• KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
17 September 2026

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What Building Central Asian Supply Chains Taught Me About AI

I took over spare-parts supply at BPK Auto in Ust-Kamenogorsk in the mid-2000s, at the age of 25, moving from selling cars. The company was the general dealer for VAZ in Kazakhstan, assembled Niva models in the city, and was taking on Skoda, Chevrolet, and Kia while building service centers across the country to meet the expectations of those brands for a dealer. My job was to keep parts flowing to all of it. Several thousand vehicles came through in a month, and a single car contains something like 50,000 separate part numbers. The service teams wanted as many of those as possible sitting on the shelves. From where they stood, that made sense, because they were judged on whether a mechanic could start a repair the same day, whether a customer complained, and an ISO audit was running over the service operation at the same time. From the procurement side, the arithmetic looked different. Some parts cost two or three thousand dollars and were fitted once or twice a year, and holding them across four model lines tied up a large share of the company's working capital. I built the forecast in spreadsheets and checked it against actual sales once the month closed in 1C. To run it, I needed the service side's own records: how many vehicles of each type they had seen, and what had been repaired. I asked for them for months. They would not release them. Some of that was habit; a warehouse full of everything being what a well-run operation had looked like for the previous 40 years. More of it sat in how the two departments were counted. My result was recorded the moment the parts moved into the service center. Theirs was recorded much later, when the car left the workshop. Nobody was measured by the number that would have made the forecast work. The forecasting was the straightforward part of that job. The difficult part was building an operation in which people shared the information behind the forecast and were expected to act on its findings. Why a Better Model Would Not Have Changed the Outcome Put one of today's AI demand-forecasting systems into that same warehouse and very little changes. The forecast would be far better than anything I produced by hand. It would still depend on service records that nobody was willing to release, and where records did exist, it would be reading entries written up at the end of a long shift. It could not grant the purchasing manager authority to reorder against it, nor could it alter the measures by which the service department was judged. Better intelligence does not repair the path between operational data and operational action. Every party you add to that path lengthens it. A distribution network across Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan can run from a manufacturer to over 45,000 small retail outlets, served through more than 18 distribution centers, with 1,391 field staff taking and checking orders on the ground. An order begins...

3 weeks ago

Turkmenistan Gas Exports: Could Tajikistan Become a New Market?

Turkmenistan has the world’s fourth-largest natural gas reserves, but most of its gas exports still go to China. Ashgabat has spent years seeking other markets and is again looking to potential customers elsewhere in Central Asia. Uzbekistan already buys Turkmen gas, while Tajikistan remains a potential customer. The prospect drew renewed attention after Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin visited Turkmenistan on August 20–21. During meetings with President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, the two sides discussed trade, transport, energy, and other areas of cooperation. The published accounts of the talks, however, made no mention of new gas supplies. The Idea Dates Back to 2023 At an August 2023 summit in Ashgabat, the presidents of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan agreed to cooperate on supplies of natural gas, oil, petroleum products, and electricity. They instructed their energy ministries to discuss joint projects. After the summit, Meredov identified Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as priority markets in the region. At the time, Turkmenistan said it planned to increase gas production by at least 60 billion cubic meters in the coming years, citing further development of Galkynysh, one of the world’s largest gas fields. State-owned Turkmengaz and UzGasTrade subsequently agreed on annual supplies of up to 2 billion cubic meters under a short-term contract and discussed a longer-term arrangement. The contract came as Uzbekistan became a net importer after decades as a gas exporter, with domestic production declining and demand rising. Output fell further in 2025 and the first half of 2026. Any Turkmen gas bound for Tajikistan would have to pass through Uzbekistan because the two countries do not share a border. Tajikistan already imported around 267 million cubic meters of Uzbek gas in 2024, but Turkmen supplies would require a separate commercial arrangement. No prices, volumes, or timetable have been announced, leaving the plan on paper. A Small Market, but a Short Route Tajikistan cannot replace China as a market for Turkmen gas. Hydropower provides almost all of its electricity, and its potential demand for imported gas is far smaller than China’s. In February, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Turkmenistan’s former president and current chairman of the Halk Maslahaty, described diversifying gas exports as one of the country’s main priorities. Turkmenistan’s landlocked position leaves it dependent on where its pipelines lead. The main route runs east through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, carrying around 30 billion cubic meters of gas to China each year via the Central Asia–China pipeline. That reliance may deepen after China National Petroleum Corporation reached an agreement with Turkmenistan in April to develop the fourth phase of Galkynysh. The $5.1 billion project is expected to add 10 billion cubic meters of annual gas-processing capacity. Bigger Alternatives Are Moving Slowly The best-known alternative is the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Although construction began on its Afghan section in 2024 after decades of discussion, the pipeline remains far from delivering gas to Pakistan or India. By August 2026, Afghan authorities said 116 kilometers had been laid. Afghanistan’s role could expand from transit country to gas buyer....

