Our People > Times of Central Asia

Articles

Railway Manufacturing

Alstom’s Jérôme Boyet: Kazakhstan Is Building a Regional Rail Manufacturing Hub

Kazakhstan has spent the past decade developing domestic rail manufacturing, supported by foreign investment and increased local production. The sector is also beginning to supply export markets. Kazakhstan is also preparing the next phase of railway expansion to increase network capacity and accommodate growing transit volumes. Alstom has operated in Kazakhstan since 2010, developing locomotive production and maintenance facilities while increasing the manufacture of components in the country. Its Astana plant has also produced locomotives for export. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Jérôme Boyet, Alstom’s managing director for Western and Central Asia, discusses the company’s investment plans and efforts to increase local production. He also considers how new locomotive projects and the Middle Corridor could affect Kazakhstan’s prospects as a regional rail manufacturing center. TCA: Alstom has now been operating in Kazakhstan for 15 years and has become one of the country’s largest industrial investors. What are the company’s current investment priorities, and how has its business in Kazakhstan evolved over that period? Jérôme Boyet: Over the past 15 years, Kazakhstan has become much more than a market for Alstom. It has evolved into one of our key manufacturing and engineering centers for Western and Central Asia. To date, we have delivered almost 500 electric locomotive sections to Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ) and another 50 to international customers. Our work extends well beyond manufacturing. Through service teams based across Kazakhstan, we maintain KTZ’s locomotive fleet throughout its life cycle, helping ensure the locomotives remain safe, reliable, and available for operation. To strengthen these capabilities, we launched a €50 million investment program in 2023 covering four service depots in Almaty, Astana, Shu, and Arys. The upgraded facilities are already beginning to deliver results and are scheduled to become fully operational by the end of 2027. The program will establish a nationwide maintenance network, reduce locomotive downtime, and further strengthen Kazakhstan’s technical expertise in fleet maintenance. These investments build on the industrial base we have developed over the past decade and a half. Today, our priority is to integrate manufacturing, maintenance, digital diagnostics, and local engineering expertise into a single industrial ecosystem capable of supporting the continued modernization of Kazakhstan’s railway network and growing freight traffic along strategic routes such as the Middle Corridor. TCA: How large is Alstom’s workforce in Kazakhstan today, and what role does workforce development play in your localization strategy? Jérôme Boyet: Alstom currently employs more than 1,300 people in Kazakhstan, with our workforce divided almost equally between manufacturing and service activities. Around 20% of our employees are women, while the average length of service exceeds four years. Importantly, 98% of our employees are citizens of Kazakhstan, reflecting the strong technical capabilities that have been developed locally. For us, localization goes beyond manufacturing components. It also means developing knowledge, engineering expertise, and professional skills within Kazakhstan. Our employees work across the entire industrial cycle from engineering, welding, and assembly to testing, diagnostics, and maintenance. As new locomotive and service projects move forward, we continue...

1 day ago

Fuel Supply

Tajikistan Holds Talks on Fuel Imports from China

Tajikistan has begun negotiations with China on importing gasoline and diesel fuel as the country grapples with a sharp decline in fuel imports. Prices are rising, and filling stations in Dushanbe are experiencing diesel shortages. The two sides are discussing possible transport routes and which companies in Tajikistan would be authorized to import petroleum products. Tajikistan’s Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, cited by Asia-Plus, said Chinese fuel could be delivered directly through the Kulma border crossing or via Tajikistan’s northern neighbors. The volume and timing of any future deliveries have yet to be agreed, while pricing remains under discussion. Dushanbe is also negotiating increased fuel imports from other Central Asian countries and seeking supplies from Iraq. Agreements have already been reached with Iran on imports of petroleum products and crude oil, although implementation has been postponed because of the armed conflict in the region. Additional supplies from Kazakhstan were discussed during a meeting between President Emomali Rahmon and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana on July 29. The talks included the possibility of increasing deliveries of petroleum products from Kazakhstan to the Tajik market. Kazakhstan’s presidential administration said the leaders discussed energy cooperation, along with trade and transport logistics. On July 10, Tajikistan’s Minister of Energy and Water Resources, Daler Juma, said the country had sufficient fuel reserves for approximately 60 days. He added that the government was negotiating with several countries in addition to Russia, which remains Tajikistan’s principal fuel supplier. Fuel imports into Tajikistan have fallen sharply over the past month. During the first half of the year, Russia accounted for 72.3% of all fuel supplied to the Tajik market, while domestic refineries produced only about 0.5% of total supply. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that disruptions in Russia’s fuel market had intensified competition for alternative fuel supplies across Central Asia and increased costs for the region’s most import-dependent economies.

