Our People > Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Senior Editor and Contributor

Robert M. Cutler has written and consulted on Central Asian affairs for over 30 years at all levels. He was a founding member of the Central Eurasian Studies Society’s executive board and founding editor of its Perspectives publication. He has written for Asia Times, Foreign Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Euractiv, Radio Free Europe, National Post (Toronto), FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, and many other outlets.

He directs the NATO Association of Canada’s Energy Security Program, where he is also senior fellow, and is a practitioner member at the University of Waterloo’s Institute for Complexity and Innovation. Educated at MIT, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), and the University of Michigan, he was for many years a senior researcher at Carleton University’s Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, and is past chairman of the Montreal Press Club’s Board of Directors.

Articles

critical raw materials

U.S. Backs Private Bid for Kazakhstan’s Tungsten

The United States is facilitating a private American bid by Cove Kaz Capital Group LLC for Kazakhstan’s Upper Kairakty and North Katpar tungsten deposits, in competition with state-backed Chinese bidders. Tungsten is not a rare earth element, but it is a critical raw material. In particular, it underpins armor-piercing ammunition, penetrators, and high-temperature tooling used across aerospace and industrial manufacturing. Reporting indicates direct engagement by senior U.S. officials and active coordination with Kazakhstan’s sovereign-wealth ecosystem. The metal’s significance elevates the commercial negotiation into a strategic policy. The policy driver is diversification away from China’s dominance along the mine-to-powder supply chains. China accounts for well over four-fifths of global tungsten production and processing, and tightened export controls in 2025 have upset pricing and availability. The U.S. has established a procurement deadline of 2027 to avoid sourcing from China or Russia for covered defense uses. All this adds urgency to securing non-Chinese volumes. Kazakhstan’s revived tungsten sector includes a newly opened processing plant, with destinations not yet announced for the concentrate to be produced. The country thus offers a practical non-Chinese source of tungsten. Strategic Stakes and Principal Actors The American role would be one of facilitation and financing, rather than ownership. The administration has supported talks linking Cove Kaz to Kazakhstan’s Samruk-Kazyna and relevant mining entities. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick is mentioned as a key interlocutor. Potential financial tools include the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank. Insurance (EXIM), guarantees, or direct loans from these institutions would offset pricing and risk advantages historically offered by Chinese bidders. The U.S. government’s approach is to enable a private operator to compete without placing federal equity as an asset. Kazakhstan’s Samruk-Kazyna and its mining arm Tau-Ken Samruk coordinate with the national exploration company Qazgeology. Kazakhstan has pursued a wider critical-minerals investment agenda, signaling its openness to joint ventures and privatization pathways under a special legal regime that provides a familiar legal and compliance framework for Western partners. That structure streamlines licensing and dispute resolution and has already been used for joint ventures in other critical minerals projects. China remains the current market leader, dominating tungsten mining, ammonium paratungstate (APT) conversion, and downstream powders and carbides. Beijing’s 2025 export controls cover tungsten, tightening an already narrow global market and raising the policy value of non-Chinese options. Reports of Chinese interest in Vietnam’s Nui Phao tungsten complex underscore that non-Chinese sources face active competition, framing Kazakhstan’s appeal to Western buyers. The Assets and Kazakhstan’s Capacity Rebuild Kazakhstan suspended tungsten production after the 1990s but has moved over the past several years to re-establish a mine-to-processing base, with corporate and ministerial communications emphasizing the strategic nature of these deposits for long-term development. Upper Kairakty (also rendered as Verkhneye or Upper Kayrakty) and North Katpar sit in the Karaganda Region and feature repeatedly in Samruk-linked materials as the top tungsten prospects. Upper Kairakty is by itself the world’s largest tungsten deposit, and represents over two-thirds of the total tungsten reserves across the ex-Soviet territories. One...