3 weeks ago

Bipartisan U.S. Congressional Visit Highlights Expanding Partnership with Kazakhstan

A bipartisan six-member delegation from the U.S. House of Representatives met with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana on August 25, two days after Kazakhstan elected the first members of its new unicameral Kurultai. Tokayev called the timing symbolic and proposed closer dialogue between Congress and the new legislature. The delegation was led by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Jason Smith and included Greg Murphy, Carol Miller, Ronny Jackson, Wesley Bell, and Ed Case. Smith said President Donald Trump had called him at 2 a.m., several hours before the meeting. Trump sent his regards, expressed appreciation for his relationship with Tokayev, and said he looked forward to the Kazakh president’s visit to Miami for the G20 summit. Smith said one purpose of the visit was to explore opportunities to expand economic ties and pursue a substantive bilateral dialogue. The visit reinforced Congress’s role in a relationship that has recently gained momentum at the presidential level. It also showed the breadth of the emerging agenda, from trade and investment to energy security, strategic supply chains, nonproliferation, and regional stability. A Delegation With Trade and Security Reach The delegation’s committee assignments closely matched that agenda. Smith, Murphy, and Miller serve on the Ways and Means Committee, which oversees trade and tariff legislation. Jackson serves on the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, and Agriculture committees. Bell serves on the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Oversight and Government Reform committees. Case sits on the Appropriations Committee and its Defense and Homeland Security subcommittees. That mix places delegation members on committees with jurisdiction over many of the issues now shaping the bilateral relationship. Congress can advance cooperation through trade legislation, appropriations, oversight, and support for American companies entering or expanding in Kazakhstan. Smith’s committee has jurisdiction over H.R. 1024, the bipartisan U.S.-Kazakhstan Trade Modernization Act, which would authorize the president to end the application of the Cold War-era Jackson-Vanik restrictions and extend permanent normal trade relations to Kazakhstan. Miller was among the bill’s original co-sponsors, although the issue was not mentioned in the public account of the meeting. Bipartisan congressional engagement could help translate recent presidential momentum into more durable institutional ties. Kazakhstan Has Made the U.S. Relationship a Priority From the Kazakh side, Tokayev has treated closer ties with Washington as a presidential priority. During his November 2025 visit to Washington, the two leaders welcomed commercial agreements worth more than $17 billion. Trump reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the Enhanced Strategic Partnership, while the two presidents identified new areas for cooperation. The August 25 meeting also highlighted Kazakhstan’s support for the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace, as well as the countries’ longstanding work on nuclear security and nonproliferation. Trade, investment, advanced technology, science, education, and culture were also discussed. Tokayev’s proposal for closer dialogue between Congress and the Kurultai would strengthen the parliamentary channel alongside the relationship’s presidential and executive-level diplomacy. In January, Tokayev appointed veteran diplomat Erzhan Kazykhan as his representative for negotiations with the United States on priority bilateral issues....

3 weeks ago

UN Desertification Forum Highlights Central Asian Land Degradation

Mongolia is hosting a United Nations (UN) conference on combating desertification this month, with delegates from Central Asian countries discussing cooperation on the challenges of climate change, water scarcity, and sustaining vast ecosystems such as the Eurasian steppes. Bakhodur Sheralizoda, chairman of Tajikistan’s Committee for Environmental Protection, was among speakers appealing for more regional and international cooperation in the face of land degradation, desertification, and drought. While the meeting in Ulaanbaatar is aimed at the protection of rangeland and grassland ecosystems, Sheralizoda also noted the importance of preserving mountain ecosystems such as those that cover most of Tajikistan’s territory. He said Tajikistan is one of Central Asia's major sources of water and protecting its glaciers is therefore critical, Khovar, Tajikistan’s state news agency, reported on Monday. His comments highlighted the interconnectedness of the environmental challenges being discussed at the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, which started on August 17 and ends on August 28. The conference is focusing on “the arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas, known as the drylands, where some of the most vulnerable ecosystems and peoples can be found,” according to organizers. The goal of the meeting is to promote sustainable rangeland management, climate-resilient land use, and land restoration across those fragile areas. Nearly 77% of Mongolia’s land is already degraded, and limited rainfall and short growing seasons make recovery from degradation difficult, according to the UN. More than 80 million hectares in Central Asia, or an area about four times the size of Kyrgyzstan, are already degraded, the UN says. Along with Tajikistan, the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have been working on ways of mitigating threats to ecosystems, including soil protection and monitoring, drip irrigation, and the planting of seedlings. Late last year, Uzbekistan hosted a major international conference on wildlife trade, held under the UN-linked Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, as countries and international institutions look for ways to counter global conservation pressures. In a commentary on PBS, Dr. Justine Shanti Alexander, Mongolia director for the New York-based Wildlife Conservation Society, said the hosting of the UN event in Ulaanbaatar “provides a unique opportunity to showcase to the world how healthy, high integrity rangelands underpin wildlife, pastoral livelihoods, and climate resilience.”