1 day ago

presidential election

Kyrgyzstan Moves 2027 Presidential Election to January 27

President Sadyr Japarov has signed legislation changing the schedule for Kyrgyzstan's next presidential election. Under the amendments, the vote will be held on 27 January 2027, the fourth Wednesday of January, instead of the fourth Sunday of the month, as provided for under the previous legislation. The amendments also retain the requirement that the Jogorku Kenesh, Kyrgyzstan's parliament, must schedule the presidential election no later than four months before polling day. Election day will be a paid day off. According to the explanatory note accompanying the legislation, moving the vote from Sunday to a weekday is expected to encourage higher voter turnout. Lawmakers argue that participation in some local elections has remained low in recent years. This is the second change to Kyrgyzstan's presidential election timetable in less than a year and a half. In April 2025, the authorities moved the vote from October 2026 to January 2027 so Japarov could complete the six-year mandate he won in 2021. The parliamentary calendar was changed separately later that year to prevent the two nationwide campaigns from overlapping. Japarov has served as president since 28 January 2021. Earlier this year, the Constitutional Court ruled that his current six-year mandate counts as his first under the 2021 Constitution, leaving him eligible to seek a second five-year term in 2027. The parliamentary election calendar was revised separately. Early elections to the Jogorku Kenesh were held on 30 November 2025, allowing the parliamentary and presidential electoral cycles to be separated. The authorities said the snap parliamentary vote was intended to prevent the two nationwide campaigns from coinciding in 2027. Earlier, The Times of Central Asia reported that a Kyrgyz court had convicted former security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev, former parliamentary speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu, and six others of plotting to overthrow the government. The case followed a February 2026 open letter calling for an early presidential election.

2 days ago

U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations

Rubio and Kosherbayev Discuss CPC Ahead of Tokayev’s U.S. Visit

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a telephone conversation with Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev on 29 July. The discussion focused on the situation surrounding the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, energy cooperation, critical minerals, trade and investment ties, and current international issues. According to the U.S. Department of State, Rubio and Kosherbayev discussed the importance of energy security, including the “reliable and uninterrupted” export of Kazakhstan-origin oil through the CPC system. Rubio also thanked Kazakhstan for supporting President Donald Trump’s peace initiatives and expressed interest in deepening bilateral economic cooperation. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the two ministers discussed in detail the situation surrounding the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, cooperation in the energy, transport and logistics sectors, supplies of critical minerals, efforts to attract U.S. investment, and coordination in international organisations. The ministry said the conversation also covered preparations for President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s forthcoming visit to the United States for the G20 summit. The telephone call took place shortly after Kazakhstan resumed crude oil exports through the CPC system. The pipeline carries the vast majority of crude exports from the Tengiz oilfield, whose largest shareholders include the U.S. companies Chevron and ExxonMobil. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry said the two ministers reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining regular political dialogue. The conversation followed President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with U.S. Senator Steve Daines on 8 July, when the two sides discussed expanding trade and economic cooperation, attracting investment and strengthening cooperation in the energy sector. On 28 July, The Times of Central Asia reported that Kazakhstan had resumed oil exports through the CPC system after a week-long disruption at the consortium’s Black Sea marine terminal near Novorossiysk. The interruption more than halved oil production at Tengiz and again highlighted Kazakhstan’s dependence on its principal oil export route.

3 days ago

Cross-Border Trade

Turkmenistan Renovates Customs Post on Border with Iran

Turkmenistan took steps to expand economic ties with Iran this week, completing the upgrade of a customs checkpoint on the border with its neighbor to the south and hosting an Iranian cabinet minister. The modernization of the Sarahs Autoyollary customs post at the Turkmen-Iranian border follows upgrades earlier this year at the Artyk post, also on the border with Iran, and the Garabogaz checkpoint, on the northern border with Kazakhstan, according to Turkmenistan’s State Customs Service. It said improvements to the Sarahs Autoyollary post, which is located at “the intersection of several international transport corridors,” include renovated buildings and a digital monitoring system that will help agents process vehicles and goods faster and more reliably. Meanwhile, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov discussed the expansion of Turkmen-Iranian trade in a meeting with Farzaneh Sadegh, Iran’s roads and urban development minister, in Ashgabat on Monday, Turkmenistan’s state media reported. The Iranian ministry said Sadegh and top Turkmen officials discussed joint projects in transportation, energy, electricity, and infrastructure development. Iran is a significant economic partner for Turkmenistan and other Central Asian countries that are trying to diversify and expand trade corridors to foreign markets, although Iran’s conflict with the United States has highlighted the vulnerability of transit through Iranian territory. Earlier this month, Iranian officials alleged that a U.S. strike hit a railway bridge on a northern Iranian line crossing into Turkmenistan, although there was no independent confirmation. Iran later said it had repaired the tracks and trains were running again. On Monday, Turkmenistan criticized an attack on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea that the Iranian government blamed on Ukraine, which has acknowledged strikes on vessels in the sea that were allegedly carrying military cargo linked to Iran and Russia. The Caspian Sea is critical to Turkmenistan's ambition to play a larger role in the Middle Corridor, a trade network linking Asia and Europe via Central Asia and the Caucasus.

