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Asset Recovery

Kazakhstan Ratifies European Legal Assistance Convention as Asset Recovery Push Expands

Kazakhstan has ratified the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, in a step that could strengthen a long-running effort to obtain evidence and pursue assets held across foreign jurisdictions. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed the ratification law on October 6. The 1959 Council of Europe convention requires participating states to assist in criminal cases, including gathering evidence, transmitting records, serving judicial documents, and executing certain search and seizure requests. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers invited Kazakhstan to join on June 18, 2025. Kazakh prosecutors have said accession would provide a common legal channel with European states where no bilateral agreement exists. Deputy Prosecutor General Galymzhan Koigeldiyev told lawmakers that Kazakhstan had been pursuing accession since 2001. Kazakhstan’s Kurultai approved the ratification law on September 23. Search and seizure requests can be carried out only when the conduct is an offense in both countries and is punishable under Kazakh law. The Supreme Court will handle requests concerning cases already before the courts, while the Prosecutor General’s Office will handle other requests. Under Council of Europe rules for non-member states, Kazakhstan must deposit its instrument of accession with the Council of Europe Secretary General. Accession then takes effect 90 days later. The effort to recover wealth from abroad predates Tokayev’s current campaign by many years. The clearest example is former BTA Bank chairman Mukhtar Ablyazov. After BTA was nationalized in 2009, the bank pursued him through the English courts in a sprawling series of asset recovery cases. The UK Supreme Court later recorded default judgments totaling about $4.6 billion amid allegations that Ablyazov concealed assets through a network of companies. In one of the English proceedings, Lord Justice Maurice Kay said: “It is difficult to imagine a party to commercial litigation who has acted with more cynicism, opportunism and deviousness towards court orders than Mr Ablyazov.” Ablyazov has denied the allegations and has long maintained that the cases against him are politically motivated. The litigation has spread across jurisdictions and family networks. BTA later pursued Ablyazov’s son-in-law, Ilyas Khrapunov, alleging he helped dissipate and conceal assets despite worldwide freezing orders. Khrapunov is the son of former Almaty mayor Viktor Khrapunov, who has also faced claims over allegedly misappropriated city property. The Times of Central Asia previously detailed how funds linked to the cases moved through shell companies and foreign property deals. Viktor Khrapunov has also rejected the accusations as politically motivated. Those disputes continued in the United States. In 2024, a New York jury awarded BTA Bank and the city of Almaty more than $32 million in litigation over money and property linked to the wider case. The need to pursue separate cases in Britain, Switzerland, the U.S., and elsewhere highlights a recurring problem: a Kazakh investigation or judgment does not automatically provide access to evidence or assets held overseas. Following the unrest of January 2022, Tokayev made asset recovery a more formal part of state policy. Kazakhstan adopted its asset recovery law in 2023, giving the Prosecutor General’s...

Rule of law

Uzbekistan Strikes Down Ten-Day Border Detention Without Court Approval

Uzbekistan’s Constitutional Court has struck down provisions allowing people accused of breaking border rules to be held for up to ten days without a judge’s approval. The decision followed complaints about detention beyond the constitution’s 48-hour limit. The court adopted its ruling on September 22. It took effect on September 25, removing the legal basis for extended detention periods. The case reached the court through parliamentary ombudsman Feruza Eshmatova. Her office received six complaints in 2025–2026 concerning alleged unlawful administrative detention lasting more than 48 hours, according to the court’s account of the case. The challenged provisions were part of Article 288 of the Code of Administrative Responsibility. They covered violations of border regulations and rules at state border checkpoints. Officials could hold a person for up to three hours to prepare a report. If they needed to establish the person’s identity or clarify the circumstances, they could extend detention to three days, though they had to notify a prosecutor in writing within 24 hours. For someone without identity documents, a prosecutor could authorize detention for up to ten days. Neither extension required officials to seek a court order. The ombudsman challenged those powers under Article 27 of the Constitution, which bars detention beyond 48 hours without a judicial decision. The court agreed that the longer periods breached that guarantee. It also identified a gap in the code: the provisions contained no mechanism for obtaining judicial approval when officials wanted to hold someone longer. Notification or authorization by a prosecutor “must not replace a court decision,” the court said in its published account of the ruling. The decision concerns how long the authorities can hold someone without judicial oversight. It does not abolish border offenses or prevent detention beyond 48 hours when a court authorizes it. According to Gazeta, the ruling is final and cannot be appealed. The body responsible for the legislation has one month to bring it into line with the constitution. The court did not prescribe the replacement wording. The ombudsman’s office has also reported unlawful detention elsewhere this month. In a separate case in Nukus district, monitors found three people held without sufficient grounds at a medical facility for intoxicated people. None of the three was intoxicated. Police inspectors had taken them there while awaiting a court decision on placement in a special reception facility. Following the ombudsman’s intervention, one inspector received a disciplinary sanction. The cases of two others were referred for disciplinary consideration, and the materials were sent to the district prosecutor for a preliminary inquiry.