3 weeks ago

Kazakhstan’s North Aral Recovery Anchors Broader Environmental Push

After decades in which the Aral Sea became a global symbol of ecological collapse, Kazakhstan has achieved a measurable recovery in its northern basin. Built over two decades, the turnaround is now being linked to expanded restoration plans and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s broader Taza Kazakhstan, or “Clean Kazakhstan,” environmental agenda. According to the government, the North Aral’s volume rose from 18.9 billion cubic meters at the end of 2022 to 23 billion by the end of 2025. In July 2026, TCA reported that the Water Resources Ministry had put the volume at approximately 23.5 billion cubic meters. The recovery reflects work centered on the Kokaral Dam, completed in 2005, and management of the Syr Darya. The first phase raised water levels, reduced salinity, and helped restore fishing. Kazakhstan’s Water Resources Ministry and the World Bank have developed plans for a second phase of the restoration program. The proposed project calls for the reconstruction of the Kokaral Dam and aims to increase the sea’s volume to approximately 34 billion cubic meters and expand its surface area to around 3,900 square kilometers. The recovery described here is confined to the North Aral in Kazakhstan. The South Aral remains severely depleted, while further progress in the north depends on Syr Darya flows and cooperation with upstream states. An August 22 government review places the North Aral alongside waste management, reforestation, and environmental education under Taza Kazakhstan. Launched by Tokayev in April 2024 as a nationwide cleanup campaign, the initiative is increasingly being used as a framework for a broader environmental program. Waste Infrastructure Illegal dumping is the clearest area of reported progress. The number of identified dumping sites fell from approximately 8,600 in 2018 to 2,600 in 2026, according to the government. Satellite monitoring is being combined with public reporting through eGov Mobile and TazaQazBot. Public reports have been processed through the two services since 2024. Local authorities have been given responsibility for cleaning public areas, while penalties for illegal disposal have been strengthened. Because the 2018 baseline predates Taza Kazakhstan, the longer-term decline also reflects measures taken before the initiative. The share of municipal waste sorted or processed increased from 25.8% in 2024 to 30.6% in 2025, according to the government. Kazakhstan still faces a serious infrastructure deficit. At the end of 2024, only 20.4% of the country’s municipal waste landfills had the required documentation, while major sites in Astana and Zhezkazgan were at or beyond capacity. A 2023 plan called for 100 new landfills, but a December 2025 government update said only eight had been commissioned. The August 2026 review provided no newer landfill total, but said upgrades were planned for existing sites and additional waste sector projects were moving into operation. Large waste-processing and utilization facilities are also under development in Astana, Almaty, and the Zhambyl region. TCA has previously reported that headline processing rates do not show how much waste becomes reusable material. Only about 1.1% of municipal waste generated in 2024 was converted into secondary raw materials. The...