3 days ago

Foreign Investment

Foreign-Owned Companies in Central Asia: What the Figures Mean

When political leaders or national statistical agencies report an increase foreign-owned companies in Central Asia, the media often draw the wrong conclusion. A rise in the number of foreign-owned businesses is frequently interpreted as evidence of growing investment from the countries where their owners originate. In reality, this is not always the case. In some instances, the increase may simply reflect the registration of additional legal entities. The headline figures are nevertheless striking. According to official statistics, Kazakhstan had 52,693 operating entities with foreign ownership as of July 1, 2026, alongside 8,909 with joint ownership. In Kyrgyzstan, 5,724 operating enterprises with foreign investment were recorded in 2024. Uzbekistan had 20,502 enterprises with foreign capital as of July 1, 2026, including 15,891 wholly foreign-owned companies, while the remainder were joint ventures. Comparable totals are harder to obtain for Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. In May 2026, Tajikistan’s presidential office said that more than 700 companies with Chinese capital were operating in the country, albeit that figure covers only companies with Chinese participation and cannot be treated as a national total for all foreign-owned businesses. No equivalent recent official total is publicly available for Turkmenistan. The economic contribution made by foreign businesses also varies across the region. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of National Economy, gross inflows of foreign direct investment into Kazakhstan reached $20.5 billion in 2025, up 14.4% from the previous year. In Kyrgyzstan, enterprises with foreign participation accounted for 30% of industrial output in 2024. They produced goods, works, and services worth 179.7 billion soms, according to the National Statistical Committee’s report on foreign-invested enterprises. Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investment, Industry and Trade reported that investment reached $43.1 billion in 2025, comprising $38.2 billion in foreign direct investment and $4.9 billion from international financial institutions. None of these figures, however, means that every registered foreign-owned company has made a meaningful contribution to the economies of Central Asia. A business established by a foreign investor, either alone or jointly with local partners, may conduct no commercial activity while continuing to fulfill its statutory reporting obligations. A limited liability partnership in Kazakhstan or a limited liability company in Kyrgyzstan may be established for a variety of reasons. Sometimes a legal entity is created to carry out one or two contracts, bid for public procurement tenders, or receive specific payments. In other cases, it may be set up to facilitate import-export transactions, sell goods through online marketplaces, lease property or equipment, or remain available for future business opportunities. A registered company may have little more than a legal address. It may have no production facilities, offices, employees, or assets beyond its registered capital. A single foreign investor may also establish several legal entities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, or another country in the region. This may be done to separate projects, operate in different sectors, manage logistics, handle different product lines, or organize financial settlements. The laws of Central Asian countries generally allow such arrangements, provided that the companies comply with national legislation and meet their tax and reporting obligations....

3 days ago

Religion

Tajikistan Hijab Ban Denied by Authorities Amid Confusion

Tajik authorities have denied reports that the country has introduced a new ban on beards and hijabs, following renewed attention to the government’s regulation of religious dress and appearance. An official from Tajikistan’s Committee on Religion, Regulation of Traditions, Celebrations and Ceremonies told Asia-Plus that no new legislation prohibiting beards or hijabs had been adopted. The committee said recent reports had misrepresented the state of religious rights in Tajikistan and had relied on information from unreliable sources. The government statement followed a July 25 report by Azattyq Asia (RFE/RL) describing continued pressure on some men with beards and women wearing Islamic headscarves. Azattyq reported that officials had conducted campaigns encouraging women to wear traditional Tajik clothing and avoid styles regarded as foreign. Several men also alleged that police had detained them because of their facial hair, with some claiming that officers forcibly shaved their beards. One man told the outlet that he had been ordered to send police a photograph of his clean-shaven face each week after spending three days in detention. The police did not respond to Azattyq Asia’s request for comment on the allegation. There is no Tajik law explicitly prohibiting men from growing beards. However, the government has imposed broader restrictions on clothing and forms of religious expression. In June 2024, Tajikistan adopted amendments prohibiting the import, sale, promotion, and wearing in public of clothing deemed "alien to national culture". The Times of Central Asia reported at the time that violations could result in substantial fines, although the legislation did not clearly define which clothes fell under the prohibition. Officials have offered differing interpretations of the law. Some have said it covers hijabs, religious veils, abayas, and other forms of Islamic clothing, as well as ripped jeans and clothing considered excessively revealing. The government has said its policies are intended to preserve Tajik traditions and prevent religious extremism. Human rights organizations have argued that the restrictions interfere with freedom of religion and personal expression. International rights groups have called on Tajikistan to repeal the clothing provisions.

