• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.66%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.66%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.66%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.66%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.66%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.66%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.66%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.66%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
16 February 2025

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 2

Kyrgyzstan Raises First Sovereign Bond to Mitigate China’s Growing Influence

On February 4, Kyrgyz president Sadyr Japarov embarked on a four-day state visit to China, visiting Beijing and the northern city of Harbin for the opening ceremony of the 2025 Asian Winter Games. The visit comes against a backdrop of increasing engagement between Bishkek and Beijing. Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, says that certain groups within the government are worried about an overreliance on China. “This is the problem of the current political leadership,” Umarov says. “They want to do more with China … they want to have more investment from China, but they have this debt that they inherited from the previous administrations.” Indeed, 36.7% of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign debt is now owed to the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank), Beijing’s state-run lender which traditionally deals with foreign investments. China is also responsible for 46% of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign trade. With Russia hemorrhaging influence in the region amid its ongoing war in Ukraine, accessing new sources of investment has risen up the agenda in Bishkek. The Name’s Bond A key plank of these diversification attempts was put forward on January 13, when the Minister of Economy and Commerce, Bakyt Sydykov, announced plans to raise $1.7 billion through the sale of ten-year sovereign bonds in Hong Kong. “The country intends to tap into the international market for the first time,” Sydykov said. “We want to use Hong Kong’s role as a financial center to attract more potential investors, probably more diversified investors.” For Iskender Sharsheyev, an economist, this turn to the global markets cannot come soon enough. “This should have happened thirty years ago,” he says. Sharsheyev notes that the groundwork has been laid over the last few years, with ratings agency Moody’s reaffirming its B3 credit rating last year and projecting a “stable” outlook for the country. The yield of these bonds has yet to be announced, although Sharsheyev expects it to be reasonably high. “We expect that [the yield] will be worse for our country than for other countries, because, firstly, we are just entering. Secondly, the new flow of cash into the country could create risks; it can also spur inflation.” However, the high yield and the risk is seen as worth the cost. “The bond offering is an example of how Kyrgyzstan is trying to balance out its debt portfolio and have diversified ties with different creditors,” says Umarov. He notes that this mirrors a trend seen across Central Asia, where bonds have not traditionally been used as a means of fundraising but have become increasingly popular over recent years. In October 2024, Kazakhstan issued its first dollar-denominated Eurobond since 2015, the 10-year bond raising $1.5 billion with a yield of 4.714%. Sharsheyev believes that some of the proceeds of the bond sale will be used specifically to head off debts to Beijing. “China is the main [source of] pressure. To maintain sovereignty, we have begun to service the external debt. Our country has spent an average of $400-500 million on paying...

Russia’s Strategic Posturing and Putin’s November Visit to Kazakhstan

On November 27, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan underscored the complex geopolitical and security challenges facing the region. Hosted by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana, the visit took place amidst heightened tensions following Russia’s deployment of its Oreshnik hypersonic missile in Ukraine on November 21. This escalation has reshaped the regional security environment, compelling Kazakhstan to confront potential spillover effects of the Ukraine conflict. Energy remained a central focus during the visit. Kazakhstan remains heavily reliant on oil exports through the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which passes through southern Russia. This cooperation benefits Kazakhstan economically but, by tying Kazakhstan further into Russian energy networks, it further complicates Astana's efforts to balance relations with Moscow and Western powers. Following periodic closures of the CPC route on various pretexts, Kazakhstan has resolved to diversify its energy export strategy. It has increased shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to enter the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which terminates on Turkey's coast in the eastern Mediterranean. One should not be surprised if ideas about the old Trans-Caspian Oil Pipeline (TCOP) project are taken out of deep storage for reanimation. The TCOP is an undersea link first discussed in the late 2000s between then-Presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Nicolas Sarkozy of France. It was shelved at the time because it did not seem geoeconomically necessary. Since then, relations between Russia and Kazakhstan have been complicated by the periodic CPC closures that, although they are given technical justification, appear politically motivated by Moscow to squeeze Astana. Kazakhstan's short-term solution, to increase oil shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to Baku for insertion into the BTC pipeline, simply cannot attain the volumes necessary to provide a strategic alternative to the CPC. The BTC, at present, would be able to accommodate whatever volumes Kazakhstan would be able to transit to Azerbaijan including via a prospective TCOP, for export to world markets from Ceyhan. One would suppose that bilateral discussions also covered the possible participation of Rosatom in the construction and operation of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant (NPP). However, no mention of this topic was made in public statements. Kazakhstan would prefer to escape the vise-like pressure between Russia and China on this matter. That is why Tokayev has discussed participation by the French firms Orano and EDF with France's President Emmanuel Macron. It has recently been suggested that it would be technically feasible for Kazakhstan to find a group of Western companies capable of executing the project. A Western consortium would have no reason to hesitate to include Kazatomprom in an appropriate role, not excluding capacity-building. The Russia-only and China-only options for the NPP's construction would be less welcoming to such a possibility. Kazakhstan's leadership has become properly sensitive to how energy partnerships are not just economic decisions, but strategic calculations in Central Asia's volatile geopolitical landscape. Indeed, Russia’s use of the Oreshnik missile against Ukraine has created an entirely new security situation. It has raised concerns that...