3 weeks ago

Kazakhstan Peace Talks: Basel Al-Haj Jassem on Syria and the South Caucasus

Basel Al-Haj Jassem, a Syrian political adviser and analyst, has worked on the Middle East, the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia for many years, with a particular focus on peace processes. He is the author of the Arabic-language book Kazakhstan and the Syrian Astana, which examines Kazakhstan’s role in the Astana Process on Syria. While Al-Haj Jassem was in Kazakhstan as an observer of the first elections to the country’s new unicameral parliament, the Kurultai, The Times of Central Asia spoke with him about Kazakhstan’s international standing and the country’s possible role as a mediator in the South Caucasus and the Middle East. He described the elections as well organized and “a new stage in the development of Kazakhstan’s political system,” although he added that “in a year it will already be possible to give a more concrete assessment of the Kurultai’s work.” TCA: You have known Kazakhstan for many years and have observed the country from different professional perspectives. In your view, how have Kazakhstan’s role and international standing changed over the past two decades? Al-Haj Jassem: I think the changes that have taken place in Kazakhstan over the past two decades go far beyond economic growth or the expansion of foreign relations. The country has gradually moved from being an important Central Asian state to one whose political and diplomatic presence extends beyond its immediate geographical surroundings. Several factors have contributed to this: its geographical position, balanced relations with Russia, China, the West, and the Islamic world, as well as its ability to avoid becoming rigidly aligned with opposing political blocs. But what I consider most important is that Kazakhstan has built a reputation as a state capable of maintaining dialogue with different parties, including those that are sometimes opposed to one another. TCA: One of your books is devoted to Kazakhstan and the Astana Process on Syria. That experience demonstrated Kazakhstan’s potential as a venue for negotiations. What further role could the country play in the Middle East? Al-Haj Jassem: The experience of the Astana Process on Syria was important because it showed that a state that is not itself a direct party to a conflict can provide space for dialogue that cannot be achieved elsewhere. Kazakhstan, of course, was not a party determining decisions on the Syrian issue, but it created a political and diplomatic environment that helped maintain channels of communication between participants who found it difficult to sit at the same table. I think this experience can be developed further, but it is not necessarily a matter of literally reproducing the Astana Process model. Today, the Middle East needs different forms of mediation, including quiet diplomacy, humanitarian initiatives, and support for dialogue between religious and cultural communities. Kazakhstan’s advantage is that it carries no colonial legacy in the region and is not part of traditional intra-Arab rivalries. At the same time, the country maintains good relations with various Arab and Islamic states. This gives Kazakhstan a certain freedom of action, particularly in situations where a settlement requires, above...

3 weeks ago

Suleimenov Says Stronger Policy Framework Supported Kazakhstan’s S&P Upgrade

A stronger monetary-policy framework, a resilient banking sector, and closer coordination with the government were among the strengths recognized in S&P Global Ratings’ upgrade of Kazakhstan, National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov told The Times of Central Asia. “S&P’s upgrade of Kazakhstan’s sovereign credit rating from ‘BBB-’ to ‘BBB’ is an important external assessment of the resilience of our economy amid continued global uncertainty and commodity market volatility,” Suleimenov said. On August 21, S&P raised Kazakhstan’s long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings to BBB/A-2 from BBB-/A-3. The stable outlook reflects S&P’s view that Kazakhstan’s ample fiscal and external buffers should help it absorb external shocks, while the non-oil budget deficit is expected to narrow further. Kazakhstan last held the BBB rating before S&P downgraded it in February 2016. Kazakhstan now carries the same BBB long-term sovereign rating as India, Indonesia and Greece. It stands one notch above Hungary, Oman and Serbia at BBB-, and one below Bulgaria and Italy at BBB+. The comparison concerns credit risk rather than economic size or development. Why S&P Moved Now S&P expects Kazakhstan’s economy to grow by 5.1% in 2026 and by around 4% to 4.5% annually in 2027–2029, a pace it says exceeds that of peer countries. It also expects a broader tax base, tighter expenditure controls and reduced quasi-fiscal activity by major state-owned enterprises to improve the country’s fiscal position. Stricter rules governing National Fund withdrawals are intended to preserve the assets available to absorb commodity-price falls and other external shocks. According to the National Bank’s account of the decision, S&P also highlighted Kazakhstan’s substantial foreign-currency reserves and strong external position. A Stronger Monetary Framework “We particularly welcome the agency’s recognition of the strengthening of Kazakhstan’s monetary policy framework and the resilience of the banking sector to macroeconomic shocks,” Suleimenov said. Suleimenov had outlined that policy course in earlier interviews with TCA. In April, he described tighter monetary conditions alongside government fiscal consolidation, while in June, after the Bank cut its base rate from 18% to 17%, he cautioned that inflation had not been defeated and said further moves would depend on incoming data. Annual inflation declined from 11% in March to 10.2% in July. S&P cited a stronger monetary-policy framework, closer government-National Bank coordination, fiscal consolidation, reduced quasi-fiscal activity and tighter macroprudential regulation. It also described the banking sector as resilient, with adequate capital and liquidity buffers. The National Bank’s response went beyond the base rate. It increased minimum reserve requirements, used operations linked to gold purchases to absorb excess liquidity and supported measures to slow unsecured consumer lending. The Bank lowered the rate again to 16.75% in July as inflation eased. Even so, inflation remains more than double the National Bank’s medium-term target of 5%. S&P’s assessment recognizes the strengthening of the monetary-policy framework, not the end of Kazakhstan’s inflation problem. “Enhanced coordination between the Government and the National Bank, together with the continued improvement of regulation and supervision, is contributing to stronger macroeconomic and financial stability,” Suleimenov said. Fiscal Reform...