3 days ago

Energy Security

Central Asia Rethinks Energy Security After the 2026 Fuel Crisis

The summer of 2026 marked a turning point for energy security in Central Asia. In July, drone strikes temporarily halted crude oil receipts and loadings at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) marine terminal in Novorossiysk. Although CPC resumed normal operations on July 27, the incident exposed the vulnerability of one of the region’s principal export routes to external security risks. Russia, which for decades has been Central Asia’s principal supplier of refined petroleum products, has also faced prolonged pressure in its domestic fuel market. Reduced utilization at some refineries and rising domestic demand have created longer-term challenges. Restrictions on gasoline and diesel exports have added to the pressure, affecting the Russian economy and neighboring states that have traditionally relied on Russian supplies. For three decades, Central Asia’s system for supplying refined fuels remained relatively stable. Russian refineries covered shortages in local markets, providing fuel that was both comparatively affordable and predictable in volume. The events of 2026, however, reaffirmed a basic principle of national security: during large-scale crises, governments tend to prioritize domestic stability over external trade commitments. For Central Asian states, this has prompted a fundamental reassessment of long-established approaches to energy security. Any strategy dependent on a single external supplier ultimately becomes vulnerable to disruptions beyond its control, regardless of their origin. The current crisis has also revealed significant differences in how well prepared the region’s governments are to protect their domestic fuel markets. Kyrgyzstan has proved the most vulnerable. The country consumes around 1.6 million metric tons of fuel annually, with 90-95% of supplies imported from Russia. Faced with a sharp reduction in available supplies during May and June 2026, the Kyrgyz authorities were forced to begin urgent negotiations with alternative suppliers, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. Uzbekistan has been in a somewhat stronger position. Until recently, Russian companies dominated the country’s imported gasoline market. During the first five months of 2026, Uzbekistan spent more than $1 billion on imports of crude oil and petroleum products, while spending on motor gasoline imports increased by 85.1% compared with the same period a year earlier. Tashkent has responded by prioritizing strategic fuel reserves. Ahead of the coming autumn and winter season, the government has begun building a 120,000-metric-ton reserve of motor gasoline. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, enjoys a considerably higher degree of energy self-sufficiency thanks to its developed refining sector, centered on the modernized refineries in Atyrau, Pavlodar, and Shymkent. It is therefore unsurprising that Bishkek turned first to Astana when seeking emergency fuel supplies. Kazakhstan’s potential to serve as a regional supplier nevertheless has clear limits. The country’s domestic fuel market periodically comes under structural pressure during the spring and autumn agricultural seasons and when planned maintenance is carried out at its refineries. As a result, Astana must balance support for its regional partners with maintaining stability at home. Although Kazakhstan annually agrees with Russia on duty-free import quotas of up to 1.12 million metric tons of Russian petroleum products under the indicative fuel balance mechanism, the current...