6 months ago

Railways

Central Asia’s Rail Corridors: U.S. and Chinese Partnerships in Perspective

Kazakhstan’s railways are modernizing with a U.S. supplier, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are advancing a new trans‑mountain link with China. On September 22, 2025, Wabtec and KTZ announced a multi‑year locomotive and services package worth about $4.2 billion, described by the company as its “largest” agreement. In parallel, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan formalized a joint company to build the long-planned CKU railway, with China holding a 51% stake. Central Asia’s rail networks are thus being reshaped by two major partnerships - one with the United States and one with China. Rather than a zero-sum rivalry, these projects show how regional governments are pursuing different infrastructure strategies to expand connectivity. Kazakhstan and Wabtec: Modernizing an Existing Network In September 2025, Kazakhstan’s railway operator KTZ signed a $4.2 billion agreement with U.S.-based Wabtec for 300 Evolution Series ES44ACi locomotives. The diesel-electric engines are tailored for Kazakhstan’s 1,520 mm gauge network and harsh climate, replacing aging Soviet-era stock. Wabtec finalized full ownership of the Astana locomotive plant in late 2023; production and services for 1,520-mm stock are now fully under Wabtec’s Kazakhstan subsidiary. Local manufacturing and long-term service contracts are expected to expand domestic engineering capacity. The locomotives’ digital diagnostic systems should improve fuel efficiency and maintenance intervals. According to the official Wabtec press release, the agreement “strengthens KTZ’s role as a critical and reliable hub for the Middle Corridor,” while KTZ CEO Talgat Aldybergenov said it “confirms our commitment to advanced technologies in the transport sector”. Rail accounts for about 64% of Kazakhstan’s freight turnover (2024), so locomotive performance directly affects Middle Corridor throughput. Financing details have not been disclosed, but the purchase appears to be domestically funded through KTZ and state support. For Astana, the order fits its multi-vector foreign-policy approach: Kazakhstan continues its partnerships with France’s Alstom, China’s CRRC, and Russia, maintaining balance across suppliers. While the locomotives are diesel, Kazakhstan is also electrifying key lines with European partners. Diesels provide an immediate boost without new catenary investment, and Wabtec claims lower emissions than previous models. Over time, expanded electrification could complement this upgrade. Overall, the Wabtec partnership represents incremental modernization. This is an interoperability-based approach that strengthens existing routes rather than building new corridors from scratch. [caption id="attachment_37655" align="aligncenter" width="950"] Image: trains.com - One of Kazakhstan’s modern Evolution Series diesel locomotives (model TE33A) produced through a partnership with U.S. firm Wabtec. Kazakhstan’s railways carry about 64% of the country’s freight, making such upgrades crucial for trade connectivity.[/caption] The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) Railway: Building a New Corridor After nearly three decades of discussion, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan launched construction of the CKU railway in late 2024. The 523 km line will run from Kashgar (Xinjiang) through the Kyrgyz mountain ranges to Andijan, Uzbekistan. It will provide a second direct China–Central Asia connection, bypassing reliance on Kazakhstan’s network. The CKU is designed with dual gauges: standard (1,435 mm) in China and broad (1,520 mm) in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, with a dry-port transshipment hub in Makmal, Kyrgyzstan. This compromise allows integration with existing Central...