3 weeks ago

Kazakhstan’s Uranium Advantage Is Difficult to Replicate

Kazakhstan supplies about two-fifths of the world’s mined uranium, making it a critical supplier to nuclear markets in Asia, Europe, and the Americas. What sets it apart is not simply its resource base, but its ability to produce and deliver uranium at scale. Kazakhstan already dominates global uranium mining. It produced 25,839 tonnes in 2025, about 40% of world mine output, and production rose another 9% in the first half of 2026. It has been the world’s largest producer since 2009. Kazakhstan holds about 14% of identified global uranium resources, while Australia, Canada and others also have large deposits. Its advantage is that production capacity is already in place. Developing comparable new supply elsewhere would take years. Demand is meanwhile expected to rise. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and International Atomic Energy Agency project annual uranium requirements could rise by about 50% by 2050 in their lower case, and more than double in their higher case. In either scenario, Kazakhstan’s existing production base would be hard to quickly replace. A Uranium Supplier Across Major Markets Kazakhstan supplies markets whose fuel-security priorities increasingly differ. Asia accounted for 56% of Kazatomprom’s consolidated uranium sales in 2025, according to its May 2026 investor handout. The Americas accounted for 25%, and Europe for 19%. The sales map gives commercial weight to Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy. China is a major customer and industrial partner. Russia remains an important partner through joint ventures, enrichment services, and long-term supply arrangements. European and North American utilities, meanwhile, buy Kazakh uranium as part of increasingly diversified procurement portfolios. Kazatomprom widened that customer base in 2025, adding buyers in Switzerland and the Czech Republic, and expanding relationships with Japan and India, according to its full-year financial results. What distinguishes Kazakhstan is the combination of scale and cross-market integration. It supplies Asian, European, and North American markets while maintaining industrial ties with China, Russia, and Western partners. That gives Kazakhstan room to tailor commercial arrangements to different markets. For Western buyers, this could support additional processing and transit options that meet their commercial and regulatory requirements. Kazakhstan could develop these while continuing to serve established Asian markets, attracting new investment while preserving its multi-vector position. Kazakhstan’s importance to the U.S. market is substantial. Kazakh-origin uranium accounted for 28% of deliveries to American civilian reactor operators in 2025, second only to Canada, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Kazakhstan was also the EU’s second-largest source of natural uranium in 2025, accounting for 20.3% of deliveries to EU utilities, according to the Euratom Supply Agency. Kazakhstan’s production share does not mean that equivalent volumes are available for new customers. Twelve of Kazatomprom’s 14 mining operations are partially owned through partnerships, and much of their output is already committed under long-term contracts. Budenovskoye’s 2026 production, for example, is reserved under an existing offtake agreement for Russia’s civilian nuclear industry. Additional capacity would give Kazakhstan more flexibility to respond to demand across multiple markets. Kazakhstan’s Stability Underpins Global Uranium Supply Kazakhstan’s importance to uranium...