Saida Mirziyoyeva

Opinion: Why Uzbekistan’s Presidential Administration Was Given Sweeping Powers and Broad Immunity

Saida Mirziyoyeva, the 41-year-old daughter of Uzbekistan’s president who has headed his administration since 2025, is taking an increasingly active role on the international stage. She participated in the 15th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Abu Dhabi, and was received by UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. During the meeting, the two sides discussed further expansion of cooperation between Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates. Combined with the law on Uzbekistan’s Presidential Administration adopted in August, Mirziyoyeva’s growing international profile raises a broader question: how far could her political influence extend? A New Legal Framework The Constitutional Law on the Administration of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, approved by the Senate on August 7 and signed by Shavkat Mirziyoyev a week later, on August 14, followed closely on the heels of a constitutional amendment establishing that the administration’s legal status and powers should be defined by law. Officially, the legislation was drafted to implement Article 109 of Uzbekistan’s Constitution. The article states that the president forms an administration and appoints its head to provide organizational, legal, and analytical support for the exercise of presidential powers. An amendment that took effect on July 25 added that the legal status, main tasks, organization, and powers of the Presidential Administration are to be determined by law. Saida Mirziyoyeva had been appointed head of her father’s administration in June 2025. When the bill, consisting of four chapters and 34 articles, was presented in the lower house of parliament, lawmakers said the experience of a number of countries had been studied. They included Turkmenistan and Taiwan, as well as Finland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Latvia, the United States, and Kazakhstan. Lawmakers cited these countries’ arrangements for regulating presidential administrations, offices, or chancelleries. The Uzbek law combines substantial administrative and coordinating authority with extensive immunity provisions for senior Presidential Administration personnel. Powers of a “Successor”? Under the new law, the head of Uzbekistan’s Presidential Administration has the authority to: introduce or eliminate additional staff positions and create or abolish project offices responsible for developing individual sectors and industries; coordinate and oversee administrative reforms in national and local executive bodies and submit proposals to the president on improving public administration; facilitate the introduction of key performance indicator systems in government bodies; appoint and dismiss certain officials of government bodies and organizations; create or abolish compliance units in government agencies, as well as positions for deputy heads or advisers responsible for compliance and internal anti-corruption controls. The head of the administration may also hire independent advisers on a contractual basis. Under the law, the head of the Presidential Administration also becomes deputy chair of the Security Council under the president and organizes and coordinates the activities of its members. Some Uzbek opposition figures, most of whom live and work abroad, see Mirziyoyeva’s expanded powers as adding weight to speculation that the president may be preparing his daughter as a possible successor. “She was already de facto the No....

Rule of law

Kyrgyz Court Upholds Ex-Security Chief Tashiyev’s Conviction but Changes Charge

On September 10, the Bishkek City Court upheld convictions against former security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev and seven others, but changed the offense from plotting to overthrow the government to interfering with electoral rights. All eight had been convicted in July of plotting the violent overthrow of the government. They received four-year prison sentences, replaced by three years of probation. The change has added to the confusion surrounding the alleged plot. On September 14, Tashiyev’s lawyer asked the Prosecutor General’s Office to investigate the appeal judges’ actions, saying the defense had received no warning of the new charge. The Letter of 75 The saga started in February, when a group of 75 prominent figures in Kyrgyzstan released an open letter calling on President Japarov to call for an early presidential election. The group argued that Japarov was elected in January 2021 under the terms of the previous constitution, which allowed a president one six-year term in office. Several months after Japarov was elected, the country approved a new constitution that gave an individual the right to be elected to two five-year terms as president. Within hours of the letter’s publication, the authorities started rounding up some of the authors of the letter, and President Japarov dismissed his long-time friend Tashiyev as security chief. Japarov said he dismissed Tashiyev to “prevent a split in society,” and for weeks after that, the Kyrgyz president was evasive about the exact reason for sacking a man Japarov continued to call his close friend. In an interview in late April, parliamentary deputy Elvira Surabaldiyeva was the first Kyrgyz official to clarify that Tashiyev was being charged with planning a coup. The trial opened on June 15. Tashiyev’s co-defendants were former Prosecutor General Kurmankul Zulushev, former Parliamentary Speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu, former Deputy Interior Minister Kursan Asanov, former Deputy Prime Minister Aaly Karashev, and politicians Emilbek Uzakbayev, Bekbolot Talgarbekov, and Kurmanbek Dyykanbayev. On July 2, all eight were found guilty of plotting the violent overthrow of the government. The court imposed four-year prison sentences and ordered confiscation of their property, but replaced imprisonment with three years of probation. Most of the defendants and the prosecution appealed the court decision, setting the stage for the court ruling on September 10. Still Guilty, but of Something Different The prosecution sought to have the sentences increased to nine years in prison for all the defendants. The defendants, of course, wanted to be exonerated. On September 10, the Bishkek City Court rendered its verdict. All eight defendants were declared guilty, but not of attempting to overthrow the government. They were guilty of “interfering with exercising voting rights.” The court retained the four-year prison terms but again allowed all eight defendants to serve probation instead. It reduced probation from three years to two and lifted the property confiscation order. Zulushev’s lawyer has said he will appeal to the Supreme Court. Tashiyev’s lawyer has separately asked prosecutors to investigate the appeal judges’ actions, arguing that his client was convicted on a charge the...