6 months ago

Rare Earth Elements

Kazakhstan’s Emerging Role in Global Rare-Earth Supply Chains

October 10 was one of the most consequential days for global trade policy and one of the most volatile for world markets since the U.S.–China tariff conflict first reignited. After China announced tighter export controls on rare earths, U.S. President Donald J. Trump first posted on Truth Social that “there seems to be no reason” anymore for him to meet with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in two weeks' time. Several hours later, the official White House account on X posted a message from Trump that he had learned that "effective November 1st, 2025, [China will] impose large-scale Export Controls [sic] on virtually every product they make, and some not even made by them." He then followed with the declaration that the U.S. will impose a 100% tariff on Chinese imports starting November 1, "or sooner," and launch export controls on critical software. As Washington and Beijing escalate their economic confrontation, the scramble for stable rare-earth supply chains has broadened beyond East Asia. Attention is shifting to Central Asia, where mineral potential and trade corridors align with the broader effort to reduce dependence on China. Kazakhstan has drawn particular attention, not as a single solution, but as a state seeking to leverage its Soviet-era industrial base and access to the Caspian to help meet emerging supply chain needs. Although Kazakhstan has made the most progress in translating its mineral reserves into a functioning mining industry, it remains part of a broader regional effort to diversify away from a single external partner, most notably China. Other Central Asian states are testing their own capabilities to meet global supply chain demands, though most remain constrained by infrastructure, financing, or lack of processing capability. Kazakhstan’s Position in the Emerging Supply Realignment On reserves, Kazakhstan’s rare-earth potential is rooted as much in continuity as it is in discovery. Decades of geological mapping under Soviet administration established its mineral profile, and recent joint surveys by Kazgeology and private firms have both confirmed and expanded those earlier findings. New delineated deposits in the east and center of the country, including the Zhana Kazakhstan site in Karagandy, have reinforced its status as a prospective non-Chinese source of critical materials, with verified concentrations of neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium, and samarium. If current resource estimates are validated, the Zhana Kazakhstan deposit could rank among the largest rare-earth reserves in the world. These elements are essential inputs for high-efficiency magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, and advanced defense systems. The U.S. Department of Defense classifies these rare earths as “critical defense materials,” a designation that underscores their strategic relevance rather than any immediate shift in supply. Both the Pentagon and the Defense Logistics Agency have begun increasing stockpiles and exploring alternative processing sources, but for now, the question in Kazakhstan is not geological endowment, which is established, but the terms under which that endowment can be brought to market. On processing capacity, Kazakhstan’s experience in large-scale mining of uranium, copper, and other critical minerals has...

6 months ago

United Nations

Kazakhstan Recasts Its Foreign Policy at the United Nations

Several days ago I argued here that Kazakhstan’s diplomacy had begun to try to move from survival-mode balancing into a more entrepreneurial phase, testing its accumulated diplomatic capital on the world stage. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s September 24, 2025, speech to the United Nations General Assembly confirms this. It was a statement of intent, marking a departure from decades of careful multivectorism toward a doctrine of initiative and responsibility. The speech sought to anchor a claim that Kazakhstan is not only balancing among vectors but weaving them into a systemic position of leverage to support active participation in the agenda-setting of global affairs. The multivector line, crafted under Nazarbayev, kept Moscow, Beijing, and Western capitals equidistant during a period when Kazakhstan’s priority was survival and gradual integration. The price of that prudence was that the distinct voice that Astana was trying to cultivate could not be heard. The country appeared more like a venue for great-power competition rather than an autonomous actor in favor of its own interests. On the UNGA stage, Tokayev did not abandon the old formula outright. Instead, he pressed it into service as a platform for what he called “bridge building,” but which looks in practice like a bid to shape the rules of the international order, instead of merely accommodating them. Railways, Corridors, and Diplomacy in Motion Tokayev declared to the Assembly: “Kazakhstan today carries eighty percent of all overland freight between Asia and Europe. By 2029, we will build five thousand kilometers of new railway to strengthen the Middle Corridor.” These words accompanied the announcement, only a few days before, of a multibillion-dollar deal with the American company Wabtec for the purchase of three hundred locomotives over ten years. Timed with his UN appearance itself, the announcement highlighted Tokayev's view of infrastructure as diplomacy. In systems terms, railways are not discrete projects but nodes in a meso-level build-out capable of reconfiguring macro-level flows. By embedding a commercial contract into the theater of UNGA, Tokayev gave it a transformational headline. The “Middle Corridor” now functions in two registers. In one, it is freight tonnage, Caspian ferry capacity, Azerbaijan–Georgia transit. In the other, it is a political instrument. Only weeks before UNGA, Astana hosted talks that facilitated the U.S.-backed Armenia–Azerbaijan declaration. By enabling that dialogue, Kazakhstan projected itself into the South Caucasus as an intermediary claiming credibility with both sides. Hosting the South Caucasus dialogue projected Astana's view of itself as a systems-level creator of interdependence at the infrastructural level. From there, the loop feeds back to the structuration of political behavior. Economically, Kazakhstan remains the only Central Asian state with diversified sources of foreign direct investment (FDI). The Netherlands and the United States together still outpace China and Russia in cumulative FDI. Uzbekistan, despite rising visibility, remains structurally dependent on its two large neighbors. By contrast, Astana uses diversification to demonstrate optionality. The locomotive deal is one example; the C5+1 dialogues with Washington are yet another. Reforming the Global Order Tokayev spoke about a “crisis of...