3 days ago

opinion

Kazakhstan’s Mineral Future Still Carries an Oil Risk Premium

In June, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev went to Brussels with a future-facing offer: Kazakhstan could become Europe’s non-Chinese option in critical minerals. Astana presented the country as a base for processing, long-term offtake, and industrial cooperation, rather than another source of ore. A month later, Kazakhstan’s older vulnerability reappeared. Drone attacks near the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal at Novorossiysk disrupted loadings and forced production cuts in Kazakhstan. By July 27, loading had resumed, with tankers receiving crude supplied by Tengizchevroil. The interruption was brief, but it exposed a structural problem. Kazakhstan’s future mineral offer still rests on an economy whose main export artery runs through Russia and the Black Sea. That is the central tension in Kazakhstan’s new resource diplomacy. Astana wants Europe to help build a future supply chain. Its present still depends on an oil corridor it does not fully control. Kazakhstan is asking Europe to make future demand bankable. A mineral deposit does not become part of a European supply chain when officials announce it in a joint statement. It needs geological confirmation, financing, processing technology, reliable power, water, logistics, and customers prepared to sign contracts years before the first shipment. This is why offtake sits at the heart of Tokayev’s proposal. Long-term purchase commitments can turn European concern over Chinese dominance into financeable projects. If Europe wants another source tomorrow, it must help fund extraction, processing, and internationally accepted standards today. Kazakhstan says it is ready to supply 21 of the 34 materials on the EU’s critical raw materials list. It also wants more of the value chain to remain at home. European capital and technology would support local processing, laboratories, skills, and higher-value production instead of simply moving raw materials abroad. Europe has good reason to listen. China dominates the processing of many minerals used in batteries, advanced manufacturing, digital infrastructure, and defence. European industry wants alternatives, but diversification cannot be improvised after a supply shock. Mines and processing plants take years to finance, permit, construct, and qualify. For Kazakhstan, the minerals offer is also an attempt to upgrade an older relationship. Western companies already know the country through Tengiz, Kashagan, and decades of oil investment. Astana now wants to move from extraction towards processing and a stronger position in industrial supply chains. But the old oil story still prices the new minerals story. The CPC episode showed why. The pipeline carries crude from Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak through Russian territory to Novorossiysk. It handles more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports and ties much of the country’s hard-currency income to a route outside Astana’s full control. A short halt was enough to cut output sharply at fields more than 1,500 kilometres away. Tokayev’s call in Omsk to freeze the war in Ukraine should be read partly in that context. It reflected more than the diplomatic caution expected from a neighbour of Russia. The war is now touching Kazakhstan’s export system through tanker security, insurance risk, production schedules, and investor confidence. Astana wants European finance for...

4 days ago

opinion

Uzbekistan’s Heritage Did Not Stop With the Silk Road

When people think of Uzbekistan’s architectural heritage, the images are familiar: the turquoise domes of Samarkand, the madrasas of Bukhara, Khiva’s walled city, and the monuments of Shakhrisabz. But Uzbekistan’s history did not stop with the Silk Road. At its 48th session in July, UNESCO inscribed “Tashkent Modernist Architecture. Modernity and Tradition in Central Asia” on the World Heritage List. The new site brings together ten buildings and urban complexes constructed between the 1960s and the early 1990s, during the period in which Tashkent was dramatically rebuilt following the 1966 earthquake. The inscription deserves to be celebrated. More importantly, it expands the definition of what Uzbek heritage can be. [caption id="attachment_52926" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Kosmonavtlar Metro Station, Tashkent; photo: Mathieu Lemoine[/caption] These buildings do not belong to the world of caravanserais and Timurid courts. They represent another layer of the country’s history: the ambitious and highly creative transformation of Soviet-era Tashkent. For decades, Central Asian heritage has often been viewed through a chronological hierarchy. The older a monument, the easier it is to recognize as heritage. Timurid architecture is obviously precious. A concrete building from the 1970s can appear more expendable. Tashkent shows why that distinction is too simple. UNESCO notes that the architecture developed after the earthquake combined industrialized construction and seismic engineering with local climatic, cultural and material conditions. The result was not simply Soviet modernism transplanted to Central Asia, but a distinct architectural language adapted to Tashkent. This broader understanding of heritage comes at an important moment. Uzbekistan is modernizing rapidly. Its cities are growing, tourism is expanding, infrastructure is improving and redevelopment is transforming urban space. Much of this change is necessary and welcome. Historic neighborhoods cannot be expected to function as open-air museums. Residents need reliable drinking water, sewage systems, heating, electricity, internet access, waste collection, accessibility, safe streets and comfortable housing. A leaking pipe is not “authenticity.” The more difficult question is how modernization takes place. [caption id="attachment_52925" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Tashkent Modernist State Museum of History; photo: Mathieu Lemoine[/caption] Uzbekistan has already experienced how delicate that balance can be. In Shakhrisabz, large-scale redevelopment substantially altered the historic urban fabric. The historic center was placed on UNESCO’s List of World Heritage in Danger in 2016 and remains there today. The experience offers an important lesson: preserving monuments is not necessarily the same as preserving a city. A city can retain its most famous madrasa, mosque or mausoleum while losing part of its heritage if the streets, neighborhoods, businesses and communities surrounding them disappear. The pressure is not only architectural. As tourism grows and historic centers become more desirable, economic incentives change. Houses can become hotels and restaurants. Businesses serving residents can give way to businesses serving visitors. Traditional workshops can struggle with higher costs. Redevelopment can create pressure on residents to relocate. Bukhara illustrates why this is important. Its identity rests not only on monumental architecture but on a living economy of craftsmanship. Gold embroidery, ceramics, jewelry, woodwork and other trades remain sources of employment as well as cultural identity....

5 days ago

1 2 3 … 275 Next