4 weeks ago

Kazakhstan’s Role in Pax Silica After WAICO

Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian country to join the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative. It also signed the agreement establishing China’s World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, or WAICO. That dual participation could now become consequential. Reuters reported on August 14 that the State Department had prepared an undated draft letter warning the 35 signatories of the U.S. AI Opportunity Statement that participation in Pax Silica could be incompatible with membership in competing initiatives. Kazakhstan is the only country presently known to have joined both frameworks. The draft could still change, and the State Department has not publicly adopted the position it contains. Kazakhstan’s decision to join both initiatives also reflects its long-standing multi-vector foreign policy. Astana has sought practical relations with competing powers rather than exclusive alignment with any one bloc, an approach its official foreign-policy concept describes as maintaining mutually beneficial relations with states and organizations of practical interest to Kazakhstan. Joining a U.S.-led supply-chain initiative and a China-led AI organization fits that pattern, although it also makes the question of compatibility more consequential. Washington’s concern is understandable. Pax Silica is intended to create trusted supply chains, strengthen investment security and protect sensitive technology and infrastructure from undue access or control. Membership is meant to represent more than attendance at another diplomatic forum. The question is what Kazakhstan has agreed to do through WAICO, how those commitments will be implemented, and whether they create competing expectations or affect specific Pax Silica projects. Kazakhstan’s Role in the Supply Chain Pax Silica spans the AI supply chain from energy and mineral processing to semiconductors, data centers and models. Kazakhstan also has ambitions in digital infrastructure and AI services, but its strongest existing capabilities relevant to Pax Silica are concentrated in energy, mineral production, selected processing and Eurasian connectivity. The framework is designed to combine the different industrial strengths of its participants rather than reproduce the entire technology chain in every country. Kazakhstan produced about 40% of the world’s mined uranium in 2025. Kazakh-origin material accounted for 28% of uranium delivered to U.S. civilian reactor operators that year, second only to Canada. Kazakhstan’s most immediate relevance is not semiconductor production, but its role as an energy, minerals and processing partner. Uranium is the clearest example, providing large-scale fuel supplies for the power systems on which expanding AI infrastructure depends. As TCA recently noted, Kazakhstan sits at the nexus of resources, processing capacity and connectivity, and its role extends beyond raw-material extraction. Ulba Metallurgical Plant produces uranium dioxide powders and nuclear-fuel pellets, along with beryllium, tantalum and niobium products. Kazakhstan also produces copper, titanium, silver, aluminum and zinc used across power, communications, aerospace and advanced manufacturing. Its position on the Middle Corridor also gives it a logistics role connecting Central Asian production with Caspian and European markets. Other contributions remain prospective. Eurasian Resources Group (ERG) plans a 15-tonne-a-year gallium facility backed by a long-term supply agreement with Mitsubishi, while a U.S.-supported tungsten project is moving forward with plans to mine and refine the...

4 weeks ago

Opinion: Kazakhstan Energy Expansion May Not Guarantee a Lasting Surplus

Kazakhstan plans to commission 13.3 GW of power capacity by the end of 2029, including 12.56 GW of entirely new generation, in a build-out the government says will move the country from deficit to sustained surplus. But new industrial projects and large data centers could absorb part of that margin almost as soon as it appears. According to Energy Ministry projections, Kazakhstan expects to eliminate its electricity deficit by the end of the first quarter of 2027 and move to a sustained surplus by 2029. The projected electricity balance for 2029 calls for generation of 162.1 billion kWh against consumption of 144.5 billion kWh, leaving a surplus of 17.6 billion kWh. However, it is difficult to predict exactly how much electricity the country will need three years from now. Therefore the forecast "surplus" will not necessarily become a reserve available for future industrial projects. Energy Hungry Data Centers Kazakhstan is pursuing a swathe of new energy-intensive industrial projects, while data centers are emerging as another major source of electricity demand. The Data Center Valley project is being developed in Ekibastuz, where the government says 300 MW of power capacity has already been secured, with plans to expand to 1 GW. It cites competitive electricity costs and the ability to scale up as advantages of the location. At full scale, such a cluster would itself become a major electricity consumer. If it drew 1 GW continuously, it would consume about 8.76 billion kWh a year – roughly half the projected national surplus for 2029. Kazakhstan’s digital ambitions already extend beyond a single data center. In June, the government announced $10 billion in agreements with U.S.-based Firebird and NVIDIA to build a large AI computing center using 100,000 advanced computer chips. The project will form part of the Data Center Valley initiative. By the end of 2029, Kazakhstan plans to commission 13.3 GW of capacity, of which 12.56 GW will come from entirely new generating facilities and 0.74 GW will replace existing capacity. According to the Energy Ministry, 7.4 GW of the total will be baseload generation and another 5.9 GW will come from renewable energy sources. The full 13.3 GW cannot be treated as spare power for new factories and data centers. Some will be needed to meet rising demand and make the electricity system more reliable. Solar and wind power also cannot produce at full capacity all the time. This is particularly important during periods of peak demand, when the power system must cope simultaneously with high consumption and possible maintenance or outages at generating facilities. A projected annual surplus measured in billions of kilowatt-hours and the amount of capacity available during a particular peak hour are therefore different measures. Upkeep of Current Power Sources The condition of existing generation remains a separate problem. Much of Kazakhstan’s thermal generation is aging and requires modernization. The Energy Ministry reported that 411 billion tenge was allocated to the 2025 repair campaign, during which 10 power units, 63 boilers, and 39 turbines were repaired. It said...

4 weeks ago