7 months ago

UN General Assembly

Tokayev at the UN Underscores Kazakhstan’s New Diplomacy

Kazakhstan’s international visibility is reaching a peak this late summer and early autumn of 2025. In August, UN Secretary-General António Guterres visited Astana, praising the country’s role as a stabilizing influence in Central Asia and a supporter of multilateral institutions. In a few days, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev will address the UN General Assembly in New York, presenting Kazakhstan as a reliable partner in peacekeeping, sustainable development, and nonproliferation. This upcoming UN speech marks a departure from past appearances, signaling Astana’s intent not only to balance powers but also to set global agendas. Together, these events signify the country’s ascent as a state no longer defined solely by the art of survival between great powers, but one that now seeks to set agendas, convene adversaries, and project norms beyond its borders. This dual UN moment illustrates the broader transformation of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy over the past year: the shift from multi-vector balancing, an inheritance of the Nazarbayev era, toward a more assertive mode of multi-actor entrepreneurship. Framed through the UN stage, Kazakhstan’s diplomacy now aspires to translate regional initiatives into a global narrative. Rather than oscillating between Moscow, Beijing, Brussels, and Washington, Astana has begun to use its accumulated diplomatic capital to initiate, mediate, and institutionalize regional and global frameworks. From Balance to Initiative For three decades after independence, Kazakhstan’s “multi-vector” foreign policy served as a model of survival in a region shaped by the clash of external rivalries. The doctrine emphasized equidistance between Russia, China, and the West, with an overlay of pragmatic economic engagement. In practice, this often meant leveraging one relationship to offset pressure from another while securing steady inflows of trade and investment. Today, however, the war in Ukraine, the erosion of European security, and the sharper contest between Beijing and Washington have undermined the viability of simple balancing. In response, Tokayev’s government has shifted its approach, seeking to overlay a more agenda-setting dynamic on multi-vectorism by positioning Kazakhstan as a regional hub for diplomacy and connectivity. At the UN, this shift might be presented as Kazakhstan’s evolution from passive survival to a more proactive approach to international diplomacy. Astana’s task is to transform such declarations into a durable strategy. Central Asia and the South Caucasus The clearest evidence of Kazakhstan’s new role comes from Central Asia itself. Relations with Uzbekistan, once characterized by rivalry, have been recast as a cornerstone of functional regionalism. Over the past twelve months, Astana and Tashkent have concluded demarcation agreements, expanded electricity grid interconnections, and coordinated positions on water resource management. The consultative meetings of Central Asian leaders, which Kazakhstan has championed, now serve as regularized platforms for joint initiatives, from infrastructure to practical economic integration, with attempts to reduce Russian and Chinese influence. At the UN, this shift may be framed as Kazakhstan’s evolution from mere survival to actively pioneering new approaches in international diplomacy. For Kazakhstan, the partnership with Uzbekistan provides buffering against external pressure and multiplies regional influence. Astana has also made use of the UN Regional Centre...

7 months ago