opinion

Opinion: How Europe Balances Conditions and Interests in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan has enjoyed preferential access to the EU market under GSP+ since 2021. The program removes tariffs on thousands of products for countries that commit to implementing international conventions on human rights, labor standards, environmental protection, and governance. Uzbekistan is one of two Central Asian countries, alongside Kyrgyzstan, participating in GSP+. Tajikistan receives the less generous standard GSP preferences, while Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are outside the scheme because they are classified as upper-middle-income economies. Uzbekistan makes extensive use of the program. In 2024, its preference utilization rate, the share of eligible exports entering the EU duty-free, was 92.2%. EU imports from Uzbekistan nearly doubled between 2021 and 2024. Those benefits come with conditions. The European Commission assesses whether Uzbekistan is implementing the conventions required under GSP+. It must consider findings from the UN and International Labour Organization monitoring bodies, but it can also use evidence from governments, international organizations, civil society groups, and other sources. If the Commission has “reasonable doubt” that Uzbekistan is meeting its commitments, it can open a withdrawal procedure. Uzbekistan can respond and provide evidence of compliance. The Commission then decides whether to close the case or withdraw preferences from some or all products. The system gives Brussels a formal role in assessing whether Uzbekistan continues to meet the conditions attached to preferential market access. It also requires the Commission to decide how different evidence should be interpreted and when shortcomings are serious enough to justify action. There is no automatic formula that produces that decision. The EU–Uzbekistan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, or EPCA, creates a separate mechanism. It makes respect for human rights an essential part of the partnership, and a serious breach can lead to partial or full suspension of the agreement. The European Parliament’s May 2026 resolution called for implementation of the agreement’s human-rights and rule-of-law commitments and for those commitments to be assessed within three years. The EU’s own report records setbacks in media freedom, civil society, and judicial independence. It also recognizes progress on labor standards and protections for women and children. The Commission must assess compliance with each required convention; progress in one area does not remove obligations in another. That means the Commission must decide how much weight to give different evidence and when concerns are serious enough to affect trade preferences. Decisions on Uzbekistan’s domestic reforms, however, remain with the Uzbek government. Concurrently, cooperation between the EU and Uzbekistan has expanded. Brussels is pursuing closer ties with Uzbekistan on transport connectivity and critical raw materials. Uzbekistan’s position on regional transport routes, critical raw materials, and access to a growing Central Asian market also gives Tashkent leverage in its dealings with Europe. The new GSP rules apply from January 2027, raising the number of required conventions from 27 to 32. Existing beneficiaries retain their preferences during a transition period and must reapply by the end of 2028. The EPCA has applied provisionally since March 1, 2026, while full ratification remains pending. The next GSP+ review will show how...

Kamchybek Tashiyev

Kyrgyz Prosecutors Seek Nine-Year Prison Terms for Tashiyev and Seven Others

Kyrgyz prosecutors are asking an appeals court to send former security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev and seven other defendants to prison. A lower court convicted all eight in July of preparing to seize power by force, but allowed them to remain free on probation. The appeal is being heard by the Bishkek City Court, with the hearing taking place behind closed doors. Prosecutors are challenging the sentences handed down by the trial court. The “Letter of 75” case arose from an open letter signed on February 9 by 75 politicians, former officials, and public figures. The authors called for an early presidential election amid a dispute over when President Sadyr Japarov’s current term should end. Five of the signatories were among the eight people later charged with preparing to seize power by force. Before his dismissal, Tashiyev had been one of Kyrgyzstan’s most powerful officials and a central figure in Japarov’s government. Japarov appointed his longtime ally to lead the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) after coming to power in 2020, but dismissed him on February 10, 2026, saying the move was needed to “prevent a split in society” and state institutions. The dismissal ended a five-year governing partnership and was followed by personnel changes across the GKNB and other state bodies. Eight people eventually stood trial, including Tashiyev, former Prosecutor General Kurmankul Zulushev, and former parliamentary speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu. The trial court found all eight guilty and sentenced them to four years in prison with confiscation of property, but exempted them from serving the prison terms and placed them under supervised probation for three years. They were acquitted of the separate charge of abuse of office. The Times of Central Asia previously reported in detail on the verdict and the circumstances surrounding the case. Prosecutors had sought nine-year prison terms at the original trial. According to defense lawyers, they are now asking the appeals court to impose the same terms on all eight defendants. Some of the defendants have also appealed their convictions and are seeking acquittal. During the appeal, the defendants again raised one of the disputed issues in the case: why criminal proceedings targeted only some of the people involved when the open letter had 75 signatories. Five defendants who had signed the letter asked the court to give a legal assessment of the actions of the other 70 signatories. The appeals panel granted the request and agreed that the other signatories could be called for questioning, with the defense responsible for securing their attendance. If prosecutors prevail, the appeal would reverse the main practical outcome of the July trial: all eight defendants were convicted of preparing to seize power by force, but none was sent to prison.