saidjamol Masayitov, a chief specialist at the Fatwa Center, will chair the council. Muhammadyubkhon Khomidov, also a chief specialist at the center, will serve as deputy chairman. The other members are Fatwa Center specialists Hikmatilla Toshtemirov and Abdullatif Tursunov, along with Akhrorjon Sadullayev, managing partner of Orient Audit Group. Sadullayev has more than 20 years of experience in banking, finance and auditing. The council is intended to combine Sharia expertise with financial regulation. It will report annually to the Central Bank’s board. From Legislation to Implementation Uzbekistan has been developing an Islamic finance framework for several years. Legislation adopted in 2022 allowed microfinance organizations to provide services based on Islamic principles, while detailed regulations introduced in 2024 covered instruments including mudaraba, murabaha, musharaka, ijara and salam. The Central Bank is also preparing a national Islamic finance roadmap for 2026-2030 with assistance from the Islamic Financial Services Board. The work covers banking, capital markets, insurance, professional training and the wider legislative framework. Law No. O’RQ-1126, signed on March 27, established a dual banking model. Stand-alone Islamic banks can operate alongside Islamic “windows” within conventional commercial banks. The law also created a special licensing system and defined permitted Islamic financial operations. Uzbekistan had previously planned to introduce its first Islamic finance services through a commercial bank in 2027, with at least three banks expected to offer them by 2030. Licensing Rules Approved The Central Bank has now amended its licensing regulations for Islamic banks and Islamic windows. The changes were registered by the Ministry of Justice on July 17 and took effect upon official publication. Applicants must submit Sharia-compliance policies, information about their institution-level Islamic finance council, evidence of dedicated internal oversight and audit systems, and a three-year business plan. Existing conventional banks will require a separate license to open an Islamic window. Council candidates must receive Central Bank approval and meet education and professional-experience requirements. At least one member must hold a certificate from the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, or AAOIFI. Certification will become mandatory for all council members from July 1, 2027. Adopting International Standards The Central Bank joined AAOIFI as a regulatory...

Tax Policy

Uzbekistan Bank Data Plan Sparks Privacy and Tax Debate

A draft government resolution that would establish unified rules for information sharing between banks and tax authorities has triggered widespread public debate in Uzbekistan, with supporters describing it as a necessary step to combat the shadow economy while critics warn it could weaken constitutional protections for banking privacy. The proposal, published for public discussion by Uzbekistan’s State Tax Committee, aims to regulate how banks provide information to tax authorities. According to the committee, the document does not introduce new powers for tax officials or abolish bank secrecy. Instead, it seeks to define the procedures, deadlines, formats, and electronic methods for exchanging information already permitted under existing legislation. The proposal attracted significant attention after some media reports suggested it would allow tax authorities to gain broad access to citizens’ bank accounts and deposits. Responding to the growing discussion, the State Tax Committee issued a public explanation, arguing that these interpretations do not accurately reflect the draft’s content. “The draft does not grant tax authorities new powers, does not abolish bank secrecy, and does not provide free access to the bank accounts of citizens or businesses,” the committee said. It stressed that banks would continue to provide information only in cases established by law. The committee pointed to Article 134 of the Tax Code and the Law on Bank Secrecy, which already allow banks to share information related to taxation with state tax authorities under specific legal procedures. It also emphasized that any information received by tax authorities is itself protected as tax secrecy and cannot legally be disclosed or used for purposes other than tax administration. Officials further argued that similar information-sharing mechanisms exist in many countries, including members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Uzbekistan has also joined the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, requiring the country to develop clear and transparent rules in this area. Despite these assurances, the proposal quickly became one of the country’s most discussed regulatory initiatives. One of the most controversial provisions concerns peer-to-peer (P2P) transfers. Under the draft, banks would report cases where an individual’s bank card or electronic wallet receives transfers totaling at least 500 times the base calculation amount during a calendar month from people other than close relatives. The measure is intended to identify cases where personal bank cards are allegedly being used for unregistered commercial activity. Economist Otabek Bakirov criticized the proposal, arguing that it contradicts constitutional guarantees protecting banking secrecy. Referring to Article 41 of Uzbekistan’s Constitution, he noted that the confidentiality of bank operations, deposits, and accounts is guaranteed by law. Bakirov also recalled that previous attempts to introduce similar monitoring of P2P transactions had been abandoned following constitutional reforms. “I hope this attempt will also fail,” he wrote, calling on parliament, the Central Bank, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, journalists, and the public not to remain silent during the discussion. Public comments submitted during the consultation have echoed many of these concerns. According...

Kyrgyz-Uzbek Border

Chongara and Tash-Tobo: The Villages That Changed Countries Without Moving

About 2,500 people in Chongara and Tash-Tobo now live under Kyrgyz jurisdiction. The transfer reduces the number of Uzbek enclaves in Kyrgyzstan and clears the way for a much shorter road across the Batken Region. For Umitbek, the change first appeared online. Chongara, his home village, passed from Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Region into Kyrgyzstan when the legal border moved. “We are welcoming the decision with joy,” Umitbek told Azattyk. “Ninety-nine percent of our village is Kyrgyz.” Umitbek already holds a Kyrgyz passport, while many neighbors have Uzbek documents. Some households include citizens of both countries. The village has Kyrgyz and Uzbek schools, and families have chosen between them. Kyrgyz presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov announced the transfer on June 23. “Now registration procedures will be conducted in these villages, after which their residents will be granted Kyrgyz citizenship,” Alagozov said. He did not give a timetable for the process. Kyrgyzstan transferred plots of equal area to Uzbekistan as part of the settlement. Public announcement did not identify those plots or state their total size. The two governments also conducted a separate exchange involving 236 hectares. That land will support a road between the villages of Sai and Tayan, and shorten the journey between Aidarken and Batken from 225 kilometers to 55, or about 76% of the present route. Officials have yet to publish a construction date or budget. A Century Inside Another Republic Chongara and Tash-Tobo were Uzbek exclaves, pieces of Uzbekistan completely surrounded by Kyrgyz territory. Their unusual status grew from Soviet boundary decisions made a century ago. Chongara’s administrative link to the Uzbek Republic dates to territorial decisions around Sokh in 1925. Tash-Tobo was also assigned to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic that year. A parity commission confirmed its enclave status in 1955. These lines served as internal administrative boundaries during the Soviet period. Villages that had shared roads, water systems and family links found themselves divided by customs posts and citizenship rules. Uzbekistan previously had four exclaves inside Kyrgyzstan: Sokh, Shakhimardan, Chongara, and Tash-Tobo. Following the latest transfer, only Sokh and Shakhimardan remain under Uzbek jurisdiction. Sokh is the largest and most complicated. It lies within Kyrgyzstan, but has a largely ethnic Tajik population. Roads around the enclave have long shaped travel through the western Batken Region. A Settlement Built Over Two Decades Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan began formal border negotiations in 2000. Progress remained slow while relations between the two governments were strained. The process accelerated after Shavkat Mirziyoyev became Uzbekistan’s president in 2016. A 2017 agreement settled about 1,170 kilometers of the roughly 1,378-kilometer frontier. The remaining sections involved land, roads, and water infrastructure. The two foreign ministers signed a further border treaty in Bishkek on November 3, 2022, which covered sections left outside the 2017 settlement. On January 27, 2023, Mirziyoyev and Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov exchanged ratification instruments during a state visit to Bishkek. The legal delimitation fixed the agreed line on maps. Physical demarcation then placed that line on the ground. The 2022 package also...